IR 05000341/1989025
| ML19324B763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1989 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19324B759 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-89-25, IEIN-88-051, IEIN-88-51, NUDOCS 8911080178 | |
| Download: ML19324B763 (19) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION III
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Report No. 50-341/89025(DRP)
Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 i
Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name:
Fermi 2
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Inspection At:
Fermi Site, Newport, MI
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Inspection Conducted:
September 1 through Octooer 16, 1989
Inspectors:
W. G. Rogers S. Stasek P. Pelke P. Eng P.~ Byron J. Ulie
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// /'!9'i Approved By:
M. A. Ring, Chief Reactor Projects Sec 'on 3B Date Inspection Summary Inspection on September 1 through October 16, 1989 (Report No. 50-341/89025(DRP))
Areas-Inspected:
Action on previous inspection find ngs; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; followup of events; refuel floor activities; material control; LER followup; information notices; DET review and management l-meeting.
i Results: The licensee entered into their first refueling outage during this inspection period.
Fuel movement was handled adequately, but control of
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activated components was not as strong.
Also, initial housekeeping on the I
fifth floor and in the drywell was weak.
One violation was identified (Paragraph 2.t) and one unresolved item was identified (Paragraph 8).
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted a.
Detroit Edison Company
- P. Anthor.y Licensing
R. Bailey, General Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance i
- S. Catola, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Services
- G. Cranston, Ocseral Director, Nuclear Engineering
- D Gipcon, Plant Manager
- L. Goodman, Licensing
- R. Matthews, Acting Supervisor, Maintenance & Modifications
- R. May, Director, Nuclear Material Management
- R. McKeon, Superintendent, Operations
- G. Ohlemacher, Principal Engineer, Licensing
- W. Orser, Vice President, Nimlear Operations
- J. Plona, Operations Engineer
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- T. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance
- A. Settles, Superintendent, Technical Engineerirg
- R. Stafford, Director. Quality Assurance
- R. Thorson, Outage Manager J. Walker, General Supervisor, Plant Engineering b.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Stasek, Resident In,pector P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector, Davis-3 esse
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- M. Clausen, Deputy Division Director, DRP, RIII
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- P. Eng, Project Manager, NRR
- M. Ring, Section Chief J. Ulie, Reactor Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on October 18, 1989.
- Denotes thosa attending the monthly management meating October 13, 1989.
The_ inspectors alsc interviewed others of the licensee's staff during I
this inspection.
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2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(0 pen) Open Item (341/89018-02(DRP)):
Non-interruptible I.ir System (NIAS) Color Coding. The plant manager committec' to l.
painting the appropriate divisioc of NIAS.
Work request 004C890918 has been initiated to accomplish this task which will commence
after the refueling outage.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/89021-01(DRP)):
Annunciator Power Source.
The annunciator system in the controi room received power from one
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source.
The licensee evaluated this situation under PDC 10747 and
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documenten the results of the review in memorandum NP-SE-89-0169.
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The licensee concluded that a modification was not warranted.
q This matter is considered closed.
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(0 pen) Violation (341/87022-01(DRS)):
Inadequate corrective action
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to Jamesbury butterfly valve failures.
In the original corrective action to the violation the licensee committed to replace all the
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stems tnd wafer.: of this type of valve.
On October 12, 1989, the licensee met with the inspector to discuss this corrective action.
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The licensee provided stroke time data on those valves that haa not been changed out and reported the results of inspections o~n two of the valves that had been changed out during the outage.
Based upon
this information the licensee indicated that they did not want to i
change out the stems / wafers on some of the valves but wanted to continue accelerated stroke time testing.
The inspector provided the licensee with the names of the cognizant individuals who could approve the change.
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d.
(Closed) Violation (341/89008-09(DRP)):
Failure to make a 10 CFR 50.72 report.
The inspector reviewed the completed trainir.g provided licensed operators on this matter and found it
. satisfactory.
e.
