IR 05000397/1990025

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Insp Rept 50-397/90-25 on 900909-1021.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, ESF Status & Surveillance Program
ML17286A441
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1990
From: Johnson P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17286A439 List:
References
50-397-90-25, NUDOCS 9011270165
Download: ML17286A441 (14)


Text

U. S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No:

Docket No:

Licensee:

Facility Name:,,

50-397/90-25 50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P.

0.

Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.

2 (WNP-2)

Inspection at:

WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:

September 9 through October 21, 1990 Inspectors:

R.

C. Sorensen, Acting Senior Resident Inspector M. Royack, Reactor Inspector H.

D. Chancy, Acting Resident Inspector A. Mon, Acting Resident Inspector Approved by:

o nson, se Reactor Projects Section

- 0 ate sgne Summary:

Ins ection on Se tember

1990 - October 21 1990 50-397/90-25

~AI d:

R ti i

p i

byth id ti p t f

t room operat)ons, operational safety, engineered, safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, special inspection topics, proce-dural adherence, and review of periodic reports.

During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90713, and 93702 were

'uti 1 ized.

Safet Issues Mana ement S stem (SIMS Items:

None.

Results:

General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s

Si nificant Safet Matters:

None.

Summar of Violations and Deviations:

No violations or deviations were 1 entl )e

.

0 en Items Summar

No items were closed and no new items were opene DETAILS 2.

Persons Contacted

"J. Baker, Plant Manager L. Harrold, Manager, Generation Engineering

"R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

  • J. Harmon, Maintenance Manager A. Hosier, Licensing Manager

"H. McGilton, Operational Assurance Manager R. Koenigs, Technical Manager

"S.

McKay, Operations Manager

  • J. Peters, Administrative Manager G. Gelhaus, Assistant Technical Manager M. Shaeffer, Assistant Operations Manager R. Mebring, Assistant Maintenance Manager The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, maintenance, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel.

"Attended the Exit Meeting on October 23, 1990.

Plant Status 3.

At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was operating at lOOX power.

On September 25 the reactor was manually scrammed due to problems encountered with maintaining Digital Electrohydraulic Control System (DEH) pressure sufficiently high (see paragraph 3).

The reactor was restarted on September 29 and achieved lOOX power on October 4 where it remained until the end of the inspection peri,od.

Reactor Scram Due to Broken Relief Valve Pi in in Turbine Auto Sto Oil stem At 5:58 a.m.

on September 25, control room operators manually scrammed the reactor from approximately 40X power.

A reactor shutdown was in progress due to the inability to maintain DEH pressure sufficiently high to keep turbine throttle valves and governor valves open.

System pressure is normally maintained at about 2100 psi by one of two positive displacement pumps.

Annunciators had been received in the control room indicating high differential pressures across system filters and low system pressures.

The "A" DEH pump was secured and the "B" pump was started, but excessive leakage was noted from the "B" pump discharge filter.

The DEH ~umps were swapped again but system pressure continued to degrade.

The

'B" pump was restarted, leaving both DEH pumps running, which caused DEH pressure to increase to about 2000 psi for a short time, temporarily allowing an orderly reactor shutdown since the operators recognized that the problem would not be corrected with the reactor at power.

However, DEH system pressure again degraded to approximately 1700 psi and a TG AUTO STOP TRIP alarm was received in the control room indicating that turbine auto stop oil pressure was low and that a turbine trip should already have occurred.

In addition, one of

the four turbine bypass valves spuriously opened.

The shift manager ordered a reactor scram.

The bypass valve subsequently reclosed and the scram recovery was conducted without further complication.

The unit was placed in cold shutdown.

Control room operators responded appropriately to the event".

A level I (highest tier) root cause analysis was conducted.

It was determined that a pipe nipple to a relief valve in the turbine auto stop oil system had cracked approximately 340 degrees around the circumference.

