IR 05000400/1985035
| ML18019A461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1985 |
| From: | Conlon T, Hunt M, Mcelhinney T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18019A460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-85-35, NUDOCS 8511040388 | |
| Download: ML18019A461 (20) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/85-35 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris Unit
Inspection Conducted:
September 30 - October 4, 1985 Inspectors:
M. D. Hunt License No.
CPPR-158 Da e Soigne o~
Approved b
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c inney ae one on on, ection ie Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety a e sgne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 72 inspector -hours on site in the areas of Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs), Electrical Cable Material Certification Records, Equipment Installation Records, Relay Coordination Program, Equipment Qualification Control, and the QA Surveillance Program.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8511040388 851029 PDR ADQCQ 05000400
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- N. J. Chiangi, Manager, QA/QC, Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)
- G. L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC, HNP
- P.
W. Howard, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
- L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support R.
M. Parsons, Project General Manager, Construction
- D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- M. D. Vernon, Superintendent, QC
- D. C. Whitehead, QA Supervisor
- E. J.
Wagner, Manager, Engineering General Manager R. Yarner, Electrical Construction Inspection Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organization R. A. Somers, Construction Inspection, Daniel Construction Co.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Maxwell
- R. Prevatte
- S. Burris
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Inter view 3.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 4, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters 4.
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio t T
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Electrical (Components and System II) Review of guality Records (51055B)
The inspector reviewed the receipt inspection and installation records for the 6.9 KV Emergency Switchgear 1A-SA and Diesel Generator Control Panel 1A-SA.
The installation of this equipment was controlled by Installation Procedure MP-105, Equipment Installation and Inspection Traveler.
The final inspection was conducted in accordance with inspection procedure TP-28, Inspection of Equipment Installation.
The review of records assured that the specified equipment was received, properly installed and gC inspections completed.
The records were assembled in groups that were easily retrievable.
The inspector reviewed gA Surveillance Report No.84-838 of activities observed during modifications to the 6.9 KV Emergency Bus 1A-SA and 1B-SB to correct wiring bend radius in accordance with the corrective actions required by Field Change Request (FCR) SI-70.
Another gA Surveillance Report No. 84-0266 covered the implementation of FCR-E-1959 for'mergency Diesel Generator lA-SA and 1B-SB.
The activities involved the replacement of engine mounted cables.
The reports identified the acceptance criteria, verified traceability of materials, and had no open items.
During this review, the inspector was advised that the licensee has developed a
gA Surveillance Program to provide a
means of assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of the guality Assurance Program through examination, evaluation, direct observation, and comprehensive reporting.
The program was established by Project Hanagement and is not a regulatory requirement.
The program involves three different types of surveillances:
The Attribute Surveillance provides a statistical method of assessing the overall adequacy of the construction inspection program by examining installed equipment after gC inspection acceptance.
The attributes used by the gC inspection programs are used as items for the Attribute Surveillance inspections.
The program develops a series of items to be covered for an extended period by a statistical analysis approach.
From these evaluations, management can evaluate the overall program and take proper corrective action.
Routine Product Surveillance.
This'rogram is designed to review safety-related products of items not covered by the attributes surveillance program and is primarily concerned with civil products covered previously by routine product surveillance and installation prior to 1984.
gA Program Surveillance.
This program concentrates on the evaluation of the effectiveness of the program and systems that indirectly influence the quality of the plan '
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This program will cover construction and start-up activities and provide management with various trend analysis relating to progress and completion of the project.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Electrical (Components and Systems II) Review of guality Records (51056B)
The inspector examined the receipt inspection and installation inspections records for Diesel Generator 1A-SA Generator Control Panel and 6.9 KV Emergency Switchgear 1A-SA.
The records reviewed covered the corrective actions for various minor discrepancies and equipment replacement.
The following nonconforming reports (NCR) were examined.
Nonconformin Re orts 85-0490 (0)
85-0497 (0)
85-1664 (0)
85-1859 (0)
85-1889 (0)
85-1900 (0)
85-1837 85-1818 85-1674 84-0557 Note:
(0)
= Open-1
85-1656 85-1556 85-1606 85-1607 85-1109 85-1112 85-0928 85-1229 84-0490 85-0652 85-0552 85-1735 85-1612 85-0555 85-0347 85-0256 84-2392 84-2272 84-2301 The inspector reviewed the relay setting sheets for the protective relaying for the 6.9 KV safety-related power distribution boards.
