IR 05000397/1996021
| ML17292A598 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17292A597 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-96-21, NUDOCS 9611220179 | |
| Download: ML17292A598 (15) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-397 NPF-21 50-397/96-21 Washington Public Power Supply System Washington Nuclear Project-2 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 September 15 through October 26, 1996 R. C. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector G. D. Replogle, Resident Inspector D. E. Corporandy, Project Inspector F. R. Huey, Acting Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information 96ii220i79 96iii9 PDR ADOCK 05000397
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Washington Nuclear Project-2 NRC Inspection Report 50-397/96-21
~Oerations
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Operator response to several off-normal events was prompt and conservative (Section 01.1).
Maintenance
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Noncompliance with procedures, the absence of a questioning attitude, and poor work coordination resulted in the installation of the incorrect stem and disc assembly in Valve RCIC-V-19. The licensee identified this problem and took appropriate corrective action (Section M8.1).
~En ineerin
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Teamwork and safety focus were good when resolving the failure of turbine intercept Valve MS-V-165C to open during surveillance testing (Section E1.1).
Re ort Details Summar of Plant Status The inspection period began on September 15, 1996, with the reactor at 52 percent power in economic dispatch.
On September 15, during surveillance testing, steam intercept Valve MS-V-165C failed to open.
On September 17, reactor power was reduced to 22 percent to repair Valve MS-V-165C. Reactor power was returned to 100 percent on September 18.
On September 20, reactor power was reduced to 55 percent to plug a leaking condenser tube.
Reactor power was returned to 100 percent on September 29.
On October 11, reactor power was reduced to 55 percent to modify components within the digital feedwater control system.
On October 13, reactor power was returned to 100 percent.
On October 23, reactor power was reduced to 90 percent due to a sensed, but not actual, high resistivity of Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) A.
On October 25, reactor power was reduced to 55 percent to repair ASD A. On October 26, while at 89 percent power, after bypassing the resistivity trip circuitry, a sensed, but not actual, drive overspeed occurred.
The inspection period concluded with reactor power at 90 percent and the licensee evaluating ASD system problems.
I. 0 erations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments 71707 92901 Using Inspection Procedures 71707 and 92901, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, the conduct of operations was safety conscious and professional; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
01.2 Followu of Nonroutine Plant Events 92901 a.
Ins ection Sco e 92901 The inspectors conducted routine followup of several plant events and assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of the licensee's responses and actions to these events.
b.
Observations and Findin s Adjustable Speed Drive Initiated Events:
On October 23, while at 100 percent reactor power, Drive 1A2 of the ASD system tripped on high resistivity in the glycol cooling system, causing reactor recirculation (RRC) Pump RRC-P-1A to automatically reduce drive frequency from 60 to 52 hz.
Operators responded in accordance with procedures by reducing RRC-P-1B frequency to 52 hz.
Reactor power stabilized at 92 percent.
The licensee determined that the high resistivity trip was due to a spurious signal.
As corrective actions, the licensee bypassed the high resistivity trip.
The licensee justified bypassing the trip because it was not safety-related and
-2-operators had sufficient time to respond to the high resistivity alarm prior to equipment damage.
The ASD vendor agreed with this action.
The licensee plans no further corrective actions on this issue.
On October 26, while at 89 percent reactor power, Drive 1A2 of the ASD system tripped on overspeed, causing Pump RRC-P-1A to automatically reduce drive frequency from 60 to 52 hz.
Operators responded in accordance with procedures by reducing RRC-P-1B frequency to 52 hz.
Reactor power stabilized at 89 percent.
The licensee determined no actual overspeed occurred and that the cause of the sensed overspeed was likely due to interaction between ASD Drives 1Al and 1A2 while passing through 55 hz.
As corrective actions, the licensee bypassed the 69 hz overspeed trip. The licensee justified bypassing the trip because the circuitry had a speed limiting circuit and safety-related overspeed trip. The ASD vendor agreed with this action.
The licensee plans no further corrective actions associated with this issue.
Because of the high number of problems experienced with the ASD system, the licensee plans to perform a reliability review of this system. One aspect of the review is to assess the basis and need for the various trip features.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump RHR-P-3 Bearing Failure:
On October 16, Pump RHR-P-3, the keepfill pump for RHR Trains B and C, tripped on overload due to a seized bearing.
