IR 05000397/1990007
| ML17285B231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1990 |
| From: | Cicotte G, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285B230 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-90-07, 50-397-90-7, IEIN-88-034, IEIN-88-34, IEIN-90-008, IEIN-90-8, NUDOCS 9005010331 | |
| Download: ML17285B231 (9) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
License No.
Licensee:
Facility Name:
50-397/90-07 NPF-21 Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted:
April 2-6, 1990 Inspected by:
cocotte, a iat)on e
a >st a
e
>gne Approved by:
ens aws 1,
>e Faci 1 ities Radi ol ogi cal Protecti on Secti on
/c P4 e
igne
~Summer:
Ins ection durin the eriod of A ril 2-6 1990 Re ort No. 50-397/90-07)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine unannounced inspection by a regionally based inspector o
aci lities and equipment; occupational exposure and efforts to keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA); and follow-up.
Inspection procedures 30703, 83727, 83728, 83750, and 90702 were addressed.
Results:
No violations were identified in the three areas addressed.
iivuera
, the iicensee's programs appeared fully capabie of meeting its safety objectives.
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DETAILS
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L. McKay, Operations Manager H.
McGilton, Manager of Operational Assurance R. Allen, Health Physics (HP) Craft Supervisor L. Bradford, HP Supervisor L. Gelhaus, Plant Technical Assistance Manager G. Graybeal, HP/Chemistry (HP/C) Manager D.
Harmon, Maintenance Manager T. Irish, Program Analyst [Bonneville Power Authority (BPA)]
F. Patch, ALARA Coordinator J. Pisarcik, HP Support Supervisor A. Smith, Radwaste Program Leader L. Wardlow, Radiological Services Supervisor
- Denotes those present at the exit interview held on April 6, 1990.
In addition to the individuals identified above, the inspector met and held discussions with other members of the licensee's'staff.
2.
Facilities and E ui ment (83727)
B.
~Chan ea As noted in inspection report 50-397/90-01, the main condenser off-gas treatment system equipment had been upgraded such that it could be operated in sub-cooled mode.
This provides more cleanup of gaseous effluent, by increasing the ability of the charcoal adsorber
.beds to adsorb radioactive noble gases and iodines.
Review of the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports (SARERR) for 1989, and current effluent readings at the time of the inspection, confirmed the effectiveness of the system.
The licensee had significantly increased the size and facilities within the control rod drive (CRD) rebuild room.
Increased shielding and storage were provided, and air and power service lines, including breathing air-lines, were being installed.
The licensee stated that the new facility was expected to significantly improve maintenance and turnaround time for CRDs.
At the time of the inspection, the licensee was in the process of permanently removing from the Reactor Building (RB) some unused instrument air system compressors.
The removal of these large components improved access and provided additional room for staging of outage equipment and personnel in low doserate areas.
Emer enc E ui ment Storage and emergency response kits were inspected to determine if the licensee was keeping emergency equipment in sufficient inventory and condition to adequately respond to emergency conditions.
One sound-powered telephone headset was missing from the Radwaste
C.
Building (RWB), and was brought to the attention of the licensee.
No other deficiencies were found.
Outa e
Su lies and Confi uration Survey and air sampling instruments, protective clothing, respiratory protection equipment, and facilities for cleaning and repairing these items, were inspected to determine if sufficient equipment would be available for the outage.
Capabilities for turnaround of used items was discussed with responsible personnel at the Plant Support Facility (PSF).
No concerns were identified.
The licensee stated that it plans to significantly alter the way access is controlled for primary containment "drywell" work.
The access control point was to be moved from the entrance on the 501'levation of the RB to the 471'levation, to allow more room for support equipment'.
The licensee's program appeared fully capable of meeting its safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Maintainin Occu ational Ex osure ALARA (83728 and 83750)
A.
Audits and A
raisals B.
Several appraisals by the plant quality control group were reviewed.
No significant concerns regarding ALARA were identified, Pro ram Chan es C.
No major changes to the ALARA program had been made since the last inspection of this program area.
However, the licensee stated that several improvements were being examined, including shifting additional staff to ALARA, in order to shift responsibility for more planning to ALARA, similarly to some other utilities with well-developed programs.
The inspector noted that the changes to how radiation work permits (RWP) are routed appeared to have been effective in increasing the time available prior to the outage for planning purposes.
Worker Awareness and Involvement D.
Personnel with whom ALARA was discussed were aware of their responsibilities regarding exposure control and how to maintain exposure ALARA.
The licensee maintains an incentive program for improvement suggestions.
ALARA "working groups" had been established to address specific issues.
The inspector attended a
meeting of the working group for control of contaminated tools and test equipment.
The group contained members from several disciplines, including contractor representatives.
ALARA Goals and Results The licensee's cumulative external occupational radiation exposure goal for the 1990 outage was 300 person-rem, The inspector noted
that this was well below the approximately 400 person-rem expended in the 1989 outage, which had exceeded the original and revised goals.
The licensee attributed the projected reductions to changes in the scope of the outage, and to various processes instituted in part for the purpose of minimizing radiation dose.
