IR 05000397/1985012
| ML17277B754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1985 |
| From: | Johnson P, Toth A, Waite R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17277B753 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-85-12, IEIN-84-29, NUDOCS 8505300212 | |
| Download: ML17277B754 (28) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No:
Docket No:
50-397/85-12 50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
O.
Box 968 Richland, WA. 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
March 1 - 31, 1985 Inspectors:
A. D. Toth, Senior Resident Inspector R.
S. Waite, Resident Inspector Date Signed
~la/no Date Signed P.
H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Projects Section
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Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on March 1 - 31 1985 (50-397/85-12)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of control room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF)
status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports and special inspection topics.
This inspection involved 180 inspection-hours on site by two resident inspectors, including 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> during backshift work activities.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
One unresolved item was identified, as discussed in paragraphs 5.c and 12.
85053002l2 850507 PDR ADOCK 05000397
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Mashin ton Public Power Su l S stem d J
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Martin, Plant Manager Powers, Assistant, Plant Manager Corcoran,'perations Manager Cowan, Technical Manager Landon, Maintenance Manager Harmon, Instrumentation Supervisor Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Feldman, Plant (}uality Assurance Manager Peters, Administrative Manager Partrick, Administrative Assistant Powell, Iicensing Manager Malker, Maintenance Outage Manager Wuesterfeld, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
"Personnel in attendance at exit meeting The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
General
'The Senior Resident Inspector and/or the Resident Inspector were on site March 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18-22 and 25-29.
Several regional office inspectors visited the site this month for an Emergency Re'sponse Facility Appraisal, March 25-29.
They were R. Fish, G. Temple and K. Prendergast accompained by M. Wohl, E. Markee, R'. Hogan, G.'upinski",
and M. Mangler from headquarters; also K. McBrode from Pacific Northwest Labs (PNL) and G. Bryan from Comex/PNL.
These. activities"were documented in a separate inspection report.
Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power level for most of the month.
A scram occurred March 22, due to problems with the computer controller for the turbine generator.
V 0 erations Verifications The resident inspectors reviewed the control room operator and shift manager log books on a daily basis for this report period.
Reviews were also made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and that the licensee was actively pursuing corrections to conditions listed in either log.
Events involving
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unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with the control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The licensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's), particularly those dealing with Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
and ESF electrical alignment, were observed.
The inspectors, routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that licensed personnel on duty in the control room at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance.
The inspectors observed access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments, and availability of onsite and offsite electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of
~ accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety 'and adherence to regulatory requirements.
Reactor Trip, March 22, 1985 The reactor tripped on high neutron flux associated with a pressure increase which occurred when the turbine control valves shut during work on the turbine control system.
The automatic control system computer was in the first stages of return to service after work by the Westinghouse representative.
The work was performed under close supervision by the shift manager.
The Vestinghouse representative had provided assurances to plant management that the planned computer activation actions would not have any'ffect on the control portion of the system.
The control valve actuation was not expected and appeared to be inconsistent with the control system design, for the actions taken.
A licensee investigation commenced immediately.
The resident inspector was in, the on-site technical engineering building at the time of the scram, and observed that the reactor engineering manager, technical manager, and mechanical system supervisor convened immediatel'y at the remote computer monitoring terminal in the office of the 'r'eactor"engineering supervisor.
At this location, they were able to monitor the principal plant parameters to assess any major irregularities.
They were able to determine closure of main steam isolation valves, operation of pressure relief valves, reactor pressure and coolant flow, suppression pool conditions, control rod insertion completion, an other parameters.
A similar terminal exists in the plant'anager's office.
They were in prompt contact with the Shift Technical Advisor in,the control room to confirm their observations and ascertain additional information regarding the transient.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Surveillance
.Pro ram Im lementation The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of selected safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements, In addition to observing and occasionally verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the
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inspectors observed portions of several detailed surveillance tests by operators and instrument and control technicians.
a.
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors - Checking and calibration of the monitors was conducted in accordance with procedures, with careful regard to independent verification provisions and coordination with the reactor operators.
b.
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units - Records showed that the weekly surveillance checks of local pressure gages had been conducted as required.
