IR 05000397/1990018
| ML17285B425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1990 |
| From: | Garcia E, Tenbrook W, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285B424 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-90-18, NUDOCS 9008160140 | |
| Download: ML17285B425 (13) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-397/90-18 License No.
NPF-21 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Mashington Nuclear Project No.
2 (MNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 site, Benton County', Mashington Inspection Conducted:
July 9-13, 1990 Inspected by:
en roo
,
>a ion pec>a
>s a
e igne Approved by:
~Sommar:
a cia, en>or a
>a ion pecla 1s U,
1e Reactor a iological Protection Branch a
cygne a e sgne Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection of followup items, Licensee Event epor s, ra
~a ion protection during the current plant outage, training and plant process water quality over the preceding operating cycle.
Inspection procedures 92700, 92701, 83723, 83729 and 84750 were used.
Results:
equality verification activities for both chemistry and radiation pPro ecEion had improved since prior inspections (Sections 4 and 6).
The licensee's radiation protection program during outages had isolated lapses of individual radiation protection practices similar to problems observed during prior inspections (Section 4).
One unresolved item involving radioactive material uptake by a worker on May 20, 1990, was identified (section 2).
Plant chemistry performance was similar to that observed during the prior operating cycle (Section 6).
The licensee had discovered a non-conservative dose calculation error the GASPAR II computer code (Section 6).
900:=iA0140 90ri803 PDR ADOCK 05000397 lg PDC
Persons Contacted Licensee DETAILS A. Alexander, Chemistry Craft Supervisor J. Allen Health Physics Craft Supervisor J. Arbuc(le, Compliahce Supervisor J.
Baker, Plant Manager D. Bennett, Chemistry Craft Supervisor R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager A. Hosier, Licensing Manager D. Kobus, Plant equality Assurance Manager L. Mayne, Chemistry Supervisor L. Morrison, Chemistry Support Supervisor G. Oldfield, Senior Health Physicist R. Patch, ALARA Coordinator D. Pisarci k, Health Physics Support Supervisor L. Pritchard, Health Physics Craft Supervisor S.
Regev, Senior Health Physicist R. Mardlow, Radiological Services Supervisor D.
Mer lau, Training Manager Bonneville Power Administration'.
Irish, Program Analyst USNRC C. Sorensen, Resident Inspector The persons listed above attended the exit meeting on July 15, 1990.
In addition, the inspectors contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection.
~277 2927917 Item 50-397/88-13-01 (Closed):
This item concerned periodic reca s ra son o
gamma spec rometers.
The licensee had established an annual calibration check at multiple gamma energies.
The.data'btained was evaluated and averaged with previous calibration data.
The recalibrations addressed the inspector'-s concern with reference to ANSI N42. 14-1978, "Calibration and Usage of Germanium Detectors for Measurement of Gamma-Ray Emission of Radionuclides."
Item 50-397/89-15-01 (Closed):
This item concerned a measurement aisagreemen urging an licensee measurement of radioactivity in a coolant sample.
The inspector attributed the disagreement to nonhomogeneity and deposition in the sample.
The licensee had evaluated this hypothesis and had not observed any significant sample changes.
However, as a precaution, the licensee had included a nitric acid digestion step in the Plant Procedures Manual (PPM), procedure 12.5.6,
"Determination of E-Bar," to assure that all nuclides were in solution during analyses.
Item 50-397/89-15-02 (Closed):
This item concerned verification that the licensee s
ana yses o
gaseous particulate and liquid effluent met the technical specification (TS) lower limit of detection-(LLD) when a
low-abundance 748 keV gamma emission was used to quantify Mo-99.
The inspector reviewed testing performed under PPM 12. 11.3,
'Lower limit of Detection and Data Reporting."
The inspector also independently requested a computation of Mo-99 LLD for a gas particulate filter based
.on conservative values.
In each case, the detection limit for Mo-99 was the limiting case, and met the requir'ed LLDs of TS tables 4. ll-l and 4.11-2.
