IR 05000395/1981032
| ML20041A701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1982 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Skolds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041A698 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-81-32, IEB-80-04, IEB-80-4, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8202220421 | |
| Download: ML20041A701 (7) | |
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report No. 50-395/81-32 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Docket No. 50-395 License No. CPPR-94 Inspection at V. C. Summer site near Parr, South Carolina Inspector:
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LI b J.L.Sgalas D&te Signed I) h AbD
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l/LP/ N Approved by:
V. L. l@ovinlee, Section Chief, Division of Date Sfgned Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUl51ARY Inspection on December 1-23, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 150 inspector-hours on site in the areas of review of licensee identified items preoperational test records, safety committee activity, open item review, IE Bulletin followup, operational staffing, preoperational test procedure review and independent inspection effort.
Resul ts Of the 7 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8202220421 820129 PDR ADOCK 05000395 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Station flanager
- J..G. Connelly, Deputy Si te llenager
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- D.11oore, fianager of Quality Assurance
- L. Storz, Assistant 11anager, Operations
- P. Fant, Director of Station Quality Control
- F. J. Leach, Director of Site Engineering
- H. J. Sefick, Security Supervisor
- M. N. Browne, Director Independent Safety Engineering Group
- S. S. Houze, Nuclear Licensing
- J. W. Packs, Technical Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, and mechanics.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 22, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector also attended the exit interview of D. floore _on December 18, 1981 and W. Peery on December 11, 1981.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) (81-23-06) Unresolved Item.
Storage of QA Audit Records. This item dealt with the fact that the QA audit records were not being stored in accordance with ANSI 45.2.9.
However Appandix 3A to the FSAR indicated that the requirements of ANSI 45.2.9 only applied to nonpermanent records and therefore excluded the QA audit records. The FSAR has since been amended to indicate that the QA audit records will be stored in the permanent record vault commencing at a future date.
Until that time the records will be kept in the QA building and at the corporate offices.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Preoperational Test Records The inspector reviewed the applicant's program for records control of
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preoperational test records.
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References utilized were:
a.
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
b.
-Operational QA Plan c.
ANSI 45.2.9 - 1974 " Requirements for Collection, Storage and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Power Plants" d.
Start Up Manual Implementation of the program was also inspected.
Findings were acceptable.
6.
Operational Staffing The inspector reviewed the qualifications of plant personnel to verify that all eky staff positions are filled and that the staff qualifications are adequate for the designated assignment.
References used were:
a.
FSAR Chapter 13 c.
ANSI 45.2.6 - 1973 Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
a.
Chapter 13 of ref (b) is not up to date in that a plant reorganization recently took place and is not reflected in the chapter.
b.
Not all the Shift Supervisors have been assigned.
c.
It is not clear to the inspector whether there was any distinction made between a Technician and a Repairman (as defined in Ref (a), paragraph
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4.5.2 and 4.5.3).
Specifically, it appears that no distinction is made between electronic technicians and electronic repairman in the I&C
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organization. Also, it is not clear who are considered laboratory technicians, as defined in Reference (a), in the applicant's organi-zation, d.
In reviewing the qualifications of Quality Control (QC) personnel it was noted that waivers were being granted to personnel to qualify them as Level I or II in some diciolines.
Reference (d) makes no provisions for waivers.
However,.in rev leweing the waivers, it was noted that the
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personnel involved possessed dequate qualifications but that not all
experience was gained on site in the Nuclear Operations organization.
Because this experience was not gained on site the applicant felt it was necessary to grant a waiver, even though no wa!ver was necessary.
Since waivers are not allowed by Reference (d) the inspector recommeded
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modifying the qualification program to eliminate any reference to waivers of requirements.
The above items will remain open (81-32-01) pending future inspector review.
7.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the following preoperatinnal test procedure:
LD-2 Reactor Coolant Leak Detection Monitoring System The procedure was reviewed for technical adequacy and to ensure it conformed to the requirements in Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the FSAR.
Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
-The alarms mentioned in the procedure that exist on panels 6032 and 6034 are not consistent with what actually exists on the panels.
This item will remain open (81-32-02) pending future inspector review.
8.
Open Item Review (Closed) (79-28-07) Reactor Building Door Position Indication.
Section 3.8.1.1.2.3 of the FSAR has been ammended to read "Each airlock has position indication on a CRT in the Control Room as follows:
a.
Alarm, if either of the two airlock doors is not shut.
b.
Trouble, if the magnetic switch circuit has a ground or a break.
Additionally, an audible alann is given upon a change of status.
This description adequately describes the system as it is installed in the plant.
(Closed) (79.-28-04) Fuel Handling Building Pool Liner Leak Test.
The acceptance criteria for this test was changed to correctly incorporate the.
vendor's acceptance criteria for the gates, valves and liner seams.
(Closed) (79-28-06) First Out Panel.
This item dealt with the ability of operators to recognize the meaning of the various modes of operation of the first out panel. The panel is now color coded red and has separate acknowledge - test - reset controls.
Conversations with operators indicated adequate familiarity with the operation of the panel.
(Closed) (80-29-03) Loss of Instrument Air Procedure.
This item dealt with procedure ICP240.018 " Air Operated Valves-Generic".
Review of numerous functional tests on air operated valves indicated that the response check on a. loss of instrument air was being performed and properly documented in the procedures.
(0 pen) (80-29-05) Alarm Setpoints for MODUFLASH Unit.
This item dealt with descrepancies in setpoints on the MODUFLASH Unit and the setpoints in the
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instrument list. The inspector selected 11 setpoints at random.
Seven of the setpoints differed from the instrument list. This item will remain open pending resolution of the discrepancies.
9.
Licensee Identified Items (0 pen) (81-32-03) Reportability Aspects of NUREG 0588 Review. On December 3,1981 the licensee reported that during the NUREG 0588 review, the architect-engineer discovered that the original specification for the qualification of Kerite splices used on safety-related control and power cables in harsh environmental areas outside containment was not adequate and resulted in the use of unqualified splicing material.
This report es-reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e) porting any additional items determined to be tablishes the framework for re during the NUREG 0588 review.
reported that a single failure of the volume control tank (VCT) pplicant (0 pen) (81-14-02) VCT Level Transmitter. On June 23, 1981 the a level control system in conjunction with no operator action could cause the VCT to empty and subsequent charging / safety injection pump damage.
In a subsequent letter dated December 9,1981 the applicant indicated that timely operator action can prevent any damage to the charging / safety injection pumps. The inspector asked what timely operator action meant and was told that it meant ten (10) minutes.
The inspector requested that a basis for the ten minutes be provided. The inspector verified that operator training material had been generated which reflects that both channels of level are required for transfer over to the RWST from the VCT. Operating and Annunciator Response procedures have not been changed to identify the proper response to the failed VCT level channels. This item will remain open until the procedures are changed and a basis is provided for the ten minutes.
10.
Safety Committee Activity l
The inspector reviewed the programs for the on site (Plant Safety Review, PSRC) and Offsite (Nuclear Safety Review, NSRC) committees to ensure they l
have been established and are functioning in conformance with the draft Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
The inspector attended a PSRC
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meeting on December 15, 1981.
Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
a.
The inspector reviewed the minutes of all PSRC meetings held to date.
tieetings number 80-09, 80-13, and 80-16 did not have a quorum as defined in the draft Technical Specifications.
b.
Section 6.5.1.7 of the draft Technical Specifications does not indicate that the PSRC will recommend in writing the approval / disapproval of the Process Control Program and the Offsite Dose Calculation flanual.
c.
Section 6.5.1.3 of the draft Technical Specifications states that no more than one alternate shall participate as voting members in PSRC
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l activities at any one time. The applicant indicated that this one alternate did not apply to the Chairman's alternate.