An 18-Month surveillance of the low-pressure alarm switches (Barksdale BlT-GH-32SS) had also been conducted in November 1984.
Records for this surveillance showed that 22.7 percent of the switches had their setpoints drift below the Technical Specification limit of 940 psig.
Five of the switches had drifted to below 880 psig.
All setpoints were.reset to within the technical specification limit.
However, the licensee failed to recognize the generic implication that the 18-month surveillance interval specified by the 'technical specification was apparently too long to assure that the setpoints would remain within the acceptable range throughout the entire period between surveillances.
The NRC event reporting rules (NUREG-1022 and Supplement 1)
do not require reporting of singular items found during Technical Specification required surveillance activities, such as drift of setpoint of a single pressure switch; however, the published guidelines suggest that a generic and/or repetitive problem (of a type of switch used in several safety systems)
would be reportable.
Through nonconformance report 285-179 the licensee has programmed evaluation of this matter for reportability and to determine the need to trend, anlayze and shorten the calibration cycle.
(85-12-01)
C.
Containment Integrity Verification - Technical Specification surveillance procedure 7.4,6.1.1 records showed that containment isolation valves were verified to be closed on January 17, February 20, and March 18.
However, the February surveillance did not include 24 vent and drain valves in the steam tunnel and four valves above the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) vaults.
The March surveillance omitted these same valves, plus four valves above the transversing in-core probe (TIP) room.
The surveillance records were annotated that these were not inspected due to the ALARA considerations of their being in high-high radiation areas.
The Assigned Reviewer and the Operations Manager stated that they approved this action on the basis that the personnel risks associated with verifying these valves were not justified and that the areas were generally locked and inaccessible during operations (full power operation commenced February 18 and was continuous, except for reductions to 80 percent for certain testing, through to March 22),
and any actual water/steam leakage would be detected by area/room temperature monitor y ~
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The situation was not recognized and anticipated by the plant staff and a technical specification change had not been submitted to except these valves from the general surveillance requirement.
(Prior to March 18, 1985, the surveillances were conducted during plant shutdowns and the plant had not been in power operation for continuous periods of 30 days).
This is an unresolved item (refer to paragraph 12).
(85-12-02)
The valves in question were verified by the licensee to be closed, on March 26 and April 2, 1985 during unplanned plant shutdowns.
d.
Standby Service Water Loop B Operability - This surveillance appeared to be accomplished in accordance with the approved procedures.
e.
RHR Loop B Operability - This surveillance appeared to be accomplished in accordance with the approved procedures.
6.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety-related systems maintenance activities were observed.
By direct observation and review of records the inspector determined whether these activities were consistent with LCOs; that the proper administrative controls and tag-out procedures were followed; and that equipment was properly tested before return to service.
The inspector also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine if the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and to verify that backlogs which might affect system performance were not developing.
a
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Special Preventive Maintenance Activities The inspector interviewed licensee staff nondestructive testing (NDE)
personnel and observed a demonstration of infrared detection equipment which the staff used to examine the electrical connections of all motor control centers in the reactor building this period.
The NDE personnel worked in conjunction with plant staff electricians in obtaining access to the motor control centers.
This examination was at the licensee's initiative, and was intended to identify any terminations which had high electrical resistance and thus excessive heat generation.
This, effort was an appropriate generic corrective action following a recent fire in a non-safety related circulating water equipment motor control center.
b.
Priority Maintenance Planning - The plant management held in readiness a group of approved priority work packages for maintenance items which could be accomplished during any unexpected plant outage.
At about 3 p.m.
on Friday, March 22, the reactor experienced an unexpected scram.
Plant management immediately convened a Plant Operations Committee (POC) meeting to review; confirm'and approve prompt implementation of the maintenance work plans.
The advance planning allowed completion of repairs which otherwise would have had to be
deferred to the next planned outage, or be conducted while the plant was operating, with higher radiation ex~sire and/or other encumbrances.
c ~
Routine Maintenance Planning - On March 22 the inspector monitored a typical daily (7 AM) maintenance planning meeting, which was attended by maintenance supervision and operations representatives.