(Closed) Open Item (341/87031-04(DRP)):
Allowable ECCS/EDG alignments in cold shutdown.
In a letter dated September 28, 1989, from NRR to Region III this matter was resolvect.
The NRR interpretation was that the operable EDGs must be aligned to the operable ECCS for the ECCS to be considered operable and this understanding was an inherent part of Technical Specifications 3.5.3 and 3.8.1.2.
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(0 pen) Open Item (341/86032-03(DRP)):
Corrective actions to loss of modular power unit (MPil) 3.
During the inspection period engineering completed all the MPU load lists in calculations 5024
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through 5029.
The load lists are being incorporated into procedure 23.308.
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(0 pen) Violation (341/86032-02(DRP)):
Inadequate corrective action to unplanned ESF actuations.
The final corrective action to t:iis violation was the modification of the reactor vessel instrument racks during the refueling outage.
However, the licensee could not support that schedule and the corrective action hs been deferred to the next refueling outage.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/85015-01(DRP)):
Acceptability of the offsite
b power distribution network.
In a memorandum dated March 28, 1989, t
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NRR documented an additional review of the offsite power sources and l
found them adequate.
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(Closed) Violation (341/87021-02(DRP)):
Irrproper use of fermanite.
The-inspector verified that engineeving procedure 5.17, " Approved /
Controlled Materialc List," and the design verification checklist i
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have been modified to preclude repetition of this problem.
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j (Closed) Violation (341/89015-01(DRP)):
Failure of a material
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engineering supervisor to issue DERs.
The inspection performed in Inspection Report 341/89015 included followup on the corrective actions to the violation.
Therefore, this item is closed based on those inspection efforts.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/88030-05(DRP)):
Mixing o' grease in Vahe P44-F613.
Replacement of the grease in this valve is currently
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scheduled during the current refueling outage (WR 010C890107).
The
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associated DER 88-1956 is still open.
Completion of the work request and closure of DER 88-1956 will be tracked under Open Item 341/89011-07, implementation of the lubrication program action plan.
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(0 pen) Open Item (341/89002-06(DRP)):
Implementation of on-the-job (0JT). training to familiarize journeymen electricians with the proper techniques and critical performance elements for performing maintenance on the GE AKF-2-25 type circuit breaker.
The licensee developed OJT Lesson Matrix EM-033-002, Revision 0, to implement the training commitment.
However, the inspector noted that the study l
. guides had not been updated as revised mcintenance procedures are implemented.
This occurred because the cognizant individual in the l'
Training Department had not evaluated changes to procedures as they
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were identified by the Training Document Index (TOI) system.
The cognizant individual was a contractor and no longer works at Fermi.
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The inspector determined through a maintenance record review that l
l six of 33 journeymen had' completed the OJT matrix.
Only journeymen
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who have completed the 0JT are allowed to work on the breakers.
L The licensee identified that a Task Qualification Manual (electrical)
i had recently been developed and was available to the Maintenance foremenasamasterindexofjourneymenversusthejobsthatthey are qualified to perform.
Upon reviewing the journeymen who were l.,~'
qualified to perform maintenance on the GE AKF-2-25 breakers, the inspector noted that two individuals were listed in the Task i
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Qualification Manual who were not qualified based on the inspector's l
previous review of training records.
The licensee subsequently J
issued DER 89-1129 to address the administrative error that allowed the two individuals to be olaced * the list.
The licensee was L
initiating an independent verification to ensure that all names 1;
listed in the Task Qualif2
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A review of Procedure NPP-35.301.002, Revision 21, " Recirculation
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Pump Generator Field Dreaker (GE Type AKF) General Maintenance," was
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conducted by a Region III Division of Reactor Safety inspector and was determined to be acceptable.
This item will remain open pending
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closure of DER 89-1129 and improvements to the TDI/ training document revision interface such that disposition of document changes is
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adequately tracked.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/89008-06(DRP)):
Lubrication concerns identified after mixing greases in the Hydrogen Recombiner motor.
