IR 05000397/1990017
| ML17286A356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1990 |
| From: | Prendergast K, Rosano R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A355 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-90-17, NUDOCS 9010180273 | |
| Download: ML17286A356 (16) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Y
Report No. 50-397/90-17 Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21 Licensee:
Mashington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Mashington May Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Mashington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conduct d:
Se tember 10-14, 1990 Inspector/
Team Leader:
Kent M. Prenderg t
Emergency Preparedness Analyst Team Members:
Da e
igned Blair Spitsberg, NRC Region IV Tom Lonergan, Comex Comex Approved by:
'I 28 Rsc ard osano, ctsng se
,
a e
cygne Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch SUMMARY:
Ins ection on Se tember 10-14, 1990 Re ort No. 50-397 90-17 Areas Ins ected:
Announced inspection, of the 1990 annual emergency prepare ness exercise.
Inspection Procedures 30703 and 82301 were used.
Results:
The licensee's approved scenario and objectives provided an adequate scope and framework for the 1990 exercise.
Based on the scenario, the licensee adequately demonstrated capabilities for accident assessment and mitigation, emergency classification, notifications to state and local agencies, and
.recommendations for the protection of the public.
Areas for improvement were identified in Sections 5a and 5d.
These areas included one open item for potential inadequacies in the licensee's procedure for emergency classification and a number of items in the EOF that were noted to require improvement.
No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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P5C
DETAILS Persons Contacted:
N. Monopoli, Manager, Support Services R. Chitwood, Manager, Emergency Planning F. Klause, Supervisor, Emergency Planning R. Noggle, Supervisor, Drills and Exercises Y. Derrer, Emergency Planning Training Supervisor Exercise Scenario 82302 The scenario began with the plant in power ascension following a technical'pecification shutdown.
The reactor was at about 10K power; en route to 100K.
There were no open Technical Specification action statements.
Several anti-nuclear activists had staged a protest on the east side of the parking lot, as they were permitted under a court order which forced the county to issue a lawful demonstration permit.
The Shift Manager declared an Unusual Event and assumed the duties of the Plant Emergency Director (PED) based upon the civil disturbance at the entrance to the plant.
Mhen three of the activists exceeded the limitation of the permit and scaled the protected area fence, the PED declared an Alert as required by the classification procedure for intentional breach of the protected area.
The offenders were apprehended almost immediately. Shortly after the Alert was declared a fire in the TSC forced an evacuation to the Control Room (CR).
Following a reactor protection system half scram and many radiation alarms, a manual scram was inserted.
One main steam isolation valve pair remained open.
The PED concluded that although the circumstances were not specifically identified in the situation-based section of the classification procedure, a Site Area Emergency Classification was required under the procedures basis discussion involving the level of safety of the plant.
This declaration was soon overtaken by an escalation to the General Emergency classification based upon an interfacing LOCA and projected dose rates at the exclusion area boundary greater than
Rem whole body and
Rem thyroid.
The exercise was terminated when the MSIVs were manually closed, stopping the release to the environment.
Emer enc Pre aredness Exercise Plannin 82301 The Manager, Emergency Planning has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting, and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
The objectives were developed in concert with state and local agencies.
The scenario was developed by licensee emergency preparedness staff with the assistance of contractor support and additional staff with appropriate expertise in engineering, operations, health physics, etc.
The scenario was kept under strict security until after the exercise.
Individuals involved with the scenario were not allowed participation in the exercise.
Players were not allowed access to the scenario or to
'1 cc t'
~
exercise objectives.
The exercise was conducted to meet the requirements contained in Section IV.F.3. of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
4.
Federal Evaluators Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to the scenario.
The evaluators were stationed in the CR (Simulator), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The inspector in the OSC also accompanied repair/monitoring teams dispatched from the OSC.
FEMA, Region X, evaluated the response to the scenario by state and local agencies in the EOF and other offsite emergency facilities. The results of the FEMA evaluation will be addressed in a separate correspondence from FEMA Region X.
5.
Exercise Observations 82301 a.
Control Room The following aspects of control room operations were observed during the exercise:
Accident assessment, classification of emergency events, emergency notification, frequent use of emergency procedures, and brainstorming involving actions to mitigate the accident.
The following are NRC observations of CR activities.
The observati'ons are intended to highlight areas for improvement of the program.
The inspector in the CR observed the following during the CR/simulator notification of the unusual event.
