IR 05000397/1996009
| ML17292A796 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17292A795 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-96-09, 50-397-96-9, NUDOCS 9704160210 | |
| Download: ML17292A796 (20) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
I Docket No,:
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1:
Attachment 2:
Attachment 3:
50-397 NPF-21 50-397/96-09 Washington Public Power Supply System Washington Nuclear Project-2 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington October 7-11, 1996 H. Bundy, Chief Examiner R. Baldwin, Examiner (Region II)
R. Lantz, Examiner T. Meadows, Examiner J. L. Pellet, Chief, Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Partial List of Persons Contacted Simulation Facility Report Final Written Examination and Answer Key (This attachment is not being reissued, please retain original copy)
9704160210 9704i0 PDR ADOCK 05000397
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Washington Nuclear Project-2 NRC Inspection Report 50-397/96-09 This inspection evaluated the competency of six senior operator and five reactor operator license applicants for issuance of operating licenses at the WNP-2 facility. The initial license examinations were developed by the facility using the pilot process program guidance and approved and administered by NRC examiners.
Guidance for conduct of the pilot examinations was contained in Generic Letter 95-06.
The draft operating test portion of the examinations originally submitted by the licensee were inadequate for administration and were revised during the preparation process.
The initial written examinations were administered to all 11 applicants on October 7, 1996.
The operating tests were administered October 8-10, 1996.
In general, all applicants displayed the requisite knowledge and skills to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55 and were issued the appropriate licenses, No significant generic performance weaknesses were identified during the examinations.
Minor performance weaknesses identified by the examiners were discussed with the licensee for its consideration in providing future operator training.
~Qeratioas All applicants passed all portions of the initial license examinations and satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(2) and were issued the appropriate licenses in accordance with 10 CFR 55.51 (Sections 04.1, 04.2).
II No significant generic knowledge or training deficiencies were exhibited by the applicants.
Minor deficiencies observed by the examiners were referred to the licensee for appropriate actions (Sections 04.1, 04.2).
All applicants, as well as licen~~d operators in the main control room, exhibited excellent communications skills and teamwork in responding to abnormal operating conditions (Sections 01.1, 04.2).
A procedural and training inconsistency involving flow control during single loop operation was referred to the licensee for resolution (Sections 03, 04.2).
The licensee's actions to resolve an issue concerning incorrect modeling of feedwater flow control in the simulation facility were adequate (Section 05.1).
The draft operating tests submitted by the licensee were not adequate for administration and were upgraded by licensee staff in response to chief examiner comments prior to administration.
The remaining portions of the draft examinations were adequate for administration but did not meet NRC's expectations for a high quality submittal (Sections 04.1, 04.2, 04.3).
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The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters (Section E2.1).
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Plant housekeeping was excellent (Section F8.1).
Re ort Details I. 0 erations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Observations a.
Ins ection Sco e
During the in-plant main control room section of the operating test walkthroughs, the examiners observed the on-shift operators during routine and abnormal operations of the facility. The facility was at 100 percent power during most of the inspection, and all observations were conducted during the day shift, coincident with conduct of the walkthrough examinations.
b.
Observations and Findin s Crew communication was clear, unambiguous, consistently three legged, and consistent with communication observed in the simulator during conduct of the initial operator license examinations.
Excellent response to control board annunciators and a power reduction, resulting from a partial runback of the reactor recirculation pumps, was observed.
Actions taken in response to annunciators were prompt and appropriate to the conditions observed or reported.
Command and control during the reactor power reduction event was excellent.
Professional demeanor was exhibited by both the reactor operators and senior operators.
c.
Conclusions The control room staff exhibited professionalism and excellent communications and command and control.
Operations Procedures and Documentation A potential weakness in Procedure 2.2.1, "Reactor Recirculation," Revision 27, is discussed in Section 04.2b.
