IR 05000395/1981005
| ML20004D323 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1981 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Skolds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004D316 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-81-05, 50-395-81-5, NUDOCS 8106090170 | |
| Download: ML20004D323 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W.. SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA. oEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-395/81-05 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company
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Columbia, SC 29218
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Facility Name:
V. C. Summer
Docket No. 50-395 License No. CPPR-94
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Inspection at V. C.
ummer site near Parr, South Carolina Inspector: [1A 4/!24
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i J. ~L. $k Bafte Signed i
Approved by:
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P.f. Kellogg, n Chi ivision of Date S4gndd Resident an ctor Pr t Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on February 12, - March 31,1981
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Areas Inspected
' This routine unannounced inspection involved 175 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Followup cf 50.55(e) and Part 21 reports, Preoperational Test Results Review, I&E Circular Followup, Technical Specification Review, Open Items followup, Preoperational Test Procedure Review, Review of Preservice Valve and Hydro program, observation of Preoperational Testing.
Results i
Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified in seven areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area
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(Violation - Failure to follow procedure paragraph 6).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Station Manager
- J. G. Connelly, Assistant Station Manager
- L. Storz, Operations Supervisor
- S. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor
- B. G. Croley, Technical Support Supervisor
- C. Ligon, Administrative Supervisor
- A. Koon, Technical Services Coordinator
- P. Fant, QC Inspection Coordinator
- H. Donnelly, Independent Safety Engineering Group
- A. A. Smith, Director Surveillance Systems
- J. B. Bone, Emergency Coordinator
- D. R. Moore, QA Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 6,1981 and March 27, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The violation was discussed at the exit interview on March 27, 1981.
The
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inspector attended the exit interview of E. Girard on March 27, 1981.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (80-18-07) Diesel Generator Jacket Water Relief.
This item dealt with the installation of piping on the dischage of the jacket water heater relief valves.
The pipe were installed to prevent personal injury if a relief were to lift with a person near the relief. An evaluation was performed to ensure the adequacy of the relief with the additional piping.
Also the vendor drawing was incorrectly read when mention was made of a flexible hose on the discharge of the relief.
4.
Unresolved Items
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' resolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e) and Part 21)
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a.
(0 pen) 395/81-05-01:
Improper Heat Treatment of A490 Bolts. On i
February 17, 1981 the licensee reported a potential Part 21 report concerning thirty five (35) structural bolts provided by the Southern j
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a
y Bolt Corporation.
In a letter dated March 16, 1981, the licensee reported that bolts included in heat number 69784 may have received improper heat treatment. The bolts are located on the pretsurizer upper lateral support frame the bolts in questions will be replaced. This item will remain open pending completion of. action by the licensee.
b.
(0 pen) 395/81-05-02: Circuit Board Failures. On February 19, 1981 the licensee reported a 50.55(e) report concerning circuit board failures in Westinghouse 7300 series Nuclear Power Plant Control Instrument-ation.
In a letter dated March 20, 1981 the licensee indicated that they were reviewing the causes of the failures and would issue a final report at a later date. This item will remain open pending completion of the review by the licensee.
c.
(0 pen) 395/81-05-03:
480 Volt circuit breaker trip failure. On February 19, 1981 the licensee reported a potential Part 21 report concerning 480 volt ITE breaker failing to trip. In a letter dated March 20, 1981 the licensee reported that a latch engagement and tripper bar latch engagement were not properly adjusted on some breakers which causes the breaker to intermittently fail to trip on a fault condition. This item will remain open pending inspector review of the corrective action.
d.
(0 pen) 395/81 ~3-04: Unauthorized Hanger Work. On December 16, 1980 the licensee reported a 50.55(e) report concerning unautharized work being done on hangers. In a letter dated January 13, 1981 the licensee indicated that SCE&G/QC personnel found disassembled hangers that had previously been completed, inspected and had their associated docu-mentation completed. The licensee indicates that a monitoring program by QC personnel plus a reindoctrination program of craft personnel had been implemented to correct these problems.
Until the corrective action has been reviewed, this item will remain open.
e.
(0 pen)
395/81-05-05:
Penetration Assembly Deficiencies.
On December 24, 1980 the licensee reported a potential 50.55(e) report concerning penetration assemblies. In a letter dated January 23, 1981 the licensee indicated that two concerns existed.
First, a one inch layer of insulation was omitted from several process pipes as they pass through the bellows portion of the penetration assembly. The licensee determined that the failure to install the insulation was not report-able since the function of the insulation is to reduce heat input to
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the bellows and failure of the bellows would have no effect on con-tainment integrity.
Second, a mislocation of a centering sleeve occurred on process piping whose function is to properly distribute piping loads to the penetration assembly. These items will remain open pending inspector followup.
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(0 pen) 395/81-05-06: Separation Criteria for Speed Switches. This item was reported on October 31, 1979 to the NRC. The inspector could find no documentation in an inspection report to track this item.
