IR 05000395/1990033
| ML20029A958 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1991 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Haag R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029A950 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-90-33, NUDOCS 9103050150 | |
| Download: ML20029A958 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES
[pm R80gD NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON o
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101 MARIETTA ST REET N.W.
- t ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323 i
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Report No.:
50-395/90-33 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395 License No.:
HPF-12 Facility Name:
V. C. Sumer Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted:
Dwember 15, 1990 through January 31, 1991 Inspectnr:
Id.IuM d/i3 /9I R. C. Haag, Senior Resitent inspector Date Sigv d Accompanying Personnel:
L. A. Keller 3 k/ /
Approved by:
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FToyd S. Cantrell, S~ecti.ori, Chief Date 51gned
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Reactor Projects Branch 91 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
i This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspector onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation, operational sawety verification, review of nonconformance reports, and the installation and testing of modifications.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Resul ts:
At the beginning of the inspection period the plant was operating at 99 percent power until power was reduced to 47 percent on December 18, 1990.
The power reduction was initiated for fuel conservation and to allow continued plant operation for this fuel cycle until the next scheduled refueling outage in September, 1991.
With the exception of a power reduction to 33 percent on January 17, 1991, for the addition of oil to a RCP motor reservoir, the plant operated at approximately 47 percent power until January 21, 1991 when power was increased to 75 percent.
The plant remained at that power level through the remainder of the inspection period.
l An NRC identified violation involving procedural compliance was identified l
during an incore detector flux mapping (paragraph 2).
This Severity Level V violation is addressed as a noncited violation.
The licensee was requested to 9103050150 910213
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PDR ADOCK 05000395 l
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E review the weekly lubrication PM for the EDGs to determine if adequate perscnnel safety measures have been irplemented (paragraph 3).
The timeliness of several aspects of the EDG day tant setpoint change modification and the lack of post modification testing was identified as an unresolved item (paragraph 6).
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REPORT DETAILS
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i 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
- C, Bosnan, Manaqer, Maintenance Services
- M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance
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B. Christinsen, Manager, Technical Services
- H. Donnelly, Senior-Engineer, Nuclear Licensing -
S. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations
- G. Gibson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services D. Goldston, Supervisor, Test Uait
W. Haltiwanger, Nuclear Engineer
- W. Higgins, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- A. Koon, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
- D. Moore, General Manager Station Support
- C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services
- L. Shealy, Senior Engineer, ISEG
- J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- G. Soult, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
- D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering
- R. Waselus, Manager, Design Engineering B. Williams, Manager, Planni?g and Regulatory Support Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators', mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
F. S. Cantrell visited the site January 9-10, 1991,. to review-inspection activities and attend the exit i nterview for the Maintenance Team Inspection (MTI).
C. A. Julian was on site Janu. y 10. 1991, to attend the MTI exit interview.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout_ this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components listed below to a:<.ertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements.
Tne inspector verified
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that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was calibrated, and limiting conditions for operation were met.
Upon completion of the test, the inspector verified that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel, and the systems were properly returned to service.
Specifically, the inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the followino test activities:
ICP 400.004, Calibration of Flow Transmitter IFT-4490 (service water
from component cooling water heat exchange).
STP 249.036, Static Head Test of Emergency Diesel Generator "A" Day
Tank and Piping.
STP 105.003, Safety Injection Valve Operability Test.
The initial
quarterly test of the accumulator fill check valve XVC-8861 failed when the pressure on the test gauge used for back leakage indication spiked high.
During the last quarterly test, pressure also spiked high; however, after several flushing evolutions the valve was satisf actorily tested.
Af ter the recent test failure the system piping was verified to be completely filled with watcr.
Two subsequent tests verified that valve XVC-8861 closed with minimal seat leakage.
While the exact cause of the past two quarterly test failures has net been determined, the licensee believes that some form of water hammer occurred during the tests which caused the pressure spikes at the test gauge.
In addition, sluggish closure of the valve may have increased the pressure spikes.
The NCN disposition accepted continued use of XVC-8861 until the next refueling outage when replacement of the valve has been proposed.
This was based on a recent change to SOP 112 which now requires verification that check valve XVC-8861 has actually closed af ter any addition to the accumulators.
This action appears appropriate based on the fact that during all previous tests the valve never failed to reseat and that af ter all future cycling of XVC-8861 it will be verified to be in the closed posftion.
STP 249.131, Static Head Test of Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil
Storcge Tank "A".
The inspector noted that af ter the storage tank was completely filled from the tanker truck, the STP only required the closure of one valve to isolate the truck from the storage tank.
Since the test relied on a drop in tank level to determine leakage, it is critical that the tank be isolated from any external source of fuel oil that could mask tank out leakage.
During the actual test
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two valves were closed to isolate the storage tank from the truck.
However, the licensee noted that disconnecting the supply of fuel oil from the truck to the storage tank prior to starting the test would improve the overall reliability of the test.
