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Insp Rept 50-400/85-19 on 850507-10.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas inspected:safety-related Pipe Support & Restraint Sys & Seismic Analysis for as-built safety-related Piping Sys
	ML18003B135
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/28/1985
From:	Ang W, Blake J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18003B134	List: IR 05000400/1985019; ML18003B133;
References
	50-400-85-19, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8507010115
	Download: ML18003B135 (18)
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No.:

50-400/85-19 Licensee":

Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:

50-400 Facility Name:

Harris Inspection Conducted:

May 7-10, 1985 Inspector:

W.

Approved by:

J J.

a e, Section C ref n

neeI'ing Branch Di ision of Reactor Safety License No.:

CPPR-158 Date Signed as z<

Date Soigne SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 29 inspector-hours on site in the areas of safety-related pipe support and restraint systems, (50090)

and seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systmes (IEB 79-14).

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris

R. M. Parsons, Project General Manager

E. J. Wagner, Engineering General Manager

N. J. Chiangi, Manager, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)

M. Hutton, Project Engineer

M. G. Wallace, Construction Specialist

K. V. Hate, Prinicpal QA Engineer

P. H. Cook, QA/QC Specialist Other Organizations Daniel Construction Company

C. L. McDonald, Resident Engineer

R. Calabro, Assistant Resident Engineer Westin house 0. Painter, Site Manager D. Kimbro, Welding Engineer NRC Resident Inspector

R. L. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector

Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 10, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The following new items were identified during this inspection.

Unresolved Item 400/85-19-01, Mechanical Snubber Nonconformance Repor t-ability - paragraph 5.

Unresolved Item 400/85-19-02, Pipe Support Inspection Unresolved Questions - paragraph 5.

Westinghouse material reviewed were marked proprietary but the proprietary information was not used in this repor I) l<<>f ')

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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any other materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed)

Unresolved Item 83-25-09 - Pipe Support Installation and Inspection Procedure guestions.

The unresolved item noted several pipe support installation and inspection questions regarding requirements of WP-110 Revision 8, and TP-34, Revision 8.

The licensee had revised both procedures and had undertaken an enhanced pipe support inspection program.

Work Procedure 110, Revision 13, Change 7, Installation of g and Non-g Pipe Hangers and Supports, and Technical Procedure 34, Revision 15, Change 2,

Inspection of the Installation of Seismic Pipe Hangers, were reviewed.

The revised procedures appeared to adequately address the inspector's questio'ns.

The unresolved item was closed.

(Closed)

Unresolved Item 84-25-01, Pipe Support Storage and Installation guestions.

The unresolved item involved miscellaneous questions regarding the storage of surplus pipe support material, gA audits of pipe support installations and pipe hanger problem reporting.

An inspection of the pipe support warehouse was performed and the inspector verified identification and control of surplus pipe support material.

An inspection of the other two concerns for this unresolved item revealed that the gA audit corrective action had been changed to preclude potential procedural violations.

In addition, the inspector determined that the licensee instructed field engineers to assure clarity of pipe hanger problem reports by providing sketches in lieu of verbal descriptions.

The inspector determined that the licensee had taken steps to preclude procedure and drawing violations due to the noted concerns.

The unresolved item was closed.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.

Two new unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.

Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (50090)

and Seismic Analysis for As-built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IEB-79-14)

An inspection was performed to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-14 requirements and licensee commitments.

The licensee discussed with the inspector its current pipe support installation and inspection program.

The inspector noted that the licensee had eliminated the hanger engineering examination of pipe supports for design compliance prior to submission of the pipe support package to construction inspection for final inspection.

The licensee stated that its experience with the enhanced pipe support installation and inspection program over the past

months led to the conclusion that it was no longer necessary.

The licenseefur ther pointed out that the verification step will be performed by trained 'craft supervisors and hanger engineering personnel will continue to be involved with the

