IR 05000395/1990001
| ML20011F021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011F020 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-90-01, 50-395-90-1, NUDOCS 9002230469 | |
| Download: ML20011F021 (10) | |
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UNITED ST ATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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REGION ll'
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j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
. ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 f
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Report No.:
50-395/90-01
Licensee: 'SbuthCarolinaElectric&GasCompany Columbia'. SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395-License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name:
V. C. Sumer Inspection Conducted: January 1 - 31, 1990 Inspectors:
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p s Richard L. Prevatte Date Signed bh, A kbw a~940
/wLdoP.Modenos Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel: Peter A. Balma{n. Project Engineer Approved by:
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Floyd S.,Cantrell. Section Chief Date Signed m
Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY
. Scope:
This routine irspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance -observation, operational safety verification. onsite follow-up of written reports of nonroutine events at-power reactor facilities, onsite follow-up of events at operating; power reactors, preparation for refueling, management meetings, action on previous inspection findings', and other areas.
Selected tours were conducted.on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on 14 days during this inspection period.
Results:
,j The unit was operated at 100 percent power throughout the reporting period.
The. site received three new fuel shipments from Westinghouse in preparation for their fifth refueling outage (paragraph 7). The licensee identified a potential
10 CFR 21 event in a portion of the chilled water system related to an apparent
. design deficiency (paragraph 4b).
The licensee reported to the NRC that a security guard was relieved of his duties when he was found to be inattentive (paragraph 6a). The inspectors attended a pre-outage plan presentation for the upcoming refueling outage (paragraph 8).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9002230469 900212 n
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- W. Baehr. Manager.-Chemistry and Health Physics C. Bowman. Manager. Scheduling and Modifications i
- 0. Bradham. Vice President. Nuclear Operations M.-Browne. Manager. Systems Engineering & Performance W. Higgins. Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance S. Hunt. Manager. Quality Systems
- A. Koon. Manager. Nuclear Licensing
- G. Moffatt Manager. Maintenance Services
- D. Moore. General Manager, Engir.eering Services
- K. Nettles General Manager. Nuclear Safety
- C, Price. Manager. Technical Oversite M._ Quinton, General Manager. Station Support J. Shepp. Associate Manager. Operations
- J. Skolds. General Manager. Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Soult General Manager. Operations and Maintenance
- G. Taylor Manager. Operations D. Warner, Manager. Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services M. Williams General Manager Administrative & Support Services K. Woodward. Manager. Nuclear Operations Education and Training Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit ir,terview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of three selected surveillance tests including all aspects of HVAC Chilled Water Pump B Test. STP 129.001.
The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtainad prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements. test
. discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3..MonthlyMaintenanceObservation(62703)
l The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components.to : ascertain that these activities were' conducted _ in accordance with approved procedures. TS. industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to t-control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspectors. independently verified that the
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equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee-was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance.
The following specific maintenance activities were
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observed:
MWR 8902473 Repair rod position recorder MWR 209130002 Install cable as dispositioned in MRF-20913 MWR 8902170 Repair suction header drain valve on CCW pump B
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PMTS 0129736 Monthly inspection of DC distribution bus 1B battery-PMTS P0129245 Annual HVAC chiller A preventive maintenance PMTS P0129410 Calibration of reactor building foundation - strong motion accelerograph PMTS P0130766 DG B quarterly inlet / exhaust valve backlash PMTS P0130281 DG B weekly performance of lube manual PMTS P0130280 Semi-annual inservice inspection of fuel injection pump studs MWR 21580007 Calibrate DG fuel oil storage tank A level switch per MRF 21587 MWR 90000210 Repair 61 meter wind directional chart recorder No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room ' staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures. TS, and liniting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and
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other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs. jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the folloving areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s),
i and operability of instrumentation and support items essential-to system actuation or' performance.
Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions. fire protection and preventative measures. control' of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical
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security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness and missile hazards.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following) areas:
verification review and -walkdown of safety related tagout(s in effect; review of sampling program (e.g.. primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous
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samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s);
and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas.- emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms. control room, auxiliary building, containment. cable penetration areas, service water intake' structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken.
if. required.
On a regular basis. RWP's were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
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On January 8,1990, the licensee wrote a Non-Conformance Notice
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. No. 3645 which raised a concern that a postulated high energy line n-break in the intermediate building will increase the load on the chillers and may trip the chillers due to the throttled condition of the SW to the operating chillers. The SW flow rates to the chillers are manually throttled for low winter inlet service water temperatures.
in order to maintain chiller outlet temperatures at. 65 degrees F in
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accordance with the chiller manufacturers recomendations.
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The licensee and their architect and engineering firm are reviewing the potential impact of this concern. They have concluded that they do not have an unanalyzed condition and that they were not outside of the design basis accident.