The documented existing plant status and problems were reviewed at the meeting, in addition to the status of individual maintenance work requests in progress and planned for the day.
Potential issues were identified for the routine afternoon meeting of plant department managers for review and action.
The data and meetings demonstrated continuing efforts to coordinate maintenance activities with the operations staff and maintain cognizance and involvement by senior plant management.
d.
Station Battery Operation And Maintenance - The inspector reviewed the plant procedures for 24 volt, 125 volt, and 250 volt station battery surveillance and testing.
Procedures for weekly and quarterly tests were examined, in addition to associated records of surveillances which had been conducted through 1984.
The procedures included reference to and guidance from IEEE-450-1980.
The inspector particularly noted provisions relative to specific gravity determinations, records of battery charging, equalizing charging, float charging, arrangement of the battery cells, and corrective actions for deficient readings.
Procedures were in preparation for conducting the 18-month load discharge test, based upon an existing maintenance procedure which addressed the requirements of IREE-450.
Interviews with the electrical supervis'or ascertained that single cell chargers were not used at this site for station battery charging, and were not accepted for use by the plant procedures.
Inspection of the batteries showed cleanliness, adequate fill, lack of significant sediment, proper spacing material, and provisions for addition of water.
Records showed that discrepancies identified by the licensee were corrected or incorporated into planned work activities'echnical specification and procedure requirements appeared to have been satisfied.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
ESP Verification The inspector verified the operability of the Containment Atmosphere Control System by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration, and verified that valves were in the proper position, had power available, and were locked as appropriate.
The licensee's
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procedures were verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Action on
CFR 50.55(e)
and
CFR 21 Construction Deficienc Re orts Various construction deficiency reports were issued by the licensee during the construction phase of the project.
Those reports of conditions and corrective actions taken or planned were reviewed by NRC regional staff at the time of submission.
Fulfillment of reporting requirements, report completeness, corrective actions, generic aspects of the items, and need for onsite followup were evaluated.
Many of these reports were further examined during followup inspections of records and hardware at the site.
During the current period, the inspector performed a review of the WNP-2 plant files of such reports.
The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain that the plant records verify that the described corrective actions had been implemented and/'or incorporated into controlled corrective action'rograms subject to tracking and prioritization evaluations.
The following item is considered closed:
(82-12-B) Licensee. Item No. 118:', J.eakage path within main steam isolation valves may exceed capabilities of main steam leakage collection system.
This matter was identified as a result of the Burns and Roe human factors engineering review in 1982, and appropriate reports,to NRC were issued.
A corrective design change was issued to provide power to valve MS-V-146 from safety related switchgear.
This reviewed'y an NRC inspector, as described in NRC inspection report 83-24.
The inspector questioned the possible existence of the condition elsewhere in the leakage collection system.
Subsequently, via letters dated July 25 and 29, 1983, the licensee requested more thorough review by Burns and Roe of the root causes and actions to prevent recurrence of such a design oversight.
Burns and Roe replied on August 23, 1983 with an assessment that unique circumstances existed for this design.
The normal. function of the valve in question (MS-V-146) was not safety-related; however, in some circumstances it did have a safety-related function; its location was in a non-safety related area.
Other components that perform a safety related function and are located in a non safety related area perform only the safety function, such that there should be no confusion to the engineer as to their function.
No further action was identified nor appears required.
This item is closed.
I,icensee Event Re orts (LERs)
The resident inspectors reviewed selected reports and supporting information on site to verify,that licensee management had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety
questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
Except for LER 85-011, the following LERs are closed.
LER-84-005, Inadvertent Autostart Of Diesel Generator This matter was reviewed and closed as described in NRC inspection report 84-31, as related to followup item 84-06-03.
Current activities include daily maintenance planning meetings and increased emphasis by plant management for the technical staff to be more complete in preparations of details of maintenance work requests.
LER-84-047 (Revision 1), Significant Design Deficiency (Pire Penetration Seals)
This item was reviewed by the resident inspectors as described in NRC Inspection Report 84-18.
The revised report documents the completed corrective action of adding fire barrier material in piping annulus areas of the containment structure concrete.
The inspectors have observed such installed material during routine plant tours of all areas of the reactor building.