Operators started Pump RHR-P-2B; however, they could not start Pump RHR-P-2C due to system pressure decreasing below the pressure required for pump starting.
Operators declared RHR Train C inoperable.
The licensee initiated Problem Evaluation Request (PER) 296-0718 to document this event.
Pump repairs were completed within the allotted TS action requirement, and Pump RHR-P-3 and RHR Train C were restored to service.
This item remains open pending the licensee's resolution of PER 296-0718 (Inspection Followup Item 50-397/9621-01).
Conclusions Operator response to the above events was timely and conservative.
An inspection followup item was opened regarding the failure of Pump RHR-P-3.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdowns 71707 The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the following engineered safety feature systems:
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RHR C
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High Pressure Core Spray Emergency Diesel Generator
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Control Room Emergency Ventilation System A
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Remote Shutdown Station The systems evaluated were in good material condition and valves were in the correct position and appropriately labeled.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92702)
08.1 Closed Violation 50-397 9419-05: incorrect orientation of fuel bundle during refueling.
This item identified that a refueling supervisor and operator had verified that a fuel bundle was properly positioned when, in fact, it was not.
Licensee Letter GO2-94-203, dated August 29, 1994, denied the violation on the basis that the core orientation verification process involved three separate actions (e.g., first visual verification, second independent visual verification, and final photographic verification); none of the three verification steps should stand alone, and all are required to define the integrated refueling process.
The licensee did not consider that the cited event involved a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, since the work was in process, and the errors were detected and corrected by the overall process designed to detect and correct errors.
The NRC inadvertently did not respond to the August 29, 1994, denial letter.
The NRC acknowledges that the redundant verification process ultimately detected and corrected the errors, nevertheless, NRC continues to believe that the failure to properly perform the first two visual verification checks constituted a violation of the approved refueling procedure.
The licensee determined the cause of this event was inadequate self-checking, inadequate independent verification, and failure to follow procedures.
As corrective action, the licensee counseled the individuals involved with this event and conducted additional training for all fuel handlers.
The inspectors verified the licensee's corrective actions and noted that, during Refueling Outages R10 and R11, there were no instances of incorrect orientation of fuel bundles.
08.2 Closed Violation 50-397 95096-1013: reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system not operated in accordance with procedures.
This violation involved a control room supervisor and shift manager who knowingly allowed Valve RWCU-V-31, the orifice bypass valve, to remain open during system operations with reactor coolant system pressure at approximately 215 psig.
The applicable procedure, Plant Procedure Manual (PPM) 2.2.3, "RWC System," Revision 20, requires that Valve RWCU-V-31 be closed when the reactor coolant system is greater than 125 psig.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter of September 25, 1995, to be reasonable and complete.
The licensee verified that pressure stresses in the affected portions of the RWCU had not exceeded ASME Code allowable.3 Closed Violation 50-397 95096-1043: inadequate verification of clearance order status due to inadequate self-checking and inattention to detail.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter of September 25, 1995, to be reasonable and complete.
08.4 Closed Violation 50-397 95096-1063: failure to follow procedures during performance of the main turbine functional test.
Specifically, operators performing the'monthly turbine valve surveillance testing manipulated the wrong lever, resulting in a turbine trip and reactor scram.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter of September 25, 1995, to be reasonable and complete.
The inspectors noted that all subsequent tests have been performed without incident.
08.5 Closed Violation 50-397 95096-1073: TS 3.0.4 violation for entry into an operational condition when the conditions for the limiting condition were not met without reliance on the provisions contained in the action statement.
In this example, operators entered Modes 2 and 3 with one of the two required independent main steam isolation valve leakage control subsystems inoperable.
The inspector verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter of September 25, 1996, were implemented.
However, the inspector noted the corrective actions had not appeared to be fully effective.
NRC Special Inspection Report 50-397/96-19identified an example of an apparent violation involving changing reactor operational modes when the conditions for the limiting condition were not met without reliance on the provisions contained in the action statement.
Furthermore, additional examples of not performing required surveillance prior to operational mode changes were also identified. The effectiveness of additional licensee actions will be assessed in the followup of NRC Inspection Report 50-397/961 9.
08.6 Closed Violation 50-397 95096-1083: TS 3.0.4 violation for entry into an operational mode when the conditions for the limiting condition were not met without reliance on the provisions contained in the action statement.
In this example, operators entered Mode 1 with a suppression chamber-drywell breaker open which rendered a pair of suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers inoperable.
