IR 05000395/1990008
| ML20034A916 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034A914 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-90-08, 50-395-90-8, NUDOCS 9004250061 | |
| Download: ML20034A916 (12) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR CEGULATORY COMMisslON
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Report No.:
50-395/90-08 Licensee: South Carolina Electric- & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name:
V. C. Sunrner Inspection Conducted: March 1 - 31, 1990
Inspectors:
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Richard L. Prevatte Date Signed dL /9/D b+ct h - It ~W u
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Approved by:
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.f,~Flopd 5. Cayftrell, Section Chief Date Signed Redctor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, ESF system walkdown, onsite follow-up of written reports of nonroutine events at power reactor facilities, onsite follow-up of events at' operating power reactors, installation and testing of modifications, licensee plans for coping with strikes, loss of decay heat removal, and action on previous inspection findings.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on 12 occasions.
Results:
The plant operated at or near full power until the unit was shutdown for a planned refueling outage on March 23, 1990. Two minor procedural deficiencies, which indicated a lack of attention to detail, were noted in the surveillance area (paragraph 2).
The licensee continued to perform well in the area of maintenance.
Several minor deficiencies were identified during the engineered safety features system walkdown (paragraph 5).
However, a review of licensee records revealed that the majority of these had been previously identified by 9304250061 900413
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the licensee with corrective actions either planned or in progress.
The-licensee experienced an inadvertant. automatic actuation of'an emergency diesel i
generator during the performance of an Appendix R surveillance test on the charging pump fire switches (paragraph 7b).
An investigation into this event i
revealed an error in the test procedure for the train 8 and'C charging pump
. test.
The licensee is still = investigating this event-to determine the root-cause.
This item will be tracked - as Unresolved Item -90-08-01, until - the licensee determines the causes and consequences of this event.
A' review of the--
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licensee's. preparation for. reactor coolant system " half-pipe" operation in accordance with NRC inspection guidance (T! 2515/101) did' not. identify 'any -
- deficiencies (paragraph 10).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted-
Licensee Employees
- W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications
- 0. Bradham, Vice President. Nuclear Operations M. Browne, Manager, Systems' Engineering & Performance
W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
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G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services
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- D. Moore, General Manager, Eagineering Services
- K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support
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J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
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G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance G. Taylor, Manager, Operations-D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services
- M. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services i
K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training.
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Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
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operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed.in the
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last paragraph.
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2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of'
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six selected surveillance tests including all aspects of STP 409.001, Emergency DG B Refueling Inspection.
The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test-
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instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test
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discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to
service.
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On March 8,1990, the inspector observed the performance of STP 502.003, 125VAC Circuit Breaker Surveillance Test, on APN1BF Breaker No.15..
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Enclosure 10.1 of the STP identified the breakers that are non-safety-
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related by an "X" marked at the end of the breaker number.
When the breaker was removed from the panel the electricians identified a procedural error in breaker classification.
A temporary procedure change was made to correct.the error and classify the breaker as safety related.
However,'
when this change was made the "QC Required" column was not changed to
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reflect QC inspection required for work on the. component.
The STP was-therefore perfonned without QC present.
When the inspector. identified:
this item, the licensee stopped the test and corrected-the procedure.
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discrepancy was also identified in the procedure where the bresker trip test tolerances were not in agreement with EMP 280.004, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing,- Rev. 8.
A procedural. change was implemented to
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correct the discrepancy on the tolerance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted:in accordance with approved procedures TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that the equipment was properly tested before being returned ' to service.'
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to - safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance.
The following specific maintenance activities were observed:
PMTS P0131876 Electricel inspection and cleaning of CHG/SI pump B motor PMTS P0132327 Calibration of CHG/S! pump B discharge pressure
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indicator
MWR 218200040 Terminate cable and install cards on condensate system per MRF 21280 g
PMTS P0125434 Calibration on 480 volt unit substation bus IB2
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MWR 89V0032 ISI-hanger inspection MWR 90M0113 Replacement of DG B exhaust valve water passage o-rings
PMTS P012647 18 month DG B preventive maintenance i
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MWR 90M0112 Replace cylinder liner and water jacket o-rings on DG B
F.TTS 0034386 Calibration on SG C wide range level D/P XMTR-STTS 0034381 Calibration on SG 8 wide range level D/P XMTR
.No violations or deviations were identified.