LER-84-79 (Revisions 0 and 1), Reactor Scram Due to Low Reactor Mater Ievel This item related to overload of the startup transformer during startup activities.
The inspector verified that the startup procedure 3.1.2 had been r'evised to incorporate appropriate cautions to the operators relative to starting system pumps.
The inspector also interviewed the system engineer and the Compliance Engineer to ascertain that the undervoltage relay time delay discrepa'ncy had been evaluated and resolved.
TER-84-081, System Isolations During Calibration and Maintenance This item was reviewed by the inspector and the inspector verified that procedures were revised as specified.
LER-84-086, Pailure to Conduct Fire Tour The inspector verified that a fire tour program was provided for by procedures and was routinely conducted and documented on a daily basis, such that the described event appeared to be an isolated oversight in the program.
LER-84-100, (Revision 0 and 1) Technical Specification Valve Closing Times Not Met (Surveillance frequencies were missed for several valves)
The licensee identified a program deficiency relative to surveillance of two valves, and conducted a study of the generic implications.
As a result, additional discrepancies
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were identified, and corrective actions taken.
The inspectors verified issuance of revisions to plant procedures 3.2.1 and 1.5.1 as described in the LER.
The inspector interviewed the Compliance Engineer and ascertained that he was routinely routed recent Technical Specification change requests for review of interim measures in-place.
LER-84-109, Hanual Scram Due to Turbine Control Valve Cycling The inspector verified that corrective action was taken as specified.
LER-84-111, Late Performance of Battery Surveillance Testing The resident inspectors verified that battery condition surveillance procedures existed and records showed that these were implemented for the safety related batteries during 1984, and that these activities were prescribed in accordance with acceptance criteria of the technical specifications.
Other related inspection activities are discussed in paragraph 6.d of this report.
The matter described in the LER appeared to be an isolated oversight associated with the initialization of the program.
LER-84-113, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation on Low Water Level The inspector verified that corrective action was taken as specified.
LER-84-119, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Isolation on High Delta Flow It appears that several RWCU Isolations have occurred since licensee corrective action was implemented subsequent to the feedwater transients discussed in report 84-25.
At that time the licensee initiated procedure changes which effect RWCU
,system operation.
During startup the RWCU discharge is routed to the main condenser until certain temperature constraints are met.
The RWCU flow is then restored to normal lineup, i.e., to the Reactor Feedwater Piping which returns to the vessel.
During the tim'e period that the RWCU flow is diverted to the condenser it appears that'he normal flow path begins to fill with air.
RWCU-FT-41 is mounted above the RWCU line so that when flow is restored t'o the normal lineup the gauge reads erroneously until vented due to the sensing lines fillingwith air.
Some work has been performed by the licensee in an attempt to correct this problem, however several more design changes are in the review stage at this time.
The problem of inadequate mounting of flow instruments has been noted in several other systems throughout the plant and appears to be due to the original system design.
The licensee will perform action to correct each individual mounting problem as it
c,
arises.
This is a followup item from a previous inspection.
(85-02-02)
LER-84-120, Auto Start of Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit The cause of this event, appears to be due to a lack of independent verification.
The independent verification program is currently being examined by the inspectors in detail.
LER-84-122, Fire Door Supervisory Alarm Inoperable The inspector interviewed the Compliance Engineer relative to the design oversight of omitting the connection wiring diagram from the design change process'he design change process was found to include provisions for identification and revision of all applicable drawings prior to closeout of a design change package.
This item appeared to be a matter of personnel error.
LER-84-123, Loss of Division I Critical Switchgear Room Cooling This event involved failure of. the bearing of a room cooler fan shaft.'he inspector, interviewed the mechanical maintenance supervisor, who referred to the computerized maintenance log to demonstrate that the plant staff had not done prior maintenance on the fan 'unit.
The loose bearing problem, if due to improper installation, was most'likely 'due to performance by the vendor.
The supervisor stated that he had recently performed training of plant maintenance crafts, using vendor manuals for bearing maintenance.
The maintenance records showed planned and completed training for individuaL qualifications as including the specific area of,bearing maintenance.