TS 3.6.4.1 requires that all nine pairs of suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers be closed in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter of September 25, 1996, were implemented.
However, the inspector noted the corrective actions had not appeared to be fully effective, because NRC Special Inspection Report 50-397/96-19identified several examples of apparent violations involving changing reactor operational modes when the conditions for the limiting condition were not met without reliance on the provisions contained in the action statement.
The effectiveness of additional licensee actions will be assessed in the followup of NRC Inspection Report 50-397/961 II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1
~ 1 General Comments a.
Ins ection Sco e 62703 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
Work Order Task CVT1-01:
Overhaul of the HPCS Keepfill Pump PPM 7.4.0.5.1 6:
I Standby Service Water Loop A Operability Work Order Task BCK4 01:
Corrective Maintenance Activityfor "HPCS Oil Pump Room Heater Fan Motor Vibrates Loudly" Work Order Task BFM6 01:
RHR-P-3 Bearing Replacement
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PPM 7.4.2.1:
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PPM 700 Power Distribution Limits Shift and Daily Checks in Modes 1, 2, and 3 b.
Observations and Findin s Generally, maintenance was performed acceptably.
The inspectors observed selected portions of maintenance associated with Work Order Task BFM6 01 and Pump RHR-P-3 bearing replacement, and reviewed the completed work package.
The inspectors observed that the maintenance was performed as described in the work order task, and that craftsmen used good radiological work practices.
Several minor errors in documenting the maintenance were identified. The inspector discussed these with the assistant maintenance manager and the items were corrected.
IVl8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1 Closed Unresolved Item 50-397 9606-02: Incorrect Stem and Disc Assembly Installed in Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valve RCIC-V-19. The licensee identified that a new stem and disc assembly for Valve RCIC-V-19 had not been installed during the previous outage (as required by the Section XI repair plan) when the new assembly was found in the engineering building.
PER 296-0130 was initiated to determine the cause and to implement corrective action for this problem.
When Valve RCIC-V-19 was disassembled, the licensee determined that the old assembly had been reinstalled after the valve seat had been reworked.
The licensee verified that the local leak rate of the valve did not exceed the ASME Code allowable rate.
The licensee concluded that the existing procurement and work process was
-6-adequate.
It determined the causes of this problem were failure to follow procedures, lack of a questioning attitude, and inadequate coordination of work planning.
Specifically, Procedures SQI 7-4, "Source Surveillance Activities," and SQI 10-3, "Receiving Inspection," required documenting a specific identification number (serial number).
Instead, personnel documented the part number, which was not unique to the component.
The licensee determined this may have resulted from the certificate of conformance listing the part number instead of the serial number.
Additionally, PPM 1.3.30, "Repair, Replacement and Alterations of ASME Items," required visual observation of the material acceptance tag by the person in charge of the maintenance and this was not done.
The licensee believed that this resulted from poor work planning, coordination, and inadequate understanding by the person in charge.
As corrective actions, the licensee counseled personnel and conducted retraining for selected material, technical, and quality personnel.
The licensee replaced the stem and disc assembly.
The inspectors verified selected corrective actions, and interviewed selected personnel involved with the procurement process.
The personnel were aware of this issue.
Those interviewed understood that a part number was not a unique component identifier and that a serial number was a unique identifier. The failure of the involved personnel to follow Procedures SQI 7-4 and SQI 10-3 and PPM 1.3.30 is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a (Noncited Violation 50-397/9621-02).
This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
III. En ineerin E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Turbine Interce t Valve Failure a.
Ins ection Sco e 37551 Turbine intercept valves are designed, in part, to automatically close in response to a turbine overspeed.
TS surveillances are performed to demonstrate this capability.
During TS surveillance testing of turbine intercept valves on September 15, Valve MS-V-165C failed to open after it was stroked closed.
Subsequently, the licensee maintained reactor power level below 62 percent, as required by procedure, and initiated plans to troubleshoot the problem and effect repairs.
The inspector observed the activities of the engineering staff during this proces b.
Observations and Findin s The inspector noted that engineers performed effective troubleshooting and isolated the cause of the failure to a solenoid-operated pilot valve.
The pilot valve allows the licensee to test each turbine intercept valve online, but is not relied on to function in response to a turbine overspeed.
The inspector noted that replacement of the pilot valve presented operational challenges to the licensee's staff.