Operator Knowladge and Performance 04,1 Initial Written Examination a,
Ins ection Sco e
The initial written examination was developed by the facility in accordance with guidance provided in Generic Letter S5-06, "Changes in the Operator Licensing Program," and submitted to the chief examiner for review and approval for use as
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The written examination was administered by the licensee onsite on October 7, 1996, in accordance with guidance provided by the chief examiner.
Observations and Findin s The written examination was transmitted by the licensee to the NRC in a letter dated September 6, 1996.
The draft written examination was considered technically valid and discriminating.
It was responsive to a knowledge and abilities sample plan submitted by a letter dated July 26, 1996, which was approved by the staff. The staff approved the draft as submitted, subject to the licensee modifying a'distractor in'one question and replacing a second question which did not comply with the outline previously submitted.
The licensee subsequently obtained approval to replace two additional questions which had been inadvertently used in a practice examination.
The post examination review did not identify a need for further modifications.
The licensee did not provide any post examination comments.
The staff independently graded the examinations.
The minimum passing score was 80 percent.
The scores for senior operator applicants ranged from 82 to 92 percent, with an average score of 87.8 percent.
The scores for reactor operator applicants ranged from 86 to 89 percent with an average score of 88.2 percent.
More than half of the reactor operator applicants missed the same six questions (6, 27, 44, 57, 68, 79). More than half of the senior operator applicants missed the same seven questions (18, 31, 49, 50, 51, 53, 63). The majority of the questions with high miss percentages were common to both exams.
However, only two questions (reactor operator 57 and 68 and senior operator 53 and 63, respectively) were missed by the majority of both applicant categories.
No broad training or knowledge weaknesses were identified based on review of the entire examination results.
Reasons for incorrect responses to individual items related to question difficulty and isolated training weaknesses.
The licensee initiated action to upgrade candidate specific knowledge and correct specific training weaknesses where indicated.
Conclusions All 11 applicants passed the written examination portion of the license examination.
Evaluation of the graded examinations did not identify any generic knowledge or training weaknesses.
Initial 0 cretin Test Ins ection Sco e
The operating test was developed in accordance with Generic Letter 95-06 by the facility under a security agreement and reviewed and approved by the staff.
NRC examiners administered the operating test from October 8-10, 1996.
The examiners evaluated the applicants in three areas to assess their ability to safely
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operate the facility. The first area, integrated plant operations, evaluated the applicants functioning in shift crews and responding to component and instrument failures, and a major plant transient or accident, and utilized the dynamic plant referenced simulator in two or more scenarios.
The second area, control room and plant systems, required each applicant to respond to simulated tasks or plant conditions, using the appropriate facility procedures as a guide to complete the tasks.
The third area, administrative topics, consisted of an oral examination of the applicants'dministrative knowledge of facility operations.
Observations and Findin s After initiation of a security agreement, the licensee submitted an operating test outline with a letter dated July 26, 1996, which was generally responsive to the examiner standards referenced in Generic Letter 95-06.
However, there were deficiencies in the dynamic simulator part of the examination outline which were discussed with the licensee.
The operating test outline was approved, subject to licensee incorporation of staff comments, and the draft operating test was submitted by a letter dated September 6, 1996.
Specifically, in the outline submittal, four of five scenarios submitted in the outline failed to cover the number and type of events required by Form ES-301-5,
"Transient and Event Checklist."
The chief examiner provided specific comments concerning the inadequacy of the scenario outlines.
For example, Scenario 1 did not contain a reactivity manipulation for the instant senior reactor operator applicant performing in the primary reactor operator position.
The comment resolution was incorporated in the as-given examination Scenario 1 (Drill 961HLC.pgp) as Event 1,
"Plant Power Reduction per PPM 3.2.1."
NRC examiners validated the operating test onsite during the week of September 23, 1996, using the plant simulation facility and plant tours.
Further deficiencies relating to satisfaction of NRC examiner standards were identified in the dynamic scenarios.
Further changes were made to the scenarios and validated using an actual operating'crew signed under the security agreement.
