IR 05000397/1985021
| ML17278A344 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1985 |
| From: | Johnson P, Toth A, Waite R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278A343 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-85-21, NUDOCS 8508190586 | |
| Download: ML17278A344 (12) | |
Text
Report No:
Docket No:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIP1ISSION
REGION V
50-397/85-21 50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
June 1 - July 12, 1985 Inspectors:
A.
~ R.
R.
Approved by:
P.
H. J Reactor 7 2A. zs~
h, Senior Resident te, Resident Inspector son, Chief rojects Section
Inspector Date Signed 7(2 e (dd-Date Signed Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on June 1-Jul 12 1985 (50-397/85-21)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of control room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF)
status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
This inspection involved 174 inspection-hours on site by two resident inspectors,, including 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> during backshift work activities.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su l S stem I
D. Mazur, Managing 'Director J.
Shannon, Assistant Managing Director for Operations J. Martin Assistant Hanaging Director for Operations-C. Powers,'lant Manager
"J". Baker, Assistant, Plant Manager R, Corcoran, Operations, Manager
'.'eardsley, Assistant Operations Manager
"K., Cowan, Technical',Hanager
"-J. Landon Haint'enance Manager
"-R.'raybeal Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
"-D. 'Zeldman", Plant Quali.ty Assurance Manager
";;J. Peters, Administrative Manager P. Powell,, Licensing Manager'.
Wuesterfeld, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
"Personnel in attendance at exit meeting.
The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and,shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and.records.
General The Senior Resident Inspector and/or the Resident Inspector were on site June 3-7, 10-14, 17-21, 23-29 and 30 and July 1, 2, and 12, 1985.
Regional office inspectors visited the site this month for routine inspection activities.
These activities were documented in separate inspection reports.
These included:
Regional office reactor inspector (P. Quails)
was on site June 10-14, and June 25-28, 1985.
A regional emergency preparedness inspector (G. Temple)
was onsite June 24-28, 1985.
Plant Status The plant shutdown continued for the majority of the month. for a maintenance outage.
The reactor was returned to service June 27, 198 t I I I
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I 0 erations Verifications-
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The resident inspectors",reviewed the control room operator and shift manager logo'okslon a daily basis for this report period.
Reviews were also, made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead I,og and Nonconformance Report Log to verify, that there were no conflicts with Technical Spe'cifications and'hat the licensee was actively pursuing corrections to conditions,3.isted in either log.
Events involving unusual conditions of equi.'pm'ent were discussed with the control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance, The licensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's), particularly those dealing with ZSF and ESF electrical alignment, was observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that the control room licensed personnel on duty at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance.
The inspectors observed access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments, and availability of on site and offsite electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
a
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During a plant walkdown the inspector observed that the Reactor Building to Metwell Vaccum Relief Lines do not have Seismic Category I stainless steel grilles installed across the swing check valve openings to prohibit debris from entering and preventing the valves from seating as specified in FSAR section 6.2.4.3.2.2.3.5.
A Plant Hodification Request (PMR)
02-85-0056-0 in which the system engineer identified this problem was initiated on January 22, 1985.
The plant tracking log projected completion of review by corporate engineering as late as August 2, 1985 and installation by the first refueling outage.
It appears that this item was not identified by the licensee as a nonconforming condition, nor did it obtain timely disposition and corrective action.
On July 12, a licensee representative provided a pending FSAR change and related design changes indicating that the grills are not required.
He also stated that records of prior telephone concurrence by NRC were being sought.
This is an unresolved item (85-21-01).
b.
During the month the inspector observed several instances of what appeared to be lax housekeeping and fire protection
,practices:
l.
In two separate entries into the drywell the inspector observed miscellaneous tools spread throughout, paper towels spread around, pieces of loose plastic, and approximately 2 quarts of oil in non-safety containers.
2.
During tours of the plant the inspector observed acetone, oil, and 'alcohol in non-safety approved containers stored throughout the plant in addition to boxes of paper towels as well as scattered paper towels.
Unattended
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oxy-acetylene rigs were observed on the 501 and 471 levels of the reactor building.
These items were presented to the plant management in several meetings and were presented by a regional office inspector at two meetings during this month.
On June 28, the regional office inspector identified these findings as a potential violation, to be discussed in another inspection report.
5.
Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation
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The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components w'as being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
Xn addition to.,witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks,,the inspectors observed portions of several
"- detailed survei11ance'ests by operators and instrument and control technicians.
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'he following p'rocedures-'were witnessed:
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a.
