IR 05000395/1981010
| ML20009D690 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1981 |
| From: | Economos N, Foster L, Herdt A, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009D686 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-81-10, NUDOCS 8107240273 | |
| Download: ML20009D690 (8) | |
Text
V.
.y
.gv suc<ig
=
<f
'o UNITED STATES 8 'j ),
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~'
'
\\"
.c REGION il
- ['%' g,s f
101 MARtETTA ST.. N.W.. SulTE 3100 o
y e
ATLANTA, GEORo tA 30303 j
.....
Report No.. 50-395/81-10 Licensee:
Scuth Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Facility Name:
Summer
Docket No. 50 395 License No. CPPR-94 Inspection at..Surrgr 1te ne ? Col -650uth Carolina j
Inspectars:~ "]/
< -x.4-^> 7, m
[
[ '<k
,
N. E.onomos
Da'te Signed b/
$l s
-
L. Foster Date Signed
.
$bu O}. %k 6 /s'/7/
J. York {/
~
[
Date Signed
,
Approved by:
d 8/
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Date Signed Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY Inspection on May 11-15, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 60 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings, IE Bulletins, licensee identified items (50.55(e)), reactor vessel installation, and reactor vessel internals (welding).
Results Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8107240273 810617 PDR ADOCK 05000 G
_
,
,-,. _. _
. _. _ _ _ _ - _.
-
.~.
fl
,
.
.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Station Manager
- H.- Radin, Sr. Engineer
- S. J. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor
- A. A. Smith, QA Director
- J. G. Connelly, Assistant Plant Manager J. Woods, Construction QC Manager
- K. W. Nettles, Sr. Engineer, Engineering
- S. S.- Howze, Licensing Engineer
- T. A. McAlister, QA Surveillance Specialist Other Organizations
- J. Harvey, Construction Manager, Daniel Construction Company
- J. R. Fletcher, Assistant Project QA Manager, Daniel Construction Company NRC Resident Inspector
- J, L. Skolds
~
- Attended exit interview-2.
Exit Interview-The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 15, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings-a.
(Closed) Violation (395/81-02-01) - Failure to Follow Procedure for Documenting Completion of Fabrication and Installation Operations.
SCE&G's letter _of response dated March 27, 1981 has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II. The inspector held' discus-sions with the QA specialist and other cognizant personnel and examined the corrective actions as stated in. the letter of response.
The
'
-inspector concluded that SCE&G had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions, and developed the recessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
m
.
I.
i
.
J b.
(Cloced) Unresolved Item (395/80-30-03) - Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure. Magnetic particle procedure ISI-70 was revised and approved by the Westinghouse Level III examiner on May 4,1981. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure for technical adequacy and compliance with ASME Section V requirements and found it satisfactory.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (395/81-06-01) - Inadequate Icentification of RPV Internals. Sketch-No. CGE-1-1200 has been revised to match more closely the items on the list of internals earmarked for PSI /ISI examination.
4.
' Unresolved Items -
i Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
! Inspector Followup Items (IFI)
a.
(Closed) IFI 395/81-02-02 - RT ' Indications in the Steam Generator Flow Restrictor. Westinghouse by memorancum to 0. S. Bradham dated May 14, 1981, and previous. correspondence to Region II stated that the restric-tors were UT inspected per ASME Section III, NB-2542 and th.e surfaces PT inspected per ASME Section III, NB-2546. Results of these inspec-tions showed the material acceptable for the application.
.b.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 80-19-01 - As-Built Piping Inspection Procedure. The following procedures were reviewed:
(1) ' Procedure No. AP-III-03 " Preparation of Field Drawing and Sketches", Revision 7
.
(2) Procedure No. AP-III-04 " Field Engineering (Survey)", Revision 7
'
These two procedures are used for as-built piping inspection. - This item is considered resolved.
'. 6.
Licensee Identified It tms 50.55(e)
,
a.
(Closed) Item'395/80-20-02: Piping Attachment Welds.
