IR 05000397/1990024
| ML17286A310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1990 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A301 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-90-24-MM, NUDOCS 9009140234 | |
| Download: ML17286A310 (10) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No.:
Docket No.:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Meeting at:
Meeting Conducted:
Prepared by:
50-397/90-24 50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Region V Office, Walnut Creek, CA July 26, 1990 S.
R. Friedenthal, Intern, Reactor Projects Branch Approved by:
r
- -; Consta e, Acting C ief Reactor Projects Section
F /c D te Signed Su+nary:
On July 26, 1990, a meeting between NRC and Supply System management was held in the Region V Office.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss issues related to the WNP-2 restart, receive a briefing on the status of certain licensee initiatives, and to.continue dialogue between the senior management of Region V and the Supply System regarding recent performanc DETAILS 1.
Mana ement Meetin Partici ants Nuclear Re ulatoi Commission J.
B. Martin, Regiona1 Administrator Dr. J. T. Larkins, Acting Director, Projects Directorate V, NRR S. A. Richards, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch D. F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch P.
H. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
G. L. Constable, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Section
P. L. Eng, NRR Project Manager C. J. Bosted, Senior Resident Inspector, WNP-2 S.
R. Friedenthal, Intern, Reactor Projects Branch Washin ton Pub1ic Power Su
S stem A. L. Oxsen, Deputy Managing Director G.
D. Bouchey, Director, Licensing and Assurance J.
W. Baker, WNP-2 Plant Manager L. T. Harrold, Manager, Generation Engineering 2.
~Back round On July 26, 1990, a meeting was held at the Region Y office with the individuals identified in paragraph 1 in attendance.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss issues related to the WNP-2 restart, receive a
briefing on the status of certain licensee initiatives, discuss some recent significant events, and continue dialogue between senior Region V and Supply System Management regarding licensee performance.
3.
~Meetin Hr. Hartin opened the meeting by welcoming the members of Supply System Management and discussing the agenda for the meeting.
In his-opening remarks, Mr. Oxsen stated that the Supply System was pleased to discuss the issues at hand, and that they were prepared to answer any questions which the NRC might have.
a ~
Shorted Windin s in No.
1 Diesel Generator Mr. Baker discussed in some detail the sequence of events that led to the discovery of the shorted stator windings in the 4'I diesel generator.
He stated that while the generator was in Spokane, WA, for repairs related to the bearing failure, an AC Voltage Pole Drop Test was performed, indicating that some of the coils were shorted.
Mr. Baker's discussion of the type and extent of the damage was facilitated by the presentation of photographs and some pieces of the damaged windings.
He stated that they decided to rewind all
eight poles, even though all eight were not damaged, because there may have been a manufacturing defect resulting in inadequate insu-lation between the coils.
Mr. Oxsen added that they brought in three outside consultants who determined that there was no way of knowing about the shorted windings without performing a Voltage Pole Drop Test a test usually done only at the manufacturing level.
He emphasized that'hey had taken a very conservative approach.
Following rewinding, a
24-hour full load test was performed satisfactorily.
b.
-
Shorted k~indin s on No.
2 Diesel Generator Mr. Baker stated that as a result of the problems found with 81 diesel generator, 0'2 diesel generator was tested, and also failed the Voltage Pole Drop Test.
After seeking outside consultation, a
72-hour full load test was performed satisfactorily.
Based on the successful'2-hour full load test and outside consultation, the licensee decided that it would be acceptable to declare the f2 diesel generator operable.
Mr. Baker added that they had prepared a
justification for continued operation (JCO) with requirements for.
more frequent monitoring and testing of the 82 diesel generator.'This JCO was subsequently forwarded to the NRC by letter dated July 27, 1990.)
Mr. Martin asked if there were plans to rewind the stator during the next outage.
Mr. Baker responded that they are assembling eight poles and will store them with the intention of eventually replacing all eight poles in the P2 diesel generator.
C.
f/1 Diesel Generator Bearin Failure Mr. Baker detailed the sequence of events that led to the failure of the roller bearing on the 81 diesel generator, adding that he was particularly proud of the root cause analysis.
He concluded that the failure was the result of excessive oil leakage and improper markings on the oil level sight glass.
Additionally, in the course of the investigation it was 'discovered that the bearing thermo-couples were wired incorrectly and the bearing high-temperature alarm would not have functioned.
Mr. Oxsen added that a review of the maintenance records showed that oil was frequently being added by shift personnel, and that the 0-ring had been replaced at least once, but the significance of this was not noticed or pointed out to management.
In summarizing the stator and bearing problems with the diesel gener'ators, Mr. Martin commended Supply System Management for dealing with them head-on.
He expressed concern regarding the two principal issues, these being (1) why the system engineer or mainte-nance personnel did not know the significance of repeated oil additions and (2) whether all plant operators knew how to read the oil levels.