LER-84-126, Temperature'Monitoring Procedure Deficiency The inspector verified corrective action by observing that the licensee has created, three Operations Surveillance procedures for use in performing Technical Specification Surveillances (TSS) during the various modes of operation.
Procedures 7.0.0, 7.0.1, and 7.0.2 are to be performed respectively in modes 1,
2, and 3; mode 4; and mode 5.
The subject TSS is required to be performed by each procedure.
LER-84-129, Reactor Scram Due To Turbine Auto Stop Oil Low Pressure This event occurred'ue to the setpoint drift of pressure switches which can trip the main turbine.
The inspector verified that such equality Class II items (which can result in a trip of the reactor plant) are included in the scheduled surveillance program.
The pressure switches in question are specifically included in that program, with a two year cycle.
However, the system engineer plans to monitor the setpoint drift more frequently as a part of a study of temperature
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effects.
Monitoring for temperature effects on setpoint drift commenced immediately after a reactor scram on March 22, to assess conditions with hot and cold control oil.
Actions described in the LER appear to have been implemented.
LER-84-130 (Revisions 0 and 1), Primary Containment Integrity (Omission of valves from routine surveillance procedure)
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'The inspectors reviewed the revised proc'edures, and examined plant. operations records relative to the prior operation of valve FPC-149.
There did 'not appear to be excessive periods during operation when the valve was used for discharge to the radwaste system.
When not in use,, the valve was shown to be locked closed, as would be expected from the'Normal Position" indicated in FSAR Table 6.2-16.
However, control room night orders have now been issued to prohibit use of this valve during plant operation, and the LER was placed in the required reading. file for control room.operators.
Also, the Assistant Plant Mange'r has advised that a design change is in preparation to make manual valve FPC-149 valve a motor operated valve with automatic isolation.
LER-85-011, Pressure Boundary Leakage (Open)
I This item 'was discussed in NRC inspection report 85-08, and was considered open due to the reported saw cut or grinding mark on one of the 3/4 inch diameter drain pipes.
The licensee had cut out the failed piping and performed sec'tioning and metallurgical examination of the surfaces.
The inspector subsequently examined, the 'photographs and interviewed the engineers who performed the study.,
The apparent cut was found to be a linear appearing eroded zone due to the flashing of steam from the crack in the piping.
The surface of the crack, and the eroded area, showed evidence of fatigue failure as described in the LER ~
The piping involved was schedule 80 stainless steel and schedule 160 carbon steel.
Both were drain lines supporting two isolation valves on total lengths not exceeding 25-inches from the main piping to the far end of the outermost isolation valve.
The engineers attributed the fatigue failure to the vibration (probably 150 Hz for the stainless steel, 7 Hz for the carbon steel)
experienced by the cantilevered piping-valve assemblies, and stated that such vibration was not an element of the ASME required stress analysis performed for such piping design.
The licensee has assigned personnel to followup on this item in terms of any other locations of potential fatigue failure and is considering examination of additional piping during the forthcoming maintenance outage.
(OPEN)
LER-85-022, Inadvertant deactivation of high pressure core spray system
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During repair of two indicating light sockets a technician disconnected the grounding wires from the sockets, which inadvertently interrupted the ground return for the entire logic system for the high pressure automatic and manual actuation.
The work was performed in accordance with an approved emergency maintenance work request which was reviewed by the shift manager.
The vendor's elementary diagrams for the control panels showed that the light sockets were at the end of the logic train and removal of the ground wires should not have interrupted the system logic.
These were used as the basis for approval of the work, which appeared appropriate at the time.
However, the elementary diagrams were not usable for determination of actual wiring connections.
Actual wiring connections were shown on the vendor's detailed termination drawings, which were not suitable for ready determination of system logic.
The inspectors verified that operations and maintenance craft personnel received and were aware of a March 12, 1985 memorandum from the Assistant Plant Manager, which prescribed that specific details of as-wired connections must rely upon the connection diagrams and electrical wiring diagrams associated with the equipment, with use of elementary diagrams restricted to analysis of general system logic.
10.