Several minor deficiencies were identified by the examiners in the job performance measures to be used in the control room and plant systems part of the examination.
Appropriate corrections were reflected by the licensee in the final examination.
The staff approved the final draft. The licensee devoted a high level of effort to examination validation during the week of September 23, 1996, and was responsive to making the required changes.
The NRC examiners discovered a further deficiency in Scenario 1 during the onsite examination preparation week.
Although credit for a component failure was taken in Event 6 of the outline, "MSIV Isolation on High Temperature in the Steam Tunnel
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~.," this was, in fact, actuation of a component interlock and not a component failure. This event was replaced with Event 6, "RHR Pump Associated with the Loop Used to Initiate Wetwell Sprays WillTrip," in the as-given scenari When the scenario was initially run during the examination, the senior reactor operator applicant acting in the primary reactor operator position did not have enough involvement in the event to permit evaluation.
The backup scenario had to be run to evaluate the candidate's competency in responding to a component failure.
Scenario',
in the outline, was also developed as an examination scenario.
During the onsite examination preparation week, the NRC examiners discovered that it was necessary to add an instrument failure to satisfy the requirements of Form ES-301-5.
Of the five outlined scenarios, only Scenario 4, as submitted, satisfied the requirements of Form ES-301-5, However, it was not developed as an examination scenario.
It appeared that a number of the problems the licensee staff experienced in developing dynamic scenarios were highlighted by the failure to complete and forward to the chief examiner Forms ES-301-5 and ES-301-6, "Competencies Checklist." This is needed to meet the guidance of Section ES-301,'tep D4g, which requires assuring that each scenario set adequately measures each applicant's competency.
Designing scenarios and carefully validating their test of all applicant competencies in the simulation facility prior to submittal in accordance with NUREG-1021, should minimize these types of problems.
All 11 applicants passed the operating test portion of the examination.
During the integrated plant operations simulator examinations, the examiners observed that the applicants consistently used formal, three legged communication with one exception.
When the senior operator applicant, serving in the command position, announced ent.y to an emergency operating procedure, there was typically no verbal response.
However, the other applicants responded by proceeding with actions required by the applicable emergency operating procedure.
The examiners observed that applicants serving in the reactor operator positions routinely monitored plant indications and promptly flagged entry conditions to emergency operating procedures to the senior operator applicant in the command position.
The senior operator applicants in the command position promoted good crew synergism by routinely providing comprehensive briefings and asking if anyone had any questions.
Operating deficiencies observed during the operating test which applied to more than one applicant are as follows:
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When simulating startup of the high pressure core spray diesel generator, several applicants pushed the start push button on Panel E-CP-DG/RP3 instead of the push button on Panel E-CP-DG/EP1, as required by the procedure.
With the unit mode selector '.witch in MAINT, as required by the cited procedure, the unit would not respond to the push button on Panel E-CP-DG/RP When referring to power to flow maps in accordance with Procedure 2.2.1,
"Reactor Recirculation," following trip of one reactor recirculation pump to determine the potential for core power oscillations, several applicants attempted to use two loop instead of single loop power-to-flow maps.
Also, several applicants attempted to use total core flow instead of loop drive flow in determining the operating point on the power-to-flow map.
In each instance, other applicants on the involved crews corrected the potential errors.
There was also some confusion on the part of the senior operator applicants regarding the requirement in Step 5.4.5 of the procedure which stated, "As soon as possible, increase operating loop flow to GT 34,000 gpm to maintain adequate reverse flow through the idle loop."
One applicant felt this only applied if the trip occurred with the plant at 100 percent power.
The training and operations representatives stated a flow increase was required whenever a reactor recirculation pump trip occurred to maintain adequate reverse flow through the idle loop.
Licensee staff indicated that appropriate actions would be taken to address the operating weaknesses.
The licensee staff also stated that they would review Procedure 2.2.1, Step 5.4.5 to determine if action was appropriate.
C.
Conclusions All applicants passed the operating test portion of the examination.
