IR 05000397/1996007
| ML17292A367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17292A366 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-96-07, 50-397-96-7, NUDOCS 9607230250 | |
| Download: ML17292A367 (25) | |
Text
s ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Accompanying Personnel:
Approved By:
Attachment:
50-397 NPF-21 50-397/96-07 Washington Public Power Supply System Washington Nuclear Project-2 3000 George Washington Way
'ichland, Washington June 3-7, 1996 C. J.
Paulk, Reactor Inspector P.
C. Gage, Reactor Inspector E. J.
Lee, Electronics Engineer J.
C. Stewart. Electrical Engineer Dr.
D. A.Powers. Chief. Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Partial List of Persons Contacted List of Inspection Procedures Used List of Inspection Procedures Reviewed List of Problem Evaluation Requests Reviewed 9607230250 9607i7 PDR ADOCK 05000397
-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Washington Nuclear Project-2 NRC Inspection Report 50-397/96-07 In an effort to improve operation of the Washington Nuclear Power Unit 2 facility, the licensee elected to retrofit a digital feedwater control system and to replace the motor generator drive for the recirculation system pumps with a solid state adjustable speed drive system.
The replacement of the motor generator drives for the recirculation system pumps with an adjustable speed drive. while a nonsafety-related system, required prior.NRC approval because of a required change to Technical Specifications.
This was the first application of a digital adjustable speed drive control system on a boiling water reactor in the United States.,
The feedwater control system change was also nonsafety-related.
This inspection was performed using the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedures 52001, "Digital Retrofits Requiring Prior Approval," issued September 27, 1995:
and; 52002, "Digital Retrofits Not Requiring Prior Approval," issued September 27, 1995.
The inspection was to confirm the following:
1) that digital systems previously reviewed by the NRC staff were installed, operated, and maintained according to the safety evaluation and in accordance with the manufacturer 's design and operating recommendations.
as appropriate.
and licensee commitments; 2) that the licensee had properly considered the guidance for effective digital system design in the upgrade.
and had satisfied, the plant specific licensing basis; 3) that the licensee had properly addressed the regulatory requirements of, 10 CFR 50.59 regarding the existence of an unreviewed safety question for the digital upgrade:
and.
4) that digital system failures (if any). modifications.
and maintenance issues had been assessed for their effect on the system function.
and for potent>al generic concern.
The inspectors concluded that the adjustable, speed drive modification to the'eactor water recirculation system had been installed in accordance with the safety evaluation.
The system had not been turned over for operation:
however, the inspectors concluded that the operatingprocedures were appropriate to operate the system in accordance with the safety evaluation.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had satisfied the plant specific licensing basis for both modifications.
The inspectors also concluded that the licensee properly address the regulatory requirement of 10 CFR 50.59 and that no unreviewed safety question existed.
There were no digital system fai lures to evaluate.
The inspectors concluded that, while licensee involvement was significant after the design and fabrication of the components.
involvement by plant engineering was minimal during the design phase of the modification II,
-3-
~0erations
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Training was provided to the operations personnel (Sections 04 and 05).
~
Operations personnel were knowledgeable of the modifications and aware of the revisions made to the normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures (Section 04).
Maintenance I
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Maintenance procedures had not been prepared for the modified systems (Section M3).
~
Maintenance personnel were provided training on the modifications (Section M4).
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Maintenance personnel involvement in troubleshooting activities was limited because of the reliance on the system engineer and vendor support (Section M4).
En ineerin
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Plant engineering had minimal input during the design and fabrication phases of the modifications.
This contributed to the lack of specific information requested through the procurement process (e.g.,
maintenance recommendations)
(Section E4)
~
Plant engineering participated significantly in post-fabrication and pre-installation testing.
This participation provided training for the engineers (Section E4).
~
Plant engineering exhibited a lack of consideration in the design process regarding the interfaces between analog and digital equipment, which led to numerous field revisions in the designs (Section E4).
~
Ouality assurance and configuration controls requirements were being met in accordance with existing plant programs for nonsafety-related equipment.
(Section E7).
~P1 tS t
~
No inspection was performed in this are Re ort Oetails Suranar of Plant Status The plant was in its 11th refueling outage during the inspection period.