L 4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted-daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection. system elements to determine that required - channels are operable; and review of contro1 ~ room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout ' logs, jumper logs, and tags 'on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or components, and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.
Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in
)rogress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant lousekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in 'the-following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety--related tagouts in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that. notices to workers are-posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
Selected tours were conducted on backshif ts. or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration-areas, service water
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intake structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required. On a regular basis, RWP's were. reviewed
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e and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being
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conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were
periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency l
were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, ths inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various t
shifts of the security force was observed. in the conduct of daily
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activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles;- badge issuance and t
t retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts,
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
ESFSystemWalkdown(71710)
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The inapectors verified the operability of. an.ESF system by-performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the emergency feedwater system.
The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system line-up procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
The inspectors
.i looked for equipment conditions and items that might-degrade performance
(hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the
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interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose
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material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors. verified that
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valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in-proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriate. The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.-
Minor deficiencies were identified during the walkdown.
The majority.
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of these items had been previously identified by the licensee and corrective action was planned and scheduled.
Corrective action for the
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remaining items were initiated immediately after notification by the inspectors.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor facilities (92700)
t The inspectors reviewed.the following LER's 'to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements. TS, license
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conditions, and licensee procedures and_ controls.
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(Closed)
LER 88-08 and Unresolved Item 88-17-02, Steam path yielding l
potential for affecting unqualified equipment.
This item identified a steam propagation path that could affect safe shutdown equipment.
It was identified in a LER dated July 7,1988-and a supplemental report dated January 8,1990.
Upon initial identification of this item the licensee i
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performed temporary modifications and other compensatory. measures to alleviate this situation.
The immediate and additional corrective actions
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listed in the LER were completed prior to unit restart.
All long term
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corrective actions listed in the LER, with the exception of item 1. er*
l scheduled for completion under MRF's 32995 and NCN 3348 during RF0 5.which
is currently in progress.
Item No.1, which specifies replacing doors
!10-403, 407 and 409 with pressure and fire rated safety related doors is scheduled to be completed during RF0 6 under MRF 32976.
The doors currently in place have been modified to insure they will provide adequate protection against steam intrusion during the interim.
(Closed)
LER 89-18, Inadequate procedures result -in non-compliance with
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radiation monitor. surveillance.
The STP and calibration procedures as
performed did not adequately test all possible low flow conditions for radiation monitors RM-A3 and RM-A4 as sensed by the radiation monitor's
instrumentation. The monitor's instrumentation includes high differential
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pressure indications across the filter which senses -low flow due to-clogging and low-differential pressure which senses low flow due to a-complete loss of flow (sample pumps stopping).
The STP'and calibration procedures addressed only the high differential pressure indication.
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calibrated, the instrumentation would not sense "a loss of. flow" when the
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sample pumps stopped. The calibration procedures have been revised and the-units have been recalibrated using the improved procedure. The licensee is investigating a potential modification to enhance the. flow detection method such that a more precise setpoint can be utilized to detect a broader range of possible degraded flow conditions.
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(Closed)
LER 89-19. Personnel error leads to missed surveillance -of specific activity.
This item was the result of chemistry personnel-
failing to review and interpret sample results in a timely manner. This j
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item was discussed in detail in inspection report 395/89-24 December 1989,
and was identified as NCV 89-24-01. The inspector verified that procedural
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revisions and special training of chemistry personnel identified as corrective action in the LER had been completed.
(Closed) LER 89-21, Failed circuit board causes ESF actuation of service water pump.
A circuit board card failure during the-ESF-actuation
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performance of an STP resulted in an automatic-start-of service water pump C on low discharge pressure.
The circuit board card was replaced and the.
discharge pressure switch and bistable were calibrated.
The failed card
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was evaluated by systems engineering for root cause.
During the review of this LER it was identified that system engineers were not always informed
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in a timely manner of events which occurred on their system.
Engineering agreed that.ommunications between maintenance and system engineers needed improvement.
The licensee-has implemented measures to correct-this l
situation.
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No violations or deviations were identified, j
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7.
Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
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On March 6,1990, the licensee discovered that the control room ventilation pressure boundary had been breached while performing pre-outage work for MRF-21360.
During the work, a 2 inch diameter hole was drilled through the control building Wall at tne 488 elevation.
The licensee evaluated this item and concluded that leakage through the hole was within allowable limits.
