IR 05000382/1980026

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IE Insp Rept 50-382/80-26 on 800916-17 & 1007-10. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures for Protection of Installed Valves
ML19343B545
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/1980
From: Crossman W, Roberds M, Stewart R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19343B530 List:
References
50-382-80-26, NUDOCS 8012240181
Download: ML19343B545 (6)


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S.~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. 50-382/80-26 Docket No. 50-382 Category A2 Licensee:

Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3 Inspection at: Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana Inspection-conducted:

September 16-19 and October 7-10, 1980 M o a ///

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[15 Inspector:

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it. C. SteWrWtor Insp'ec' tor, Projects Section,

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Other Accompanying Personnel:

M. J Roberds (October 7-10, 1980)

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/0JII/Bo Approved:

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W. A. Crossma6, W ef, Projects Section Dafe /

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 16-19 and October 7-10, 1980 (Report No. 50-382/80-26)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of construction activities related to a follow-on review of previously identified unresolved items and a review of the instrumentation installation subcontractor's QA/QC pr^ gram activities. The inspection involved forty-seven inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.

Results:

Of the two areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified (infraction - failure to follow procedures for protection of installed valves and system paragraph 3.b).

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees

  • T. Gerrets, QA Manager
  • B. Brown, QA Engineer
  • B. Toups, QA Engineer L. Bass, Project QA Manager R. Sandridge, QC Engineering Technician R. Gautreau, Project Coordinator
  • G. Pittman, QA Engineer
  • R. Bennett, QA Engineer
  • J. Woods, QC Engineer (Operations)

Other Personnel R. Hartnett, QA Site Supervisor Ebasco L. Stinson, Site QC Program Manager, Ebasco R. Ronquillo, QA Manager, Gulf Engineering (Gulf)

  • J. Abbott, QA Supervisor, Mercury The IE. inspector alco interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel including members of the engineering and QA/QC staffs.
  • Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (10 CFR 50.55(e)/10 CFR 21)

July 25, 1973-Emergency Diesel Generators - Defective Shafts and Springs. During this inspection, the IE inspector reviewed the licensee's final report, dated September 18, 1980, regarding this matter and conducted a review of the QA/QC documentation relative to the corrective rework involved.

On July 25, 1978, Cooper-Bessemer Company, Cooper Energy Services (CES), pursuant to 10 CFR 21, notified the NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington D.C.,

of defective shafts and springs in the Emergency Diesel Generators supplied for LP&L's Waterford SES, Unit No. 3 at Taft, Louisiana.

A defect existed in the two shafts which drive the engine speed control governor and the engine overspeed shutdown governor on each engine.

The splined driven ends of the shafts were manufactured two inches longer than required by design specification. The additional length caused the shaft spline to misalign with the splined drive bushing, resulting in marginal engagement of the splined surfaces.

This defect was considered reportable by CES and is described in an

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attachment to the CES letter to NRC, dated July 25, 1978.

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i In addition,.a defect existed in a spring which operates the overspeed shutdown butterfly valve on the engine turbocharger air inlet connection. The spring was plated with electrolytically deposited cadmium to prevent corrosion.

Several identical springs had failed on units still in the process of manufacture at CES.

The cause of failure was determined to be cracks in the base metal caused by the electrolytic plating process.

This defect was considered to be nonreportable and is described in Attachment. B, CES letter to NRC, dated July 25, 1980.

Cooper Energy Services has fabricated new governor drive shafts, thus correcting the deficiency in the length of the shaft.

New springs have been manufactured from a material that, as stated in the report by CES, will not crack as a result of the electrolytic plating process.

Replacement of the new shafts and springs was accomplished by Gulf Engineering Company, Inc., (Gulf) under the supervision of a Cooper-Bessemer representative. The work was completed during the week ending September 19, 1980.

The IE inspector reviewed the Gulf QA/AC documentation related to the rework as documented in Gulf Travelers No. P5-233 and PS-229.

The travelers, each containing sixty-four sheets of QA/QC documentation, were reviewed by the IE inspector. The rework, as reflected in the documentation, appeared to be in conformance with the licensee's and Gulf's QA/QC program requirements.

This matter is considered closed.

(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (10 CFR 50.55(e)/10 CFR 21)

November 3, 1978:

Emergency Diesel Generator - Defective Roller Pin. During this inspection, the IE inspector reviewed the licensee's final report, dated September 18, 1980, in conjunction with the QA/QC documentation of the corrective rework involved regarding this construction deficiency.