These sheets specify the type of relay required, the tap setting, and the operating time.
Presently, the licensee is re-verifying all the calculations and supporting documentation to assure that the protective relay sequencing is accurate and adequate.
They advised that any deficiencies identified will be evaluated for reportability as required by
CFR 50.55(e).
To date all deficiencies found have been in a conservative direction.
The NCRs have been evaluated for reportability under
CFR 50.55(e)
requirements.
The records were easily retrieved.
The records appeared complete and had been properly reviewed and stored.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Electrical (Cables and Termination II) Observation of Work and Work Activities (51064B),
Review of Records (51066B)
The inspector reviewed receipt inspection records, cable certifications and installation inspection records for the following cables:
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10221A-SA 10222A-SB 10223A-SA 10224A-SB 11921A-SA 11922A-SB Power Cables 6900V Feeder to Charging/Safety Injection Pump lA Motor 6900V Feeder to Charging/Safety Injection Pump 1B Motor 6900V Feeder to Charging/Safety Injection Pump 1C Motor 6900V Feeder to Charging/Safety Injection Pump 1C 6900V Feeder to Aux Feedwater Pump 1A 6900V Feeder to Aux Feedwater Pump 1B Contr ol Cables 10224E 12675X 10321G 10223E 10224F 11922F 12675L 10223 F 10321Q 12675N 12675 W 11922 E Charging/Safety Injection (SI)
Pump 1C RCB AH-2 SA RHR Pump 1A SA Charging/SI Pump 1C-SAB Charging/SI Pump 1C-SB Aux. Feedwater Pump 1B-SB RCB AH-2-1B SA Charging/SI Pump 1C-SA RHR Pump 1A-SA RCB AH-2 1B-SA RCB AH-2 1B-SA Aux. Feedwater Pump 1B-SB Power Cables (480V) to RCB Fans 12669A-SB 12669B-SB 12669C-SB 12669D-SB 12675A-SA 12675B-SA 12675C-SA 12675D-SA 12673A-SA 12673B-SA 12673C-SA 12673D-SA RCB Fan AHl-SB RCB Fan AH1-SB RCB Fan AHl-SB RCB Fan AHl-SB RCB Fan AH2A-SA RCB Fan AH2A-SA RCB Fan AH2A-SA RCB Fan AH2A-SA RCB Fan AH1A-SA RCB Fan AH1A-SA RCB Fan AH1A-SA RCB Fan AHlA-SA The inspector also reviewed the installation of cable raceways and conduits and equipment for conformance to the construction drawings listed below:
Drawin No.
CAR-2166-G317 CAR-2166-G317-S01 Area Reactor Aux. Building Conduit arrangement-EL 286'-00"
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CAR-2166 G-090 CAR-2166 G-091 CAR-2166 G-092 Diesel Generator Building Conduit and Grounding Details The following nonconforming reports were examined for proper evaluation, prompt closure and appropriate corrective actions:
85-1730 (0)
85-1542 85-1826 (0)
85-0899 85-1617 (0 85-1615 85-0121 84-1558 84-1502 84-0984 84-0750 84-0592 All the NCRs were closed except as noted.
All had been reviewed for reportability under
CFR 50.55(e).
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Identified Items (LII) 10 CFR 50.55(e)/Part
a.
(Closed)
CDR-80, Pressure Sensing Line in the Starting Air System for Emergency Diesel-Generator Sets.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on April 19, 1982, and submitted a final report on August 16, 1984.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves the pressure sensing line between the starting air tank and air compressor which could rupture during a seismic event.
The rupturing of this line could cause rapid depr essurization of the starting air tank to a pressure below what is required to start the Emergency Diesel-Generators.
The vendor recommended that the licensee installed a 1/8" orifice in the pressure sensing line to increase the amount of time to depressurize the starting air tank.
However, after further review, the licensee determined that the pressure sensing line was designed and installed seismically supported and no corrective action was necessary.
The inspector reviewed supporting documentation and held discussions with licensee and contractor personnel to verify that the pressure sensing line was designed and installed seismically supported which confirms that this item was not reportable per
CFR 50.55(e)
or Part 21.