The licensee's corrective. actions on this item included updating of the Special Instruction 90-09, Pressure Boundary _ Barriers, to include steps taken when and if a pressure barrier is breached in the future, b.
On March 17, 1990, while performing the fire switch functional surveillance test procedure STP-170.015, on CHG/SI Pump'C, the plant experienced an inadvertent start of the B diesel generator.
The performance of the above STP provides a seal in signal to the DG'
automatic start relay and energizes the emergency start light on the main control board and the local DG panel. In order to perform the above STP and prevent automatic diesel actuation, the diesel. mode selector switch is transferred from the " remote" position to the
" maintenance" position at the local control panel.
Upon completion of the test, the automatic start circuit is reset by depressing the diesel generator emergency :, tart reset pushbutton at the local control panel. An error in the procedure resulted in the operator attempting to reset the relay by depressing the emergency start override pushbutton at the main control board. Since the relay was not reset, when the operator transferred the mode selector switch from main-tenance to remote, the diesel automatically started.
Investigations by the licensee revealed that the A train can be reset from the main control board but since B train is the protected train for Appendix R it requires the emergency start signal to be reset-locally.
On March 4,1990, the same surveillance had been performed on CHG/SI Pump B utilizing STP-170.014.
Prior to restoring the-mode selector switch from " maintenance" to " remote," the shift supervisor recognized that the ESF annunciator was on and that he could not reset the' relay using the mode selector switch on_ the main control board.
At that time he made a decision to complete the test and then submit a feedback form requesting that the procedure be corrected.
By procedure, the test should have been'_ stopped and a temporary procedural change implemented to correct this deficiency.
After completion of the test, a procedure feedback form was submitted to.
correct the procedure by using-.the emergency start reset button at the local control. panel.
However, this procedure change was.not implemented into STP-170.015-prior to the performance of the March 17, 1990 test.
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was identified by the licensee on March 17, 1990.
The emergency start lights in the control room and at the local panel were not-illuminated while performing the test.
The lights came on after the diesel started. The failure of the lights may have been a contributor to the ESF actuation.
The licensee is currently investigating this event.: This item will be identified as an Unresolved Item 90-08-01 -
Inadvertent actuation of DG, pending completion of this investigation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
InstallationandTestingof-Modifications (37828)-
The inspectors reviewed 'the design and installation activities for the addition of a voltage regulator and switches to the 115kv offsite power source transformer XTF-4, MRF 21349.
This modification will add a voltage regulator and switches to permit switching the voltage regulator in and out of the line on the transformer low side'of the-115kv offsite power source.
This modification provides a long term fix to a previous problem of low voltage on the 115kv offsite power source during heavy system loading conditions'.
The inspectors reviewed the structural design and installation activities associated with excavation and backfill to permit construction of the concrete pad, fire wall, conduit, grounding cable and other miscellaneous components to support the installation of the voltage regulator and switches.
The activities were completed with the unit on line.
No deficiencies were identified during this review and inspection.
The voltage regulator and switches are currently being manufactured and are expected to be received onsite during the fifth-refueling outage now in progress. The inspectors will continue to review the installation and testing activities associated with these components as they occur.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Plans.For Coping With Strikes-(92709)
The licensee informed the inspectors that they had received information indicating that the IBEW union was attempting to organize the contract health physics workers supplied by Bartlett, IRM and ARC for the refueling outage.
The licensee received assurances from these contractors that if personnel who are assigned to support the outage fail to show for work, the contractor will provide additional resources to replace them.
The licensee has established communications with local support organizations and law enforcement officials to insure their availability if required.
During the first two weeks of-the outage, approximately 30 people have supported this effort.
The licensee anticipates that the total number of people who will support this effort will be less than 20 percent.
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inspectors have noted a group of approximately 20 - 30 people, displaying union informational material, gathered near the site entrance each'
morning. These efforts appear to have had minimal effect on the refueling outage work R tivities.
10. Loss of Decay Heat Remaval (T! 2515/101)-
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to Generic Letter 88-17 and their preparation for mid-Loop operation.
The licensee has implemented:
procedures and administrative controls to assure at least two independent, continuous core exit temperature indicators are available during mid-loop operation. This is accomplished by ' installing two temporary thermocouples in the incore thimble guide tubes.
Reactor vessel water level is monitored by two tygon tube level indicators that can be viewed locally or remotely by a TV monitor in the main control room.