L DER 88-1896 is still open.
These issues will be tracked under Open Item 341/89011-07,' implementation of the lubrication program action
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(Closeo) Open Ite:a (341/89008-07(DRP)):
Mixed oil in Diesel Fire Pump.
DER 89-0072 is still open.
This issue will be tracked under L
Open Item 341/89011-07, implementation of the lubrication program action plan.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/89008-08(DRP)): Grease not tested to GE specification.
DER 88-1335 is still open.
This issue will be tracked under Open Item 341/89011-07, implementation of the lubrication program action plan.
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-(0 pen) Open Item (341/89011-07(DRP)):
Implementation of the lubrication program action plan.
Six of twenty-four DERs relating to lubrication issues have been closed.
For further status of the lubrication program refer to Paragraph 12.
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(0 pen) Open Item (3'41/89011-09(DRP)):
TWR not implemented in accoraance with a commitment in e.n LER respo.1se.
The concern was documented in DER 89-0816.
Development of a course on precautions to take while working on energized equipment ano a revision to the electrician STQPD QP-EM-727 to include the course as required training are currently in progress. These actions should be complete by the end of October.
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(0 pen) Open Item (341/88030-04(DRP)):
Implementation of administrative controls such that PM program credit is taken when a PM event is accomplished under a Corrective Maintenance work request and additionally, if a CM is scheduled to be performed, the planner
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will look ahead and include an upcoming related PM in the work request if appropriate.
Administrative controls in this area have not been fully formalized due to maintenance program evolution,
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(Closed) Open Item (341/87040-05(DRP)):
The inspector determinea after review of the audit report and following discussions with the licencee's staff, that an improved itnerface between the designated
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systems engineer and fire protection engineer relative to Appendix R
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criteria review is needed during the performance of future fire protection QM audits.
Subsequently, during the December 1-15, 1987 audit (Number A-Qs-P-87-37), the audit report specified that a walkdown of plant installed fire protection systems and barriers for safety-related equipment was performed by the Fire frotection Engineer and the Systems Engineer to review the facility for compliance to the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and any approved deviations.
The report identified twelve plant areas inspected during this walkdown.
In addition, by licensee internal memorandum dated Ane 14, 1988, from F. E. Abramson, Supervisor, Quality Program Assurance, to L. Bregni, Senior Engineer, Licensing, the Quality Assurance organization did make sure during the December 1987 Fire Protection audit that the Fire Protection Specialist and the designated systems engineer did work together during the audit.
Further, this memorandum specified that this action item is an ongoing item and will be continued during future fire protection audits.
Based on the above, this item is n nsidered closed.'
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (341/89021-02(DRP)):
Identified weaknesses
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in the performance of the Standby Gas Treatment System Division I filter performance test and subsequent return-to-service of the train.
Upon reviewing the subject surveillance procedure NPP-43.404.01, the inspector found that steps 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4 requiring certain independent verifications were not performed.
Despite this, LC0 No. 89-0665, written to address the inoperability
of Division I SGTS during the performance of the test, was
"clearec'" on August 16, 1989 and Division I SGTS declared operable l
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witnout meeting the restoration requirements of Item 7 of the LC0
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sheet.
Item 7 specifically delineated that completion of
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NPP-43.404.01 was required prior to system restoration and
" clearing" of the LCO.
This is in conflict with the requirements of administrative procedure NPP-0P1-11, Rev. 3, " System and Equipment Status." which in step 6.3.3.1 specifies that to clear an LCO, i
verification is to be made to ensure... "all listed requirements
neaded to declare the system or component operable have been
performed." This is considered a violation (341/89025-01(DRP)).
Although engineers in the Technical Group on occasion are required l
to perform independent verification activities in accordance with procedures, to date, no formalized training has been provided to ensure familiarity with the requirements associated with independent verification.