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L. ~. 8 '(()'-'<<pl t l,.,">> " >><<ilt 3'I";l.!f.'q<"', <<<<),,$ ~ l j3,">',(".P,()(1 r', I'J ')I fr>dp 4ir.:~: .r;Ig <i',)U, to ~pi~:)U 'aAoa h<<1(; "Oi>>'ii bAUO'>> <<J ., i.;)'rjeh>>4b;> 1;) Ap rg~ r"'>>)r><<) .~if' << i;<A <>,l st 4)>>>~~" r'o>(iiv,<<a,>ri Jy~)zi"oo <<U~<< f<<'<< "1',>>'>>I (t >>9f Q '> '>if,t ~>>() pg<<'> ~."~>qp <<O y.i y ~ >><<" 9(I 1 g f )>>" .">VI<<i<< l)JJ g".'r,i '~ li tt')i(>>8 ><<(l<<,.),i> f() "t 3() 'lit <<tii l)3lJU(', << ')'l0 fu') I">U-.c,',f '>>>I'Ir '(;" <<+>><< represents: (i) A significant breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance program conducted in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B to this part; or (ii) A significant deficiency in final design as approved and released for construction such that the design does not conform to the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit; or (iii) A significant deficiency in construction of or significant damage to a structure, system, or component which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function; or (iv) A significant deviation from performance specifications which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to establish the adequacy of a structure, system, or component to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function." The inspector questioned the adequacy of the licensee's evaluation for reportability due to the following: (1) The evaluation was performed on only four of the 85 identified mechanical snubber test failures. The total number of failures contributes to the determination of "extensive repair" and generic considerations. (2) The evaluation was performed without knowledge of the mechanical snubber discrepancy that was causing the test failures, the cause for the snubber discrepancies, and the corrective action that would be required. These conditions affect the consideration for "a significant discrepancy in construction of or significant damage to a... component." (3) The licensee's CFR Part 21 compliance was also not clearly established in that the inspector was unable to verify recorded notification to the vendor for 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation. (4) CgA-3 appeared to allow discrepancies identified during an "established checkpoint" to be identified on "subordinate nonconforming documents." CgA-3 further defines subordinate nonconformances as "insignificant nonconformances" and therefore not reportable. CgA-3 appeared to cut-off reportabi lity evaluation of discrepancies identified during an established checkpoint rather than the significance of the identified discrepancy. Pending ( 1) further evaluation of the adequacy of the CgA-3 reportabi lity requirements and the NCR 84-2333 reportabi lity evaluation (10 CFR 50.55(e) and CFR Part 21) and (2) deter-mination of the 85 mechanical snubber discrepancies causing the >dJ )3 Aor Hog p'A > I" 'l i~Nb'a1.r,)r'r~~'2 4,'r)::> IJc ) 'r'> ~ Wt> P+>l.'> l9 I I Ltj)sl ".)jJ 'l+riv 'nb.) i I Jb At 0".'.)LA~oa,c>ria;, (J tg 3orjb tu,,".; fkjti t Lt". 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ZA,." <<9'>i j33r'>>Id.' 63 [.I>y'.."p.'"il ~it, L ~j> ')lltg[AgA>l J>J~)l, I r'8 40""i'f') '"'c) Zbgj I') I 'I> I p>Vc3 '):I 32 s,. I >JR>, ~.> ~ui 'i:t 3z>>~s x;I ->sr >t>t'~ z;-IJ Jbr'J yo >st'>-~'c~~ rb I.I>l,'.U'I 'brl I .'I.I>'.>>>i ovr~3'J* oo erik "I >, i'sr tt. l x"joe rh "I d>l'I:I. "rc> >j>6I>i.r~ I I3 Idf:0"'V'6 >.I f rO,IO~.;~e~T .b C~ j Jpe~ .