Item 50-397/90-15-01 (0 en):
This item involved review of the licensee's eva ua
>on o
a ay
,
, work activity which resulted in several workers becoming contaminated with radioactive material.
The inspector s
onsite review focused on the licensee's internal dosimetry techniques.
The inspector was informed that the maximally exposed individual's second lung count indictaed the presence of 160 nanocuries of Co-60 although the license had only assigned an exposure 0.58 MPC-hour.
Subsequent in-office NRC calculations indicated the presence of 160 nanocuries in the lung to be inconsistent with an exposure of less than one hour at the concentration presented in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B.
The Chief Reactor Radiological Protection Branch called the Senior Health Physicist on August 2, 1990, and was informed that a calculation error had been made and that their current assessment indicate a potential exposure of 114 MPC-hours.
In view of the provisions stipulated in 10 CFR 20. 103(b)(2)
this matter will remain "open" and will now be considered an unresolved item.
An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation or a violation.
Items IN-90-31 (Cl osed)
IN-90-33 (Cl osed)
IN-90-35 (Cl osed):
The snspec or vers se a
e is e
zn orma ion no sees were distributed to cognizan't licensee personnel for evaluation.'.
Onsite Followu of Event Re orts (92700 LER 50-397/89-40-L1 (Closed):
This supplemental report concerned the discovery o
erroneous
)na Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) meteorology data during reviews of secondary containment post-accident performance.
The meteorology data in FSAR Amendment 36 was erroneous due to the rotation of a data matrix during transmission from a contractor's database to the licensee's corresponding database.
In the report, the licensee committed to correct the FSAR.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for the erroneous meteorology data based on potential effects on'ther license conditions, procedures, calculations and setpoints.
The.licensee had begun their investigation of this matter through their licensing department.
At the close of the inspection, the licensee had determined
that the erroneous data set was only included in chapter 2.3 of the FSAR, but not used for the chapter 15 analyses.
The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) used the chapter 15 data, therefore, various setpoints and calculations based on the ODCM were not corrupted.
The licensee s'tated their intention to include the appropriate matrix of meteorological data
'n FSAR Amendment 42.
The chapter 15 accident analyses would be revised in 1992 upon resolution of the design basis secondary containment leak rate.
Occu ational Ex osure Durin Outa es (83729)
Audits Since the prior inspection,.the licensee had performed equality Assurance Survei llances 2-90-057, 058 and 082 concerning radiological protection and radwaste management.
Five equality Finding Reports were identified among the three Survei llances.
The Findings concerned conduct of personnel in controlled areas, overdue instrument calibration, frisking of contaminated items, and lack of procedure detail for specific radwaste system operations.
The Survei llances appropriately addressed work activities and practices during the outage.
The reports aggressively addressed specific inadequacies in training and management supervision that contributed to the Findings.
The licensee's program for audits had improved since survei llances were conducted to observe radiation protection practices during the outage where no audits or surveillances had"been planned as of the prior inspection.-
~Chan ea The licensee had identified a potential failure to evaluate a change in the facility as described in the FSAR.
Problem Evaluation Report (PER)
290-555 described a deviation to Plant Procedure Manual 4.602.A5 that
.
allowed area radiation monitor setpoint changes, but did not recognize that dose rates in multiple areas had increased beyond the values stated in the FSAR.
The inspectors observed that the licensee's radiation dose rate trending programs did not identify changes from the FSAR earlier, despite the performance of two concurrent trending programs by the health physics and power generation departments.
Although the final corrective action was not decided, the licensee had initiated a program to clean the contaminated floor drain and equipment drain lines responsible for the dose rate changes, and modify the lines to remove flow restrictors causing crud traps.
In this case, licensee self-assessment was successful in recognizing unreviewed changes.
The inspector had no further questions in this matter.
External Ex osure Control
The inspectors examined a sample of external doses received by workers during 1990, including the refueling outage, and dosimetry evaluations of prior dose history.