It is therefore being assigned to tracking number in this report. The
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50.55(e) report involved separation requirements which were delected by the Architect Engineer in the Speed Switches for Component Cooling Pumps, Service Water Pumps and Charging / Safety Injection Pumps. This item will remain open pending corrective action review.
g.
(0 pen) 395/81-05-07:
Sodium Hydroxide Tank Vacuum. On March 4, 1981 the licensee reported that it was discovered that the Sodium Hydroxide Tank was not specified to be designed for vacuum service. In a letter on March 30, 1981 the licensee reported that a continuing review was in progress concerning this problem. This item will remain open pending
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review of the final report on this subject.
h.
(0 pen) 395/81-05-08: Sodium Hydroxide Tank Relief Valves. On March 4, 1981 the licensee reported that it was discovered that the relief valves on the Sodium Hydroxide Tank were not procured as active valves nor were they procured for outdoor service.
In a letter on March 30, 1981 the licensee indicated that a continuing review was in progress, concerning this problem. This item will remain open pending review of the final report on this subject.
1.
(0 pen) 395/81-05-09: Westinghouse 4 Inch Gate Valves. On February 13, 1981 the licensee informed the NRC of a potential Part 21 report concerning Westinghouse 4 inch gate valves.
In a letter dated March 12, 1981 the licensee reported that the 4 inch gate valves were being reported as on outgrowth of the problem with Westinghouse 3 inch gate valves. This item will remain open until the final report is reviewed.
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(0 pen) 395/81-05-10: Corroded Hermetic Connectors. On March 10, 1981 the licensee informed the NRC of a potential 50.55(e) report concerning the discovery of a corroded hermetic detector.
This issue is still being investigated. This item wi11 remain open pending review of the final report on this subject.
6.
Preoperational Test Procedure Results Review The inspector reviewed the following Hydrostatic test results:
CS-08-H1 Excess Letdown CS-09-H1 High Pressure Letdown RC-01-H1 Reactor Coolant RC-03-H1 RTD Bypass loop SI-01-H1 SI High Head SI-04-H2 Penetration 329 Pneumatic SP-04-H1 Penetration 327 Pneumatic SP-04-H2 Penetration 328 Pneumatic RC-02-H1 Pressurizer Dead Weight Tester Tubing RC-05-H1 RCP Standpipe CS-26-H3 CVCS Holdup Tank
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CS-21-H1 Holdup Tank
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SI-02-H1 Bit Recirc DG-08-H1 D/G "A" Air Start CS-01-H1 Charging Pump Suction SS-05-H1 Primary Sampling-Accumulators
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SS-04-H1 Primary Sampling-RCS SW-01-H1 Service Water "A" Train The test results were reviewed to ensure that they are being adequately
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evaluated, that the test d.fa meets acceptance criteria and that deviations are properly identified and restored. The references used were:
1.
ASME Code,Section III b.
ASME Code,Section XI c.
Start Up Manual, SUM-C-1, " Hydrostatic and Pneumatic Tests" d.
Quality Control Procedure QCP VII-13, " Quality Verification of Hydro-static and Pneumatic Tests".
Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
1.
Many of the Code Hydros are having to be redone for various reasons.
During the performance of a rehydro, it was not clear to the inspector what procedural controls were being used. The same procedure was being used over again but the documentation of the steps performed was not always clear. This item will remain open (395/80-15-12) pending future inspector review.
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2.
Reference (d), Section 4.6.6 states that the quality verification will verify that all valves within the test boundary are properly aligned so that components will be subjected to test pressure. A quality verifi-cation was performed on hydrostati test CS-21-H1, Holdup Tank Hydro, indicating that valves were alighed so that the system inside the test boundary would receive test pressure. However, Valve 8620 was shut preventing hydrostatic test pressure from being applied between valve 8620 and 8621 (Hydrostatic Test Boundary). The test was performed with the valve shut. The test results were then reviewed without exception by five individuals.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, implemented by FSAR Section 17.1.5 requires that activities affecting quality be l
prescribed by documented instructions, procedure or drawings.... and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions procedures or drawings. The failure to follow Section 4.6.6 of Reference (d) is considered in violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V.
(395/81-05-11)
7.
Preservice Valve and Hydro Review
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The inspector reviewed Revision 1 to the preservice valve and hydro program.
The program was reviewed for technical adequacy and clarity. Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
a.
It is not clear to the personnel writing the valve program which valves
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should be in the program. The basis for the program needs to be e
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determined before another attempt is made at generating a new list of valves. This item will remain open (395/81-05-18) until a revised list has been reviewed.
b.
Twenty two hydrostatic tests listed as " Code" hydros appear ca the startup list of hydros but do not appear in the preservice plan. This item will remain open until an accurate list is submitted in the
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preservice plan. (395/81-05-13).
8.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review The inspector reviewed procedurc RC-01-H1, Reactor Coolant System Hydro-static Test. The procedure was reviewed for technical adequacy and to ensure it was consistent with the commitment in Chapter 14 of the FSAR and Regulatory Guide 1.68. Findings were acceptable with following exceptions:
a.
