IR 05000395/1990002
| ML20006E736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1990 |
| From: | Belisle G, John Zeiler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006E732 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-90-02, 50-395-90-2, IEIN-88-073, IEIN-88-73, NUDOCS 9002260295 | |
| Download: ML20006E736 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES v'
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REGION il
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 ^
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Report No.:. 50-395/90-02-j
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-Licensee:' South-Carolina Electric & Gas Company-Jenkinsville, SC 29065
- t Docket No.: 50-395
- License No.: NPF-12 l
. Facility Name:
V. C. Summer
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Inspection Conducted: January. 8 - 12, and January 22 - 26, 1990 Inspector:-
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J.Zeiger (f Date Signed Approved by:
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G /r5 7[(/8)
G. A. BelisTe, dihief' ~
Date' digned Test Programs Section
Engineerin5 Branch
L Division of Reactor Safety-l
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
L This routine unannounced inspection was -conducted in the areas of the.
containment 1ocal' leak rate testing, verification of containment integrii.y.
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and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
Results:
In general, the licensee's local leak rate test (LLRT) program was adequate in all areas inspected.
Two weaknesses were identified regarding: 1) the lack of documentation for review to assure that penetration boundaries were properly idrained before testing, paragraph 2.a. and 2) improper recording of leak rate-test results, paragraph 3.b.
A st'rength was. identified with regard to the setting of strict controls on
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containment' isolation valve leakage limits which should help to maintain low containment penetration leakage.
In the area of containment integrity, the inspector found adequate procedures and - controls were established to ensure containment integrity during unit startup and operation.
No violations or deviations were identified, h
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees L. Collier, Operations Test Coordinator, 9perations Test Unit
- H Donnelly, Jr., Senior Engineer, Regulatory Interface D. Goldston, Shift Supervisor, Operations Test Unit
- W.' Higgens, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations Other licensee emp'ioyees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- L. Modenos
- Attended exit interview 2.
Containment Local Leak Rate Testing (61720)
The purpose of. the inspection activities in this area was to ascertain that the licensee's local leak rate test (LLRT) program was being conducted in compliance with NRC requirements and applicable industry standards.
The inspector reviewed LLRT procedures, evaluated test results, and reviewed containment isolation valve (CIV) maintenance records, a.
LLRT Procedure and Administrative Control Review The inspector examined the following surveillance procedures:
GTP-302 Inservice Testing of Valves GTP-007 General Procedure for Operation of Leak-Rate Monitors STP-115.005 Reactor Coolant Valve Leakage Test STP-115.007 Safety Injection System Valve Leakage Test STP-115.009 Liquid Waste System Valve Leakage Test STP-115.012 Service Water System Valve Leakage Test STP-115.017 Reactor Building (RB) Spray System Valve Leakage Test STP-115.021 Hydrogen Removal System Valve Leakage Test The inspector verified that the following attributes were included in these procedures to ensure adequate leak rate testing of containment isolation boundaries:
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('1) All required containment penetration boundaries and CIVs were
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included in the LLRT program.
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(2) LLRTs were performed at containment integrated leak rate ' test
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(CILRT) peak design pressure.
(3) The L LLRT program utilized approved methods for testing
containment penetration boundaries and CIVs.
(4) Penetration leakage rates were determined using the. maximum -
pathway leakage.
(5) The criteria and response for LLRTs' and combined leakage rate failure were incorporated in the test program _ procedures.
Review of the above procedures indicated a weakness in the licensee's LLRT ~ program with regard to penetration venting and
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draining control. ' The licensee's procedures for Type C LLRTs did not. provide the level of detail necessary for the inspector to-verify and ensure that adequate penetration draining was-accomplished for all leakage tests.
Step-by-step instructions of the draining process for each penetration tested were not' included'
in the procedures and no documentation-was aveilable which described
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how each penetration was drained.
However, the test procedures did-specify purging the process piping between the test boundaries in order to remove any residual moisture left after penetration draining.
Although the inspector found this practice acceptable, detailed draining instructions would provide a more positive means to assure that penetrations are being fully drained.
A strength was noted :in-the licensee's control of. penetration leakage.-
Specifically, GTP-302 specified three levels of valve leakage limits, and at each level, corrective action was required
- should these limits be exceeded.
The inspector viewed this-as positive action toward keeping valve leakage rates reasonably low.
The licensee also recently transferred leak testing responsibility from the Operations Department to a leak rate test group.- The test group personnel appear to be more knowledgeable of test equipment and general test practices.
This should provide greater coordination of test activities and control of leakage limits.
A detailed review was performed for Type C classified CIVs in the following penetrations to verify adequate alignment for venting and draining, and adequate boundary alignment for leak rate testing. No discrepancies were identified.
Penetration 304 Service water to RB cooling unit A Penetration 305 Service water from RB cooling unit A Penetration 403 RB cooling unit B supply Penetration 102 RB cooling unit B return Penetration 420 Pressure relief tank nitrogen supply / return line
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.t Penetration-422 Pressure relief tank makeup i
Penetration-418 Reactor coolant drain tank to vent header and H 2 Penetration 423 ' Reactor coolant drain tank Penetration 303 Supply to RB spray nozzles - Train B Penetration 327 Spray pump A suction from RB recirculation sump Penetration.
