IR 05000483/1990009
| ML20043F469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1990 |
| From: | Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043F468 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-90-09, 50-483-90-9, NUDOCS 9006150042 | |
| Download: ML20043F469 (19) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, ., . . . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION.III ~
, Report-No. 50-483/90009 Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 " Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant Inspection At: -Callaway Site, Steedman, Missouri , Inspection Conducted: May 29 through June 1, 1990 Inspector: h. SM Le /t, ///o _ T..Ploski / Date " Team Leader , Accompanying Inspectors: B. Bartlett C. Brown ' T. Gody, Jr.
J. Hawkinson T. Lonergan Approved By: l/). $,s 8 Zw //, />>0 ! W. Snell, C11ef Date ' l Radiological Controls and Emergency Preparedness Section - Inspection Sungnary Inspection on May 29 - June 1, 1990 (Report No. 50-483/90009(DRSS)) hreas-Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the annual emergency preparedness exercise (IP 82301, IP 82302), involving observations by six NRC representatives of certain key functions and locations.
Licensee action on previously identified items (IP 92701), records of actual emergency plan activations (IP 92700), and records of 1989 audits and surveillances of the emergency preparedness program (IP 82701) were also reviewed.
Results: The licensee's overall exercise performance was good.
However, one Opdn Item was identified regarding the need to upgrade provisions for verifying the onsite locations of persons initially presumed to be missing during the accountability process.
Improvements were also recommended for 9006130042 900611 PDR ADOCK 05000483 O PDC _
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j a a , Q .! the: posting and/or verbaldissemination of information.in the Technical- % ' Support-Center and Operational Support.-Center.
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, y , _ LThe.1989: Quality. Assurance a'udits and surveillances of the program were
~ ' . , (thorough and.well-documented.- Records of the. only. actual emergency plan < " Jactivation since AprilE1988 were properly 1 evaluated by the licensee;- the - i V _1:: emergency'was properly classified; and required offsite notifications were -
Ltimely cCorrective ' actions on several: concerns identified by emergency i
-
- planning l and Quality,Assdrance staffs were appropriate..
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, .,3 ~ y . [Q:lig% ',7 ' I ~ ' ,. .. Q + y n- _" DETAILS Ti ' , - kg., ' ' > , .1.- Persons Contacted r , , E
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fNRC~ObserversLand Areas Observed ',t ~ v
. .. . . . . , i"t T. Ploski, Control' Room -Simulator (CRS), Operational Suppbrt, Center, l (OSC),lTechnical-Support Center (TSC),-and Emergency Operations -! ' ' Facility (EOF) ~ . , , ,
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.B. Bartlett,-CRS, OSC, inplant' teams ' < <<
- C. Brown,'CRS, TSC
' as .~N, J..Ha~wkinson, CRS,~0SC, TSC,~E0F 9w
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,A.'Gody, TSC- . , ~
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- ~t ".1 T.'Lonergan, OSC, inplant. team 3 Nl .m..,
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- Licensee, Personnel E
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y e pc i /,3 J Randolp.h, General ManagerA'. PassWhter, Manager, Nuclear Operation "l G .
.. l b.M ' v 'J. Slaux,ir,4 Manager,- Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness
- Manager,. Quality AssuranceJ
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Still ' ' x h it , W* J.' Peevy ' Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance . , ' - e
M." Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work control-f y',
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, b ^ / w? s..Gl'Hil1, Training Supervisor ' ' . f a JI 'R9 Mertz,' Security Supervisor u ,., , o
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- A. White, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
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F ', 2* S. Petzel, Quality Assurance Engineer
4 G. Hughes, Supervisor, Technical Support Engineering
' . m j P. Sudnak, Administrator, Nuclear Affairs G =* M.'Cleary, Supervisor,' Nuclear Information ' - ' , .
- Jl'Dampf, Emergency Response Coordinator f
- F. Eggers, Supervising Engineer 4 w;
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- J. Gearhart, Superintendent l
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- M. Faulkner, Administrator,; Nuclear Affairs
.l ' . , E, ?*S. Crawford, Admin /;strator,-Nuclear Affairs , ', Nu k
- M. Buel, Quality Assurance Engineer
. ' ' " y ; .. 3The licensee representatives listed above, and ~approxinately 10 others, ' .* . .\\ . , attended'the'May 31 exit' interview.
Those denoted by an (*) asterisk also- , attended the' June 1, 1990 exit interview which addressed program audits ' ' ~ and actual emergency plan activations ' , T2; ~ Licen'see Action-on Previously - Identified Items (IP 92701) L, g, , - ~ 1(Closed) Open Item No. 50-483/89013-01: -Ouring the 1989 emergency , preparedness exercise, simulated exposures of inplant teams were , recorded and tracked at the Health-Physics Access Control (HPAC) ~ E 5.. " portion of the Operational Support Center (OSC).
However, they were not tracked at the Service Building's OSC from which these teams were
.- formed and dispatched, regardless of whether they were required to i report to the HPAC.
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,- m - - x 3,, 2y ' L.f j , ,L ' ,e h4 Emerg6ncy Implementing Procedure (EIP) -ZZ-00220, " Emergency Team L ~ Formation", was revised in April 1990 to' include provisions for issuingt , , dosimetry to all teams being dispatched from the Service Building's OSC C ' ' o and for recording the teams' exposures upon their. return to that location, - b(
, regardless of whether the teams would be required to pass.through the.