He emphasized that management must be self-critical and ensure that appropriate lessons are learned from this even d.
Instrument and Control S lices e.
Mr. Baker opened the discussion by reviewing the discovery of an improper and unauthorized splice on a flexible conduit cable.
He felt that this was an isolated case and not symptomatic of the Supply System's maintenance program.
He also felt that a contribu-ting factor was the instrument 5 control (I
C) shop's
"can-do" attitude which encouraged them to complete all maintenance tasks quickly.
Mr. Richards pointed out that the basic issue was that the indi-vidual writing the maintenance work request (NWR) did not know how to do an MWR for environmentally qualified (Eg) equipment.
Nr. Baker agreed, noting that. the employee had not been trained to review the Eg list.
Mr. Kirsch questioned'he attitude of the technician and the mainte-nance program in general.
Nr. Baker responded again that he felt it was an isolated case.
One of the reasons he thought the error was not caught by the gA program was the technician's age and experience, which led to his work not being sufficiently questioned.
Mr. Baker finished the discussion by reviewing their efforts to find and identify other splices that might also have been done impro-perly.
Also, to help prevent future similar occurrences, he intro-duced a
new policy in which the electric shop will perform all splices, since they are much more experienced at splicing than the I 5 C shop.
In summarizing, Nr. Martin complimented Supply System management for doing a good job of following up on this issue, but questioned the health of the maintenance and inspection program.
He emphasized that this did not appear to be an isolated case and, in view of the extent and complexity of the breakdown, should be treated as a
characteristic event.
In particular, he also asked for a copy of the Root Cause Analysis and the status of the Management Role and Surveillance Program Report.
Pro ram Initiatives in Safet and Ins ection Mr. Bouchey discussed some of the improvements seen from the Maintenance Improvement Plan.
He felt that it was still too soon to see any real benefits, but that 'they should be more apparent by the next outage.
In the area of corrective action timeliness, he noted that although there was a decrease in the backlog, the time from the identification of a problem to its resolution is still too long.
Nr..Bouchey also discussed problems experienced with work attitude and quality from some work groups.
He stated that there have also been some problems with attitude toward procedure compliance, noting that it is one of the top three root causes of plant events, but he pointed out that trend analysis since 1987 shows improvement in this area.
Nr. Bouchey also gave an overview of the status of six
programs, including Safety Analyses, Procurement gA, The Technical
.Specification Improvement Program, and computerized searches of the FSAR.
Mr. Oxsen discussed an example of a situation wher ein he felt that their quality process was improving.
This example was a grass-roots effort to coordinate work within the reactor building.
He concluded that they had already seen some improvement, but that it was an evolutionary, not a revolutionary process.
f.
25KVA Switch ear Mr. Baker started the discussion by outlining the cause of the 25KVA electrical explosion.
He noted that it was the result of poor communications and procedures, complicated by the fact that the grounding straps were not originally installed with the intention of carrying a fault current.
He concluded that in the future the grounding straps will be capable of carrying a fault current.
Mr. Oxsen emphasized that Supply System management was taking this event very seriously and would be reviewing and changing the procedures to prevent this and other possible similar events.
Mr. Martin concluded this discussion by agreeing that Supply System management should be taking this event very seriously, using it as an opportunity to stress the importance of proper communications and formal control of equipment clearances.
He noted that this event could have had much more serious consequences.
g.
En ineerin and Maintenance Mr. Harrold discussed some of the improvements the engineering section would be making in the implementation of field change requests (FCRs) in particular, to make the engineering section more responsive.
He gave an example in which engineers were stationed to review FCRs first and thus eliminate a lot of them.
Other improvements he discussed included the minor modifications process, a process for initiating generic issues, and (by January),
an evaluation on simplifying non-safety related design activities.
Mr. Harrold also outlined future improvements.
These included.an electrical calculations computer program, flow-charting procedures, ANSI N45-2.11 improvement program, a specification improvement committee, a backlog management plan (by the end of August), the five-year scheduling plan, modification review committees, and the status of some design basis documents.
h.
Conclusion In closing, Mr. Oxsen outlined a training plan to educate plant personnel on how they can actively help to prevent problems from occurring.
He also pointed out that, except for the significant problems at the end, they had had their best refueling outage eve He requested another meeting with the NRC before the end of August to discuss the Supply System's actions in response to the 1988-89 SALP assessment.
Mr. Martin acknowledged the good operating run leading into the well-executed refueling outage.
He noted, however, that the events encountered at the end of the outage were fundamental in nature, resulting from lapses in what would be considered effective engineering or operating practices.
He stated, that the events bring into question the degree to which real improvements in performance have been thus far realized by the Supply System.
Mr. Martin adjourned the meeting at 4:30 II