328 Spray pump B suction from RB' recirculation sump Penetration 401 Supply to RB spray nozzles - Train A
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- Penetration leakage results for each containment barrier tested were recorded and summed in GTP-302.
The inspector reviewed a sample' of the completed "As-Found" and "As-Left" Type 'B and C LLRT results from the last refueling outage through the current operating cycle..
A minor weakness was. identified with regard to the licensee's tracking of total penetration leakage.
The inspector noted that'for
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leak rate test results which were unquantifiable', -1.e.,
exceeded leak rate instrumentation range, the licensee recorded the maximum
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instrumentation capacity as the leak' rate result.. This value was
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then added into the total containment leakage summation.
The inspector was concerned that if this recording practice was used during periods of unit operation, the 0.6La technical specification (TS) total leakage limit could be exceeded without being identified.
The licensee-committed to revise the procedure format for tracking the total Type B and C leakage total.
The inspector tracked the maintenance, repair, and leakage retest of eight CIVs to assure that controls were established to ensure adequate maintenance and retest of CIVs.. All work requests written since 1984 for valves XVC-8381, XVT-8100, XVC-8103, XVT-8112, -
PVT-8880, XVC-8947, MVG-8811B, and LCV-1003 were reviewed.
No discrepancies ' were identified.
The inspector concluded that the licensee has implemented a workable system to ensure that
maintenance,and retest of CIVs are satisfactorily completed.
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b.
Review of Containment Purge Valve Design NRC Information Notice 88-73, Direction-Dependent Leak Characteristics of Containment Purge Valves, dated September 8, 1988, identified a potential problem regarding the unexpected direction dependent leakage through Fisher Series 9200 butterfly valves used in containment purge lines.
These valves have a tapered seat that gives them a directionally dependent. leakage characteristic.
The Notice indicated that a potential problem could also exist in other valves which were normally considered to have bidirectional leakage characteristics.
The licensee uses Posi-Seal, International butterfly valves in the containment purge lines.
The valve design and leak rate test configuration were reviewed by the licensee and valve vendor.
Although the Posi-Seal valve sealing design is different from the Fisher design, the valve does have a preferred direction in which tighter shutoff capability is expected.
However, the valves are I
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oriented and leak rate tested in a conservative' manner.
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containment -inboard purge valve is tested in the non-accident '
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~ direction, but.this is conservative since accident pressure would be-
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in the valve's pressure assisted direction.
The outboard valve :is
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tested-in the accident pressure direction. The inspector considered'
that the licensee's current LLRT configuration for these valves to be
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Verification of Containment Integrity (61715)
The purpose of the inspection activities in this area was to verify the adequacy and implementation of procedures and controls designed to maintain containment integrity and to mitigate contamination releases in-
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the event containment integrity is lost following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
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Primary Containment Integrity Controls The inspector reviewed General Operating Procedure G0P-1, Plant Startup and Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown, and General
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Test Procedure.GTP-702, Surveillance Activity Tracking and i
Triggering, which together ensure all necessary plant conditions are
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established and prerequisites are met for reactor startup.
The
. inspector verified that the procedures included the following minimum provisions that ensure primary containment integrity exists before the plant enters operational modes which require containment-integrity:
(1) All penetrations required to be closed.during accident conditions are closed by operable automatic valves or closed by
manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves.
(2) All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
(3) Each containment airlock is operable.
(4) Containment leakage rates are within technical specification (TS) limits.
(5) Sealing mechanisms associated with each penetration are operable.
The inspector reviewed STP-115.001, Penetration Isolation Verification, which provides assurance of primary containment isolation by verifying that all manual valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves are closed and locked as required.
The inspector verified that the procedure included all appropriate barriers.
Completed records for STP-115.001 were reviewed over the
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previous seven months of reactor operation.. The inspector. verified that a'.1 valves were inspected and found to be in their cor~ rect position.
In addition, the_ inspector' conducted a_ walkdown of selected penetrations to ensure that manual isolation valves were in
'their required closed or. locked closed position and blind _ flanges
were installed as required. No discrepancies were identified, i
b.
Containment Systems Designed to Mitigate Contamination Releases
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The following containment related systems designed to mitigate the consequences of contamination releases following a LOCA were-
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inspected for compliance with plant TSs:
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Containment airlocks.
Containment ventilation system
RB spray and spray additive system RB cooling system Particulate iodine cleanup system Combustible gas control
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- The inspector reviewed the following surveillance procedures and
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verified that the procedures complied with applicable plant TS requirements that adequate information and instruction were
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. provided, and tht.t adequate acceptance criteria and limits.were specified:
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i STP-115.002 RB Airlock Test-
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STP-118.004 RB Purge Isolation Verification
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l STP-115.022 Air Handling System Valve Leakage Test STP-112.001 RB Spray Monthly Valve Verification
.STP-112.002 RB Spray Pump Test
STP-125.010 Integrated Safeguards Test
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STP-112.009 Spray Additive Tank Sodium Hydroxide Contained-Solution Volume Test
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STP-116.001 RB Cooling Unit Functional Test
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STP-117.001 Iodine Removal System Test STP-553.001 RB Cooling Units Performance Test STP-301.004 Train A Containment Hydrogen Monitor Calibration STP-301.006 Train A Containment Hydrogen Monitor Operational Test STP-119.001 Hydrogen Removal System - Post Accident The inspector reviewed surveillance records listed in Table 1 below and verified that~ the surveillances were performed at the required frequencies, test results met acceptance criteria or limits, and appropriate sign-offs, test reviews, and test concurrences were performe m
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Containment Procedure System No.