7.4.3.3.2.1'5y. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) B/C Low Pressure
'oolant Injection'",(LPCI) Mode Actuation - Logic System Functional Test (LSFT)-
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b.
7.4 '3'.3.2.9, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
B - LSFT c.
7.4.3.2.2.11, Balance of Plant Isolation LSFT The inspector observed that 13 out of 118 items failed to meet the requirements of the testing procedure.
The licensee prepared several Maintenance Work Requests (MWR's) to correct these problems and test each item individually in order to meet the requirement's of procedure 7.4.3.2.2.11.
d.
7.4.8.1.1.2.5, Standby Diesel Generator Loss of Power Test e.
7.4.3.2.1.2, Division I Isolation Activation, Reactor Level 2, and Accident Monitoring Level Indication Channel Calibration No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety-related systems maintenance activities were observed.
By direct observation and review of records the inspector determined whether these activities were consistent with LCOs; that the proper administrative controls and tag-out procedures were followed; and that equipment was properly tested before return to service.
The inspector also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine lf the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and verify that backlogs which might affect system performance were not developing.
The inspector followed maintenance on the Reactor Recirculation (RRC) System Pumps lA and 1B.
The licensee determined that the cause of vibration in pump RRC-P-1B was due to tensional failure of 16 out of 16 pump bearing housing bolts.
This failure appeared to
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have occurred due to inadequate staking of the bolts when originally installed, thus allowing, the bolts to loosen and back out, causing the bearing housing to,wear irregularly leading to a fatigue type failure of the bolts; or'to'overtorquing of the bolts when originally installed'
- The'icens'ee advised the inspector that similar type failures have occurred at"the Lasalle and Brunswick Plants.
The licensee inspected pump RRC-P-1A and determined that stud wear similar to RRC-P.-1B had not occurred; however, replacement studs were installed and,staked using a new procedure.
The licensee determined that a Part 21 report was not required.
No violations or deviations were i'dentified.
Other -Si nificant Findin s During the performance of surveillance procedure 7.4.8.4.2.4,
"Fuse
'Functional Testing", the licensee discovered several fuses with amperages exceeding those allowed by technical specification 3.8.4.2-1.
The technical specification limits had been exceeded for more than a year in one instance, with the majority of fuse changes made in April, 1984 under a design document for CRA-FN-3A2.
These changes to fuse ratings appeared to have been made in accordance with the design criteria; however, the technical. specification changes were never made.
In the instance of CRA-FN-3A2 a technical specification change appears to have been initiated but the paperwork was misplaced during the review process.
In each of the other cases the initiating engineer and the review process failed to identify these items as requiring technical specification changes.
Because the fuse ratings are within design limits the safety significance is minor and NRC has granted an emergency technical specification change to the table.
This item was identified by the licensee and an IER is being prepared.
The licensee has committed to evaluate the PMR process and the necessity for the-technical staff engineers to become more familiar with the technical specifications.
This will be reviewed during a future inspection (85-21-02).
No violations were identified.
Followu On Licensee Event Re orts LER-84-04,
CFR 50 Appendix R Cable Fire Protection.
This report, and supplements 1 through 3, describe problems with cable separation.
A regional office letter dated June 7,
1985, requested additional information regarding the nonconformances, and the licensee response dated June 17, 1985 has been received and is under evaluation.
A pending Supplement 4 to the LER addresses additional filed inspection activities by the licensee which identified 7000 feet of cable tray which had missing tray covers (required for cable separation criteria).
All items in high radiation areas were corrected prior to'lant startup, and work in other areas is in progress.
The licensee's engineering organization assigned four teams of electrical engineers to reinspect every area in the plant for compliance with the cable separation criteria, during the recent
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two month outage.
Training to the details oE the separation criteria was conducted by the engineering author of the separation criteria document.
The identification of the 7000 Eeet of nonconforming trays was a result of this inspection.
The inspector examined the in-progress investigation of the circumstance of this finding.
The site quality assurance department obtained corporate office assistance in investigating the details and root causes of the currently identified omissions.
The inquiry to date appears to have been comprehensive, and has identified that acceptance criteria for "prime" cables separation were complex, not adequately translated into criteria for field inspections, and apparently not well understood by the Bechtel inspectors who had performed the cable separation verification inspection in late 1983.
The engineering and quality assurance monitoring of this matter are continuing.
Progress and results of this effort will be subject of future NRC inspections.
(85-21-03)
9.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.a.
10.
Hana ement Heetin The inspector met, with the Plant Hanager approximately weekly during this period, to discuss inspection finding status.
On July 2, 1985, the inspectors met with the Plant Hanager and members of his staff to discuss the inspection findings during this perio l "
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