HPAC portion of.the OSC.
A computer terminal has been installed in the , fService:Buil. ding'0SC to facilitate the entering of updated exposure e .. inform'ation-on~ the Individual Dose Tracking System (IDTS) that is maintained by HPAC staff.
Records review indicated that the current.
,( revision of EIP-ZZ-00220 was utilized during the 1990 exercise.
However, , updating of the IDTS from thesService Building OSC was not observed since
.". , f, -teams' dispatched during the exercise received no simulated exposures.
~' P This item is' closed.
t,. . ' ! I - 3.
Emergency Plan Activations (IP 92700) ~ , ' ' During'the period' April 1989 through May 1990, the licensee activated the '
- emergency plan-on one occasion.
On May 18, 1989, an Unusual Event was < correctly declared following an unintended injection of coolant into the , , .. reactor vessel through-a safety injection system. _The records of this 'c
- plan activation were compiled and evaluated by emergency planning staff.
" ' e' , e These records clearly indicated that State, county, and NRC officials ' ' H ereliniti'lly notified of the Unusual Event declaration in a timely a <
. manner.- The111censee's evaluation correctly concluded, however, that '- + ., , .the onshift. communicator had not accurately followed procedural guidance ,s , sinceithe commun,icator had called the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer + - , ' prior to' contacting State and local officials.
, ., II * sRecords Ef the<1989 QualityLAssurance (QA) Audit No. AP89-008 of the
fm . emergency: preparedness program indicated that a remedial training i ! t"" ' package.had1been' issued to onshift personnel to emphasize the regulatory
' requirement to' initially notify State-and county of ficials of any J 'y emergency pian activation prior to contacting the NRC.
This audit also ~ included a good recommendation, which has beenl accepted-by the emergency
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,pla'nning staff, that copies of the staff's evaluations of future
o emergency plan activations must be forwarded to licensing staff who, in <uturn, can. forward these evaluations to the Onsite Review Committee for "further action.
i Based on the above' findings, this portion of the licensee's program is- . acceptable.
4.
. General (IP 82301) ! The annual exercise of the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant's Radiological ' . Emergency Response Plan (RERP) was conducted on May 30, 1990, testing the 'c
- licensee's response to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a simulated, minor radioactive release to the environment.
Although this ' daytime exercise required only the participation of-the licensee's emergency response organization, State and county-organizations voluntarily. participated by accepting notifications, and by providing an ambulance.to transport a simulated contaminated, injured worker to a local hospital.
The scenario narrative summary and exercise objectives j ' are attachments to this inspection report.
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General Observations (IP 82301) T La.
, Procedures.
The exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 5'0, ' v a' Appendix E requirements using the Callaway:RERP and related . "4 i . implementing procedures.
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Cooraination'- ,$ ,
. The licensee's response was coordinated,corderly, and-timely.
Had '"
y scenario events been real, the actions taken by the licensee's , ' emergency responders would have been sufficient to allo'w. State and ' o, local officials.to take appropriate actions to protect public health'.
' y and safety.
4. c.- Observers .
m , 4 ; Licensee observers monitored and evaluated this exercise.along with! -.i
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'"# t 'six NRC observers.
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' <Thellicensee conducted critiques immediately following the -exercise ?[ aiid on the following morning.
The licensee sum'marized the majorL . f ' ' , f.'f 4, strengths.and areas ofl concern that were identified by its
's s'" i 7. controllers on May 31, 1990, prior to the NRC inspectors' exit
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, ' " interview.
The licensee's findings were in good agreement;with the: F y, E.
E cinspe'ctors' evaluations.
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Sp5cific10bservations (IP 82301) ' '
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, ' < .re n, .a .r ,^ < , , j? d' a.U NControl Room Simulator (CRS)
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s ' ?.Operatorsproperlyperformedpanelreviewsatthebeginningofthe L > , . l exercise. When a bomb'. threat was received regarding "B-train"
,., '3.,,, ' equipment,;a prudent decision was made to expedite repairs to any i . f,' !
' "A-train". components.that were out of service.
The: Shift Supervisor - ' y-(SS) did a good job of communicating with:the oncall duty officer J ' ,l 1, and the security shift supervisoi-regarding the' security force's.
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, 4^? t (, . responses to the bomb threat and his plan to declare an- . - ' Unusual Event once the relevant Emergency Action Level (EAL's) criteria had been met.
The Unusual Event was correctly classified at 7:50 a.m.
Initial.
notifications to State, county, and NRC officials were completed per ye
procedures and within the regulatory-time limits.
However, the same ' prescripted notification form utilized to notify State and county' . officials was also used to inform the NRC Headquarters Operations O ,0fficer (H00) of the bomb threat.
No copy of the NRC's Event ' Notification Worksheet was visible as a reference in the CRS to
better ensure that licensee communicators were aware of the NRC initial information needs.
Between the Unusual Event declaration y.
.and exercise termination, no communications were made from the CRS or another facility with the H00 or with simulated NRC officials.