This caused a loss of auto stop oil pressure which in turn caused the DEH interface valve to open, dumping DEH fluid back to, the sump.

This'esulted in a loss of DEH system pressure.

All other indications followed as a consequence of reduced system pressures and high system flows.

The leaking discharge filter was due to improperly sized 0-rings.

The pipe nipple was replaced, as were various filter O-rings.

The inspector reviewed the root cause analysis and found it to be thorough except for a lack of discussion of the spurious bypass valve operation.

Licensee representatives responsible for the root cause analysis agreed to include a short discussion of the spurious bypass valve opening and why that was an expected outcome of the scenario depicted above.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

0 erational Safet Verification 71707 a.

Plant Tours The following plant areas were toured by the inspectors during the course of the inspection:

o Reactor Building o

Control Room o

Diesel Generator Building o

.

Radwaste Building o

Service Water Buildings o

Technical Support Center b.

The following items were observed during the tours:

(1)

0 eratin Lo s and Records.

Records were reviewed against ec naca peer 1catson an administrative control procedure requirements.

Emer enc Communication Director in Remote Shutdown Room.

e snspec or oure e

emo e

u own corn an

)

no find the Emergency Communication Directory, but found only an out-of-date version of the plant telephone directory.

This was brought to the Shift Manager's attention on October 10, 1990.

He agreed to provide a current copy of the Emergency Communication Directory to the Remote Shutdown Room.

At the

A I

exit meeting, plant management committed to ensure current revisions of the Emergency Communication Directory are main-tained in the Remote Shutdown Room.

(2)

(3)

Monitorin Instrumentation.

Process instruments were observed for correlat)on etween c annels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.

Shift Mannin

.

Control room and shift manning were observed or con ormance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.

The attentiveness of the operators was observed in the execution of their duties and the control room was observed to be free of distractions such as non-work related radios and reading materials.

(5)

(e)

E ui ment Lineu s.

Valves and electrical breakers were ver)

se to e

1n the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.

This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.

Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were verified by direct observation.

E ui ment Ta in

.

Selected equipment, for which tagging requests a

een initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment was in the condition specified.

General Plant E ui ment Conditions.

Plant equipment was o serve or 1n ducats ons o

system 1 eakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingits functional requirements.

Annunciators were observed to ascertain their status and operability.

Fire Protection.

Fire fighting equipment and controls were f

ih dpi ti p

d Plant Chemistr

.

Chemical analyses and trend results were revsewe or conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.

Radiation Protection Controls.

The inspectors periodically observe ra so oglca protect>on practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.

The inspectors also observed compliance with Radiation Mork Permits, proper wearing of protective equipment and personnel monitoring devices, and personnel frisking practices.

Radiation monitoring equipment was frequently monitored to verify operability and adherence to calibration frequenc While observing work on MS-FT-33B, the inspector noted that no specific survey for the component being replaced existed and only a general statement concerning a contamination survey on the 471 level of the reactor building was in the HP shift log.

The HP supervisor verified that the transmitter/piping and work area had been surveyed in detail, and that there was no contamination problem.

The HP supervisor also agreed that he would bring to the attention of all HP technicians the need to be more specific about documenting their survey activities.

(10) Plant Housekee in

.

Plant conditions and material/

equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.

Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.

While observing work on RCIC-P-3, the inspector observed one area around RCIC-P-1 which was properly designated as a

contaminated area by a boundary rope and floor tape.

Within this area two valves, RCIC"V-7518 and RCIC-V-38 had packing leaks sufficient enough to have a steady stream of condensed steam flowing through the contaminated area, which was cluttered with air hoses, equipment, and an old set of PC coveralls.

The stream of water was to the point of running out of the contaminated area over the tape.

The inspector advised the HP supervisor of the situation.

The area was cleaned up and a temporary berm was put into place to direct the flow of condensed steam to a floor drain.

(11) ~Securit

.