The inspectors verified that each worker exceeding 1250 mi llirem in a calendar quarter had had their exposure history documented on NRC Form 4 or equiv'alent, and that all doses fell within the 5(N-18) accumulated dose limit, N representing the persons'ge in years.
All selected workers accumulated less than 2500 mil'lirem in'he calendar quar ters examined.
The inspectors observed that dosimetry personnel were engaged in a highly laborious procedure to determine the distribution of personnel dose for
CFR 20.407 reports.
The inspectors also encountered difficulties in obtaining data on those individuals with greatest exposure.
Both of these problems were caused by an inability to conveniently sort or reference the dosimetry data by dose received.
The licensee had recognized the deficiencies in the dosimetry database and was yursui-ng different hardware/software options for replacing the system.
The inspectors also learned that the licensee had not yet reassigned shin doses to the whole body, as had been understood during the previous inspection.
Since the prior inspection, the licensee had received a
legal memorandum recommending the reassignment, and the plant radiation.
protection group had formally informed Radiological Services of the individuals who required such reassignment.
At the time of this inspection, Radiological Services had not completed reassignment of the doses.
The licensee's program for external exposure control was adequate.to meet safety objectives however one area needing improvement involved a lac'k of versatility in accessing dosimetry data.
This-condition could lead to errors in report preparation and dose tracking efforts.
Control of Contamination Surve s and Monitorin The inspectors conducted tours of the Reactor Building, Radwaste Building and Turbine Generator Building.
The following items were observed:
Chewing gum wrappers and an empty can of chewing tobacco with tobacco residue were found in controlled areas.
Unsecured items crossed contaminated area boundries, such as tools, ladders, cords and hoses.
Such items could cause cross-contamination, or could have been mistaken as clean items, causing personnel contamination if removed from the contaminated area and used without a precautionary survey.
Pools of feedwater/condensate had crossed contaminated area boundries around feedwater pump 1A at several points.
Also, oil from equipment was pumped from the contaminated area to a portable skid in the non-contaminated area, and leaked on the clean area floor.
No berms were provided around the feedwater pump.
Mater had pooled within a berm fashioned from rope and tape around the vacuum pump near steam jet air ejector B.
Personnel had left a
mound of protective clothing in the water.
No step-off pad was provided for the area.
An RO-2 survey instrument was left unattended near condensate pump lA and had not been source checked on the date of the tour.
Collectively, the inspectors characterized these observations as lapses of personal responsibility for radiation protection practices and were similar to observations in prior inspections.
The Health Physics and Chemistry Manager stressed that certain controlled areas had been kept under scrutiny to detect inappropriate practices, with no positive results.
The inspectors acknowledged the licensee's efforts, but emphasized that manaqement expectations may need to be reemphasized beyond that information received in routine training.
Radiation Protection Chemistr and Radwaste Trainin (83723)
The inspectors examined the licensee's training update system.
This system incorporated generic information distributed through NRC and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) into revisions to the training curriculum.
However, the system did not include licensee event reports, radiological occurence reports and formal problem root causes in the training revisions.
The inspectors observed that the training update system would be the logical point to introduce plant-specific experience into the training program.
In September, 1990, the licensee planned to convene a group of subject matter experts to periodically review new industry and plant experience to determine if the information should be included in 'the training updates.
The inspectors requested records from the'raining department database.
The database indicated many overdue job performance measure items for chemistry and radiation protection personnel.
Discussion with craft supervisors in these areas and the cognizant training manager revealed that plant personnel did not consider the training database as timely or accurate as needed for some recurring training, Problems with in-qrade technician qualifications appearing on the database with inappropriate due dates had been identified by the licensee.
Because of these problems, the training department interpreted the training records and submitted specific lists of personnel to plant supervisors, who in turn made the designated personnel available for the required traininq.
Also, the training department had committed to health physics and chem>stry to remove the erroneous in-grade qualification data.
In light of the actual frequencies of required retraining, the inspectors did not identify instances of personnel missing required training.