The licensee's response to this item dated March 17, 1981 wa.; discussed in NRC Inspec-tion Report 50-395/81-06 and found inadequate in that it failed to indicate whether conditions identified did r.ot extend to other areas such as equipment and piping.
In a supplemental response to Region II, dated ' April 3, 1981, the licensee stated that inspections had been performed on equipment and pipe supports where full penetration welds were dictated by design.
The inspector reviewed selected inspection reports and applicable procedures to ascertain implementation of activity in this area.
.
+
.
-
.m.,
- -,.
____..-._,,.,..y m,., _..... - - _ _ _ _,,, _ _, _ _ _ ~....,
_ -..
__ _
.., -.
e
+
.
.
.
.
b.'
(Closed) Item 395/80-30-01:
Pipe Hanger Material Traceability.
The licensee's response to this item, dated January 13, 1981, was reviewed and -discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-395/81-06. At the time of this inspection there were eighteen (18) hangers that have been identi-
'fied as having parts requiring material verification.
Work on these hangers will_be completed pending receipt and installation of requisi-tioned material as required. This problem was identified and disposi-tioned through the licensee's nonconformance notification (NCN) 1154H, Pipe Hangers, Material Traceability. Tne inspectors reviewed applic-able. inspection procedures, related records and observed / inspected the following hangers f* compliance with drawings.
Hanger ~No.
System SIH-355 Safety Injection-BRH-053 Boron Recycle CCH-269 Component Cooling System CCH-1599 Component Cooling System Results of this work effort indicate the licensee's planned actions, now being implemented, should bring this - matter to a satisfactory conclusion.
c.
(Closed) Item. 395/80-39-01:
Craf t-Doing Unauthorized Work on Pipe Hangers. The licensee's. response to this item dated January 13, 1981.
was reviewed and discussed in NRC Inspection Report number 50-395/
81-06.
During this. inspection the inspectors. reviewed applicable procedures,- related QC records and observed / inspected a -sample of randomly _ selected hangers including some of which had undergone
.. unauthorized work. The hangers observed were as follows:
Hanger No.
System BDH-027 S/G Blowdown RCH-284 Reactor Cooling SIH-231 Safety Injection RHH-204 Residual Heat Removal Discussions with cognizant licensee representatives disclosed that in addition 'to planned corrective actions and inspections the licenwee plans to conduct _ an additional walk down of the systems to confirm
. hanger location, type, orientation, design, etc.
This will be done prior to system turnover. On the basis of these_ findings the inspec-tors concluded the licensee's planned actions, and. their implementation
~
should bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion.
.
n-
,,,,,'-,,ww--,
-gm,.
- -.,
.-->
-
s
,
d.
(Closed) Item 395/80-25-14 - Incorrectly Specified and Installed Flange Material. Review of this item was a followup to earlier reviews on the subject matter discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-395/81-02 and 50-395/81-06. _-Tne inspectors reviewed the licensee's reports on this matter dated July 30, 1980 and May 4, 1981.
Through discussions, interviews and reviews the inspectors have concluded that actions taken to identify the cause, determine the extent and prevent recurrence were addressed satisfactorily.
e.
(Closed) Item 395/80-37-13: Seismic Installation Not Inspected.
The licensee submitted interim reports on this matter cated December 23, 1980 and January 30, 1981. The final report dated February 10, 1981, stated that an evaluation performed by the licensee's structural engineering department disclosed that the matter was not reportable as a ' significant. deficiency.
The inspectors have concurred with this position.
Status of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins
,.
a.
(Closed) IEB 395/80-BU-08: Examination of Containment Liner Penetra-tion Welds. The licensee's response to IE Bulletin 80-08 " Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds" dated June 24, 1980 stated that V. C. Summer did not use the flued head design for penetration connec-
=tions. In addition, the respor.se stated that the utilized penetrations were purchased, fabricated, and installed in accordance with ASME Section III (74W75) and Code Case 1607-1.
The containment field boundary butt welds were fabricated without the use of backir.g rings and were _radiographed.