Communications, command and control, and crew synergism were noted strengths.
Applicants were knowledgeable and sensitive to entry conditions for emergency operating procedures.
Applicant deficiencies involving use of power to flow maps in single loop operation and starting the high pressure core spray diesel generator at local panels were observed.
An operating weakness involving maintenance of adequate reverse flow in an idle recirculation loop following a trip of the reactor recirculation pump was identified for licensee staff review.
Overall, the operating test administered was adequate.
However, the draft examinations and outline did not meet NRC expectations and required substantial enhancement prior to administration.
04.3 Post-Examination Comments a 0 Ins ection Sco e
The inspectors reviewed the draft examinations using guidance reflecting higher quality expectations developed during and after an NRC internal audit.
b.
Observations and Findin s During post-examination review of these examinations, the inspectors noted several areas for improving examination qualit The following comments pertain to the written examination:
A significant number of the proposed questions discriminated at an unacceptably low level or contained implausible distractors.
Examples are as follows (the reactor operator examination question number is listed first followed by senior reactor operator examination question number, if applicable): 8/10, 10/14, 15/42, 19/19, 22/22, 24/24, 29/29, and 49/NA.
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The sampling of the seven items in 10 CFR 55.43(b) for the senior reactor operator examination was minimal.
, A modified version of Attachment 2 to ES-402, "Policies and Guidelines for
'aking NRC Written Examinations," contained in the written examination omitted a required admonishment from the NRC guidance that cheating could result in more severe penalties.
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Twenty-three questions on the combined reactor operator and senior reactor operator examinations were not referenced to learning objectives as required by Form ES-401-2, "Interim Written Examination Quality Assurance Checklist," Item 2.
Examples are as follows (the reactor operator examination question number is listed first followed by senior reactor operator examination question number, if applicable): 3/5, 6, 7/8, 10/14, and 13/NA.
The following comments pertain to the operating test:
Many of the Category A (Administrative) and Category B (Systems)
questions in the operating test were evaluated as discriminating at a minimal level or being direct look-up questions.
Examples are as follows: Job Performance Measure 1, Question 2; Job Performance Measure 2, Questions 1 and 2; Job Performance Measure 4, Question 1;
Job Performance Measure 5, Question 1; Job Performance Measure 6, Question 2; Job Performance Measure 7, Questions 1 and 2; Job Performance Measure 8, Questions 1 and 2; Job Performance Measure 10, Questions 1 and 2; Reactor Operator Administrative Part A.1, Question 2; Senior Operator (Instant) Administrative Part A.1, Question 1; and Senior Operator (Upgrade) Administrative Part A.1, Question 1.
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The as-run simulator scenarios were evaluated as discriminating at a lower than desired level.
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Two job performance measures (5 and 8) in subcategory B.1 of the reactor operator and instant senior reactor operator tests were selected from the same safety function (reactor water inventory control - 2) in contradiction to ES-301D. ~
There were instances in which the overlap of actions required by job performance measures were similar to expected actions in dynamic simulator events.
Scenario 3 (Drill 963HLC.PGP), Event 4, "Reactor Recirculation Pump A Trips," and Job Performance Measure 12, "Power/Flow Map," is one example of such overlap of actions.
Another example is Scenario 3, Event 6, "Electric ATWS, Entry into PPM 5.1.2," and Job Performance Measure 4, "Operate SLC Boron System for RPV Injection."
c.
Conclusions Overall, the final license examinations administered were valid and discriminated at a'n adequate level. However, the quality of the examinations did not meet NRC expectations.
Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Simulation Facilit Performance a.
Ins ection Sco e
During the examination period, the inspectors also reviewed recent simulator fidelity issues related to the modeling of the digital feedwater control system and that installed in the plant.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors were told that after the digital feedwater modification installed in the plant during the past outage ti e operators identified difficultyon the plant-specific simulator in controlling feedwater in the manual fast speed mode.
Because of this feedback, the setpoint in the plant's comparable controller was set at a lower multiple of the normal range manual controller.