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
Design Deficiency Report (DDR ¹870)
Corrective Action Report for DDR ¹870 Piping Dr awing 2165-G-194502 Seismic gualification Results Certification and Summary for the Starting Air Compressor and Aftercooler Nodule Seismic Tri-Axial Test gualification Plant of Compressor, Aftercooler, Starting Air Check Valve, and Starting Air Dryer Instrumentation Detail Drawing For the Pressure Sensing Line Examination of the records indicated that the pressure sensing line was designed and installed with seismic supports.
A visual inspection of the pressure sensing line showed that the seismic supports are installed as documented.
This item is close I t
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(Closed)
CDR 83-149, Engine Mounted Fuel Oil Lines Emergency Diesel-Engine Generator Sets.
The licensee reported this item to RII on November 18, 1983, and submitted a final report on June 27, 1985.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves the fuel oil line between the fuel oil pump and the fuel oil header.
The licensee was informed by the vendor that fuel oil line support clamps welded to the turbocharger bracket could be missing.
Without these clamps excessive vibration could lead to a failure of these fuel oil lines.
The vendor recoraoended that the licensee weld these support clamps onto the turbocharger bracket if they weren'
already done so.
Upon inspection of the Diesel Generator Sets, the licensee found that the 1A-SA engine had the support clamp in place but it wasn't welded to the turbocharger bracket.
The 1B-SB engine was missing the entire support clamp.
The licensee corrected this problem by welding the support clamp on the lA-SA engineer and installing and welding the clamp to the bracket on the 1B-SB engine.
The vendor also recommended that the licensee install spray shields between the fuel oil lines and turbocharger to reduce the possibility of a fire if the fuel oil lines did fail.
The licensee installed the spray shields on both the lA-SA and 1B-SB diesel engines.
The inspector discussed these items with responsible licensee and contractor representatives and reviewed supporting documentation to verify that the licensee followed the proposed actions recommended by the vendor.
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
Non-Conformance Report (NCR) 84-0390 Field Change Requests (FCRs)
Numbers M-1561 and M1562 R1 Corrective Action Report for NCR 84-0390 FCR Permanent Waiver Closeout for M-1562 R1 TDI Owners Group Inspection Report for Fuel Oil Header Supports Equipment Assembly/Disassembly/Modification Repair Travelers for Work Procedure (WP) 137, jobs M-653 and M-652 Review of the records indicated that for both diesel engines, 1A-SA and 1B-SB, the fuel oil line support clamps and the fuel oil spray shields were properly installed.
A visual inspection was made to verify that the support clamps and spray shields were installed on both diesel engines.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
CDR 84-181, Component Cooling Water System Butterfly Valve Operators.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on October 31, 1984, and submitted a final report on June 27, 1985.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves four motor operators for certain butterfly valves in the component cooling water system, tag numbers 1-9370, 1-9371, 1-9384, and 1-9385.
The licensee identified that these motor operators, supplied by Westinghouse, were not qualified as 1E.
The licensee issued NCR 85-1587 which addressed this item and closed out this NCR based on the Westinghouse letter to CPSL, C(L-8642, gualification of 18" Butterfly Operators, dated March 1, 1985.
The Westinghouse gualification Report includes testing of Generic Design Limitorque Electric Motor Operators
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to verify their operational integrity.
The valve operators used at SHNPP, model number SMB-00-10, are among those included in the qualified Generic Design Group.
Based on the Westinghouse gualification of the Limitorque Motor Operators, the licensee determined that the Motor Operators were indeed 1E components and that no modifications were necessary.
The inspector reviewed the above documents to verify that the licensee took the proper actions to close out Non-Conformance Report (NCR 85-1587).
Review of the records indicated that the licensee performed the neces-sary actions identified in the report.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
CDR 84-190, 7.5 KVA Inver ters - Capacitor Terminations.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on October 24, 1984, and submitted a final report on April 16, 1985.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves the 7.5 KVA instrument inverter tuning capacitor terminations which could cause a drop in inverter output voltage during a seismic event.
The vendor (Westinghouse)
notified the licensee that the ferroresonant transformer leads using fast on terminals'ere connected to tuning capacitor solder lugs in some instances.
Westinghouse Bulletin, TB-84-08, recommended that the licensee remove the connector lug and solder the wire to the solder lug.
The vendor also suggested that the licensee perform a
20 lb. pull test on the connection after the work was complete.