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. .. ^. ' After further consideration of the potential consequences of the ,~ security threat, the SS declared an Alert at 8:10 a.m < in order to .. have a precautionary activation of the onsite Emergency Response , L,1 Organization (ERO).
State and county officials were initially.
' notified in a timely manner; however, the notification message < indicated that the Alert was being declared for " attempted sabotage", which was the same reason that had been given less than 30 minutes earlier for the-Unusual Event declaration.
Had events - , ! been real, offsite officials may have been confused as a result of "7 being given the same explanation for two emergency. declarations, N 1.'s ' l - ' '- ' with,only the Alert declaration warranting some activation of their ., ,t ER0s.
The plant Public Address (PA) system was utilized to informt ' , onsite personnel of both emergency declarations and any required - u s
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' onsite' response actions.
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. p+ fI- ?Tt[eCRSsoonreceivedareportofasimulatedContaminatedInjured , P &
l'> C ( ). Man,(CIM) situation in the auxiliary building, with an indication of' ' , increased radiation levels in a portion of.that building..The !
- y J a, - s [e' Medical, Emergency Response Team (MERT) was activate
.* ' s x J] minutes / A prudent PA announcement was made to restrict access to ' 'the affected portion of the auxiliary building.
As,ClM response
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s, , ~, , '}. actiohs c6ntinued, the SS'kept the Operating Supervisor adequately i ,1 , % ' ' . , t . updat e'd.- m ., + ! , , , , ~d n p _ , J_ N % _ As the1 exercise progressed, the SS demonstrated good command and " ' ! control in the CRS.
The CRS crew quickly reorganized changes to < - i;, " , l 3*. annunciators and other readouts.
For example, they promptly realized ' i '( sthat-the reactor had not automatically tripped after the turbine . $' , . j - i 'E - trip.
The manual reactor trip procedure was then accomplished.
The , , , crew also demonstrated good adherence to the Emergency Operating s , Procedure (EOP) for a reactor coolant system break.outside of'
, containment.
They demonstrated good judgement by utilizing the (
,
steam generators to better accomplish forced.cooldown in view of the . , availability of only one train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) , system, s ' Based on the above findings,'this portion of the licensee's program.
.! , is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for { r improvement: ' , . . mi
- Initial notification. messages to State and county officials q ' te should cicarly. indicate the reason for any emergency declaration.
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l Communicators who are speaking with NRC Operations Officers , , . and Regional Outy Officers could better anticipate the NRC's ' initial information'needs.if they had a-copy of the NRC's . Event Notification dorksheet available as a reference.
j ~b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) ' j Soine administrative and dose acsessment staff arrived in the TSC l soon after a PA announcement was erroneously made to activate the ' ,
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I , facility following the Unusual Event declaration.
The announcement' .-
,,4,, was promptly corrected by CRS staff.
Controllers prohibited further
a activation of the TSC until a correct PA announcement was broadcast ' ^ ~ ' + after,the Alert declaration.
The TSC was fully operationalLwell
-,,7S 'within"an hour of the Alert declaration, and af ter the Emergency
,, l' Coordinator (EC) had been briefed by the SS in the CRS.
Communica- ' - ' ' tions/were quickly established with.the CRS and the Operational l ' ,
Support Center (050).
TSC access control and habitability t " '*w %- . K 'J monitoring provisions-were adequately maintained.
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sf: The Health Physics Coordinator (HPC) and the EC provided good "E .- initia lbriefings to the TSC staff.
The EC conducted briefings =F " ' at'a!20 to 30 minute. frequency thereafter. The quality of these . c q *7.$ r ' '
briefings deteriorated during the middle portion of the exercise.
Q.~ ~ > - , y; y Various TSC staff gave the EC information updates between - ga briefings.
The EC would then try to summarize these inputs, during . L his update briefings.
The potential existed, therefore, that not all' key staf f who needed to know a certain piece of information " L ' " from a co-worker were made aware of that information in a timely manner.
Later in the exercise, the EC announced which emergency > - e responsibilities had been transferred to the Emergency Operations - Facility's (EOF's) Recovety' Manager (RM).
However, he did not . <,
state which emergency resporsibilities,. including, event . [i <, * , a classification and-emergency worker exposure authorization, he had chosen to retain, nor did he state whether he-or the RM was in overall command of the licensee's response efforts once the ' EOF was declared fully operational.
.H ' ' , . ,l ' Reactor parameter and dose assessment status boards were readily visible and kept current in the TSC.
In contrast, chronology of events information was relatively sketchy and was posted on flip , charts located in the rear of the main workspace where they were j much less conspicuous.
No status board was used to display , information on inplant team assignments, the teams' status of i i dispatch from or return to the OSC, and the teams' results.
Such . , 4, information wasisought with great interest by'various key TSC staff
at various times.
Responses to inquires regarding.inplant teams' c . y3 activities were generally one-on one verbal communications, with , _ inconsistent attempts to ensure that all personnel who could benefit j , 'from knowing the-information became aware of the information ' , - simultaneously.
! $ The.HPC and Technical Assessment Coordinator (TAC) closely monitored A the EALs to better ensure timely emergency reclassification.
The.
j , LY EC correctly declared a Site Area Emergency at 9:55 a.m. due to a t ' loss of coolant accident greater than available charging capacity.
e' , ' ' State'and county officials were initially informed of this - reclassification in an adequately detailed and timely manner.