These items were produced from SA-333 GR-6 material. Within these areas, the inspector selected at random the following penetration welds and reviewed existing radiographs for
. compliance with applicable code' requirements, ASME Section III (71S73)
and radiographic procedure WEl-02:
Weld Size ISO System FW-6R1-12.75" x.375" SE-RH-10 Residual Heat Removal FW-2 38" x 1.109" DE-FW-203P Feedwater FW-1 18" x.840" DE-SP-401P Reactor Building Spray FW-1 24" x 1.08" DE-SI-227P Safety Injection FW-1 10.75" x.539" DE-SI-320P Safety Injection Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie '
.
.
.
.
b.
(0 pen) IE Bulletin 79-02:
Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchors. All of the concrete expansion anchors used by the licensee were the wedge type (Hilti "Kwi k Bol ts").
A 100 percent reinspection had been performed on all of the installed expan-sion anchors. The licensee stated that all of the anchors installed since the reinspection and any installed in the future (a small amount of construction remains to be completed, plus some modifications to Lexisting structures) will be inspected to the same criteria in order to meet the requirem? qts of IEB 79-02.
The wedge type concrete expansion anchors require a safety factor of four.
In a response from the licensee to IEB 79-02, dated May 5.1979, a sample of bolts from 96 base plates (out of a population of 700)
revealed that approximately 10% were below the required safety factor of four.
In an additional response to 79-02 and 79-14, dated-August 17, 1979, the licensee agreed to either add additional supports or make modifications where the engineering design analysis indicated a safety factor-below four.
This decision was reaffirmed by the licensee.
'
Hilti expansion anchors were inspected on the following hangers:
(1) Hanger No. BRH-026 in the Boron Recycle System (2) Hanger.No. CCH-269 in the Component Cooling System (3) Hanger No. CCH-4002 in the Component Cooling System
.To further assure that the licensee had performed adequate inspections and ' corrective actions, the inspectors examined approximately 100-nonconformance and deficiency notices concerning the Hilti Bolt instal-lations.
.
This Bulletin will remain open until all anchor bolts are installed and
'
until modifications are made to ensure a safety factor of four.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
c.
(0 pen) IE Bulletin 79-14: _ Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems.
Engineering design analysis verification using the actual as-built dimensions is complete on 39 systems out of a total of 142. Most of the other systems are almost completed. The analysis is approximately 90% complete and modifications to existing systems are presently being performed.
Gilbert (GAI) is responsible for the program management of the analysis efforts and is using four subcon-tractors, e.g., EDS, EBASCO, Teledyne, and ENCOMP.
.
I
-
..
.
-.
.
i
The systems subject to a walkdown inspection are provided by GAI to Daniels Construction Company (DCC).
Daniels then prepares isometric drawings for the walkdown inspections. Another DCC group performs the inspections by measuring, locating, and identifying all of the compon-ents along the' isometrics. The isometrics are then revised to depict the actual as-built system. The two following procedures that related to these inspections were reviewed:
(1) Procedure No.
AP-III-03, " Preparation of Field Drawing and Sketches," Rev 7-(2) Procedure No. AP-III-04, " Field Engineering (Survey)" Rev. 7 Three isometrics with as-built dimensions were reviewed:
(1) MS 710, Rev. 6G, Main Steam System-(2) DE-MS-68, Rev. 3, Main Steam System (Revised dimensions on drawing to reflect as-built dimension per FCRB 12PO4-H)
(3) CS-09, Rev. 2C, Chemical System Isometric CS-09, Rev. 2 was walked down with a DCC survey team and the recorded as-built parameters were verified.
