IR 05000395/1981019
| ML20010H359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1981 |
| From: | Conlon T, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010H355 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-81-19, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8109240385 | |
| Download: ML20010H359 (9) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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.yE 101 MARIETT A ST., N.W.. SUITE 3100 g
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Report No. 50-395c,1-19 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric and G&s Company P
0. Box 764 C,iuabia, South Carolina 29218 Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-395 License No. CPPP-94
Inspection at Summ: sit.e near Columbia, South Carolina Inspector:
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J. Jf L.na Date Sig,ned j
Approved by:
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T. E. Conlon, Sectior Chief ate Signeci Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Divisior SUM'iARY
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Inspection on July 28-30, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, uaannounced inspection involvsd 17 inspector-hour 3 onsite in the areas cf post tensioning quality records, containment structural integrity test quality records, service water pumphouse settlement records, tne service water pond, IE Bulletin 70-11, and follow-up on Re.gional request.
Results Of the areas inspected, N violations or deviations were identified.
8109240385 810024 PDR ADOCK 05000395 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Station Manager
- A. A. Smith, Director, QA Surveillance Systems
- D. Moore, QA Manager
- T. A. McAlister, O'. St veillance Spacialist l
' R. Bot knight, QA ! #ru.illance Spacialist R. Liniiler, Civil QC Supervisor
- H. Radia, Director; Project Engineet ir.g S. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor C. Fields, T chnical Support Engineer fxC Resident Inspector
- J. L. Skolds
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 30, 1931 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
i 3.
Licensee Action on trxvious Inspection Findings i
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved 1* ems are matters about which more ;nformation is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. New unresoited itens identified during this inspection are discussed in parseraph 6.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
The inspector examined monthly service water pumphouse settlement records and the service water pond piezometer data for the period July, 1979 through June,1981.
b.
The inspector reviewed the following reports:
(1)
1980 Inspection of Service Water Pond Dam (2)
1981 Inspection of Service Water Pond Dam
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c.
The inspector examined the service water pond. With the exception of some' vegetation growing on the embankment slopes, no problems were-observed. This same problem was noted by licensee engineers during the
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1981. annual inspection of the service water pond.
Licensee personnel stated that the vegetation will be removed in the near future and that a spraying program wi 1 be initiated to prevent vegetation from growing on the embankments.
d.
The inspector reviewed a draf t of Specification SP-220, " Surveillance of Reactor Building Post Tensioning System."
No deviations or violations were identified.
6.
Containment (Prestressing) - Review of Quality Reocrds The inspector examined the following quality records related to post-tensioning of the reactor building:
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a.
Stressing cards for tendon numbers V-4, V-22, V-30, V-34, V-36, V-50, V-52, V-60, V-70, V-88, V-90, V-92, V-102, V-108, V-114, D101, D104,
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D109, D118, D217, IAC, 2AC, 4AC,~5AC, 12AC,.49AC, 98A, 24BA, SCB, and 21CB.
b.
Greasing records for tendon numbers V-4, V-22, V-30, V-53, D-111
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through D-116, D-229, 4AC through 10AC, and 14AC through 24AC.
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INRYC0 Nonconformance Report numbers NCR G75 - F-46 through NCR G75-F-74 d.
Calibration records for hydralic rams, register numbers 9361 through.
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9366, anf e )
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Licensee QA S;, viellance Report s (1) For March 1979, number 3-35, 3-36, and 3-122 (2) For April,1979, numbers 4-19 aad 4-110
-(3)
For June,1979, numbers G0389, G0879, and G0999
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l Acceptance criteria examined by the Inspector appear in FSAR Section
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3.8, and INRYC0 Field Installation Manual Prccedures F7.0 through F7.4,
F8.1 through F8.4, and F9.1.
l Review of. the hydraulic ram calibration records disclosed the following i
unresolved item. The ram calibration procedure. requires the stressing
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rams to be calibrated before tha tendons are stressed, after repairs to the stressing rams, and following completion of stressing operations.
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The records available for review by the inspector were those for cali-
bration of the rams prior to start of work, and those for rams which
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had repairs made to them while stressing was in progress. There were no records available for calibration of the rams following completion of the onsite stressing work.