Post-modification testing of the adjustable speed drive and feedwater control digital retrofits was being performed by licensee personnel and contractors.
I.
0 erations
Operations Procedures and Oocumentation a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed surveillance, abnormal operating.
and annunciator response procedures related to the installation of the adjustable speed drive controls for the reactor water recirculation system and the installation of a digital feedwater control system to determine if the procedures had been updated.
The inspectors also reviewed plant drawings, the safety analysis report, and other relevant documentation for the reactor water recirculation system and the feedwater system.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed that most of the procedures affected by the installation of the adjustable speed drive control and feedwater control systems had been revised and issued; however, some procedures had not been approved for issuance.
but were in process at the time of the inspection=.
A The inspectors observed that the surveillance.
annunciator response, and abnormal operating procedures reviewed had been revised to incorporate the changes installed in accordance with the design change packages.
'he inspectors found the revised procedures properly addressed the changes incurred during the modification process.
The inspectors noted that the safety analysis report change notices appropriately characterized the changes made to the reactor water recirculation system.
The inspectors also noted that licensing personnel had prepared safety analysis report change notices to be submitted with the next safety analysis report update, approximately 6 months after the conclusion of the 11th refueling outage, in accordance with plant procedures and regulatory requirement c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the procedures reviewed were revised and maintained in accordance with the licensee's programs and regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also concluded that the safety analysis report change notices had been prepared in accordance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.
Operator Knowledge and Performance a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors interviewed operators to determine the their understanding of the modified reactor water recirculation and feedwater systems, commensurate with their responsibilities.
The inspector s also interviewed operators to determine their knowledge and understanding of the indications and annunciations for system bypass and failure of the adjustable speed drive and digital feedwater control modifications.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors noted that the safety evaluation report for the adjustable speed drive modification described the indications and annunciations for the adjustable speed drive system bypass and failures.
The inspectors also noted that the design package for the digital feedwater control modification described the indications and/or annunciations for the feedwater system.
The inspectors observed the installed indicators and annunciators in the control room and at the equipment cabinets in the adjustable speed drive bui,lding and feedwater pump room.
The inspectors found that the operators were aware of the modifications'ad an understanding of how the reactor water recirculation and feedwater systems were expected to perform after the modifications.
and understood the related indications. controls, and annunciations.
The inspectors also noted that the operators were aware of the revised annunciator response procedures applicable to the adjustable speed drive and digital feedwater control modifications.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the operators had sufficient knowledge to operate the reactor water recirculation system with the adjustable speed drive modification installed and the feedwater system with the digital control modification installe Operator Training and gualification a.
Ins ection Sco e 52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed operator training records and lesson plans, and, interviewed operators to determine the effectiveness of the training provided for the adjustable speed drive and digital feedwater control modifications to the reactor water recirculation and feedwater systems, respectively.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors noted that operators had been provided training on both modifications.
The inspectors also noted that a'll operations personnel had passed the written examination upon completion of the training.
The inspectors noted.
through interviews, that the operators were able to discuss the qodifications intelligently.,
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded, on the basis of interviews. without observation of system operation, that the training provided to the operators for the adjustable speed drive and digital feedwater control modifications was effective.
II.
Haintenance
Haintenance Procedures and Documentation a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed the latest revision of calibration and surveillance procedures associated with the installation of the adjustable speed drive modification 'to the reactor water recirculation system to determine if they had been updated in accordance with plant procedures.
The inspectors also reviewed the vendor supplied operations and maintenance manuals for both modifications.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed that the vendors had not recommended any preventive maintenance in the supplied manuals.
The inspectors also noted that maintenance personnel had not reviewed, or completed review of, the manuals or other design information to determine any maintenance needs.
As a result, the inspectors found that there were no maintenance rocedures for the vendor supplied (proprietary)
components.
The icensee stated that upon completion of their review of vendor supplied reference material, appropriate maintenance procedures would be generate The inspectors found that the surveillance procedures had been revised in accordance with facility procedures and that the procedures met the
'equi rements of the revised Technical Specifications.