The licensee had included instruction for proper completion of ALARA scope sheets in the supervisors'adiological refresher training and retraining for non-supervisory engineers..
During discussions w>th the licensee, the inspectors stated that ALARA scope sheet training would be most beneficial during initial training, as well as refresher training.
The licensee's programs for radiation protection, radwaste and chemistry training met requirements and commitment.
Gaseous Waste Mater Chemistr (84750)
Audits The licensee conducted an in-depth "Mater Chemistry Effectiveness Assessment,"
dated January 3,
1990.
The assessment highlighted the need for communication and interpretation of plant chemistry data.
This conclusion generated two quality finding reports with recommendations for an overall chemistry program plan and improved data reports to plant management.
Several observations on chemistry procedures and performance were also presented.
During verification and validation of a recently received copy of the dose assessment code GASPAR II, the licensee discovered that a
subrouti'ne'ontained an erroneous substitution of a Curies/year conversion rather than the required microcuries/second, resulting in dose factors'ow by a factor of 32.
The licensee had observed the same problem in a copy obtained in 1987.
The licensee referred the problem to the originator of the code and NRC headquarters.
The senior inspector discussed the recurring error with the licensee and stated that he would personally discuss the matter with NRC headquarters.
The licensee's appraisals of water chemistry had significantly improved in scope and depth with the addition of the Effectiveness Assessment.
The licensee's commendable identification of a persistent error in the GASPAR II computer code revealed a potential generic problem.
Primar Water ualit The inspectors conducted a review of reactor water and final feedwater chemistry trends measured during the 1989-1990 operating cycle. 'he inspectors examined reactor water conductivity/pH, chloride and specific activity, as well as feedwater copper.
The inspectors observed the following:
Reactor water conductivity varied about the EPRI-referenced 0.2 uS/cm achievable value for copper condenser/filter-demineralizer
.
plants.
Mide variations in conductivity occurred in response to plant transients, such as condenser leakage, exhibiting performance similar to the 1988-1989 operating cycle.
During 1990, plant transients were less frequent, improving conductivity to 0.15 uS/cm periodically, and rarely exceeding 0.2 uS/cm during steady operation.
The conductivity trends met the requirements of TS 3.4.4 and PPH 1. 13. 1, "Chemical Process Management and Control."
Reactor water pH predictably followed conductivity behavior.
Reactor chloride and sulphate anions were well-beyhaved at approximately 1 ppb.
Feedwater copper only occasionally attained the achievable value of 0.3 integrated ppb, varying instead at 0.3-0.4 ppb.
Occasional transients near the 0.5 ppb action level 1 occurred due to both chronic and traumatic condenser tube degradatio The inspector and the licensee discussed the observed performance trends and current plans for improvement.
The licensee and the inspector agreed that high transient conductivity and copper concentrations could be prevented by further improvements in condenser performance and water cleanup system performance, but significant further reductions in baseline conductivity and copper were not feasible without major modifications and improvements.
The Chemistry Support Supervisor was preparing presentations for management consideration 'of condenser replacement and deep-bed condensate demineralizers to improve long-term performance.
The licensee had also identified design problems with the condensate filter-demineralizer resin precoats, as approximately one cubic foot of resin was lost from the septa to the lifting plate due to flow irregularities.
This condition created inefficiencies in resin utilization and earlier, more severe, breakthrough.
The 1'icensee planned several backfits to improve resin distribution and retention during precoating and operation, including new liftplates, baffle plates and flow straighteners.
The licensee maintained previous levels of performance.in water chemistry, with primary chemistry at or near "achievable" values as defined by EPRI/Owners Group guidelines, and within the requirements of the TS.
Exit Meetin (30703)
The inspe'ctors met with licensee management on July 13, 1990 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspect>on.
The senior radiation specialist explained that he had contacted NRC headquarters. during the inspection to personally make NRC management aware of the systematic error in the GASPAR II computer code.
The inspectors 'bservations regarding the master training database were discussed and clarified.