Step 3.2.16 sets the relief valve at 3250 psig. The previous reactor coolant hydro was performed with the relief valve set at 3162.
The
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inspector questioned why the settings were different.
b.
Step 6.4 instructed the operator to start a Charging /SI pump on minimum flow in accordance with SOP-102.
However SOP-102 does not tell an operator how to start a pump on mimin.um flow, given the conditions of the plant in Step 6.4 of the procedure.
c.
Step 6.6 instructed the operator to start a RHR pump in accordance with SOP-115. However SOP-115 does not tell an operator how to start a RHR pump, given the plant conditions existing in step 6.6 of the procedure.
d.
Step 6.7 fills the Reactor Coolant System until water flows out the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV). However a valve lineup done prior to step 6.7 shut the PORV.
e.
Step 6.32 vents the RCS in accordance with SOP-101, Section 5.6.
However, all steps of Section 5.6 should not be done.
f.
Step 6.37 adds the incorrect chemical (H-OH instead of LiOH) to the reactor coolant system in accordance with the wrong section (5.7) of S0P-101.
g.
Step 6.79 closes valves opened in step 6.46.1.
There is no step 6.46.1.
These items will remain open (81-05-14) pending future inspector review.
9.
Technical Specification Review The inspector reviewed the draft Technic:' Specifications for enforceability and clarity. This review is an ongoing process until the Proof and Review copy of the Technical Specifications are issued, at which time the final
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review will be performed.
There are five basic problems with the present
"draf t" Technical Specifications.
a.
Section 6, Administrative Controls, is still not in a condit ion to be fully reviewed since a number of changes are being proposed by the applicant.
b.
Section 4.6.2.2.d states that the spray additive system shall be demonstrated operable every 5 years by verifying each solution flow
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rate (to be determined during prwoerational tests) from the following drain connections in the spray additive system.
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1.
NaOH Tank to Loop A 5015 gpm 2.
Na0h Tank to Loop B 5015 gpm The inspector has questioned the source of the 50 + 5 gpm figures and will also review the test procedure to accomplish this test.
c.
Numerous sections of the Technical Specifications indicate required levels in tanks that are not in the same units as the gages in the control room, where the Technical Specification will be verified.
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d.
The inspector questioned whether Reactor Building Cooling Unit Condensate Flow Rate could be measured, as specified in 3.4.6.1, using the installed equipment.
e.
Table 3.3-2 lists response times for Reactor Trip System Instrumenta-tion which are different from the Response Time Table in the FSAR.
Table 3.3-2 is not always more conservative.
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These items will remain open c 4-01-15) pending future review by the inspector.
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10. Observation of Preoperaty n !
The inspector observed the performance of a portion of RH-1, Residual Heat Removal. The performance was observed to verify the testing is conducted in accordance with approved procedures and to independently verify the accept-ability of test results.
Findings were accentable with the following i
exceptions.
a.
Section 5.6 of the procedure, RH-1, states.that the following Starting Duty on the RHR pump motor shall not be exceeded:
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"Two consecutive starts with motor cold, one consecutive start with motor at operating temperature, subsequent starts with motor running between starts (15) minutes apart, with motor standing between starts 45 minutes apart."
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The operators were confused as to what was a consecutive start, how long it takes the motor to reach operating temperature and how long can
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l you wait once the motor is secured before you consider the motor i
" standing" between starts, this item (395/81-05-16) will remain open l
pending future inspector review.
11.
Review of Open Items The following open items were reviewed and are considered closed:
79-31-07 Tagout Problem 80-01-07 Q List 80-13-05 LR 4 80-25-01 VB-1 80-25-10 EF Flow 80-25-12 1600 psid Across S/G 80-34-04 FSAR error 80-40-04 Maximum external pressure 12.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector participated in the following events during the inspection period:
a.
H. B. Robinson Emergency Drill - March 11, 1981 b.
ACRS Meeting for V. C. Summer - Febru:ry 26-27, 1981 In a letter to the NRC dated March 23, 1981 SCE&G stated that the shutdown margin in Modes 4 and 5 would be changed to 2 percent delta K/K and that the
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setpoint on the high flux at shutdown alarm would be changed to 2 times
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background.
When these new limits appear in procedures and Technical Specifications they will be reviewed.
Until that time, this item will remain open (395/81-05-17).
13.
IE Bulletin Circular Followup The following IE Circulars (IEC) were reviewed to ensure the IEC was received and reviewed by the applicant:
IEC 79-10 Unacceptance Djpefjttjng$
IEC 79-11 Design Construction Interface Problems IEC 79-12 Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem IEC 79-17 Contact Problems in SB-12 GE Circuit Breakers IEC 79-18 Target Rock Valves IEC 79-19 Loose Locking Devices IEC 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking Devices IEC 80-10 Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification IEC 80-13 Grid Strap Damage IEC 80-15 Natural Circulation Cooldown All of the above circulars are considered closed.
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