The licensee performs the inspections on the concrete anchor bolts (IEB 73-02) and on the hangers (IEB 79-14). The following SCE&G procedures relating to these inspections were reviewed:
(1)
Procedure No. 6.3.1, " Inspection of Fabrication and Installation of Pipe Hangers and Supports", Rev. TA2 (2)
Procedure No. MF-9, " Inspection of Fabrication of Safety-Related Pipe Hangers and Supports", Revision 7
-
The inspector observed modification work being performed to FCR 12967H on hanger No. SIH 322 (Isometric No. SE SI 29) in the Safety Injection System. The inspector witnessed the reinspection of the following five hangers on which a final QC inspection had been previously performed:
(1) Hanger No. BRH-023 in the Boron Recycle System (2) Hanger No. CCH-269 in the Component Cooling System
,
(3) Hanger No. CCH-4002 in the Component Cooling System
.(4) Hanger No. FWH-261 in the S/G Feedwater System (5) Hanger No. WDH-029
-
--
._. - _. - -._ _
_
__
.. _..
. _. _ _ _
. _.. _, _ - -
.
.
.....
_.
.
__
_
_
_
_
___
-
,
.
.
The' QC personnel performing inspections on concrete anchors and hangers had been trained to licensee's procedure Nos. 6.3.1 and MF-9.
The
' training records of the ' QC technician that performed the walkdown inspections of the above five listed hangers were examined and his training to these procedures was verified.
In addition to being. knowledgeable of procedures, the inspectors had been trained by performing inspections on "model" hanger installations and actual. installations under the supervision of a qualified inspector.
Results of their inspections were compared with the known
parameters of the hangers. If the inspection results were compatible with the known parameters, the inspectors were considered trained and qualified to perform inspections of installed hangers and supports.
IE Bulletin 79-14 will remain open until all walkdown inspections are completed and the resolutions of problems as described' in the licensee's letter to Region II dated March 19, 1981 have been
- completed.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
'8.
Reactor Vessel Installation - Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures The reactor pressure vessel was transported and installed by Bigge Company per Drawing 74E27RV2.
Other procedures applicable to this activity included:
a.
FQCP-6.2.2 - Reactor Pressure Vessel Installation (Inspection of
- Installed Equipment)
'
'b.
-FQCP-6.2.3 - Equipment Assembly and Disassembly Report c.
Reactor Vessel Setting, V. C. Summer Nuclear Plant The transportation / installation effort began on October 25, 1977 and final setting was completed on December 1, 1977.
Records selected for review included the following:
a.
- RPV Supports elevation and location b.
Bolted Connection Inspection Report and acceptance c.
Report of RPV installation - Form 6.2.2, 11/10/77
. NOTE:
This record indicated the RPV S/N XRE-0001-RC was installed satisfactorily.
The record was approved by the cognizant engineer and the QC supervisor.
,
,
,,
..,r
,. -, -,..
_v
.,
_m
-~_.-.-..-.,-_--..-_.r,._,,
y-,,em m, - - <, -, _.
,e.._,
,
,.. - -.,
,,m
-.
.,
,
.,
.
.
In - addition, the inspector reviewed post-installation storage inspection records covering a period from December 1, 1977 to October 1,1979.
The vessel was turned over to operations on March 12, 1979.
Records of QC personnel involved in the installation and subsequent storage inspection indicated that they were qualified to perform their assigned tasks.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reactor Vessel Internals (Welding) Observation of Welding and Associated Activities Assembly of the reactor vessel internals required only minor field welding such as fillets and for the most part tack welds. Since all welding acti-vity on the internals has been completed, the inspector selected records of field welded components (internals) for a review of welder qualification, welding material certifications, NDE inspections (visual /PT), and inspector qualification.
Welding was performed with Daniel weld procedure 8-8-B-16 which was quali-fied to Section IX of the ASME Code.
Liquid penetrant inspections were performed in accordance with approved site procedure FQCP-6.5.4, while visual inspections were conducted per requirements on Westinghouse Drawing No. -1137E78, sheets 1 and 2.
The items selected for review were as follows:
Item No.
Weld Tyoe NDE Reouired Shock Absorbers Fillet Liquid Penetrant Guide Tube Split Pins
' Tack Visual
.
Baffle Modification Fillet / Tacks Vis al Flow Nozzles Fillet / Tacks Visual Lack of accessability precluded observation of the above welds.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
,
l
...
_
..-
_ _ _ _
,-
.
_ _ _
_
_ _,
- _ -.
.