The inspectors found the reviewed drawings accurately reflected the installed modifications.
The inspectors found that the drawings had not been issued because the modifications were not completed at the time of the inspection.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the surveillance procedures were well written and that the drawing revisions were well done.
The inspectors also concluded that the lack of preventive maintenance procedures for the adjustable speed drive system and digital feedwater control components may hinder the implementation of an effective maintenance program.
Even though the systems were classified as nonsafety-related, the reactor water recirculation and feedwater systems were systems that would be addressed by 10 CFR 50.65,
"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants."
Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors'interviewed technicians to determine their knowledge and understanding of the installation of the adjustable speed drive to the reactor water recirculation system and the digital feedwater controls to the feedwater turbines.
Additionally, the inspectors interviewed technicians to determine their understanding of the indications and/or annunciations for system bypass and failure of the adjustable speed drive and digital feedwater control modifications, as specified in the safety evaluation, report or basic design change package.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors found that most of the instrumentation and controls technicians had been trained on the specific equipment used for the reactor water recirculation system adjustable speed drive and digital feedwater control modifications.
The inspectors also found that the instrumentation and controls technicians were scheduled to be trained on the feedwater turbine governor controls after completion of the 11th refueling outage.
The inspectors noted that the maintenance staff had not been required to perform any substantial maintenance since the modifications had not been completed and turned over for operation.
An instrumentation and controls supervisor stated that he had participated in the factory acceptance testing.
The inspectors found this involvement to have contributed to the supervisor's understanding of the modified system While the instrumentation and controls technicians had received training on the modifications, the inspectors noted that they were not expected to participate in any extended troubleshooting following equipment fai lure.
The inspectors observed that the system engineer was responsible for implementing troubleshooting activities.
The inspectors observed that substantial testing had been p'erformed prior to, during, and after installation of the components in the plant.
The inspectors noted that the licensee was performing functional tests on a component basis for the modifications.
The inspectors also noted.
through review of procedures.
that the testing planned for the feedwater control system prior to plant startup did not include integrated tests of the system using simulated inputs from the process instrumentation.
The inspectors found that this lack of integrated testing left the licensee vulnerable to experiencing feedwater "control problems when at power.
The inspectors also noted that the licensee did not have a
centralized system for, tracking what testing had been performed.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the instrumentation and controls technicians had received training on the reactor water recirculation system adjustable drive and digital feedwater control modifications.
The inspectors also concluded that the involvement of the instrumentation and controls technicians was limited with the majority of the troubleshooting work load being the responsibility of'he system engineer.
Hiscellaneous Haintenance Issues a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed five problem evaluation request change notices associated with the design and installation of the adjustable speed drive modification to the reactor w'ater recirculation system and the digital control modification to the feedwater system.
The purpose of the review was to verify that any 'hardware or software problems had been properly resolved, and that there were no systematic weaknesses that required correction.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors noted that all of the issues documented in the problem evaluation requests were identified during post-installation testing or during functional testing.
The inspectors observed that the documented issues address such areas as control room panel classification M CL 1%
Il
-9-transformer loading calculations. electrical separation of cable routing.
and the inverter power supply arrangement.
The inspectors found that, while the planned corrective actions were reasonable to correct the identified problem, the licensee had not completed all of the actions.
The inspectors did not observe any systematic weaknesses.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that hardware and software problems had been identified and were being addressed by the licensee's corrective action.
or design control programs.
III.
En ineerin E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment U dated Safet Anal sis Re ort Review A recent discovery of a licensee operating thei r facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report descriptions.
While performing the inspections discussed in this report. the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report that related to the areas inspected.
The inspectors verified, as described in Section 03.
above.
and Section E3. below. that the revised Updated Final Safety Analysis Report wording was consistent with the modifications.
E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed the safety analysis report.
and other related documentation for the adjustable speed drive modification to the reactor water recirculation system and the digital control modification to the feedwater system to evaluate the effort of licensee engineers and to verify that the appropriate updates had been identified.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed selected drawings that had been prepared for issuance once the systems were returned to service after the modifications were completed.
The inspectors found these drawings to accurately reflect the modifications as described in the basic design changes.