<<d I U'JL> i'3~3 ' "PrZ I I "'aI3'OLJ jJ 2>I> > Ar V~A ""'),)'ID2rD 3't 31 "rrjPr 2 . 3>t" ~;>'~>IO3 ~.. "i I> '3,Jh",I"s"lfo f0'1 "),. Li Zo'Ã 'io>)>>, f"~o > I't"'l >>33 OI P" >.J i,'U')r [ ')0, '.)3'I'lo') 'i 's'9c>v of c) ~ d.> iu zbw 'ji', t "if>Af >Idf >>>)f jlr'&r>2' > 29 J IJ[bV J ra .' ') 833 Ll ~ t" ~OhA>JV ~,il u3 Aoidba> c i "~A rtb I, r 'c"" '~si t'r t<<3r ZaioAb(, "I>rb i>of [,, >>60r>J Iv(lttz" Ao ~ ar I r>>" bi eJ or "'Ar IqJtve>$'.>>'i2i f8~ I", I"'>0 rf'"f3 Ltc.:.'">>Ir 2'9l3 lad > JJ t c. 0 I . ">A-,IIU3 ii '0 ~" "fO~ftlt >C I "'i'$99f J'ti ~~3j biTrl> 0 >0~30 f"l,) I r A'pr2 Ij'6 P93'I >l"'.,'<><DrlVIL y ' l rd j I'~ cIa N'xJ- 'a (18 b.'It.;".,"'j '.-4p,I . ".fdii Io(t'-~ by ",2, r(tf)%pe 0c 70t >up ligr rI Q "I>br Zgrl c qg j )Qf') fg:) )r f(uf".i>) 93l i I, '>tgbf 90'1 ':i 330J>3t II I "I;0j ~ .">df tl>',ft c>) lJ6't nflju "I" }9; , g,3 >a"ju~DZ I'b 'i"3 QDbup > 3>> 3.'8 T') >el l"r;)"c I 6VU > >"l > "f>A r'[ ~ oct r."'.i;~l "9i [rcl. 3 fog=',. c..~S-H <3,, ~.,lt bltb 2 I" ' "/ruo'9 7,' rdx>i"fut"-' d>b f ',! l).; ".fs (9I':.',.'~d j>33 Ut y >cirf. Ufsv J .-Jjtg QAi,'J "i~ 84r )P.".< ) I 3>>fb 13(>'",'"" r6')<jti ">') 5 9flj () 0 J' Arm test failures, the cause of the snubber discrepancies and the corrective action required, this was identified as Unresolved Item 400/85-19-01, "Mechanical Snubber Nonconformance Reportability." Work on Main Steam Support Structure C-1-180 was observed by'he inspector. Records for completed CI inspections on portions of the structure were inspected. The inspector noted that partial inspection of bolt torquing performance from 7-7-81 thru 8-20-81 were performed by four inspectors. Two of the four inspectors had completed their training and certification on 8-18-81. The pipe support construction inspection supervisor informed the inspector that Technical Procedure 40, Revision 9, Training and guali-fication of Construction Inspection Personnel, paragraph 3.4.6 states that: "At the discretion of the certified inspector, an inspector-in-training may perform selected functions under his supervisory control, provided the applicable portions of training have been satisfactorily completed. The acceptability of inspection, examination or testing results will be determined by the certified inspector and documented by countersigning the inspection report." The supervisor further stated that the inspectors involved performed the torque inspections under his supervisor's control and that he had ascertained that they had satisfactorily completed the torque inspection portion of their training prior to their performing the inspections. The following installed and inspected spring hanger assemblies were inspected for: (a) Hanger rods for supporting 2-inch pipe are not less than 3/8-inch diamter and for 2-1/2 inch pipe or larger, not less than 1/2-inch diamter. (b) Spring hangers are provided with indicators to show the approximate "hot" or "cold" position, as appropriate. (c) Spring hangers enclosed in spaces that will be subjected to high ambient temperatures during reactor operation, have suitable service ratings to accommodate the expected operating temperature range. (d) General configuration compliance with applicable drawings. 1-MS-H-444 1-SI-H-22 1-S I-H-1105 1-SI-H-1286 1-SI-H-1553 1-CS-H-221 - Size 13 spring can - Size 15 spring can - Size 13 spring can - Size 16 spring can - Size 1 spring can - Size 6 spring can 'N N IN MN r Mr) Il , t r'" ] Mt MMNM irjr 'N "~ "'i ri ~ N ~ 1' r ~ Ilv) r ivt, I I IIMM r'NMI N M I'r,r I-N ~3 N MI C'N " ' gtr rr j Ml