When the training deficiency was brought to the attention of appropriate plant management, preparation of an
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addition to the required-reading for engineers in the Technical
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group was initiated.
This item will remain open pending completion
of inspector' review into the independent verification program.
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(Closed) Open Item (341/86007-04):
Determination of maximum valve
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stroke times for' valves in the inservice testing program.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's methodology for establishing raxinum valve stroke times and found that FSAR, technical specifi. cations and valve procurement specifications were aopropriately
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considered.
The inspector also reviewed selected maximum valves stroke times and found them to be acceptable.
This is item is closed.
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(0 pen) Open Item (341/86007-02):
Verification of remote position indicators for valves indicated on the remote shutdown panel.
The licensee stated that verification of valves indicated on the remete shutdown panel was conducted as part of the fire protection surveillance test conducted on the remote shutdown panels.
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the licensee was not able to furnish drawings which supported this assertion to the. inspector prior to the end of this inspection
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This item.emains open.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Varification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs n
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period
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from September 1 through October 16, 1989.
The inspectors verified the l
operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the L
reactor building, turbine building and radwaste building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hn ards,
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fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance
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rtTuests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenar.ce.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the phy.ical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the
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station security plan.
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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the
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inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with L
plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists,
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observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and L
calibrated.
Emergency Diesel Generator do. 11
Emergency Diesel Generator No. 12
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Emergency Diesel Generator No. 13
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Emergency Equipment Service Water System - Vivision II
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Residual Heat Removal Service Water System - Division II j
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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system
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t controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
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These reviews and observations were condu'cted to verify that facility operationc wem in conformance with the requirements established under technical sp
'fications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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a.
On September 2, 1989, the licensee began a controlled reactor l
shutdown in preparation for the first refueling outage.
Start of the" outage was moved up one week from the original schedule due to identificatien of a hydrogen leak in the generator stator cooling system.
A unit shutdown was required to allow repairs to the
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Because of the short time to the outage, the licensee
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elected not to attempt a restart prior to refu; ling. Throughout the remainder of the 11spection period, outage related activities were I
ongoing with the unit in a cold shutdown condition.
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b.
During the inspection period, the inspector requested a briefing on the status of zebra mussel infestation at the Fermi facility after reading reports of problems at other facilities on the Lake Erie coast. 'The licensee responded with the following information:
Throughout the spring and summer no mussels were observed by
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the aquatic monitoring program.
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In September, mussels 5,000 to 10,000 per square meter, were
observed on the concrete walls of the general service water intake structure.
Additionally, approximately 25 dead mussels
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were observed in the sediment of the cooling tower hot water basin.
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The licensee is presently trying to receive permission to
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modify the state discharge permit to utilize clam-trol to eliminate any potential mussel problems.
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Following this briefing the. inspector requested information on future fire protection sampling results since the fire protection water source is general service water.
c.
During the inspection period, the Resident Inspector conducted
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routine tours within the drywell (cpened as part of the current
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refuel outage).
During these tours, the aspector assessed overall equipment conditions, radiological coatmis housekeeping and tool control, and implementation of security requ sements.
Overall conditions were found generally acceptable during tours conducted
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riuring the later portion of the inspection period.
However, during
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the inspector's initial tcue (conducted once the major drywell work
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activities had begun), general area housekeeping and tool control were found to be poor.
Excess amounts of tools were found l
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throughout the drywell as well as in the staging area outside the
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equipment hatch.
Work groups, apparently completing specific work
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V activities failed to remove associated ton 1s from the work area.. In
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addition, numerous pieces of trash (tape, plastic, wirc, etc.) were observed.
When licensee management was approached on the matter, they indicated they were already aware of the problera had were taking steps to. correct the poor practices identified.
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subsequent drywell tours the inspector noted ;mprovement in the area of housekeeping as well as better tool control.
The licensee subsequently initiated a policy that only tools needed for ongoing work were allowed in the drywell at any particular time. Once the
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specific work was completed, the associated tools required immediate removal except in certain case-by-case circumstances.