They are still evaluating for 10 CFR 21 reportability. aspects for inadequate design of the chillers.
They believe that the effects of a postulated high energy line break and-the loads associated with the chiller were not fully analyzed to preclude a mitigation of an accident.
The licensee has taken certain interim corrective actions to assure
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that the chillers will be operable in the event of a high energy line
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break in the intermediate building.
Final corrective actions will be incorporated in the spring outage.
They have closed the chilled
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water supply valves to the following cooling coils that are subject to a high energy line break environment:
SW booster pump area coolers; EFW pump area-coolers; and B0P charger area coolers.
The inspectors verified that the interim corrective actions had been incorporated and will follow the permanent corrective actions as they are implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
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Facilities (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the following LER to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements. TS. license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls.
(Closed)
LER 88-15. Two inoperable feedwater isolation valves requiring plant cooldown.
The cause of the event was due to inoperable valve operators as. a result of temperature variations within the area of the
. operators.
The licensee has written a MRF 20724 to install new valve operators which are less temperature sensitive. This modification will be implemented in the next refueling outage.
In addition, the licensee had submitted a TS change request to allow more than one feedwater isolation
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valve to be inoperable while in Modes 2 and 3.
This TS change was' denied
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by NRR.
The inspectors reviewed the MRF package and will follow the modification of the valve actuators in the outage scheduled this spring.
6.
Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)-
a.
On January 10. 1990. the licensee reported-to the NRC that a security
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guard was relieved of his duties at 2:41 a.m., when-he was found to be inattentive while manning the ACO booth inside the AAP.
Immediately
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following the discovery of the uncompensated barrier, the licensee
completed a search of the protected area with no indication that any unauthorized persons or activities took place.
In addition, a review of the alarm and access records was conducted. No alarm annunciators or card reader transactions were revealed for any door which could
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have previded access into the protected area through the AAP during the 41 minute time frame the guard was on this post.
The guard represents the alarm to a barrier at this post.
The loss of the alarm, due to the inattentiveness of the guard, resulted in a
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degraded barrier.
The licensee will issue a LER for a degraded barrier.
The AAP is presently closed at 8:00 p.m. and reopens at 6:00!a.m. the next morning.
The licensee has taken the following corrective actions:
activated a microwave detc-ction zone each time
the AAP is closed; the guard station will be moved from the booth to the exit / entrance corridor area of the AAP to provide observation of the badge storage area, and the security guard's badge was pulled and
he will no longer be allowed to work at the plant.
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On January.11, 1990, the licensee discovered that the main plant vent flow /RB purge vent flow recorder on the HVAC panel was inoperable.
Investigations revealed that breaker 13 on APNIFX1 had tripped due to
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a blown fuse (FU-1 in XPN 7174).
This' breaker affected a number of non-safety related components and the main plant flow recorder. The
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main plant vent flow is required to be measurable at all times during release through the main plant vent.
With the plant vent recorder
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inoperable, the main computer could be used as a back-up to verify the flow through the measuring device.
Special' Instruction, 89-05. Shift Routines, requires that the NROATC mark all chart recorders at the beginning of each shift. The control building operator then takes the readings off the chart. On January 11, 1990, when the HVAC panel was discovered inoperable, the plant vent recorder was estimated to be out of service for approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
The NROATC and his shif t supervisor discussed the problem and they both thought that since I & C was working on the HVAC power supplies, as stated in the shift turnover, that the jammed chart paper was a
' result of the work being performed on the HVAC panel.
They both
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thought that the pens. were still reading properly and assumed that only the paper drive was affected.
The evening shift operator on-January 10. 1990 marked the recorders.
When he came to the plant vent recorder he saw January 9. 1990 marked down.
At this point he thought someone had already marked the recorder but wrote the wrong date on it.
He, therefore, crossed out the 9 and wrote 10 over it.
About five hours later this operator noticed that the chart paper on the recorder had not advanced and informed his shift supervisor. The shift supervisor and his staff traced the problem and found that two other coincidental problems with high room temperature in the 1DA, 1DB and CREP rooms and the H2 removal purge valve throttle valve were without electrical power. They reviewed the load list and discovered that the three problems were all; related to breaker 13 on APN1FXI.
When a fuse was discovered to be blown on XPN 7174, they replaced the fuse and all systems returned to normal operation.
. Although the operators did respond efficiently upon discovering the recorder was out of service and no TS requirements were violated, the operators made some assumptions that resulted in the plant vent recorder being inoperable for about 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
The licensee is reviewing for root cause and has assigned the HPES group to evaluate the lessons learned, c.
On January 30, 1990, the licensee discovered that an incorrect danger tagout. 900434, resulted in lifting an incorrect lead.
This caused-the loss of the manual start capability of the C charging pump.. At the time of the event the B charging pump was running, and the C charging pump was the standby pump on the A train.