One train of RVLIS will also be available.
Both sources of offsite power and one DG 'is -
available to power the IE busses.
Both' trains of RHR.are operable:and can.
be aligned to the RWST.
One RB spray pump and the associated flow path from the RWST are available and the pressurizer manway is removed prior to SG nozzle dam installation.
Special. instructions have been issued to the control room to monitor containment openings. These include shutting the maintenance hatch and testing to verify that four closure bolts are sufficient to close the equipment hatch.
A log is also maintained.in the control room to show all open penetrations. Additional instructions-have been issued directing operations to reduce plant-perturbations while at RCS half loop. The licensee entered mid-loop operation on March 31, 1990 and expects to be in this mode for four days.
11. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
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Inspector Follow-up Item 88-26-04, Revise R-& R log so that
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action LC0's stand out.
This item identified an occasion where several operators failed to identify that an LCO time limit had expired.
The reason for this event was that the plant was in an outage and a very large:
number of R & R forms were in the 109 This large volume of R & R's with inadequate segregation and indexing of outage /non-outage and-critical /non-critical R & R's led to this error. To prevent recurrence of this item the licensee revised SAP 205.. Status'Contro1~and Removal and Restoration, Rev. 7, on March 15, 1990.
This change-will provide a
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separate volume of the R & R log for tracking outage R & R's.
This and other procedural tracking improvements should prevent repetition of this-event.
(Closed)
Violation 89-03-01, Failure to follow procedures.
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violation was.the result of the failure to control,. a valve inside e tagging boundary. The licensee provided a response to this violation in a letter to Region 11 dated April 5, 1989.
The inspectors verified-that the corrective action stated in the licensee's response was adequate-and.
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The above incident resulted in a resin intrusion into the Secondary Condensate Feedwater System and the SG from the SG blowdown demineralizers.
The inspectors attenced a MRB meeting on February 14, 1990 where this item was discussed.
Due to the SG blowdown system design and the high risk of a recurrence nf this problem a decision was reached to remove this system'
until a decision is made on SG= replacement and the overall needs and requirements for a blowdown recovery system at that time.
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(Closed)
Inspecticn follow-up Item 89-24-02, Modification and improvements to fire brigade procedures.
This item was the result of a fire brigade member who had been previously disqualified and was assigned to stand fire brigade duties prior to being retrained.
In the investigation of this event it became apparent that the licensee's procedures did not adequately cover' member disqualification and requalification.
On February 27, 1990, the licensee issued a new fire protection procedure, Fire Brigade Qualification Status Procedure FPP 016. Rev. O.
The inspector reviewed this procedure and it~ appears to address the concerns discussed in the inspectors December 1989 inspection report.
Adherence to these new procedural requirements should prevent recurrence of this item.
12. ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 3,1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
The procedural-weaknesses identified during the observation of a surveillance test were discussed with the licensee.
The licensee indicated that these deficiencies'
and those identified during the ESF system walkdown were in the process of being corrected.
The licensee also indicated that they.will inform the inspectors as soon as the causes for the inadvertent DG start and the MCB indication light malfunction, URI 90-08-01, are identified. ~ Violation 89-03-01, Unresolved Item 88-17-02 Inspection' Follow-up Item's 88-26-04, 89-24-02, and LER's 88-08, 89-18, 89-19 and 89-21 were closed.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of.the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
13. Acronyms and Initialisms ARC A) plied Radiological Controls CHG/S!
Clarging Safety Injection DG Diesel Generator DP Differential Pressure EMP
' Electrical Maintenance Procedure ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESS Emergency Start Signal IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
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IRM Institute of Resource Management l-
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r 10, ISI inservice Inspection IST-Inservice Testing KV'
Kilvolt-LCO-Limiting Conditions For Operations LER Licensee Event Reports-MRB-Management Review Board MWR Maintenance Work Request NCV Non-Conformance Violation NPRD Nuclear Plant Reliability Data NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation PMTS:
Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet QC Quality Control RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RCSLK9 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate RHR Residual Heat Removal R&R Restoration and Removal-RF0.
Refueling Outage-RVLIS Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System RWP Radiation Work Permits RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SAP Station Administration Procedure-SG-Steam Generator--
SI Safety injection =
SPR Special Reports STP Surveillance Test Procedures STTS Surveillance Test Task Sheet TS Technical Specifications m-a-m_.._m_-_t__.m.-_.__..
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