The inspectors periodica1ly observed security practices to ascertain that the licensee's implementation of the security plan was in accordance with site procedures, that the search equipment at the access control points was operational, that the vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed, and that personnel allowed access to the, protected area were badged and monitored and the monitoring equipment was functional.

5.

En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdown 71707 71710 Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety) were walked down by the inspectors to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.

The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.

Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.

~Sstem Diesel Generator Systems, Divisions 1, 2, and 3.

Dates October 9, 15

Low Pressure Coolant Injection, (LPCI)

Trains "A", "B", and "C" Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

Scram Discharge Volume System Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Divisions 1 and

October

October

October

October

October

October

October

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Surveillance Testin 61726 a.

Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were:-reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:

1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure 'existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; 'and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.

b.

Portions of the following surveillance tests were observed by the inspectors on the dates shown:

Procedure 7.0.0 7.4.3.1.1.6 Descri tion Dates Performed RPS Reactor Vessel Steam Dome

, High Pressure Trip CFT October ll Shiftly Instrumentation Check

, October ll 7.4.9.7 7.4.3.7.5.9 10. 24. 79 Reactor Building Crane Interlock Operability Test Drywell H2/02 Analyzer CMS-SR-14 Channel Calibration Calibration Test of Eberline Model BC-4 Beta Counter September

October

October

No violations or deviations were identifie d

7.

Plant Maintenance (62703 During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements and with administrative and maintenance procedures, required gAlgC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.

The inspectors verified reportability for these activities was correct.

The inspectors witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:

Descri tion MWR AR-0814, PASS PSR-V-003B Valve Indication Repair MWR AR-0377, RCIC-V-19 Miniflow Valve Torque and Captive Fasteners MWR AR-0351, RCIC-P-3 RCIC Keepfill Pump Bearing Replacement MWR AS-5592, Replace MS-FT-33B NWRs AS-4018 and AS-4032, Repair Control Room Emergency Chiller Dates Performed October ll October ll September ll, 12,

October 2,3,4,5 October

During replacement of the RCIC keepfill pump bearing per AR-0351, the inspector expressed his concern that maintenance procedures needed greater engineering involvement.

This was due in part to the observation that bolt sizes were not specified on the MWR, indicating that an adequate field inspection had not been conducted by the maintenance engineer who wrote the work instruction.

At the exit meeting, licensee management acknowledged that this did not meet their expectations and stated that the program for deeper engineering involvement in the preparation of maintenance procedures was in place, and that efforts were being taken to produce clearer and technically accurate procedures.

During MS-FT-33B flow transmitter replacement per AS-5592 a problem was identified with maintaining cleanliness of the transmitter in that the transmitter openings and reused piping were not capped or taped.

The attendant gC inspector did not appear to properly verify cleanliness of the transmitter or reused piping prior to installation even though there was a place on the gC checksheet for checking cleanliness.

On the other hand, the gC inspector pointed out to the I&C technicians that they had not run new wiring for the new transmitter.

The Plant Modification Request (PMR) parts list showed that the wiring needed to be changed from 14 to l8 gauge wire, but this was not reflected on the MWR.

The inspector requested that the licensee ensure themselves and the inspector that other previous transmitter replacements had included the proper

III wiring.

The licensee agreed to accomplish this for other Honeywell transmitter replacements, since this was the type of transmitter being installed on the particular PMR in question, and reported to the resident inspector that all other transmitters that had been replaced with Honeywell transmitters had the proper size wiring.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts (90713)

Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.

This review included the following considerations:

the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements and the reported information was valid.

Mithin the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.

o Monthly Operating Report for August 1990.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Exit Meetin (30703 The inspectors met with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to discuss inspection status and an exit meeting was 'conducted with the indicated personnel (refer to paragraph 1) on October 23, 1990.

. The scope of the inspection and the inspectors'indings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representatives.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by or discussed with the, inspector during the inspection.