The licensee indicated that these records were at the home office of the post-tensioning system contrac-tor, INRYCO, Inc. The lack of records for ram calibration following completion of the onsite stressing work was identified to the licensee as Unresolved Item 395/81-19-01, " Post-tensioning. Ram Calibration
Records" pending further review by NRC.
No violations or deviations.were identified.
7.
Containment Structural Integrity Test
The inspector examined Gilbert / Commonwealth report entitled "V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Reactor Containment Building Structural Acceptance Test."
i Review of report disclosed that all deflections and measured stresses were within the predicted valves. Acceptance criteria examined by the inspector appear in Section 3.8.1 of the FSAR and Regulatory Guide 1.18.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design IE Bulletin 80-11 was issued to Summer and other construction sites for information only. This bulletin was received by the licensee and evaluated i
in response to the NRR information request discussed below. This bulletin i
is closed.
I In a letter dated April 21, 1980 to all licensees with plants under con-struction, the NRC office of Nuclear React.or Regulation (NRR) requested design and construction information on Category I Masonry Walls.
South Carolina Electric and Gas responded to the NRR icforation request in a i
letter dated May 8,1980 and reported that there were na Category I Concrete Masonry walls in the Summer Plant. The inspector made a walkdown inspection r
of the reactor building, the auxiliary building, and portions of the control
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building and service water pumphouse to verify that there were no Category I Concrete Masonry Walls in these structures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Followup on Regional Requests Two individuals who were formerly employed at the site testified et an ASLB prehearing conference on August 2, 1978 and expressed several concerns
relating to civil construction. activities.
The licensee's QA staff conducted detailed investigations into each of the concerns these indi-viduals expressed and issued two investigation reports. The inspector I
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examined these investigation reports and conducted an independent review of the concerns to verify the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's investigations.
The concerns and the results of the investigations are discussed below:
a.
Concern Concrete formwork buckled during several concrete placements.
No specific examples or locations were specified by the tedividual.
Discussion Concrete formwork is not safety related.
A review of QA records disclosed that problems were experienced on some concrete placements
. with formwork which buckled.
QC procedures required the outlica dimensions of safety related concrete to be checked after completion of the pour and out of tolerance conditions be documented on NCNs and referred to Engineering for dispoistion. The,inspcetor noted that the licensee had documented out of tolerance concrete on NCNs. The cause for scce of the out of toleranco concrete was formwork which buckled or moved during placement of concrete.
The licensee had taken adequate measures to document and correct the problems. Buckling of'the form-work does not affect the. integrity of the structure or the quality of-the concrete being placed. Concrete formwork is not safety related, b.
Concern Concrete formwork " broke out" while concrete was being placed.
Discussion This concern is similar to the one discussed in paragraph 9.a, above.
The licensee had taken adaquate meastres to document and correct the problems. Formwork is not safety related.
c.
. Concern Concrete formwork "came apart" while being transported to the location where it was to be installed.
Discussion Concrete formwork is not safety related.
The failure of concrete formwork-prior to its installation has no affect on the quality of the finished concrete placed for a structure.
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d.
Concern
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i Unauthorized welders welded wall ties during erection of formwork-in
the control building.
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Discussion
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during the placement of concrete. These wall ties are only temporary and do not contribute to the structural integrity of the concrete.
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Concrete formwork is not safety related.
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e.
Concern-
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A tied column of reinforcing steel in the turbine building was blown I
over by the wind prior i.o concrete placement.
Discussion The Turbine Building is a non-safety related structure. The column of reinforcing steel did 'in fact blow over prior to installation of the conrete formwork.
This occurs occasionally on projects.
It had no
affect on the structural integrity of the Turbine Building.
f.
Concern Blockouts were formed at the wrong location in the "Amertap" Building.
Discussion
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The "Amertap Building" is - portion of the Turbine Building.
This structure is not safety related.
The licensee reviewed the records available for construction of this portion of the turbine building and concluded that all bockouts were in their proper location.
g.
Concern
Anchor Bolts were not placed at the proper locations in the base slab of the Fuel Handling Building.