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~ Periodic update messages were transmitted at appropriate intervals.
! Onsite personnel.were informed by PA announcement of the Site Area , Emergency declaration and its cause, but were instructed to remain ! at their workstations pending further notification.
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. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - ,s, 'n ,, ,. !, - . . e y' [ announcement was finally made almost 15 minutes after the p reclassification announcement, which instructed them to report , to predesignated onsite assembly areas so that they could be ., 7' - accounted for.
At the exit interview, the licensee :ndicated .
L .that the delay in initiating assembly and accountability was k, '. largely due to the need to deploy guards and health physics (> .h technicians'to the onsite assembly areas. While such actions + .
, [\\ were prudent, = they were not completed very promptly.
g.
The;orfsite accountability demonst' ration involved almost 550'
' , personnel., Roughly 30 minutes af ter the assembly siren had sounded, t > j t , ' / the Security Coordinator (SC) informed the EC that accountability - ., Y had been completed,'with 16 persons identified as. missing.
All 16 a '
" >- were gradually located onsite within another 40' minutes. ' ' >- . , , C ' t . ,m . Some " missing persons" were determined to be CR. staff who had been .
outside.the CR when that location's accountability roll call had t k .C been taken.l Others were members of inplant teams that had already ' - . i
- been dispatched from.the OSC.
Several were exercise observers.
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- One was' an onsite surveyor.
Several persons who had. initially been p' ' ' - F^ reported'as missing had actually been accounted for, but.were ! t-erroneously considered to be missing due to human error during the e i ,. security badge checking process in the Main Access Facility (MAF).
Although,the initial accountability determination was completed in , v l approximately 30 minutes, the efforts made to locate the 16 (presumablymissingpersonswereinefficientandnotproactive.
The !- need to upgrade provisions to verify,.in a timely manner, whether i persons initially considered as missing are actually within the < Protected Area and in need of assistance is an Open Item
M. p (50-483/90009-01).- p' ' The licensee':; methodology to determine accountability is largely a , . manual process.
Persons are instructed to report to the assembly area indicated on their badge.
A roster of personnel preassigned to '< each_ assembly area is maintained at that location.
Security personnel ' manually use the rosters to determine which persons have reported to ' their assigned assembly, area, with no assurance that all personnel on an assembly area's roster are onsite at any given time, or whether
L some persons may have gone to a closer assembly area instead of their " predesignated location.
, The rosters are then forwarded to the MAF where discrepancies abetween persons assigned to each assembly area and the persons who 'actually reported to each area are resolved. This process consumed . roughly 30 minutes during the exercise, and has a number of steps . where human error or inefficiency may be introduced.
. , Once the 16 persons had-been initially determined to be missing, the-plant's Gaitronics system was utilized in attempts to contact these persons. individually, with little explanation as to why they were being paged.
Phone calls were also made to their normal .
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- workstations.
A repeat' sounding of the assembly, siren and/or a '
second plant-wide announcement, either before or af ter the 30 minute i ' time. limit for achieving accountability, was not'made-to better .
inform onsite personnel of.the need to promptly report to an
. assembly area.
Although members of-inplant teams'were readily. ' , identifiable at the OSC Coordinator's workstation, no attempt was t
r + made to contact the OSC to determine whether some " missing persons"*f
' n , , , were_ actually members of inplant teams performing their assigments, ' i The'.TechnicalAssessmentCoordinator(TAC)andhisstaff.generaily_
~ , s performed their duties effectively.
For example, they formulated t j ' ., worst case" damage scenarios based on information provided by ,' i ' - '. security personnel regarding what locations the saboteur could have ,, ' i ' visited.
However, little preplanning was done for the possibility that.
'
.; - a device could have exploded while.being removed from the Protected
<, Area.C . , ' N1thoughadequatecommunicationsweremaintainedwiththeCRS,' ' q , n technical support staff did not closely track which procedures' - i, steps were being implemented by CRS staff in order to maintain a *+ i .- ,
better, understanding of the operators' responses to changing plant ' conditions.
Better awareness of operators' procedure usage may have,' ' n , , , led to earlier focusing on the location of the leak in the RHR_ c , , N_f ' "' f O system., Technical staff did, however, demonstrate proper concern for the inplant team's safety once the simulated adverse working-environment was' understood in a location where the leak could be
a ,
t ' ., " isolated.
' The TSC's dose assessment staff demonstrated good internal ') "
J'~- coordination and interface with~the two offsite survey teams ' deployed during the exercise.
Current and forecast meteorological e information was routinely acquired and adequately monitored.
l ' [ In addition to the Open Item, the following items should bei 'l - considered for improvement: y3-During-periodicbriefings,theECshouldrequire'hiskeysi.aff
- ,~ ' to summarize their actions, findings, and concerns so that all key staff maintain good awareness of each others' activities.- q h?
The EC should not only inform his staff of what emergency.
responsibilities he has transferred to the RM, but he should- ' , also' state which responsibilities (if any) remain primarily ' ' his, and whether he or the RM has overall command of response-efforts.