During performance of the "B" storage tank static head test, several days later, the fuel oil line from the truck to the storage tank was disconnected prior to starting the test.
The results for both tests were similar.
The licensee informed the inspector that prior to the next static head test, the STP would be revised to include instructions on properly isolating the truck from the storage tank.
STP 501.005, DC Battery Charger "A" Service Test.
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STP 212.001, Reactor Core Flux Mapping by the incore Moveable Detectors. Data from the flux map was used to perform TS -surveillances
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for the heat flux hot channel f actor and the incore/excore axial flux difference evaluation.
During the flux mapping the inspector questioned the engineer performing the STP why step 6.9 which required a plateau measurement for each detector was not performed.
Plateau measurements are performed to determine the optimum detector input voltage so that small variation in power supply voltages do not affect the detector current output.
The inspector was informed that the detector plateau's for 75 and 100 percent power are very similar, therefore, the engineer felt that the input voltages that had been selected during a 100 percent power flux map could also be used for the flux map while at 75 percent power.
On the following day, the portion of the STP involving plateau measurements was performed.
Based on the plateau results, the licensee determined that the input voltages that were used for the 75_ percent power flux map were acceptable.
A review of previous flux maps completed during this fuel cycle identified one additional example in which the STP required a plateau measurement; however, it was not performed.
The licensee's review of the STP indicated that acceptable detector input voltages were also used during that incore flux map.
Data from previous flux maps is being reviewed by the -
licensee to determine if the STP can be revised to provide greater flexibility to the engineers concerning plateau measurements.
In addition. the licensee is in the final developmental stage for issuing a new station administrative procedure dealing with procedure use and adherence.
The inspector will observe the effectiveness of the new procedure during future inspections.
This NRC identified violation 395/90-33-01 for failure to follow procedure while performing an incore flux map is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V. A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review:
that limiting-conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable,- functional testing and/or calibrations were performed-prior
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to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance that may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were observed:
Replacement of the control device for "B" service water booster
pump-circuit breaker XSWID-3105 (NCN 4093).
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Repair of
"A" service-water screen wash pump suction valve XVG 3102A
(NCN 4086).
During the valve repair it was identified that the portion of the disc which connects to the stem was severely
deteriorated due to corrosion.
The disc was replaced and the valve was reassembled.
Af ter reviewing the NCN, the inspector questioned the licensee on the similarity of two recent failures of gate valves in the
"B" SW screen wash piping.
The stem had actually pulled through the disc connection on these failures and rendered the valves inoperable.
The-licensee's review of the SW system did not identify any:similar. safety related applications of gate valves in which this type of failure would render the service water system inoperable.
In addition, action was initiated to inspect other gate valves in the screen wash piping.
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Replacement of "C" chill water pump discharg(e flow orifice-XPS 151C
(NCN 4054).
Due to recent load reductions room coolers) from the chill-water-system, - the licensee had been throttling valves-to achieve lower system flow rates.
This was required to prevent large increases in flow velocities through the remaining coolers -which could accelerate erosion in the coolers.
The installation of the-smaller orifice allows control of system flows without relying on valve throttling.
Based on the success of the "C" pump orifice, the-licensee is planning to install smaller orifices for
"A" and "B" pumps.
The -licensee is continuing to review chill water system flow rates to determine the long term resolution for this issue.
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Weekly preventive maintenance on
"A" and
"B" emergency diesel
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generators, MMP 180.030.
This activity involved cleaning and
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relubricating the exposed surf aces of the injection pump racks and the governor fuel control linkage.
The EDGs were not tagged out to prevent auto starting while this activity was performed.
When questioned by the inspector, the mechanics were aware that the EDGs could auto start.
However, the inspector noted that the procedure
did not caution workers on the need for extreme care while working on the EDGs.
In addition, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS LCO for an inoperable EDG was mentioned twice in the procedure.
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The inspector was informed by the licensee that their intent is to perform the weekly PM without. tagging out the EDG and that the mechanics are sensitive to safety when working on potentially moving parts.
Af ter observing the work, the inspector requested that the licensee review this activity for appropriate personnel safety controls.
The licensee did state that the PM procedure would be changed to delete the references to the TS LCO and that appropriate
caution statements would be added.
Periodic inspection of "A" charging pump area cooling fan circuit
breaker XMC1DA2Y -07AB and auxiliary lube oil pump circuit breaker XMCIDA2Y 01LM (PMTS P0142459).
No violations or deviations were identified.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; aperator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examina-tion of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation
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reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures, The inspector conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
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verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment.
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l breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s). and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or-performance.
Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
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The inspector conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review -and walkdown of safety related tagout(s) in ef fect;
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review of sampling program (e.j., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
Selected tours were conducted on backshif ts. or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water intake
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structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required.