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Discussion Mislocation of items embeded in concrete such as ' anchor bolts is a
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common problem on any,.onstruction project. This' problem is easily corrected. In' addition, design changes often. result in requirements for installation of additional anchor bolts and/or othe embeds after s
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tne cencrete has been placed. The installation of additional anchor bolts a*!d embeds is not a problem if it is properly controlled and inspected. NRC has identified a generic problem in the installation of
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anchor bolts in concrete and the installation of pipe hanger supports, e
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including location control for anchor bolts, which was common to several sites. This resulted in the issuance of IE Bulletins 79-02
and 79-14 which dealt with these problems. The work required to close out these bulletins is presently in progress at Summer. The. licensee's investigation into this concern disclosed that there had been problems with mislocation of items embedded in concrete and that these problems
had been documented on Nonconformance Reports (NCNs).
The inspector reviewed the NCNs to verify that they had been properly dispositioned.
h.
Concern A large concrete placement was made in the early summer of 1974 in the reactor building "oundation. During this placement there was a heavy rainstrom which rasulted in wate knee deep in a portion of the place-ment.
Discussion The individual who expressed this concern stated that this concrete -
placement was a 500 to 600 cubic yard pour placed on top of other concrete in the reactor building foundation. The individual also said there was reinforcing steel in the pour and suggested that because of this it was part of the r(zctm' building structural foundation base mat Review of the licensee's investigation disclosed that a heavy rainstorm occurred during a fill concrete placement under' the reactor i
building structural foundation mat and that the rain did affect a
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portion anf the placement.
This was documented as NCN-44. This pour (number CFRB-51) was placed on June 3, 1974 The inspector reviewed the cercrete pour card and drawing numbers E-411-015 and E-411-018
"Reacto. Building Leveling Mat Elevator 374".
Review of the above documents disclosed eitt p!scemece. CF RB-51 was a fill concrete pour of 571 cubic yards which was placed on top of a previously placed fill concrete pour.
The concrete placement contained reinforcing steel.
The required design compressive strength of the concrete for this pour was 1500 psi.
Disposition of the NCN resulted in removal of the
concrete in the area affected by the heavy rainstorm.
The extent of the concretc to be removed was determined by a detailed engineering investigation. The first concrete placement in the reactor building
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structural foundation mat was not made until October, 1974. Therefore-the placement in question was not a portion of the reactor building.
basement The inspector cancurs with -the results of the licensee's
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investigation which concluded that this problem was properly documented and corrected.
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Concern Improper concrete placement techniques. and conditions during freezing weather.
The individual gave no specific details as to concrete placements or locations on which he felt improper cold weather concrete operation occurred.
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Discussion
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The licensee's investigation into this concern disclosed that several NCNs had been written by QC personnel.to document and correct procedu-
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ral violations which occurred during cold weather concrete placements.
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The inspector reviewed the NCNs to verify that they had been properly i
dispositioned.
The ' licensee concluded that the individual's concern was a valid one, however that sufficient controls existed to assure that cold weather concreting operations were, properly executed. The inspector concurs with the results of the licensee's investigation.
Similiar concerns regarding cold weather concreting operations were expressed to NRC Region II by another individual who had been employed at the site. The result of the NRC investigation'into these concerns
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i s documented in IE Inspection Report number 50-395/79-38.
j Concern
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A concrete placement in the turbine building cured too fast and cracked.
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Discussion i
The Turbine Building is a nonsafety related structure. Review of the licensee's investigation disclosed that this problem occurred. This e
l problem was properly evaluated. It has no impact on safety.
i k.
Concern Voids in concrete (honeycomb) were not being properly repaired.
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Discussion The individual who expressed this concern stated that he saw a concrete finisher tap an area of a concrete wall with a hammer and t b n place a
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concrete patch on the area. He was, approximately 100 feet away from
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the area being repaired and he could not give any specific details as to ' location of the repair or its size 'or depth.
The licensee's investigation of this concern disclosed that numerous NCNs had been e
written to occument and c. rrect defects such as concrete honeycomb.
j The irspector reviewed these NCNs to verify they had been properly 2-L
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dispositioned P;ocedures and documentation of repairs to concrete surface defects and honeycomb had been reviewed by NRC inspectors on several oc:assions during previous inspections.
1.
Conclusion Seven of the concerns expressed by the two individuals were either not safety related or did not involve safety related structures.
The remainirq four concerns which were safety related had been detected by the 11cen see, documented, and corrected prior to the ASLB prehearing conference.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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