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A TSC status-board should be utilized to display current
- information on.inplant team assignments, status, and results.-
Technical support staff should maintain an understanding of l " ' which procedure steps are being implemented by Control Room ',
operators.
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my - - - < ,,.. , ,, s. . , ,y , ' ' Q '; m ; y ,. , , .. . .o , , -. , , ca Operational Support Center (OSC) i '_i-l, [.s - ..:. . . - - P l' g (/'A 4The'0SC consists of three adjacent rooms in the Service Build s D.the inplant Health' Physics Access Control (HPAC).
Both segments of.
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- 1 the OSC were fully operational within 30 minutes of the Alert-
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}l declaration.
Both had adequate provisions for tracking inplant team' tm y n ..ri membersliexposures, though no simulated exposures were received * r 1, & i durin pthis' accident scenario.
Teams dispatched from the Service ' '< . , . , , - i i F1 Bui.lding OSC were issued dosimetry, and were adequately briefed and' ' , laterfdebriefed on their assignments.
Those teams which required-5 i ,.
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access to controlled areas of the plant were routed through the HPAC /
', '. where.they were again well briefed and debriefed 'on their assigned 1-M ' - ' p*m - I tasks A Team briefings'and debriefings at both portions'of the OSC * .'were' adequately documented per procedures.
g (i, , , . .- - s K i The'05C Coordinator effectively managed his assistants and the ' t inplant teams.-:He and his assistants maintained an adequate overall , , oil - ' understanding of-changing plant conditions.
OSC technicians' .s , e g deployment and areas of expertise were effectively tracked using a _* "j status board.
Technicians awaiting assignment were occasionally ' , briefed on plant conditions, major response activities,- and -
decisions; These briefings supplemented plant:PA announcements.' " , Although a status board was available in the technicians' waiting (., room, it was.not utilized to post summary information from the.
, , briefings for the benefit of technicians whd might have been
' p , ,. deployed from the OSC when the briefings were made.
Habitability of the Service Building OSC was adequately maintained.. .A contamination control point was established.- Only one air sample! ." was collected in the OSC workspace during the exercist . The licensee .] L, indicated that a more suitable location for the air' sampler would be determined to reduce the adverse impact of the device's operation on^ s .' noise levels in the OSC.
. . 9~ 'The Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) was dispatched within ' , five minutes of the report.of CIM Situation in the auxiliary building.
The team demonstrated proper concern for the' victim's j medical injury versus his contaminated status.
Contamination j o i ' . control at the accident scene' was adequate, as was contamination > control during the victim's transfer out of the contaminated area.
Ambulance personnel were adequately informed of the victim's medical ~ ' condition'and the approximate extent of his simulated ' a s contamination.
A second health physics. technician was dispatched from the OSC to-the local hospital to assist the technician who accompanied the victim.
j , The fire brigade was promptly dispatched to the simulated fire at transformer C". 'The brigade arrived well equipped to battle the fire.
Plant security and operations personnel provided good onscene s, support.
Although onscene communications were good,'there was generally poor radio communications between personnel in the OSC ' and at the fire scene due to radio problems. Controllers had to ' .
provide participants with another radio to improve communications < . ~ n , s , ? ' I*. " , .
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7 .g,j The licensee ~self identified thi A problem and indicated l 't' m', capability.
q., ' m * ~ that it' would determine whether the root' cause of the problem was ). u (4$ primarily equipment related or more^a function of the locations
' . ,
-from which communications were originating.
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3, yy ,. OSCsupervisionsel'ectedvolhnteerstoperformanentryintothe.
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. ' ' ' north pipe penetration room to attempt to isolate the leak,in the , ,o RHR system.
They were given detailed briefings on their assignment.
' < t y and.on radiological hazards.
Proper concern was demonstrated for , P 3m. non-radiological hazards that the team might encounter.. The team ' f. >
procured.the tools needed to perform the assigned task.
The .. ~ ~ " o, initial attempt to isolate the leak was unsuccessful, as the team
L.,: had to withdraw from the work location due to simulated high ' Q temperature and dense steam conditions.
A later attempt was-
successful.
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' s &,; . Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program ' , "
E was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for > g ,,
improvement: '* .The blank; status board in the technicians' waiting room in the
D'
- Service Building OSC should be utilized to record chronology
' of events information.
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d.- Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)'
, F _The EOF was fully operational within one hour of-the Site Area
- Emergency declaration.
Access control and habitability monitoring b', provisions were adequate.
The: licensee indicated that an equipment i , ! problem with the facility's emergency ventilation system became
apparent during EOF activation and that a work order had been-l , !. ' initiated to correct the problem, The. Recovery Manager (RM) and the TSC's EC discussed the need to ]
,1; upgrade the event classification to a General Emergency based on ~ , r dose projections exceeding the relevent EAL's criterion at the s ED Exclusion Area Boundary.
'./ > The criterion was exceeded as a result of an eight-hour estimated
m 'i R f' release duration provided by TSC engineering staff, which was not ' f ~' greatly challenged by EOF staff despite the continuing progress .c pM;, N in. placing the reactor in a cold shutdown status.
However, based r , 1on calculations' performed by TSC and EOF dose projection staffs, ', p . , - - the:very conservative estimate of release duration from TSC fA
, ." R,j,
- engine'ering staff, and close review of the EAls, the RM properly
, o "*
': recommended that the EC declare a General Emergency.