As documented in Section 03.
above, the inspectors found the change notices had been prepared, approved.
and ready for submission in accordance with the licensee's procedures and regulatory requireme'nt,
Q4
,'7 le
-10-c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the relevant plant drawings had been appropriately prepared or revised.
The inspectors also concluded that the update to the safety analysis report was developed.
and scheduled for submittal, in accordance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.
E4 a
b Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance Ins e
i o e 52001/52002
The inspectors interviewed licensee and contractor engineers to evaluate their knowledge of the adjustable speed drive system and digital feedwater control modifications, including followup testing.
post-modification testing.
and setpoint determinations.
The inspectors also interviewed engineering personnel to determine their understanding of the indications and annunciations for the reactor water recirculation and feedwater systems'ypass and failure.
The inspectors also reviewed the safety evaluation performed for the feedwater system modification to evaluate engineeriqg performance and to verify that there was no unreviewed safety question.
I Observations and Findin s With respect to the adjustable speed drive modification to the reactor water recirculation system, the inspectors, found that the design drawings had been prepared in accordance with the technical specification change request and the safety evaluation report.
The inspectors found the contract engineers to be very knowledgeable of the mc0ifications. with one exception.
The inspectors noted that one co,itract engineer (a vendor technical representative)
misunderstood the use of certain solid state components (CHAOS semiconductors)
in the system.
The inspectors observed another contract engineer (vendor representative)
experimenting with a software package that was in standby in order to address a problem identified during post-installation testing.
During the post-installation testing, the licensee observed that the field inputs from transmitters were erratic and causing nuisance alarms.
In order to correct this problem, the contract engineer was trying different software commands to filter the transmitter noise, thereby reducing the erratic inputs and eliminating the nuisance alarms.
The inspectors questioned the contract engineer about the need for this change and why the filters were not installed originally.
The contract engineer stated that the designer had not been aware of the amount of noise produced by the plant's transmitters; therefore, no filters were installe L L
ey II
-11-The inspectors noted that the licensee had attended and participated in the factory testing of the equipment, but did not identify any need for filters at that time.
The inspectors found, through discussions with the contract engineer, that the factory testing had been performed using another programmable logic controller (a computer)
as the signal input.
Such a device produces a steady input. negating the need for a filter.
The inspectors found that, while licensee personnel participated in the factory testing, the licensee engineers did not have an understanding of the system and were not knowledgeable about the difference encountered when using a computer to simulate analog input conditions.
With respect to the digital feedwater control modification, the inspectors observed that the licensee correctly answered all questions associated with the safety evaluation performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspectors found that the licensee correctly determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
The inspectors noted that the licensee engineers were using the installation and testing of the modifications as learning tools.
The inspectors observed that the licensee relied on the vendor for verification and validation of the software.
The inspectors also noted that the licensee engineers were familiar with the ladder logic software used for the control of the digital systems; however, the licensee engineers were not aware of the software used in the operating system to implement the ladder logic.
The inspectors found this lack of knowledge to be a weakness in that unfamiliarity with the operating system was indicative of being vulnerable to the introduction of a failure not previously analyzed.
The inspectors found no examples of previously unanalyzed failures.
The inspectors questioned licensee representatives about licensee staff lack of knowledge about the operating system software.
The licensee informed the inspectors that the vendors would be responsible for maintaining the operating system software 'under proprietary controls.
The inspectors noted that the licensee also acknowledged that.
should the digital feedwater control system sustain a failure, the vendor would be called upon to make the repairs.
The inspectors found this to be a
commercial decision without safety or regulatory significance.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee engineers were not extensively involved during the design of the modifications; however.
their involvement since has been significant.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee staff's lack of understanding of the digital modifications resulted in numerous revisions to the software and design.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was using the installation of the modifications as a learning too E7 (Iuality Assurance in Engineering Activities a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed the software quality control, configuration management.
and general software quality documentation for the reactor water recirculation and feedwater system modifications to determine the adequacy of the programs.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors noted that the licensee's purchase specifications did not specify quality requirements other than stating that the equipment should meet the high reliability requirements of the plant.