After completing the corrective actions, the licensee attempted the 20 lb. pull test on the connections, but they failed this test.
The licensee generated NCR-84-2486 due to the failure of the connections in the 20 lb. pull test.
The 20 lb. pull test was performed again and the connections failed to meet the 20 lb.
criterion.
Westinghouse issued Addendum A of TB-84-08 which lowered the pull test criterion to 5 lbs.
The test was performed on the connections and they all passed the 5 lb. criterion.
The inspector discussed this item with responsible licensee personnel and reviewed supporting documentation to verify that the licensee followed the proposed actions recommended by the vendor.
Review of the above records indicated that the capacitor connections were properly soldered and tested.
The inspector visually inspected three of the terminations to verify that the work was done as documented.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
CDR 85-198 Air Flow Switches Incorrect Materials.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on January 17, 1985, and submitted a
final report on March 29, 1985.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves air flow switches for electric heating coils which were supplied with acrylic scale enclosures instead of the specified glass enclosures.
The vendor, Br asch Manufacturing, provided and installed the replacement glass enclosures which were originally specified.
The inspector discussed this item with responsible personnel and reviewed supporting documentation, to verify that the corrective action identified in the
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report has been completed.
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
NCR 84-2332 Work Procedure - 137, jobs 0112-0119 Corrective Action Report for NCR 84-2332 Equipment Assembly/Disassembly/Modification/Repair Travelers for jobs 0112-0119 Examination of the records indicated that the vendor had replaced the acrylic scale enclosures with the specified glass scale enclosures.
The inspector made an inspection of two of the eight safety-related air flow switches, EHC-24 (1X-SA) and EHC-26 (1X-SB), to verify that the acrylic enclosures were replaced with glass enclosures.
The remaining six switches were not visually inspected due to their inaccessibility.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
CDR 85-206, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine - Incorrect Capscrew Length.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on February 19, 1985, and submitted a final report on March 19, 1985.
This report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves the air start valve capscrews for the two diesel engines, lA-SA and 1B-SB.
The vendor notified the licensee that the holes in the cylinder head for the capscrews may not be tapped deep enough.
The vendor recommended that the existing 3" long capscrews be replaced with new 2 3/4" long capscrews.
The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee and contractor personnel and reviewed supporting documents to verify that the 3" long capscrews were replaced with the 2 3/4" capscrews.
The following documents were reviewed:
NCR 85-0371 Work Procedure
- 137, jobs M-178 and M-186 Equipment Assembly/Disassembly/Modification/Repair Travelers for jobs M-178 and M-186 TDI owners Group DR/QR (Volume III, Tab 02-359)
Review of the records indicated that the corrective actions recommended by the vendor have been taken.
The licensee also implemented the TDI Owners Group Inspection Plan by measuring the tapped holes and capscrew lengths to verify that bottoming out of the capscrews would not occur.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
CDR 85-211, Standby Diesel Generator Crankshaft Oil Plugs.
The licensee reported this item to Region II on April 12, 1985, and submitted a final report on May 9, 1985.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This deficiency involves the crankshaft oil plugs made with the incor rect gauge metal, for the 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator.
The vendor informed the licensee that
gauge metal oil plugs could be installed on some engines instead of the specified 16 gauges metal oil plugs.
Upon inspection, the licensee
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determined that 16 oil plugs on the 1B-SB engine crankshaft were
gauge metal.
The vendor indicated that they would replace the 22 gauge a crankshift oil plugs with 16 gauge oil plugs.
The inspector discussed this item with responsible licensee and contractor personnel and reviewed supporting documentation to verify that the corrective actions have been completed.
The following documents were reviewed by the inspector:
NCR's 85-0891 and 85-1206 Field Change Request M-1582 Materials Receiving Inspection Report Construction Material Requisition Materials Certificate of Compliance Liquid Penetrant NDE Report Work Procedure 137, job M-728 Corrective Action Reports for NCR's 85-0891 and 85-1206 NCR 85-1206 was generated by the licensee when it was found that the work was performed by the vendor without WP-137 in place.
Review of the records indicated that the work was completed and the nonconfor-mance identified was properly documented and followed up by the responsible licensee personnel.
A visual inspection of the oil plugs was not possible at this time due to their inaccessibility.
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