The RM's dose ,
- assessment staff quickly provided the appropriate offsite Protective
&y..
- Action Recommendation (PAR) of sheltering within a two mile radius
s ', , s - v p6o ' ^ of the pisnt and sheltering within two to five miles downwind of the.
' plant.
EOF staff communicated the initial notification message to t
- /'&
- [f State:and county ' officials within the regulatory time limit.
The . -- h message' included an adequately detailed reason for the declaration, ' . . ' ' F the' PAR; and current dose projection information. - The RM approved s
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~ ' ' - . [{~ f '. i " 'm-( this and subsequent periodic update messages.to offsite officials , . L
prior,to transmittal.
t . .
, , . . . M ' " The RM kepb EOF staff adequately informed of changing plant " . p4 . conditions ~and response' activities by utilizing the facility's V
- -
' PA system;and by conducting periodic briefings with. key staff in l . - - t%g - i a conference room.
Key staff were expected to share their teams' .i , recent'results, concerns, and questions at these conferences, ' ' - '
L ~~ g; while the RM listened and then set their priorities.
' , ,g w , , ' i h - Dose-assessment-staff adequately monitored meteorological conditions and frequently updated and trended dose pro l
- rate data and on offsite monitoring teams' jections based on release
'
reports.
The RM was kept-
.
' [; well informed of the latest dose projections and meteorological conditions.
- EOF engineering s'taff updated plant status information on several status boards.
Relevant plant parameters were adequately trended.
o~ Engineering staff interfaced with TSC counterparts to maintain.an " < awareness of.the efforts to isolate the RCS leak and to terminate l . the release.
They also reviewed plant drawings to help determine , possible alternate methods of achieving these goals.
' EOF staff began developing a preliminary list of recovery action items. prior to release termination.
The RM utilized procedural ' , criteria for determining when to transition to recovery made. ' operations, and discussed this issue with the EC.
The correct , decision was made'not to reclassify the situation as being in' ' < Recovery Mode until the RCS leak had definitely been isolated and
,. the release potential eliminated.
! c The RM, key EOF staff, and the EC participated in a preliminary discussion of=onsite recovery action items that had been developed.. - U by EOF-staff.
The list was soon expanded to include offsite survey , l
,
and continued public information concerns.
The need to survey vehicles of emergency responders departing the - site following arrival of their relief crew, and'the need to brief- ! . incoming licensee and contractor responders on plant status and j nearsite radiological conditions were adequately addressed.
i, However, no mention was made of the needs to interface with incoming ' NRC emergency responders or an NRC incident investigation team.
No mention was made of the need to coordinate offsite survey efforts l with Department of Energy and other Federal agencies' personnel.
l The decision to declare a Recovery mode.of operation was made ' shortly before exercise termination, with the simulated concurrence
A of the NRC.
' . Based on-the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program i . %N - is acceptable; however, the following item should be cu.sidered for
p, rimprovement: q , ,,c f
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' a . ! D C Preliminary recovery planning. discussions should' address.the ' 3,i - ,
"?, .need to interface with NRC emergency. response and incident. - ./ 9f / 'e investigation staffs, as well as the need to interface with I
' {otherFederalagenciestoassessoffsiteradiologicalimpaht.
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~ q <~ , ' -The licensee's Joint Public Information Center was activated but was.,: - ,
- "4 not observed dur'ng this exercise.
Exercise participants issued six ' ' . press releases which were evaluated.
These press releases contained . . sufficient detail and accurate information, as was understood at,the ' , times of1their issuance.
Good efforts were made to avoid using . acronyms, and to use only technical terms that could be briefly
,, explained in the text of the releases.~ There was good consistency ' ?#
- in the press releases with respect to updating information that had
.I>
, , - been introduced in earlier releases.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
. 7.
. Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions (IP 82302) ' .; Exerciseobjectivesandcompletescenariomanualsweresubmittedin . accordance with the established schedule.
No significant technical flaws i' - or omissions were identified during the scenario review process.
" Challenging aspects of the scenario included: the use of a spare t ' , transformer; an onsite medical response to a contaminated, injured ' ' man with subsequent transport to a local hospital; an assembly and ' accountability demonstration; and the use of real-time meteorological ! information.
t ! e _ , L ' Although participants were challenged in a variety of ways, they were not challenged with respect to demonstrating their capabilities of keeping
the NRC informed in an accurate, adequately detailed, and timely manner ! of changing plant conditions and resultant emergency response activities.
l > The Headquarters Operations Officer was notified of the Unusual Event declaration and instructed the licensee not to contact him until-the-
E exercise was concluded.
The licensee's controller staff did not include a response cell which could have simulated remotely located NRC emergency ' responders.
, No, examples of improper controller actions were identified.
Controllers t ' ^de'monstrated good judgement by allowing exercise freeplay which resulted in a General Emergency declaration and an extended scenario duration r* " almost two hours,. The General Emergency declaration, which was
unanticipated by scenario developers, largely resulted from participai f . very conservative estimate that up to eight hours might be needed to ' '1 i - Jisolate the reactor coolant system's leak due to the adverse work . " . environment, the need to determine the existence of other possible leaksi . ' and some delays encountered by the inplant repair team dispatched to ' ' r3 isolate the one known leak.