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" 'N"'IJ I'r fl Nrt ff MN(t N 'll M liN M CN M<.N - fl NNJ 'I M I, "Jl a f I 't II Nl I[ il p t N I'I N I 't' I'ti M N NINMN" ) IN 'N( tj 'Nr ~ M j 'N,M rc 0 Iff tjl M fvjl ft rN J' N, ~ N(N IM, I" I ~ Ni Nf ~ i,NNI'M 'l IM it r NN M 'M>>l MM I v I Nt IN. I'f4 M C vg il C It' ~' Ntf il M N N,C, N N Mtr MIN. Nl JI MN "l ii N 'i(r Nf Mr r I ~ y M N N " Nilrf I N M M Nttt I 1-CS-H-303 - Size 1 spring can 1-CS-H-468 - Size 1 spring can The inspector noted the following conditions: Support 1-CS-H-468 was not attached to the pipe and appeared to provide no significant support to the pipe. A slight manual movement of the support dislodged the support. It was recognized, however, that the spring can stop pins were still installed. Piece 2 of pipe support 1-SI-H-1286 was required to be a lubrite plate. There was no readily available means for verifying correct material for the installed "lubrite" plate. No record was available for signifying verifi-cation of the correctly installed lubrite plate material. Pipe support 1-NS-H-444 support drawing section B-B required installation of the welding lug piece (1) at an unspecified angle with the run of the supported pipe. The lug was observed by the NRC inspector to be installed parallel with the run of the pipe. Request For Information Number dated 5-10-85 stated that skewness was not critical and should not be verified unless explicity detailed in the pipe support drawings. Pending further evaluation and determination of the adequacy and significance of the above noted items, this was identified as Unresolved Item 50-400/85-19-02, Pipe Support Inspection Unresolved guestions. Pending licensee completion of IEB 79-14 requirements,and licensee commitments, the Bulletin was left open. No violations or deviations were identified. 6. Inspector Followup Items ( IFI) a ~ (Closed) IFI 83-25-21 - Pipe Support loads. The inspector follow-up item noted that a potential for errors in pipe support and concrete expansion anchor design calculations could be caused by the time lag between the piping analysis and the pipe support and concrete expansion anchor calculations. Discussion with the licensee indicated that organizational changes resulted in piping analysis currently being performed on site and pipe support and concrete expansion anchor design calculations are currently performed by the same Harris Plant Engineering Group. The reorganization would minimize if not eliminate the time lag for pipe support loads and would provide better continuity for the flow of design information used in pipe support and concrete expansion anchor design calculations. The IFI was close r)')imari<'. axrc! - rg>>;-'t-p,;)t-.r .)~);):lr r,e I )-c" - c."',J,'-H-'.J-r c'i)Jt r v g~,>~ t)lr)I)fjJt g>lt vvJrv) v fghnn.c~vj ~.,> Urer,'n .)r bod>l 't Jun ~>>w d.'. -cl-Z3-f +r>.;qud .;lip ~r<f ": tr)q i~ra .) tr~~i')re'P O~ -:Ji Iul(t 0 r).t >Oq(',.' ) lit 'b:Jf~-I). <<Jq;'g~ >t; >(i 4~-crt.ice'.r (ter:I"tt z l:)rf> ,aeV",'0 bezirlv 'SSW t'-VI >'.'.tarlr it r>a.J-.'"I Vnrq ').. -,t,u .');t vrupr05 2 rw r~ f-tl-.r.'-' tt)(tv i ']frl Jrr) (.' "vtc t J I l >f I ~)Vr p f r cc ~ t Qct r nW g'l9t)T .")g <<f l;) 'i lr U f )'l'titt)" ').l l~3grrc .'ll" 'i) ~ i )t'r.gtt I'~.'I'tou (r'rf".Wt"f'sV cvnr V)riv vc.tg ~, ~a fg > v f JVg 2t.h 0 c v.,~ Or'i ~ ruj', c i .odt l )~f~rl tf t)t fs)fdtrr '(f~'.I 't'cr)0 Prtli ~r) )ter Jbo t,r) f t ~ca " 'I;rr>ab gq~c,,ua ~'Jl)-9-',c"-;avrlqua-Jlrq "tt )tl (LI) ))-1 'l ")ul l)l'ibf9'I a,,5 r) t >', fr",J.t ) 1ru)sl . ~qrrr tier.~ q;iu'- ctlP 'to I tt~ t'l3;I~ltw sfit, b'Ji trojan;"..I 0$ c>>=>r)qPfri J>], 9t .9 b jvc'>)..gc),W -Ul;Jrl~ f "'hu)..9(,rq t)tl~;fv '"ll'I c)rl 1th'I lVIit li.l .)'tit,"nt'c~vic Pic),IH (.".>-'.")->> hc~"t~b ~ ",J~ttui'i li,>r. >I" t")ltlr ) t~r-'V 'rI 't')n <<rud't'li~ ')fear'f) ~rI 'C-O'I'-~8 ' c)ctr'r, r) 3 tt)rt~~.."c>0cq .>r)1 nc 0) i;foe VtI3, fq)c> cc") i"I <rig I) <<.)I 'l~t)rrlttgy ) c ~ins fr)r'f i'!I 5VU "tuly c 't" 9 r ' '".)" >VOrtr, -,rt() 'I lr'1 c "><) <>X -u>g "tc-f)r". ma't" "JVfove'<<J r)~ri),v,,i J,dcnr ~ger,i qqVfov>g ',"t l rtgry)cgq, n h<<"S, rrV,; il t'Jr-('c 'c'i'40 f e'r t.)'.,'.r, cO ~ "l 'vl'" i I '"I 1f,t'.) f lJ;Il),;.8')3)t,', i" Al'rlA ") ,'lli r)tc-i'9 )"'"t.Jgccg Ibt c't>H ",oq(;UP )~ )v)ot r J)rf ~ bc)f'~<i'h~gbt'"c arI Qn(r Jc)r V b tO pflJ)* 'cc'JIV (fir "l 'wot fo tu:,J oat)r,Af'~" t;oi.'. q;U,(rq - f,".-r"x-Cti iR't ",.; )i3'."~) ~lO> htA J tu~(til'r', ')r]rq nr "I)'I'I, tuh )I&fret'>')g b,f6'll ',!). 3 r,tl)3'I I f 0'r)'," rl+ W'.c ~'3>rc ciri bfugg;..;)I; t [u)tk'J cc'Jvl,',b 0 rtr I'fbi pr)i "~'t,]XJ