The licensee 'stated that the contractual arrangements for the modifications and the experience with the primary vendors were contributors to not specifying detailed quality controls.
The inspectors observed that the licensee put great emphasis on validation tests for demonstrating the operability of digital adjustable speed drive control system design.
and spent its resources accordingly.
However, the licensee was not able to show the inspectors a comprehensive test plan, a completed test status, or a list of tests to be performed to demonstrate that the digital adjustable speed drive and feedwater control systems operated properly.
The inspectors noted that the licensee depended on the vendors to develop reliable digital adjustable speed drive control and feedwater control systems.
As a result, the inspectors found that the licensee did not perform any audits or structured engineering review of the vendors'oftware verification and validation test and configuration management.
The inspectors noted that the licensee planned to control the configuration on the ladder logic software that can be modified by plant personnel and to allow the responsible vendors to control the software stored in the firmware (operating system).
The inspectors found that the licensee considered, for the purposes of configuration control. that the operating system was part of the hardware.
The licensee planned to control the configuration for these items through the standard plant configuration control procedures for procurement and installation.
The inspectors found that each primary vendor had contr'actual responsibilities to inform the licensee of any software changes in the operating system (firmware).
The licensee stated that they did not verify that similar arrangements had been made between the primary vendors and the subvendor fit
-13-EB The inspectors noted that 'the software verification and validation
'pecification used on the vendor's software for the modifications was similar to, but less stringent than, that used in another specification which was NRC-reviewed'.
The inspectors found that, although General Electric did not develop software configuration specifications the same as its safety related product lines.
General Electric has followed its internal configuration management processes for all components.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that. the licensee was relying on the vendors for installing and providing reliable and compatible hardware and firmware in the digital adjustable speed drive control and feedwater control systems.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee,'s reliance on the vendor for firmware configuration control presented a
vulnerability for introduction of a previously unanalyzed failure mechanism for the feedwater control system.
Hiscellaneous Engineering Issues a.
Ins ection Sco e
52001/52002 The inspectors reviewed precautions taken to minimize electromagnetic and radio frequency interference.
b.
Observations and Findin s Because of the large, voltage difference between the digital control system and the recirculation pump power supply, conductive coupling could be a threat to the reliable operation of the reactor water recirculation system.
The inspectors found that, to prevent this coupling. the vendor used fiber optic lines to isolate the digital control system from the silicon controlled rectifiers in the power supply system.
The inspectors also found that the system had been grounded in accordance with vendor specifications.
The inspectors noted that signs prohibiting the use of portable radios were not visible in the adjustable speed drive 'building because they
"
were posted on the cabinet doors which were open and obscured the signs.
The licensee stated that appropriate signs would be posted on the outside of the building and that plant personnel would be informed of the restriction for use of radios in the vicinity of the building.
The inspectors did not observe any permanently mounted equipment near the building that might pose an electromagnetic interference thr ea In addition to the observations regarding the lack of signs, the inspectors observed that there were no filters on the louvers in the doors to minimize the introduction of dust, dirt. or sand into the cabinets.
The inspectors were concerned about this because the local environment was desert-like.
The licensee stated that similar equipment had been operated in much worse environments than what their equipment would be subjected.
The inspectors noted that the feedwater system digital equipment was designed to perform in an industrial environment.
The licensee performed susceptibility tests and site surveys to qualify the digital equipment to the plants electromagnetic environment.
The inspectors noted that the susceptibility tests were performed using the guidance of Hil-Std. 461C.
"Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility Requirements for Control of Electromagnetic Interference,"
Sections CSOl.and CS02."
The licensee also performed a fast transient burst test in accordance with International Electrotechnical Commission Procedure 801-4,
"Electromagnetic Compatibility for Industrial Process Heasurement and Control Equipment Part 4:
Electrical Fast Transient/Burst Requirements,"
1988:
and, a surge withstand test in accordance with ANSI/IEEE 37.90a,
"Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus."
During review of licensee Report No. 31427-9H-1,
"Test Report for Analysis of Point-of-Installation and Generic EHI Mapping Data of Control Room for WNP-2 Power Station," the inspectors noted that the comparison of the data obtained during the fast transient burst test and the electromagnetic emission surveys was not clear because the results were not compatible.