The facility received the design data upgrade for the simulator during the last week of September 1996, but made the decision to postpone installation until the initial license operator class had finished their training and exams.
While the facility is committed to ANS 3.5 - 1985,
"Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training," which allows one year for upgrading the simulator after a design change is installed in the actual plant, the training of operators on a simulator which does not accurately model the actual plant could pose a potential negative training impact.
The licensee acknowledged this potential and was in the process of installing the simulator upgrade on October 11, 1996.
Further, the licensee's licensed operator requalification training was scheduled to begin training on the new system during the week of October 14, 1996.
This requalif:cation training included training of any new operator licenses on the upgraded digital feedwater control system prior to placing the individuals on shift. Other minor simulation facility performance problems observed during examination preparation and administration are described in Attachment 2,
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had known of the condition and had taken the appropriate corrective actions to resolve the fidelity condition in the simulator and to train the operators.
The licensee also initiated appropriate actions to resolve other simulator fidelity issues identified by the examiners.
III. En ineerin E2 Engineering Support of Facilities & Equipment E2.1 Review of the'U dated Final Safet Anal sis Re ort Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report de"cription highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report descriptions.
While performing the inspection discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed the applicable portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report that related to the areas inspected.
The inspector verified that the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
IV. Plant Su ort FS IV!Iscellaneous Fire Protection Issues F8.1 General Comments The examiners observed general plant housekeeping incident to administration of the in-plant control room and systems walkthrough section of the operating test.
The examiners observed that housekeeping was excellent.
The work areas were clean and well lighted and no abandoned or uncontrolled materials or tools were identified.
V. Mana ement Meetln s X1 Exit Meeting Summary The examiners presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 11, 1996.
The licensee acknowledge the findings presented.
In addition, the licensee was informed by telephone on April 10, 1997, of the results of additional in-office analysis indicating that the examination quality did not meet NRC expectations.
The licensee did not identify as propr etary any information or materials examined during the inspectio E ATTACHMENT1 PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Swank, Manager, Regulatory Affairs C. Callahan, Instructor, Initial License Training J. Albers, Manager, Nuclear Training D. Kaopuiki, Initial License Class Coordinator W. Shaeffer, Operations Training Superintendent
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Langdon, Acting Operations Manager O. Brooks, Operations Liaison to Training J. Grumme, Operations Training Secretary NRC R. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector J. Munro, HOLB Auditor, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTACHMENT2 SIMULATIONFACILITYREPORT Facility Licensee:
WNP-2 Facility Docket:
50-397 Operating Examinations Administered at: WNP-2 Training Center, Richland, WA Operating Examinations Administered on: October 8-10, 1996 These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or approv'al of the simulation facility, other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
Curing examination validation the inspectors were told that the digital feedwater controller in the simulator responds faster than the actual one installed in the plant.
This potential negative training issue is discussed in Report Section 05.1.
The licensee planned on installing a simulator modification to resolve this issue before further simulator training is conducted.
The following simulator deficiencies were identified during examination validation and did not impact the examination:
A generator lockout was received when attempting to synchronize the main generator to the South bus.
The generator was successfully synchronized to the North bus.
A Simulator Deficiency Report was initiated by the simulator instructor.
It was observed that the RRC control station readout responded slowly to actual RRC speed changes made by the operator.
The training representatives stated that this was a known problem for which correction required a simulator computer replacement.
This was being considered in the long range planning, but no completion date had been established.
This issue did not affect examination
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validity.
During examination administration, CRD Pump 2 failed to trip as designed when Malfunction EPS6D was entered.
A Simulator Deficiency Report was issued by the instructor.
This malfunction had no effect on examination validity because the instructors in the control booth were able to report a CRD pump failure by local observation to confirm loss of flow indications on the main control boar ATTACHMENT3 FINALWRITTEN EXAIVIINATIONAND ANSWER KEY (This attachment is not being reissued, please retain original copy)