Twelve minutes elapsed from the. time of declaration to the time of receipt by the EOF Coomunications Center for relay to state and local agencies.
Changes were made to the unusual event notification message after'he Shift Manager had reviewed the message.
The changes were noted to have been made prior to transmission and without the Shift Manager's concurrence.
Also the Shift Manager did not initial the unusual event message until after it was transmitted.
The inspector evaluated the licensee's classification procedure EPIP 13.1.1,
"Emergency Classification" to determine the classification of the events described in the scenario.
The following weaknesses were noted with regards to'emergency classification procedure 13.1.1.
The classification of the Site Area Emergency (SAE), during the exercise was noted to have been made based on professional judgement and, due to inadequate procedures, was not triggered by specific emergency action levels contained in either the symptomatic or event-based initiating conditions.
At the time of the SAE the reactor had
experienced fuel failure greater than 1% and had a release pathway through a failed open MSIV, which would have been classified by NUREG-0654.
During the exercise at 10:11 a.m., it was known that three barriers had failed (failed fuel, one open MSIV pair, and an interfacing loss of coolant accident resulting in high rad levels in the turbine building).
NUREG-0654 requires the classification of a general emergency for a loss of two barriers with a potential for loss of the third barrier.
However, using EPIP 13.1.1 with the 10:11 a.m.
plant conditions described in the scenario would only result in an SAE classification.
MNP-2 must await either a post-accident sample confirmation of failed fuel (potential three hour delay) or, alternatively, an exclusion area boundary dose projection greater than
Rem whole body or 5 Rem thyroid.
The lack of adequate procedural guidance forced the Plant Emergency Director (PED) to the make the GE classification based upon professional judgement.
However, the use of judgement for event classification may result in classification inconsistencies.
These inadequacies will be followed under Open Item 90-17-01.
The inspector also evaluated EPIP 13.1.1 with regard to classifying a small break LOCA either bypassing containment or leaking past a
failed penetration.
Based on plant conditions alone, it did not appear that EPIP 13.1.1 would classify this accident as an SAE or General Emergency (GE) in accordance with NUREG-0654 until something else happened (e.g.
dose projections at the site boundary or exceeding Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) graph limits; etc.).
It was also observed that EPIP 13.1.1. is not a stand-alone procedure and requires the EOPs to understand the basis and parameters of some of the EALs.
For example, discussions with State of Mashington emergency response personnel indicated that they did not fully understand some of the acronyms used in the classification procedure.
The procedure uses numerous acronyms (e.g.
HTCL, PSPL, SRVTPLL, etc.)
in the Symptomatic Initiating Conditions and these are not defined in the classification procedure.
The licensee should incorporate the basis for these EALs in their classification procedure.
Technical Su ort Center The activities in the TSC were limited because of the evacuation of the TSC shortly after activation.
The following observations were noted.
The evacuation of the TSC was performed in an orderly manner and the responsibilities of the Plant Emergency Director were transferred to the Control Room while the TSC was being evacuated.
The activation of the TSC was hindered by the use of the single portal radiation monitor outside the TSC.
There are 3 portal monitors at the access to the TSC.
However, as a
common practice only one appears to be routinely operationa t
0 erational Su ort Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:
activation, functional capabilities, and the disposition of various in-plant repair/ monitoring teams.
The following are NRC observations of OSC activities.
The OSC was set up and operational in a timely manner in accordance with EPIP 13.10.9,
"OSC Operations and OSC Duties". The OSC was well managed and status boards were well maintained throughout the exercise.
Verbal briefings and debriefings were concise and documented.
ALARA practices were discussed and observed.
Habitability checks were routinely conducted and the results were announced to all occupants of the OSC and posted in the "Events L'og".
Entry Team personnel who were required to use self contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) were observed to use and remove the SCBAs properly.
In addition, numerous team members correctly changed-out breathing air bottles using appropriate technique in areas that were noted to have been screened for acceptable concentrations of airborne radioactive materials The entry foyer of the Service Building was used as a clothing change area in the OSC.
Protective clothing was obtained from a supply in a.cabinet located in the front of the foyer.
Although an area was roped off between the clothing supply and the general area of the foyer, team personnel were observed using the same area for both dress-out and removal of protective clothing.
There was no containment, or segregation of potentially contaminated clothing upon removal during the exercise.