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~r>>,' . "r t, .'reVf>>s ~>rqrri ~ri>> c~e'adod rrtl" g->g-. )I'.)"tr <<.~It+3f f g~lt tl~'r5I ~r)f porc r'rl],prto>" "rftv;clt;) "ctrrtr4 ), tn'>0 it)~ c if'.'(fir)G cni(icrl lll'9fftt )t d&qnt "a i >Igrff~lrrt>>,'v rl') .3h Noro~'")r"- ~ l;qxu '~J".t"Dn0') h'l"r.+'t9(l',Ud 'qr I )chic'.Jft~ r)> ": ltu'9zq 1tlbt ) (<AH 9'riF '>lr '(d LSrrt<< - t,) c V fin~a'Ja ~sth 6: II >I ~ cl U3ftl) c)ttrtl'r'itr~ J,tr rt vt 9'ir'<<re)iflft bfu"'"'l"rltEt.ltd ii);->" Ur)T .9vtc) "3 r.crr tyy tt )n3 vgrv'3 trdtt(c'~ ~-c.'.t)'I htVnrr] JiuO<I,".~ - c ')l.r1,)",",rt~ )qrg l()r l)ci 0'ctrl v)fit nt".car;(J.c t)rtt>> t")q",:)," eqrq nr:",),v tlotdik t tt)cfIr nr)f+)c) 0 wr)f r 'ttt tg', .b;f I'0 < w I lL ~,>, . "orP. lu)f - of)r ".)".).t~<ortt n)r,nx9 b. (Closed) IFI 84-02-02 - Pipe Support Calculation Checker Independence. The IFI identified an inspector concern regarding independence of pipe support design calculation verifiers due to the organizational alignment of pipe support designers and verifiers. The licensee did not change the noted organization but issued a change to its procedure to emphasize design verifier independence requirements. Nuclear Engineering and Licensing Division Procedure 3.3, Revision 16, paragraph 3.3.4.2.a, was changed to emphasize design verifier independence requirements. The IFI was closed. c ~ (Closed) IFI 84-34-01 - QA and HPES Questions. The IFI identified an inspector concern regarding the need for coordination of pipe support inspections, IEB 79-02 inspections and IEB 79-14 walkdowns. The licensee prepared and issued WP-141, Revision 1, As-constructed Pipe for its IEB 79-14 Program. The IFI also identified a need for formalized QA surveillance schedules for the IEB 79-14 program. A Pipe Hanger Surveillance Plan was issued by QA on December 5, 1984. The IFI was closed. d. (Closed) IFI 85-06-01, Removal of Temporary Pipe Supports. The IFI identified an inspector concern regarding procedural requirements for removal of temporarily pipe supports. WP-110, Revision 13, Instal-lation of Q and Non-Q Pipe Hangers and Supports, paragraph 3.7.4.5, was changed to require erection and disassembly of temporary pipe supports in accordance with work directives. The IFI was closed. e. (Closed) IFI 85-06-02, SG "C" Surface Discontinuities. The IFI identified round-bottomed surface discontinuities on SG "C" and identified a need for evaluation of the noted discontinuities and identification of an acceptance criteria. The discontinuities were evaluated and considered acceptable by the site Westinghouse representative and the licensee. The acceptance criteria was identified as ASNE material specification SA-20. The IFI was closed. No violations or deviations were identifie ~ <4'" >DI'4>)'>~Ac 19)ID'll ) i(>>)f/' >>IJ fr>') YoqqU ~ ")g r g '0 )J > I ri ) wl i >>s

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IR 05000400/1985019

Text

REGION II

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