The inspector
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recommended that the Technical Specifications state that this did not apply to the Chairman's alternate.
d.
The PSRC has no method or procedure for following up or tracking recomendations made to the Station Manager.
e.
The inspector questioned whether there was any attempt to distribute material to be reviewed by the PSRC before the meetings were held. The inspector was informed that originally, the material to be reviewed was distributed prior to the meetings but as of late this has not been done.
Routine items which are not complicated do not necessarily need to be reviewed prior to a meeting. However, the inspector questioned whether a complicated design change could be adequately reviewed by the PSRC if the members see the change for the first time at the meating.
f.
In revieweing the appointment letters of members of the NSRC it was not apparent what diciplines were covered by two members.
g.
Tae NSRC has no method or procedure for following up or tracking recommendations made to the Vice President and Group Executive, Nuclear Operations.
h.
Section 6.5.2.3 of the Technical Specification states that no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in NSRC activities at any one time. The applicant indicated that this did not include the Chairman"s alternate.
The inspector recommended the Technical Specifications state this interpretation.
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No procedure or method exists for the distribution of materials to NSRC members prior to the meetings.
The above items will remain open (81-32-04) pending future inspector review.
11.
IE Bulletin Followup (0 pen) (IEB 81-02, Supplement No.1) " Failure of Gate Type Valves to close Against Differential Pressure." The inspector reviewed the responses dated July 7,1981 and November 16, 1981 concerning this Bulletin, and Modifi-cation Test Procedure No. 55, " Westinghouse Supplied Gate Valve Operator Modi fication". The paperwork to document the work accomplished has not been reviewed yet.
Not all of the work has been completed on the 3 inch valves.
The response dated November 16, 1981 indicated that valve 8130B had a gear change performed yet the implementing procedure does not include 8130D for a gear change. Also the testing performed to verify proper valve operability has not been reviewed.
(Closed) IEB 80-04, Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition.
The licensee was not required to respond to this Bulletin.
The issue discussed in this Bulletin is discussed in the FSAR.
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12.
Independent Inspection Effort 1.
The inspector reviewed Regulatory Guide 1.20 " Vibration Assessment of Reactor-Internals during Preoperational Testing." The pre-hot functional test (HFT)-inspection data was reviewed and found accept-a bl e.
The post-HFT inspection has not been performed yet.
2.
In a letter dated flovember 16, 1981 the licensee indicated that a special clamp would be used-to eliminate flexing at the connector of the acoustic transducers used on the pressurizer code safety valves.
Until this special clamp is installed, this item will remain open.
(81-32-05).
3.
The inspector reviewed Regulatory Guides 1.79, 1.68 and 1.9 and compared the requirements of these Regulatory Guides to the applicant's program.
Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
a.
Regulatory. Guide 1.79 requires a verification that no trip occurs when ECCS. pumps are running at full flow conditions and that an adequate margin exist between the trip point and the maximum operating conditions. Evaluation of an adequate margin was not performed during the conduct of the tests. Adequate margin has been 'shown to exist for the pumps at 105-125 percent above the motor continuous service factor rating.
The-continuous rating is supplied at 115 percent of the full load rating.
b.
Regulatory Guide 1.68 states that a program exist to include final verification tests to demonstrate proper operation of interlocks, setpoints, and other protective features. The inspector requested that the applicant provide evidence that the preoperational test program or surveillance test program will cover all safety-related interlocks, setpoints and protective features.
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Regulatory Guide 1.9 states that the predicted loads on the diesel generator should be verified by test.
The inspector could not find where this verification had been done.
The above items will remain open (81-32-06) pending future inspector review.
The inspector inspected the fuel handling building on December 8,1981 for security, health physics and housekeeping.
Findings were acceptable.
13.
Technical Specification Review l
l The inspector reviewed portions of the Proof and Review copy of the Draft l
Technical Specifications.
Comments have been provided to Region II for i
incorporation -into the Regional comments on the Draft Technical Specifi-l cations.
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