Records Reviewed
.,,T_S Airlocks STP-115.002 12/05/88 - 10/29/89 4.6.1.3.b/c/d
^ Ventilation STP-118.004 11/19/89 - 01/13/90 4.6.1.7.1.b STP-115.022 06/07/89 - 11/30/89 4.6.1.7.3
RB Spray and.STP-112.001 11/11/89 - 01/06/90 4.6.2.1.a Additive 4.6.2.2.a.
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STP-112.002 10/09/89 - 12/31/89 4.6.2.1.b STP-125.010 11/26/88 4.6.2.1.c 4.6.2.2.c STP-112.009 06/06/89 - 10/15/89 4.6.2.2.b.'1-l i
RB Cooling STP-116.001 09/22/89 - 01/12/90 4.6.2.3.a
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STP-125.010 11/26/88 4.6.2.3.b
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Iodine Removal STP-117.001 09/21/89 - 01/12/90 4.6.3.a STP-553.001 05/05/87 - 11/13/88 4.6.3.b/c.1/d
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STP-125.010 11/26/88 4.6.3.c.2
Combustible STP-301.004 05/26/89 - 11/08/89 4.6.5.1
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Gas STP-301.006 11/08/89 - 01/03/90 4.6.5.1 STP-119.001 12/18/88 - 12/15/89 4.6.5.2.a
A weakness was identified from:this record review concerning the RB
personnel airlock seal test conducted October 29, 1989 with the unit at power. -The airlock door seal leakage limit is specified by TS 4.6.1.3.a as 0.01La.
This corresponds to a total of 724 cubic centimeters per minute (cc/m).
The leakage test for the inner door-seal yielded 1750 cc/m.
From review of the control room logbook and completed Removal and Restoration data sheets, the licensee failed-to document' that the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was
entered' when the seal test failed.
However, from' discussions with on-duty operations personnel, the inspector was confident that, at the time of the event, operations personnel acknowledged that the LC0 was' entered.
Appropriate action was taken by the licensee to restore the airlock operability within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by TS.
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The inspector determined this to be a documentation problem.
g During discussion regarding the airlock test, the licensee stated l
that their interpretation of Action Statement a.1 for the airlock LC0 3.6.1.3 allowed them to open the outer airlock door, when the inner door is inoperable, in order to perform maintenance on the inner door and return it operability.
Action Statement a.1 states that with one airlock door inoperable, maintain the operable airlock
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idoor closed and either restore the-inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the operable airlock door closed.
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The inspector discussed this issue with NRC Region II management.
who agreed that with an inoperable inner door, the outer door may be opened, but only with the sole purpose to repair'the inner door, c.
Reactor Building Spray System Walkdown
The inspector conducted a walkdown of portions the reactor building spray and spray a ditive systems located outside containment.
All
valves were verified to be in their required position-for proper system operation.
The position of automatic valves in the system
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lineup was also verified from the control room by observing control panel light indication status.
Both - trains were operational.
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addition, all areas-inspected were generally clean and. free from
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debris.
No unacceptable conditions were identified, i
The inspection findings indicated that _ required plant systems -and
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components designed to ensure containment _ integrity or mitigate the
consequences of a LOCA were being tested as required by plant TSs.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (395/89-15-02):
Non-Citable Violation (NCV) for Failure to Fully Implement Section XI IST Pump
Requirem nts This NCV identified two examples in which the licensee failed to-fully implement 'the IST-program as required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
In _ both examples, the violation was not willful, and the licensee initiated corrective actions before the original inspection was completed. The violation met the. criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy for-not issuing a Notice of Violation.
Thus, the violation a
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was not cited.
This violation was, therefore, closed by reference
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in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/89-15.
No further NRC action
was necessary concerning this issue.
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b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (395/89-15-03):
Thrust Values at Degraded Voltage NRC' Inspection Report No.
50-395/88-20 identified several outstanding action items with regard to NRC Bulletin 85-03, Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings.
Among these were the licensee's failure to obtain thrust values at degraded voltages for valves XVG-8809A, B, and C.
With this one exception, all outstanding g
bulletin items were satisfactorily completed as verified in NRC
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' Inspection Report No.- 50-395/89-15.
The inspector reviewed Westinghouse letter. dated August.- 14,.1989, which supplied stall thrust values for the limitorque operators on'
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the aforementioned valves.
The thrust values supplied - were i
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' Exit Interview.-
The inspection' scope and results were summarized"on January 26, 1990,
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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The-inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
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Dissenting:coranents were not received by the licensee.
Proprietary
information is not contained in this report.
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