Emer enc 0 erations Facilit The following activities were observed during EOF operations:
facility activation, emergency notifications, protective action recommendations, dose assessment,'and the interface with state and local agencies.
The following are observations of the activities in the EOF.
The observations are intended for improving the program.
Staff responsibilities were well understood by EOF personnel and logs in the Decision Center were well maintained.
Information flow to decision-makers and between assessment groups in the EOF was observed to require improvement.
The inspectors observed that critical information available about plant conditions and emergency mitigation was either not communicated, or was not made'vailable to all appropriate personnel.
As a result, actions taken by EOF decision-makers, including information provided to offsite authorities, were made without a full understanding of the cause of the accident.
The following areas for improvement in the flow of information were noted.
,The Recovery Manager and his Decision Center (DC) staff were unaware of the cause of the reactor fuel damage.
Information regarding the
'I
control rod drop accident was not.cormunicated from the CR to the EOF.
Consequently, the Recovery Manager was not privileged with reliable information to assess whether the source term would be expected to increase or decrease over time.
The reason for the fuel failure was also not transmitted to the Joint Information Center for dissemination to the public.
Plant status boards in the DC and MUDAC were not maintained.
The plant status board in the DC did not reflect the time the data was posted or obtained.
The information on plant status boards in the MUDAC was not up to date as reflected by 12:10 p.m. plant conditions be posted as late as 1:45 p.m.
As of 1:20 p.m., the Assistant Offsite Coordinator was not aware of the status of the offsite evacuations, which had been completed by 12:30 p.m.
Critical events, posted by the information coordinator in the EOF, were not regularly highlighted or brought to the attention of the decision-makers.
Announcements in the EOF of the SAE and GE were not made promptly after the declarations.
The SAE was announced at 10:18 a.m.,
minutes after declaration.
The GE was announced at 10:32 a.m.,
minutes after the declaration.
The MUDAC mistakenly utilized the real time of the accident duration (the time of release to the time of calculation} for entry into the dose projection software instead of utilizing a number of default time periods for duration (2, 4, 6, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, etc.) to project the outcome if the release is not mitigated or stopped.
The MUDAC also did not appear to validate and confirm the results of dose projection by analyzing field measurements.
Access control to the EOF was not established until 10:00 a.m.,
minutes after activation.
Entrance by unauthorized persons could have occurred prior to this time and positive accountability, although not an objective of the EOF during this exercise, was never established.
Even after a security guard was posted at the entrance to the EOF at 10:00 a.m.,
access authorization did not require positive identification fo'r licensee employees or members of state and local response agencies.
6.
Exit Interview An exit interview to discuss the preliminary NRC findings was held on September 14, 1990.
Personnel present at this meeting are identified in the attachment to this report. During this meeting the licensee was apprised of the inspectors'oncerns regarding the adequacy of their classification procedure and encouraged to examine ways to improve the flow of information in the EOF. The Manager of Emergency Preparedness comnitted to examining methods to improve the operation of the EOF and to revise the classification procedure by removing the reference for a PASS sample to be taken prior to the declaration of a GE.
The Manager of
Emergency Preparedness also offered to provide the NRC with a copy of their exercise findings when their critique process is completed.
The licensee was informed that no violations of NRG requirements were identified during this inspection.
Other items discussed during this meeting are described in Sections 2 through 5 of this repor i I
ATTACHMENT EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES A. Oxsen, Deputy Managing Director D. Bouchey, Director, Licensing and Assurance S. McKay, Operations Manager M. Monopoli, Manager, Support Services R. Chitwood, Manager, Emergency Planning J.
Harmon, Manager, Plant Maintenance R. Mogle, Supervisor, Emergency Planning Q. Houchins, Manager, JIC Programs Y. Derrer, Supervisor, Emergency Training D. Ottley, Supervisor, Radiological Assessment D. Pisarcik, Supervisor, Health Physics R. Graybeal, Manager, HP/Chemistry G. Tupper, Manager, Comm.
and Ext. AFF B. Milbrat, Nuclear Engineer,,
BPA F. guinn, Meteorologist D. Mannion, Emergency Planner J.
Landon, Technical Advisor G. Birch, Emergency Planner G. Ray, Senior, Emergency Planner S. Telander, Security Program Manager K. Meehan, Security Lieutenant K. Worthen, Operations Engineer F. Diaz, Security, Sergeant
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