The inspector
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will continue to monitor conditions in the drywell during the remainder of the outage.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Station maintenance activities ori safety-related systems and components listed below were obsersed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes
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or stan':ards and in conformance with technical specifications.
l The fr lowing items were considered during this review:
the limiting
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condiuions for operation were met while components or systems'were
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L reaoved from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;' functional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality s
control r* cords were maintained; activities were accomplished by y
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implement:d; and fire prev.:ntion controls were e
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Work requests were reviewed to determir.e the status of outstanding jobs
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and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities werc observed:
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WR 002C890906 Rework B21-F022A Due to Failed LLRT
WR 003C890906 Rework of B21-F022B Due to Failed LLRT
WR 0010890918 Refueling Bridge Repairs
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WR 012C890622 Flux Wire Removal
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WR 003C890729 Remove, Rebuild & Reinstall 28 RriR Division I Hydraulic Snubbers.
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N Following completion of maintenance on the refueling btidge, the inspector verified that the system had been returned to service properly.
Noiiolations or deviations were identified in this area.
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5.
Monthly Surveillance Obser'vation (61726)
The inspectors observed the following surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and verified that:
testing was parformed in
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accordance witii adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of
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the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any ceficiencies identified during the testing vere properly reviewed and
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resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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24.307.011 Emergency Diesel Generator No. 12 - ECCS Start and
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Load Rejection Test
44.010.100 SRM A Channel Functional Test
44.010.101 SRM B Channel Functional Test
43.401.408 Local Leak Rate Testing for Penetratitn X-213B (for G51-F602)
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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6.
Followup of Events (93702)
During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt netification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.
The inspectors; pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or
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other NRC' officials.
In each case,'the inspectors terified that the
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notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee
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was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted
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within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence.
The specific events are as follows:
I September 2, 1989 Hydrogen leak in stator cocling.
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h plant shutdown was required as a result s
of the leak and start of the refuel l.
outage was moved up approximately one
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September 8,1989 Emergency Notification System (ENS)
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20, 1989 Brown Boveri type breakers found with Sept +eer
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missing close latch anti-shock sprir.g.
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- September 22, 1989 Union picket activir.y at alternate
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September 23, 1989
' Unplanned actuation of reactor
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protection system.
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' September 24,.1989 Loss of cffsite p wer to Divisior. I.
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September 24, 1989 Unplanned actuition of' reactor y,
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Unplanned ESF actuation.
While protection system.
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Ss.ptesber 28,.'1989
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"xi preparing for modification activities, the RBHVAC tripped and secondary containment dampers closed.
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a Design deficierey identified in the October 6, 1989 s
LPCI swing bus.
Followino diseassion (
with another nuclear utility the.
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licensee reviewed the design of the
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LPCI swing bus and identified that the.
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swing bus transfer would not occur in a
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degraded'hus situation with the bus i
powered from the amergency diesel
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generators.
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0ci.ober 8, 1989 PRM String Flunger inadvebtently
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'N broken during string removai from the
. core (reference paragraph 7.d of this
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Ny report),
October 10, 1989 Unplannect SSF actuation.. While l
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perfora.ing maintenance activitics the CCHVAC' shifted into the recirculation ude.
The maintenance activity vis
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replacement of a light bulb.
Subsequent discu:siom with the licensee
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'i at the monthly management meeting N's revealed that the CCHVf.C indication system may be a floating 120VAC system
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and highly susceptible to ESF actuation through grounding.
The licenne
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indicated that nuclear engineering would be reviewing the design.
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' October Ib, 1989 Vnplanned ESF actuation.
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CCHVAC shifted'to the emergency mode,
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R8HVAC, tripped, miscellaneous M
containment isolation valves closeo and
SGTS started.