The ALARA coordinator informed the inspector of some of those methods:
I The CRD rebuild room modifications, discussed in paragraph 2.B, above, along with installation of temporary shielding, were expected to result in a savings of about 15 person-rem.
A controlled cooldown sequence, involving reduction of the rate of cooldown from 80F/hour to 30F/hour, was expected to result in a reduction in out-of-core radiation sources of up to 10K.
Fuel sipping within canisters, of 100K of the modules, was expected to result in the isolation of a suspected leaking fuel element, with consequent reduction in fission product deposition and in fission gas releases.
The release of fission gases within the plant results in significant lost productivity and increased exposure, due in part to interference with personnel contamination detection equipment.
The licensee's cumulative exposure for 1989 was approximately 492 person-rem.
This compares with the calendar year 1990 goal of 469 person-rem, as stated by the ALARA coordinator.
Facilit Tours Tours of the PSF, Radwaste Building (RWB),
RB, and Turbine Building (TB), were conducted.
Independent radiation surveys were performed with NRC ion chamber survey instrument model ¹R0-2, serial
¹022906, due for calibration on April 16, 1990.
Radiological postings, contamination control stepoff pads, and other access controls which were observed were generally consistent with the licensee's procedures and TS requirements.
The inspector noted that several personnel who had been hired for the outage wore their dosimetry in pockets on their hips or in other ways not consistent with the general employee radiation orientation training and plant procedure.
Licensee HP staff were informed of the matter and acknowledged the observation.
No further examples were observed.
A contaminated area boundary on the 501'levation of the TB was observed to have been pushed back such that a portion of the undress area within the previously posted area was poorly marked.
When the matter was brought to the attention of the licensee, HP personnel went to the area to determine what had occurred.
The lead HP technician informed the inspector that workers who had been building the scaffolding had bumped into the barricade with some equipment, but had not informed HP personnel.
The lead HPT stated that the workers were counseled on the need to inform HP when problems occu C
Housekeeping appeared adequate.
The RMB was observed to have significant accumulation of used protective clothing and equipment.
The situation was better in the RB.
F.
Internal Ex osure Control and Assessment The inspector briefly reviewed internal exposure records, observed bioassay performance, and discussed internal exposure control with HP personnel.
Respiratory protection equipment available for use was observed to be in good condition, and licensee procedures for use and maintenance of respirators were consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 20. 103,
"Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive materials in air in restricted areas."
No concerns were identified.
The licensee's program appeared fully capable of meeting its safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Follow-u (90702 50-397/IN-88-34 (Closed):
This refers to NRC Information Notice 88-34, Control and Accounta s ity of Non-Fuel Special Nuclear Material
[SNM] at Power Plants."
The licensee had distributed the IN via its tracking system, and had concluded that no discrepancies existed and that no changes were necessary.
The inspector observed that the licensee's licensed sources containing SNM, including those from Units 1 and 4, were being kept in a secure location on site, under the direct control of the HP department.
This matter is considered closed.
50-397/IN-90-08 (Closed):
This refers to NRC Information Notice 90-08, r-azar rom ecayed Fuel.".
The licensee had distributed the IN via its tracking system, and was in the process of making minor procedural changes to include new information.
The inspector noted that the licensee had, prior to issuance of the IN, calculated beta dose rates from released fission product gases.
This matter is considered closed.
50-397/85-20-04 (Unresolved):
This refers to the applicability of iodine p ateout actors or samp ing of gaseous effluents under accident conditions (See inspection reports 50-397/85-20, 85-29, 87-05, 87-29, 88-33, 89-20, 89-29, and 89-32).
The licensee stated that the laboratory testing of sample lines of the type for the high range ventilation exhaust radiation monitor REA-SR-48, to which the licensee had committed, was in progress at the time of the inspection.
This matter will remain unresolved pending review of the results of the contractor's laboratory testing.
An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to determine if it is an acceptable item, a violation, or a deviation.
50-397-90-01-02 (0 en:
This matter refers to a failure to take adequate surveys urging wor on highly contaminated radioactive system components (see inspection report 50-397/90-01).
The licensee's timely response to the Notice of Violation (NOV) stated that the reason for the violation
was personnel performance by the HP technician who was to have performed the surveys.
The licensee further stated that a contributing factor was less than adequate pre-job coordination and briefings.
As corrective action, the license stated:
All RMPS were being reviewed by HP supervision prior to implementation.
A root cause analysis was performed.
The recommendations resulting therefrom were to evaluate the HP program with respect to assessment of radiological considerations during the work planning cycle, and provide increased supervisory overview of HP work coverage.
The results were to be discussed with HP technicians.
A job task analysis was performed, resulting in projected revision of the HP technician training program to emphasize performance over theory, particularly for coverage of radiological work.
The licensee committed to incorporating the recommendations of the root cause analysis, with completion by October 1, 1990.
Although the response was received after completion of the on site portion of the inspection, the inspector had observed a significantly increased awareness of the purpose of the ALARA program, as noted in paragraph 3.C, above.
This matter will remain open pending review and verification that the recommendations have been comprehensively implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspector met with those individuals, denoted in paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6, 1990.
The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.