Specifically, only single valve isolation could be provided between the valve and the high and low pressure digital electrohydraulic control system hydraulic fluid headers.
Failure of an isolation valve (a low probability occurrence) could result in a turbine trip and reactor scram if power was above 25 percent.
However, if power was below 25 percent, turbine bypass valves would open, and a reactor scram would be avoided.
Engineering demonstrated a good safety focus and recommended reducing reactor power to less than 25 percent to minimize the potential of a reactor scram.
Senior plant managers concurred with the engineers'ecommendations.
Repairs and postmaintenance tests were accorn'plished without event.
The licensee plans to perform an in-depth analysis of the failed component.
E1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of En ineerin The licensee's teamwork and safety focus in the identification and repair of turbine intercept Valve MS-V-165C were good.
IV. Plant Su ort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls a.
Ins ection Sco e 71750 Periodically during this period, NRC inspectors toured the WNP-2 radiologically protected area and outside areas to observe radiological control practices.
b.
Observations and Findin s WNP-2 radiological housekeeping and worker awareness of radiological hazards was generally good.
Licensee personnel adhered to the appropriate radiological work permits and observed boundary postings.
No discrepancies were observed.
The inspectors observed work associated with repair of Pump RHR-P-3 and noted that workers used appropriate radiological work practice The inspectors concluded that the licensee appropriately implemented radiological controls during this inspection period.
R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Control Issues (92702)
R8.1 Closed Violation 50-397 9419-04: contract craftsman worked in a high radiation area without the required dosimetry.
Specifically, a craftsman received an estimated 216 mrem while performing control rod maintenance in the primary containment without having the required dosimetry, a violation of 10 CFR 20.1502(A)(3). The craftsman left his thermoluminescent dosimeter and telemetry dosimeter in the dressout area.
The licensee determined that this occurred due to inadequate self-checking and an inadequate process for obtaining telemetry dosimetry.
As corrective actions, the licensee counseled the individual, conducted training on the telemetry dosimetry, improved the telemetry system, and changed the process for attaining the telemetry dosimetry.
The dosimetry is issued by health physics personnel at the primary containment control point immediately prior to entering the high radiation area.
The inspectors verified that the corrective actions had been completed and assessed the effectiveness of the corrective actions.
The inspectors noted that no instances of entry into high radiation areas without dosimetry had occurred since the corrective actions were implemented.
The inspectors observed the process functioning several times during Refueling Outage R11 and considered the process effective.
R8.2 Closed Violation 50-397 9531-01:an equipment operator did not follow a radiation work permit.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter of January 25, 1996, to be reasonable and complete.
V. IVlana ement Meetin s
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 5, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee P. Bemis, Vice President for Nuclear Operations L. Fernandez, Licensing Manager G. Smith, Plant General Manager A. Langdon, Acting Operations Manager J. Swailes, Engineering Director R. Webring, Vice President Operations Support D. Coleman, Supervisor, Regulatory Services W. Pfitzer, Compliance Engineer NRC T. Colburn, Senior Project Manager, NRR INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 62703: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 92702: Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
~Oen ed 50-397/9621-01 50-397/9621-02 Closed 50-397/941 9-04 contract craftsman worked in a high radiation area without the required dosimetry incorrect orientation of fuel bundle during refueling RWCI system not operated in accordance with procedures inadequate verification of clearance order status failure to follow procedures during performance of the main turbine functional test TS 3.0.4 violation TS 3.0.4 violation an equipment operator did not follow a Radiation Work Permit VIO 50-397/941 9-05 VI0 50-397/95096-1013 VIO 50-397/95096-1043 VIO 50-397/95096-1063 VIO 50-397/95096-1073 VIO 50-397/95096-1083 VIO 50-397/9531-01 VIO IFI RHR-P-3, RHR B and C keepfill pump failure NCV Incorrect Stem and Disc Assembly Installed in RCIC-V-19
50-397/9606-02 50-397/9621-02-2-URI Incorrect Stem and Disc Assembly Installed in RCIC-V-19 NCV Incorrect Stem and Disc Assembly Installed in RCIC-V-19 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ASD IFI NRC PER PPM RHR RRC RWCU TS WNP-2 adjustable speed drive inspection fotlowup item U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission problem evaluation request plant procedure manual residual heat removal reactor recirculation reactor water clean up Technical Specifications Washington Nuclear Project-2
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