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Numerous ENS updates ware provided throughout the inspection period for. valves fai1% local leak rate tests, t
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No violations or devinstons were identified in this area,
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n 7i Refuel Floor Activities u(60705) (60710)
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During the inspection period, the inspector observed / reviewed activities'
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associated.with the refic) fioor.
The inspector witnessed portions of.
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i the removal of the drywell shield plugs', detensioning and initial lif t of f: y
, the drywell head,1 removal 1of the insulation " bird-cage," and detensioning f['
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s of'the reactor vessel head.
The inspector observed fuel movements on a n-I'
number of occasions, as well as portions ~of fuel and vessel inspections.
The inspector also reviewed completed surveillances to verify Tachnical y
Specification requirenants were met prior to and during fuel. movements.
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Plant procedures related'to reactor vestel assembly /disessembly,. fuel and
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core component' movement and spent fuel paol activities were reviewed.
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During these observations the inspectors noted some o.
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sthiusekeeping/ tool control d;6crepancies on September 13, 1989.
I Y Theta discrepancies involved the handling of rags on the refueling
. platform, control of swipe twears, knowledge of tool control
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personnni, estahlishnent of a tool control boundary over the crud
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ii induced. localized corrosion inspections and handling of refueling (
lights.
Following identification of these problems and operations
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M anagemant witnessing tf the situation the refueling olatform was
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shut down and personnel briefed on appropriate ' actions, 1 Subsequently, these discrepancies were provided,to a DRi inspector y
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dedicated to refueling activity observn ore:. The DRS inspector b.1 treviewed subsequent refueling performance and did not note a-
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repetition of these discrepancies, c
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During replacement of 20 control red bladas it.e licensee hed to
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override the uptravel hoist. interlock for the blades to clear the u
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, bottom of the cattleshoot.
The cattleshoot is a transition
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.struct.ure between the reactor vessel cavity and the spnnt fuel pool.
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The inspector was contacting HRR representatives at the end of *.he d' 'p '
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laspection pet tod to ascertain if this action wu; consistent witu the intent of Technical Specification 3.9.6.
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During crud induced localized corroi, ion inspections the inspector n
noted that there was no physical interlock present when individual
' fuel rods were extracted from the main fuel assembly.
A procedural control had been established so that the rod remeined 6 feet under
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water.. The inspector will pursue the matter furtuer in the next inspection period, d.
On October 8, 1989, while personnei on the refuel floor were conducting changeout of power range monitor instrumentation strings
and were traversing one string from the reactor cavity to the sper.t fuel pool, the spring loaded plunger on the top a d of the string
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became separated from the rest of the string.
At the time of
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occurrence, the string was physically in the spent fuel pool area, y
in a non-vertical position, and was grappled to the handling tool 9t
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the plunger end ahd a lanyard further down the string..The cause of
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the break apparently was application of lateral pressure to the
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plunger via the handling tool which, in turr, causad the plunpr.r to
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shear from the string.
The string was placed in an appropri ne storage spot in the pool and the plunger which was still attached to
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the handling tool was placed in a filter storage box located underwater.near the reactor vessel flange.
This occurred at approximately 1911 hours0.0221 days <br />0.531 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.271355e-4 months <br />.
Radiation Protection personnel on the
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refuel floor at well as the shift supervisor were informed of the
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situation.
However, the consequences of plunger piecement rsative e
to radiation levels in the upper region of the drywell were riot realized at the tiri.e.
At approximately 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> en October 9, a Radiation Protectien p
technician, while performing a routina pre-job survey on elevation j
i" 659 ft, of the drywell, detected higher than expected radiation
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levels and traced the source to the uoper drywell bulkhead immediately below the filter storage box.
Levels of approximately
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40iR/hr were observed at the bulkhead (10 feet' above head level) and o
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500 mR/hr at head level.
Personnel were prohibited access to the
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area,'and the operating authurity notified.
The plunger was
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subsequently removed from the filter box and placed in the spent fuel pool,
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yh placing the plunger in proximity to the flange area due to the added.