On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the license e's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of 'he security force was observed in the conduct of daily
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activities chich included:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of, personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance ind retrieval; escceting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of Nonconformance Reports (71707)
NCNs and ON0s were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions as identi Pcd in the reports were accomplished or being pursued for completion, generic items were identified and reported, and items were reported as-required by the TS.
ON0 91-004 reported-a potential breach in a vital area barrier.
The area in question was an approximate 8 inch by 26 feet joint filled with foam for fire protection.
A compensatory -post was established at area af ter the initial questioning of a barrier breach, and remained in the area until the barrier was re-established. A review by the licensee identified that the joint did constitute a breach of the vital barrier.
The initial-notification of a potential vital barrier breach and the subsequent confirmatory notification were made to the NRC Operations Center on
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January 10, 1991.
The inspector observed a portion of the vital barrier installation that was installed in front of the joint and' concluded it
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will prevent any access through the foam filled joint.
The identification of.this obscure barrier breach by a roving security officer is an indica-tion of the licensee's strong commitment to plant security.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
y The inspector reviewed and observed verious aspects of the modification to change the setpoints associated with the emergency diesel generator. fuel oil day tanks.
The setpoints were for the high, low and low-low level alarms and for the start and stop signals to the normal and standby fuel oil transfer pumps, in November, 1987, the licensee identified that the dcy tank low level alarm was set below the TS required 300 gallon minimum tank volume.
The lack of a documented basis for the setpoint values was also identified.
The inspector was concerned with the timeliness of the modifications which were not completed until November, 1990, and January, 1991, for the "A" and "B" day tanks.
The licensee stated the length of time required to complete the modification resulted f rom a low prioritiza-tion of the setpoint changes.
This was based on the use of aperator-logs in lieu of level alarms to ensure compliance with the TS volume require-ment.
The inspector noted that one of the main functions of alarms-is to aid operators during unusual or accident situations.
Therefore, the actuation of an alarm prior to exceeding the TS limit is desirable.
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The licensee categorizes setpoint changes as a document change only modification.
While these modifications receive the same document preparation as normal modifications the inspector noted that no completion
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dates were assigned to the day tank alarm modification.
Document change only modifications normally are not assigned completion dates.-.The inspector noted that the lack of completion dates may have contributed to the timeliness of the actual setpoint changes.
The licensee stated that they are reviewing the need for assigning completion dates for future
setpoint changes.
The completion of ARP changes to reflect new setpoints was also reviewed.
L e modification process identified all the procedures which require
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l changes as a result of the setpoint changes.
The priority of completing the procedural changes as related to the modification process was also L
specified.
For the AkP changes, no associated modification milestone or completion dates were specified.
While the setpoint changes for the "A" day tank were completed in November,1990, the applicable changes to the setpoints in the ARP were not completed until the end of January,1991.
The changes to the ARP setpoints do not appear to have been completed in a timely manner when considering the need of operators to have accurate information on alarm setpoints. The inspector requested that the licensee review their practices concerning changes to ARP's.
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No additional post modification testing was specified for the setpoint changes.
The inspector was informed that the calibration procedure which was used to actually change the setpoints would also provide any required testing of the setpoint. However, procedure ICP-180.003 only required the mechanical actuation of the level switches for the level alarms to ensure
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that the alarms would actuate and clear.
No testing was specified for the level switches associated with the transfer pump auto start and stop feature.
For the application of post modification testing, setpoint changes are treated the same as setpoint calibrations.
For the majority of setpoint changes this type of application will result in no additional i
testing being performed.
The licensee is reviewing the day tank setpoint modification to determine if adequate testing was performed and the adequacy of the testing policy for setpoint change.
This is identified as an-unresolved item (URI 395/90-33-02) pending the inspectors review of the licensee's evaluation of the adequacy of testing and the policy for setpoint changes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Other Areas An inspection by_ two regional inspectors of the licensee's fitness for duty program was performed during the inspection period.
The exit interview for the recent maintenance team inspection was conducted onsite on January 10, 1991.
NRC regional and NRR management attended the exit and toured the plant.
Item Number Description and Reference l
395/90-33-01 Non-cited violation Failure to follow
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procedure while performing an incore flux, paragraph 2.
395/90-33-02 URI - Post-mod testing for setpoint changes,
_ paragraph 6.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 4, 1991,
l with those-persons _ indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the i
areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
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No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the-materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
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' Acronyms and initialisms
- ARP.
Annunciator Response Procedures EDG Emergency Diesel Generator ESF Engineered Safety Feature
'ICP Instrumentation Control Procedures t
LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations
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LER Licensee Event Reports MMP Mechanical Maintenance Procedures MWR Maintenance Work Request
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NCN Nonconformance Notice NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation ONO Of f Normal Occurrence PM Preventive Maintenance PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RWP-Radiation Work Permits SAP Station Administrative Procedures SOP-Systen Operating Procedures SPR Special Reports-STP Surveillance Test Procedures SW
'TS Technical Specifications f
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