IR 05000416/1979007
| ML19246B987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1979 |
| From: | Blake J, Conlon T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19246B968 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-79-07, 50-416-79-7, NUDOCS 7907190319 | |
| Download: ML19246B987 (5) | |
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o(.#cC+,/ ..... Report Nos. 50-416/79-07 50-417/79-07 Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Facility Name: Grand Gulf License Nos. CPPR-118 and CPPR-119 Inspection at irand Gulf site near Port Gibsan, Mississippi v _ (
Inspector:_J J Blake Date Signed Approved by: [// 4,d */ [/ //7 f T. E. Con 1bn,'Bection Chief, RCES Branch Date/ Signed SUMMARY Inspection on April 3-6, 1979 Areas Inspected ~ This routine, unannounced inspection involved 25 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of Previous Inspection Findings; Safety-Related Piping Work Activities; Safety-Related Structo-es (Welding) Work Activities; Installation Verification of Concrete Anchor Bolts.
, There were no 50.55(e) or Part 21 items inspected.
Results Of the four = eas inspected, no apparent items of nonompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; An apparent item of non-compliance was found in one area; (Infraction-Failure to follow approved drawings during installation welding of safety-related structures.)
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. . . DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees T. E. Reaves, Jr., Manager of QA
- J. C. Fuller, QAR
- S. F. Tanner, QAR Other licensee and contractor employees contacted included serveral construction craftsmen, technicians, QC inspectors and office personnel.
Other Organizations Bechtel
- J. R. Valdez, QA Engineer
- J. R. Yelverton, QA Engineer
- T. W. Habermas, PF Engineer
- J. H. McCarty, PF QC Engineer
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 6, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The item of noncompliance and the inspector follovup item were discussed in detail. The inspector also discussed the previous inspection findings which were reviewed and closed during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Infraction (50-416/78-15-02) lack of demonstration of NDE procedures to ANI; all applicable NDE procedures have been demon-strated to the ANI. and Quality Control instruction 9.1-28 has been issued to require ANI review of NDE procedures prior to use.
(Closed) Infraction (50-416/78-15-04 and 50-417/78-15-04) Failure to follow noncontormance procedure. MP&L discrepancy and correction report (D&CR) No. 1109 was issued on 9/21/78 and closed on 10/5/78 after corrective action was completed.
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-. . -2-t . (Closed) Infraction (50-416/78-15-05 and 50-417/78-15-05) Failure to follow procedures for inspection of socket veld fit-ups.
Noncon-formance report No. 2928 documented corrective action for this item.
(Closed) Unresolved item (50-416/78-21-02) Non-safety-related Welding controls.
HP&L D&CR No. 1124 was closed on April 4, 1979 documenting licensee actions on this item.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved Items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection The inspector conducted a walk through inspection of the reactor and auxiliary buildings to observe work activities and evidence of housekeeping control.
a.
Safety-Related Structurer.
Work activities osserved iucluded tLe handling and welding of the main steam moment guide plate sections in unit one. The operations observed included included welding of the vertical seam between the two plate sections and handling of the sections to attain a more suitable position for welding of the loser section of the vertical seam.
During the handling of the plate sections, a corner sf the assembly bumped a valve operator breaking a limit switet assembly. The affected valve was 6-inch, carbon-steel, valve No. Q1B21F114. During observation of the damage to the limit switch assembly the inspector noted that the valve was installed in close pror.imity to a concrete wall and the moment guide plate which was being installed.
The position of the valve was such that maintenance operations on the limit switches and other parts of the valve operator would be very difficult operations. The licensee agreed with this observation and initiated design change action to have the valve relocated in a more accessible position. Nonconformance report No. 3508 was initiated by Bechtel to track the repair of the limit switch.
The inspector informed the licensee that the repair and relocation of this valve would be carried as an inspector follow-up item; Item No. 50-416/79-07-02.
, When the inspector reviewed the drawings for the installation , . of the moment guide plates it was noted that the drawings ' showed the installation with all four main steam movement 9 67 . -r ' 34a . - - 7(
. . -3- . guides at the sare elevation, while the plates were being welded together in an aligan.ent which would result in two of the moment guides being approximately two-inches higher than the other two.
The supervisor of the crew during the installation stated tnat his superintendent had directed him to offset the plates.
Discussion with the superintendent and the responsible field engineer indicated that verbal approvel had been given to the craft superintendent because a revision to the drawing was forthcoming.
The licensee issued a discrepancy and correction report (D&CR) to the Bechtel PQAM to document the fact that work was being done without proper written quthorization or plan change,.nd requiring corrective action.
This D&CR No. 1132 referenced the fact that a nonconformance report NCR No. 3511 had been issued by Bechtel when notified that NRC and Mississippi Power and Light had concerns about this improperly authorized work.
The inspector informed the licensee that even though immediate actions were taken to stop this particular job and document - the corrective actions by the people involved; the fact that work was being done on safety related materials on the verbal instruction of the field engineer and that neither the superin-tendent nor the foreman f,volved with the operation thought to question the necessity for waiting for approved drawings was inexcusable and would be listed as an item of noncomplaince against criterion V of 10CFR50 Appendix B. Tbis will be carried as item 50-416/79-01.
b.
Installation Verfication of Concrete anchor Belts The inspector reviewed the requirements and controls for the installation and verification of proper length concrete expansion anchors. These requirements are contained in construction Work Plan / Procedure WP/PC-24 Rev 0 dated 2/11/77"; Installation, Inspection and Documentation for Concrete Expansion Anchors" . which in turn references Bechtel specification 9645-C103.1, " Technical Specification for Design and Installation of Concrete Expansion Anchors".
The work plan / procedure requires that all concrete expansion anchors used in Seismic Category I applications must be inspected to verify , that the installed anchor length meets or exceeds the design drawing ' . requirements.
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- , L-4- . There were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified in this area of inspection except as noted in Paragraph 5.A.
above.
6.
Previously Identified Inspector Follow-up Items (Closed) Inspector follow-up item (50-416/78-13-01) By passing of Weld Inspection Points. Bechtel has completed the investigation into circurustances surrounding the by passing of weld inspection points.
The investigation concluded that the problem only involved one inspector allowing welders to by pass fit-up inspections.
The investigation involved extensive interviewing of welding and inspec-tion personnel as well as verification of the acceptability of the welds previously inspected by the inspector involved.
7.
Safety-Related Piping - Observation of Work Activities The inspector observed work activities for safety related (SR) piping. The applicable code for installation of SR piping is ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III 1974 edition as specified in Fechtel specification 9645-2040.
Observation of specific work activities were conducted to a.
determine conformance, where applicable, with the following; inspection and/or work procedures, record keeping, installation specifications or plans, specified materials, specified NDE, calibration and use of proper test equipment and qualified inspection and NDE personr e.' Activity System or Component Protection Main Steam Piping Spools Storage Main Steam Valves Within the areas examined there were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified.
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