The inspectors found that the fast transient burst test was intended to demonstrate the immunity of the instrumentation when subjected to switching transient.
with the reference being time.
The inspectors found that the plant's electromagnetic emission survey was intended to measure the conducted radio frequency on the power and signal lines, with the reference being -frequency.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the use of fiber optic lines for isolating the digital control system from the recirculation pump power line was a
good engineering design.
,The proposed administrative controls for minimizing electromagnetic and radio frequency interference was acceptabl I
-15-X1 Exit Heeting Summary V.
Hang ement Heetin s
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 7, 1996.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
While the licensee identified some material as proprietary, no proprietary information is included in the repor ATTACHMENT Licensee PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED J. Albers, Manager, Nuclear Training D. Atkinson, Hanager, Reactor and Fuels Engineering P.
Bemis, Vice President for Nuclear Operations L. Fernandez, Licensing Manager G.
Freeman.
Project Engineer J. Irish. Bonneville Power Authority R. Koenigs. Project Hanager D. Hand, Manager, Design and Projects Engineering T. Muth, Manager, Quality Services M. Reis, Quality Assurance Lead H. Rice.
Design Engineer G. Smith, Plant General Manager J. Swailes. Director, Engineering D. Swank, Regulatory Affairs Manager R. Webring, Vice President.
Operations Support W. Yee. General Electric Nuclear Services Manager NRC Barr, Senior Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 52001 Digital Retrofits Requiring Prior Approval IP 52002 Digital Retrofits Not Requiring Prior Approval LIST OF PROCEDURES REVIEWED PROCEDURE NO.
1.3.59 2.2.1 2.7.4A 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.3.1 4.2.1.2 REVISION
17
18
25
23
TITLE Reacti vity Management Program Reactor Recirculation System 120V AC RRC ASD UPS Master Startup Checklist Reactor Plant Cold Startup Normal Shutdown to Cold Shutdown Normal Shutdown to Hot Shutdown Reactor Scram Reactor Vessel High Water Level
-2-PROCEDURE NO.
4.2.1.7 4.2.1.8 4.2.1.10 4.7.1.8 4.7.5.1 4.12.1.1 4.12.4.6 4.12.4.7 4.602.A6 4.602.A13 4.603.A7 4.603.AB 5.5.19 7.4.3.2.2.11 7.4.3.4.1.2.1 7.4.3.4.2.3.1 8.3.339 8.3.376 9.3.10 9.3.12 10.25.158 10.25.159 10.25.160 10.25.173 10.27.26 REVISION
9
10
23
13
6
7
10 ll
10
0 TITLE Recirculation Pump Seal Failure Recirculation Control System Failure Loss of Reactor Recirculation Flow Loss of Power to SM-7 120V AC Critical Power Supply Failure Control Room Evacuation and Remote Shutdown FAZ Unintentional Entry Into Regions of'otential Instabi 1 ity 602.A6 Annunciator Panel Alarms 602.A13 Annunciator Panel Alarms 603.A7 Annunciator Panel Alarms 603.A8 Annunciator Panel Alarms RPV Draining to Restore RPV Level Indication Balance of Plant Isolation System Logic Functional Test ATWS RRC Pump A Trip System EOC RRC Pump Trio on TTV/GV Fast Closure System A - RTT ASD/FW Preop ASD Preop Control Rod Sequence Exchange Power Plant Maneuvering Testing 8 Setting ABB-47H Three Phase Undervoltage Relays Testing 5 Setting ABB-59F Volts Per Hertz Relays Testing
& Setting Bassler BE1-81 Frequency Relays Testing 8 Setting of ITE 51IM Time Overcurrent Relays Accident Monitoring - Reactor Vessel Level Upset and Shutdown Ranges
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LIST OF PROBLEM EVALUATION REQUESTS REVIEWED PER NUMBER 296-0173 296-0317 296-0318 296-0355 296-0411 DATE 3/5/96 5/1/96 5/1/96 5/10/96 5/20/96 TOPIC Control room panel classifications Transformer loading calculations Electrical separation of cable routing Inverter power supply arrangement Electrical separation of cable routing
e III