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, ,j _...The licensee conducted individual facility critiques'and a consolidated ' < , , ' ( , ' critique following the exercise.
At the inspector $': request, the " 1. , licensee made a presentation prior to the May 31 exit interview on, , !'1; y'i the self-identified. performance strengths and concerns,. The licensee's J , , ' " evaluation was iri overall. good agreement with the inspectors' conclusions.? ' - ,,. f' . . . i Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is ' , P acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for.
"
, y7 improvement: , 'i' , , ' In'a practice or an evaluated exercise, the licensee could benefit ' t , ,, ' [ from.the use a response cell of controllers as simulated NRC duty - - , officers in; order to test participants' capabilities of providing r s - P accurate and timely information on changing plant status and ' . , . a emergency responses.
'r - !'y y 3. '7 ' ' _ 8//, Audits and Surveillances (IP 82701) ' ', W7 , , Records of the 1989 annual audit and semiannual surveillances 'of the i - ' ' "
emergency preparedness program were reviewed.. The 1990 annual audit had > < ' been, conducted earlier..in May 1990.
That final audit report was not' ' - .yet available for review.
- !
, ., , The'1989 audit'and surveillance records were complete.
These QA, staff i n.
activities were well documented and indicated a good understanding of , " the functional ~ area being evaluated.
The annual audit had good scope m ', and depth to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (t), including Q the requirement to evaluate,the adequacy of the licensee's interface with. State and local support organizations.
Records. review and m i ~ discussion with a cognizant QA Engineer indicated that the emergency . planning staff had adequately addressed the auditors' findings and . recommendations.
, i, , . . Surveillances SP 89-056 and SP 89-181' dealt ~with the adequacy of offsite , '3
' . interface'and the 1989 practice exercise, respectively.
The former
s surveillance included interviews with'several-local emergency management ' agencies' representatives on various aspects of their interface'with the.
g' ? ~ , " ' ' licensee,'in addition to records review regarding interface activities.. . ' c . L Records, review indicated that the licensee has utilized several- . e , ' mechanisms t'o satisfy the regulatory requirement to inform State.and ,y , -local off.icials of QA Department evaluations of interfaces with offsite'.. ' .., ' support.prganizations.
Copies of relevant QA evaluations have been ,y
- mailed by the Manager of Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness to F,
i-cappropriate State and' local officials.
These evaluations were also, '
- r topics on several agendas of meetings to which State and local officials
! -had been invited.
Such meetings-had occurred at least semiannually - i ' ' , if ' i i during 1989.
, . < . t 'Basehonth$abovefindings,thisportionofthelicensee'sprogram.is . _ , St.
t acceptable.
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Exit Interview- ' , iTheinspectorsmetwiththoselicensee:representativesidEntifiedin ! .$C' ' Section 1 on May 31 and on June 1,1990 to present and discuss the ,. ! ' D preliminary inspection findings.
The licensee agreed to consider the ' . , ( f* f . items discussed and indicated that none were proprietary in nature.
-" % . . s
The licensee was~ informed that the overall exercise performance was good, - > although'one 0 pen Item was identified regarding the need for upgraded
, , .. ' c' . +3 efforts 'to verify the locations of onsite personnel who may be initially _
' f' lidentified as missing during implementation of site accountability i r procedures.
Severaluimprovements were recommended regarding information
- .a i
s'M flow and/or posting'in' the.TSC1and OSC.' q , w, , '1The'licenseeproperlyclassifiedoneUnusual'EventsinceApril'1989.
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'. p 11nitial offsite. notifications were adequately done.
Adequate corrective.
/ ' , ' actions were taken on . notification ~and,evalu, several self-identified concerns regarding offsite /,;. atiori of. this situation.
~t " . - r , ,.,. . The 1989 audits 3and surveillances of the emergency-preparedness program " - were thorough'and well documented.
Emergency planning staff were
, -responsive'to the auditors' concerns.
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.' . . ANNUAL EXERCISE s - NARRATIVE SUMMARY The plant is operating at 100% power. The plant has been on line for 265 days.
Total Core IV ETPD is 356. At 0402, a leak on RHR Train 'A' relief valve EJ-v8856A was discovered during performance of surveillance OSP-EJ-P001A.
Preparations are being made to freeze seal the pipe and repair the leak.
At 0730, a bomb threat is received and Security begins attempts to compensate for the threat. The Shif t Supervisor should declare an ' Unusual Event' based on EAL 7D, Security Threat, and activate the On-Shift Emergency Organization.
Searches of the threatened areas should uncover a bomb device in the ESW pump house.
At 0811 alarms in the Main Control Room indicate high radiation in the Auxiliary Building. Reports indicate that an individual was injured while transferring seal injection filters and a filter has been dropped on the floor.
The MIRT should be dispatched. The Emergency Coordinator should declare an ' Alert' based on EAL 6E, Rad Levels Indicating Severe Degradation in Control of Radioactive Material, and activate the On-Site Emergency Organization.