On November 3, 1978, CES, pursuant to 10 CFR 21, notified the NRC, Office of Inspection and Fnforcement, Washington D.C., of a defective roller pin in the crosshead subassembly of each power cylinder within a KSV power engine.

The extent of the deficiency was as follows:

Each power cylinder has one inlet and one exhaust push rod assembly and two valve crosshead assemblies. The valve crosshead assembly contains a crosshead, a roller pin, and a pin collar. During a performance test on this engine at another facility, it was found that some subassemblies showed abnormal wear on the surface of the roller

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pin. No engine shutdown nor malfunction was experienced, but it was felt by the manufs:turer that over a longer period of engine operation this abnormal wear could progress far enough to cause the engine to malfunction. This defect was considered to be reportable and is more fully described in the Cooper-Bessemer Company initial notification letter, dated November 3, 1978.

The corrective action taken by CES was to redesign the diameter of the roller pin to provide an interference fit at the assembly between the roller pin and the crosshead and reduce the clearance between the roller pin and the collar.

In addition, the hand flaring operation to seat the pin ends into the chamber on the crosshead has been replaced by a more consistent and positive press operation.

Corrective action work on the emergency diesel generators was accomplished by Gulf under the supervision of a Cooper-Bessemer repre-sentative.

The work was completed during the week ending September 19, 1980.

The IE inspector reviewed the Gulf QA/QC documentation related to the rework as documented in Gulf Travelers No. P5-233 and P5-229.

The-travelers, each containing sixty-four sheets of QA/QC documenta-

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tion, were reviewed by the IE inspector.

The rework, as reflected in the documentation, app tred to be in conformance with the licensee's and Gulf's QA/QC program t,quirements.

This matter is considered closed.

3.

Instrumentation - Components and Systems a.

QA/QC Program / Procedures Review During a follow-on inspection, the IE inspector reviewed the following QA plans, instructions, and procedures to verify conformance to Ebasco Specification LOU-1564.407:

MCP-2140, " Cleaning," Revision 4, May 24, 1979 QCP-3110.4, " Pipe and Tubing Inspection Procedure,"

Revision 3, February 1,1979 QCP-3110.5, " Welding Inspection Procedure," Revision 2, January 12, 1979 QCP-3110.6, " Installed Equipment Inspection Procedure,"

Revision 3, January 11, 1979 SP-651, " Installation of Local Mounted Instrument Racks and Cabinets," Revision 3, October 23, 1978

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SP-652,." Installation of Process Pipe Hangers and Supports,"

Revision 6, April 19, 1979 SP-654, " Tube Tray Hanger Fabrication and Installation,"

Revision 5, November 17, 1978 SP-656, " Fabrication of Local Instrument Piping and Tubing Assemblies," Revision 3, November 15, 1978 SP-657, " Installation of Impulse Lines," Revision 3, December 6, 1978 SP-658, " Installation of Seismic I Tube Tray for ASME Class 2 & 3 Tubing," Revision 3, January 15, 1979 No items ei noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b.

Observation of Work In conjunction with the procedures review, the IE inspector conducted a follow-on review of tubetrack and tubing installa-tions.in the Reactor Containment Building.

An inspection of installed tubing was conducted on Cabinet IB, 1/2 inch 0.D.x.065 sensing stainless steel tubing runs No. LT-FW-1113b (H.P.) and LT-FW-1113b(L.P.), Code Class 2, Mercury Traveler, No. 648.

The IE inspector traced each 1/2 inch tubing run from cabinet IB, at elevation 39'-7" up through elevation 46'-8", utilizing Mercury Company Installation Drawing 151-7-014-C, Revision 0, dated January 10, 1980.

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During the tube tracing, the IE inspector observed six installed 1/2 inch needle valves, open ended and unprotected. Two of the valves were installed on the tubing runs the IE inspector was tracing and are identified as safety-related ASME Code, Class-2, Item 3 on Mercury Drawing No. 151-7-014-C, Revision 0, dated January 10, 1980. Mercury Procedure SP-656, " Fabrication of Local Instrument Piping and Tubing assemblies," Revision 3, i

dated November 15, 1978, paragraph 6.3.9 states," Plug all open l

ended valves with plastic caps or equal."

The condition of unprotected valves, at the time of this inspection, is considered to be an item of noncompliance with the-requirements of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50; ie., failure to_ follow procedums relative to the installation of safety-related tubing assemblies.

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4.

Site Tour

The IE inspector walked through various construction and storage

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areas to observe construction activities in progress and to inspect.

the general state of clesaliness and adherence to housekeeping

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requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5.

Exit Interview

The IE inspector met with iicensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on October 10, 1980, and sammarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.

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