Loss of the manual start capability resulted in the C charging pump being declared inoperable.
The initial danger tagout request form specified lifting TBF-3 in XPN-7177 for limit switch maintenance, however, the danger tagout log called for lifting TBF-3 in XPN-7111.
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The tagout was restored immediately upon discovery by the licensee.
-The total time that the C charging pump was inoperable was approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, which is less than the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS requirement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Preparation For Refueling (60705)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's-fuel handling procedures FHP 605 Receipt of new fuel and control components. Revision 8; FHP 607, Unpacking and handling of-new fuel assemblies and shipping containers. Revision 10; and FHP 608. Transfer of new fuel assemblies from the new fuel storage racks, Revision 6.
These procedures were verified to be adequate for receipt inspection and storage of new fuel. The inspectors witnessed the licensee's unpacking and storage of several new fuel assemblies in the new
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fuel storage. racks, and subsequent transfer into the spent fuel storage pool, and verified that the activities were performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
Activities were observed during the first and third fuel shipments.
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total of five shipments are planned. The inspectors specifically verified that the-new fuel storage containers were intact and container internals inspection was performed by the licensee which included a detailed HP survey, verification that - accelerometers were not tripped, and verification that no damage occurred during fuel shipments.
The inspectors also observed trar.sfer of the new fuel from the containers to the dry storage racks and from the dry storage to the fuel pool area. The inspectors determined that the licensee's receipt and storage of new fuel activities were satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
ManagementMeetings(30703)
On January 4, 1990, the inspectors observed a pre-outage plan presentation for the fifth refueling outage scheduled for March 1990, to the plants senior management. The presentation was aimed at informing the management of the schedule, major expenditures of resources, and to obtain management's approval and direction.
Significant regulatory issues with connitaents to the NRC were discussed. The outage duration was projected to be si, tty-five t
days.
Some of the areas that the licensee identified as high risk, critical path activities were:
steam generator work; the RTD bypass deletion; fuel : inspection; spent fuel gate valve replacement; poterdial erosion / corrosion inspection on the secondary side; and adequate staffing, all of which may impact the schedule.
The resident inspectors notified the region of the proposed outage schedule and will continue to follow-up the planning of the outage and the outage itself, in the upcoming months.
9.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed) Violation 89-13-01, Failure to control the temporary installation of portable demineralizers.
In response to the violation on August 31, 1989, the licensee took interim corrective action by establishing a Removal and Restoration Program utilizing data and mode restraints to ensure that the equipment is removed, when required, prior to unit startup.
As a permanent fix, the licensee has written Special Instruction No.
89-16. Installation of Temporary Demineralizers,- that controls the use of portable demineralizers.
The inspectors reviewed the special instruction and found it to be adequate, i
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(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item 89-22-01 Revise electrical procedure.
EMP 445.007.
The inspectors reviewed the revised procedure which deleted steps 5.2 and 5.4' requiring QC to be present when lifting electrical l eads '.
Lifting of electrical leads and verification by QC is covered
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under SAP-300 Conduct of Maintenance. Attachment 1.
I 10. Other Areas a.
_ The Regional Section Chief. Floyd Cantrell visited the site on January 22 and 23,1990.
He toured the plant, met with the plant management and visited the Fairfield County Pump Storage Plant.
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Four regional inspectors also visited the Summer Plant during this inspection period.
They performed inspections on containment local leak rate testiny and verification of containment integrity, fire protection / prevention program, complex surveillance, and radiological effluents and chemistry.
11. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 2,1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas. inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The Non-Conformance Notice on the potential Part 21 with the chillers was discussed in detail.
A clarification was made by the resident inspector regarding NRC Inspection
. Report 89-22.
The SER attached to this report regarding the single cell battery charger, required procedures be submitted to the NRC staff for review.
Since that time the resident inspectors have received Region II management's approval that submittal of -these-procedures to the staff is not required.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by-the inspectors during the inspection.
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12. Acronyms and Initialisms AAP Auxiliary Access Portal ACO Access Control Officer's B0P Balance of Plaat CCW Component Cooling Water CREP Control Room Evacuation Panel EFW Emergency Feedwater ESF Engineered Safety Feature FHP Fuel Handling Procedures HPES Human Performance Evaluation System HVAC Heating. Ventilation and Air Conditioning I&C Instrumentation and Control LER Licensee Event Reports MRF Modification Request Form I
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MWR'
Maintenance Work Request NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NROATC Nuclear Reactor Operator At The Controls NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
' PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet QC Quality Control RB Reactor Building RCS.
Reactor Coolant System RCSLK9 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate RTD Resistance Temperature Detector RWP Radiation Work Permits SER Safety Evaluation Report SPR Special Reports-STP Surveillance Test Procedures
- SW Service Water TS Technical Specifications
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