S ecial Ins ection To ics The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to the following matters regarding events which occurred at other reactor sites:
a
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Woodward Governor Overspeed - Some Woodward Governors on turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps experienced inability to respond quickly enough to prevent an overspeed trip.
These events involved governors with mechanical centrifugal flyweights in the feedback control arrangement.
Although Woodward Governors are used at the WNP-2 site, these are equipped with electronic speed sensors with rapid feedback to the steam control valve, such that the overspeed trip problem should not be a concern at WNP-2.
The licensee site Nuclear Safety Assurance Group reviewed this matter and confirmed this information.
The system engineer advised that such overspeed trips had not been experienced at WNP-2 during the power ascention program in 1984.
b.
I-T-E 4160 VAC Circuit Breakers Model 5HK350 - Maintenance activities (at another facility) for this model device introduced non-apparent inoperability of the device.
The licensee's Nuclear Safety Assurance Group reviewed the details of the device and the reported maintenance problems and determined that such I-T-E circuit breakers were.not used at.
WNP-2 and the problems were not associated with breakers used at WNP-2.
C.
General Electric 4160 VAC Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers - In 1984 NRC issued an Information Notice regarding such breakers
(IN-84-29); additional information was subsequently developed by GE and distributed to licensees on August 24, 1984.
The MNP-2 site received this GE information.
One specific item assessed was the absence of Tuf-Ioc sleeve bearings, and use of aluminum-bronze bearings.
To aid in future analysis of any degrading condition of the MNP-2 breakers, the licensee has procured motion-analysis test equipment, for utilization in future preventive maintenance.
d.
Paul-Munroe Hydraulic Valve Actuators - The vendor issued a
CFR 21 report to NRC on August 30, 1984, regarding oil quality, seal failure, and installation alignment of valve actuators.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had received and evaluated this information.
The licensee's Nuclear Safety Assurance Group reviewed the master equipment list for VHP-2 and ascertained that the only safety related Paul-Munroe actuators were installed on the recirculation system flow control valves, and that these were actually of Ruskin Manufacturing origin, with Paul Munroe designation only due to relabeling due to Ruskin having later become a Paul Munroe subsidiary.
The Part 21 report did not identify WNP-2 as an end user of equipment in question.
ll.
Licensee Actions on Previous Ins ection Findin s Y
The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings:
a.
(Closed) Followup Item (84-06-02)
Standby diesel generator fast starts.
Specific wording of Technical Specification section 4.8.1.1.2 implied unacceptability of fast starts during diesel generator surveillance testing.
The licensee routinely reported circumstances of this matter in Licensee Event Reports during 1984, pending anticipated clarification of the Technical Specifications.
The clarification was issued in Amendment 4 of the specifications.
b.
(Closed) Followup Item (84-09-05) - Excess noise and personnel in the control room.
Licensee memoranda dated June 8 and August 31, 1984 established policy to minimize the number of personnel in the control room and established a specific quiet time for the operations staff to conduct shift turnover activities.
The inspectors have observed implementation of the policy and practices and a general improvement in shift turnover activities.
c ~
(Open) Followup Item (85-02-02) - Inadequate mounting of instrumentation.
Several systems throughout the plant have had problems with flow instrumentation accuracy due to air entrapment or steam condensation which occurs due to inappropriate mounting of instruments (see section 9,
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IER-84-119).
The licensee has committed to perform corrective action on each individual problem as it arises.
12.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.c.
13.
Mana ement Meetin The inspector met with the Plant Manager approximately weekly during this period, to discuss inspection finding status.
The inspectors met with the Plant Manager and members of his staff on April 1, to discuss the results of the inspection.
Relative to the large number of pressure alarm switch setpoint drift instances at the 18 month surveillance of the control rod drive hydraulic control units, the licensee indicated that the technical staff would review the guidance of NUREG-1022 regarding the reporting of generic problems with setpoint drift.
Regarding the omission of certain vent and drain valves from containment isolation surveillance activities (paragraph 5.c), the inspector emphasized that there appeared to have been sufficient opportunity for the plant staff to identify the heat and radiation problems in some areas during monthly surveillances throughout 1984, and anticipate the need for a Technical Specification change request.
This was subsequently identified as an unresolved item (paragraph 12).
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