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leveli within the &ywell.
However, the following aboriations did Wni
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m (2) Refuul floor personnel were not corlnizant of the effect of
c (h i placing the plunger in pr.oximity to the sessel flange and
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top of drywell.
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(3) : Radiation Pfotection personnel and the operating cuthority
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did not recogniza the consequences of the plunger placement.
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(4) Shift turnovers were no't complete in that oncoming personnel werr not adde totally aware of the event, subsequent acti6ns
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then, and significance of those actions, 2.
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8o Material Control-Shop drea, (38702)(35502)
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On.0ctober 10,1989,'the inspector performed a walkdown of the QA1
- nate' rial? storage cage' located.on the south side of the OSB aechanical
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The inspector found that utilizi. tion of the i
iy d e was not in cenfdrmance with Fermi Administrative Procedure coqh-PM3-01 PMaterial. Storage," Rev 2.The inspector noted nut.erous
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discrepan:les between the inventory log sheets and the actual material
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The inventory log'doeurented that a bonnet gasket (ROS No.. J170234).
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yas lstorefl in the cage on July 3.1986,.with no "thte out" completed.
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Ths Dsket we.s not found'in the cage.
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1Ah cage (placed; on' Septer;ber 19,,1989)..The lights were not found in
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The inventory log documented that a " wedge" was. stored in the cage
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'A on April 21,1988, 'with a note "to be sent to stores." No date out g
wa.s'cogletedontheformnovwar,thewedgelocatedinthecage.
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August 5, 1988, and an associate & work requer,t number 014B051788.
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No qua)tities were docarnted and.the inspector could not' identify
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thei specific; box.*eferred to in the cage.
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Thefir' entory log documented " eccentric riadacers" with a "date in
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of June 1987 with no quantity specified.
Four reducers were found k
in.an opened b n in the 1totage case.
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This i!; contrary to th'!
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supervisor agreed that corrective actions were warranted and indicated
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~that a re-inventory would be performed and material not appropriately stos'ed would either be returned to the warehouse or disposed.
The
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re-inventory was subsequently completed that evening.
However, in the
. process, the original inventory logs were erroneously disposed.. At the end of the inspection period, actions were ongoing to disposition those materials still in the cage.
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5'ubsequently, the inspector performed a walkdown of the OSB shop north
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r storage cage. - Additional questions involving the proper level of control required for that area were again raised.
Althoughpiecesofharstock
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stored in that cage were tagged with the green ;'Q' tags, the cage was routinely left unlocked with the door open.
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management is currently reviewing the storage requirements for that area.
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follov:ing tne walkdowns, the inspector Lecame aware of a QA surveillance
'that had been performed on the south side storaga cage in January 1989 which had identified similar conditions.
This matter is considerad an unresolved item (341/89025-02(DRP)) pending completion of inspector
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review of the north storage cage control requirements and QA activities c
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kicenseeFjynt_ReportFollowup(92700)
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
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review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deteru.ine
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that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
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a.
(Closed) LER 87043, Revision 1 & Revision 2, Unplanned ESF actuation of the CCHVAC and SGTS.
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b.
(Clotsd) LER 85082, Revision 1 & Revision 2, Potential overloading of embedded support plater.
In a letter dated January 29, 1986, Sargent
& Lundy provided Detroit Edison with the results of the "Embedment o
Plate Loading Log." The results indicated that no embedment plates were overloaded.
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.(Closed) LER 86033, Revision 1, Actuations of the ESF and RPS by a calibration procedure not being followed.
Any further corrective actions under this LER will be encompassed by actions to violation 341/86332-02.
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(Closed) LER 86036, Revision 1. Mrloaded modular power unit causes
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ESF actuations.
Any further actions to this LER will be encompassed by actions under open item 341/86032-03, j
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(Closed) LER 88006-00, Loss of shutdown cooling due to improper
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reset of suction valve logic.