At 0940, the main generator output breakers trip due to multiple ground faults in the isophase bus ducts. A reactor and turbine trip results. Two fires occur due to the faults. One is an oil fire at the main transformer, and the 'l other is a hydrogen fire underneath the main generator. The fire brigade should be dispatched. The transient causes failure of the RHR Train 'A' dis-l charge check valves and RCS leakage into the RHR system at relief valve V8856A and in the RHR 'A' pump room. Area radiation alarms in the Auxiliary Building occur and atmosphere activity begins increasing in the building. A safety j injection occurs due to the RCS leak. One maintenance worker is contaminated by the leakage in the North piping penetration room. The Emergency Coordinator should declare a ' Site Emergency' based on EAL 2E, Loss of Coolant Greater Than Available Charging, and activate all Emergency Organizations. Accountability by Assembly should be announced. Emergency teams should be dispatched to attempt to stop the leakage and control the spread of contamination. No pro-tective actions for the public are anticipated.
Once the leak has been isolated, plant conditions should be stabilized and Plant Recovery declared. A plant recovery organization should be established.
! t b-1-Drill 90-3 03/22/90 l l k ' s
._.
_. _ _ _ ~ _ _. - . _. , '* . . . ANNUAL EXERCISE , 7-q NARRATIVE SUMMARY The plant is operating at 100% power. The plant has been on line for 265 days.
Total Core IV EPPD is 356. At 0402, a leak on RHR Train 'A' relief valve EJ-V8856A was discovered during performance of surveillance OSP-EJ-P001A.
Preparations are being made to freeze seal the pipe and repair the leak.
At 0730, a bomb threat is received and Security begins attempts to compensate for the threat. The Shif t Supervisor should declare an ' Unusual Event' based on EAL 7D, Security Threat, and activate the On-Shift Emergency Organization.
Searches of the threatened areas should uncover a bomb device in the ESW pung house.
At 0811 alarms in the Main Control Room indicate high radiation in the Auxiliary Building. Reports indicate that an individual was injured while l transferring seal injection filters and a filter has been dropped on the floor.
The KERT should be dispatched. The Emergency Coordinator should declare an l { ' Alert' based on EAL 6E, Rad Levels Indicating Severe Degradation in Control of Radioactive Material, and activate the On-Site Emergency Organization.
At 0940, the main generator output breakers trip due to multiple ground faults in the isophase bus ducts. A reactor and turbine trip results. Two fires occur due to the faults. One is an oil fire at the main transformer, and the f33) other is a hydrogen fire undctneath the main generator. The fire brigade . ( ) should be dispatched. The transient causes failure of the RHR Train 'A' dis-l \\s_) charge check valves and RCS leakage into the RHR system at relief valve V8856A ' and in the RRR 'A' pump room. Area radiation alarms in the Auxiliary Building occur and atmosphere activity begins increasing in the building. A safety injection occurs due to the RCS leak.
One maintenance worker is contaminated by the leakage in the North piping penetration room. The Emergency Coordinator should declare a ' Site Emergency' based on EAL 2E, Loss of Coolant Greater Than Available Charging, and activate all Emergency Organizations. Accountability by Assembly should be announced.
Emergency teams should be dispatched to attempt to stop the leakage and control the spread of contamination. No pro-tective actions for the public are anticipated.
. Once the leak has been isolated, plant conditions should be stabilized and l Plant Recovery declared. A plant recovery organization should be established.
l l b xs (G h-1-Drill 90-3 03/22/90 . _ _
.. . . , . . . CALLAWAY PLANT . ANNUAL EXERCISE May 30, 1990 _ Objectives The overall objective of the Annual Exercise is to demonstrate the level of emergency preparedness which exists for the Callaway Plant. The Exercise will demonstrate the adequacy of the plant's Radiological Emergency Response Plan [ and appropriate Implementing Procedures.
The following specific objectives will also be demonstratedt 1.
Demonstrate the ability to perform accident detection and assessment.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site and off-site emergency response personnel.
Demonstrate primary communications between the plant, its various facilities and other emergency response organizations.
_ 5.
Demonstrate emergency radiological controls.
_ 6.
Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action , recommendations to off-site authorities.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to augment emergency response organizations.
- -
Demonstrate the ability to staff the On-Shift Emergency Response Organization - 9.
Demonstrate che activation of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and dissemination of information to the public.
10. Demonstrate the use of a Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) and/or - search and rescue teams.
11.
- Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Medical Services (EMS) _ for contaminated injured individuals.
12. Demonstrate the use of headquarters (EOF) personnel to support emergency response.
13. Demonstrate that security can allow for prompt access of emergency equipment and support.
& ~ _ W, m.
-1-Drill 90-03 - 03/13/90 l g .-m-mesms.m.m.-i ' - - - ' - - - - ' -
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. . CALLAWAY PLANT ,. .m ANNUAL EXERCISE l h May 30, 1990 'U" l Objectives 14. Demonstrate the ability to perform field monitoring, including, soil, vegetation, and water samples.
15. Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude and impact of a ' radiological release.
' 16. Determine the capability for post accident coolant sampling and analysis.
17. Demonstrate the ability to account for site personnel.
18. Demonstrate the ability to perform plant recovery and plant re-entry.
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I f M,e A I-2-Drill 90-03 03/13/90 l 4. - ~- -, -, _. - - _,, -. , - - -... _ -. _, _ -- }}