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(Clored) LER 88031-00, Failure to Perform Accelerated Stroke Time i
Testing as required by ASME.
Procedure NFP-CT1-01,
" Surveillance / Performance Package Control," requires the ISI/ PEP Program Manager to analyze all IST Pump and Valve Program test
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results within 7 days of NSS signoff.
ISI review of the
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surveillance package must be performed within 5 working days.
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personnel make changes in stroke time testing frequencies when required using the SST/PST Periodicity Change Request Form, attached to Procedure NPP-CT1-02, " Surveillance / Performance Scheduling and
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Tracking Computer P'ocrams Maintenance." No further incidences have occurred during the p st 13 months since the event originally i
occurred.
This LER is considere6 closed.
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(0 pen) LER 89013 00, Actuation of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Isolation of the Retaci.or Building Heating, Ventilatio,1, and Air Conditioning.
This LER was previously reviewed in Report No. 89021.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed an August 25, 1989, memorandum from the acting General Supervisor /I&C to all shop personnel explaining the use of the LER Reduction Input Sheet.
Additionally, the input sheet was discussed with I&C personnel during a " Pride" meeting on September 20, 1989. One sheet has been submitted to date documenting poor lightilig in the vicinity of Panel
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H11-P891 (north wall of relay room).
This LER will remain open pending implementation of PDC 10577 to install multi-contact keylock switches on Panels H11-P883 and H11-P884.
i h.
(Closed) LER 89-019-00, Failure of Division I control Center
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Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Recirculation Fan.
The shaft and bearing were scbsequently replaced.
The failed components were sent to the Detroit Edison Engineering Research Department (ERD) for analysis.
Followup of the ERD results will be performed in conjunction with Open Item (341/89011-07(DRP)).
This LER is considered closed.
1.
(Closed) LER 89-020-00, Removal of an Incorrect Fese Caused the Fuel p
l Pool Exhaust Radiation Monitor to Become De-energized.
Root cause L
was determined to be personnel error.
A critique of this event was subsequently completeo (No.89-012) and is to be included as part of i
required reading for operators and I&C personnel.
This LER is considered closed.
L No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Review of Information Not'ces (92701)
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(0 pen) Information Notice 88-51, " Failure of Main St w Isolation Valves (MSIV)." This Notice was previously reviewed in Report No. 341/89008.
The Notice will remain open pending completion of a force balance
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calculation (PDC 10226 scheduled for the first quarter 1990) and testing the leak tightness of the MSIV actuators and accumulators (scheduled during the current refueling outage).
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
11.
Review of the Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) Report Section 3.6.2.6 of the DET report discussed the post accident sampling syster (PASS) and the inability of tne cooling system for PASS to be powered from Class IE circuits.
The inspector discussed this matter with the applicable NRR. reviewer.
The results of that conversation were that no regulatory bases existed for the PASS or its support systems to be powered from Class 1E circuits.
This matter is closed.
12.
Management Meetings a.
On October 13, 1989, a Monthly Management Meeting was conducted in
Detroit Edison's Nuclear Operations Center. The topics are stated below along with a short synopsis cf information provided.
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Outage Progress - The licensee reported thau 26 of the 209 local leak rate tested valves had failed.
The mechanical stress improvement program was almost complete.
A large percentage of some of the hydraulic snubber types were e.:periencing failures.
To improve productivity in this area an extensive snubber removal effort would occur during the next two weekends and an additional snubber testing station had been established.
The NRC questioned
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whether system operability evaluations were being performed on the as left syttem.
The licensee responded +. hat this was ongoing.
Finally, core onload was targeted for October 15.
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.d a status of the Turbine Damage - The Technical Engineer pro.-
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i.1vestigation on high vibration of the main turbine.
He related that rotating blade damage had been observed on the fifth stage of No. 2' low pressure turbine.
The blade shroud had separated and numerous blades had lodged into the casing.
Experts from English
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Electric and a consultant with experience with the similar San Onofre turbine in California were analyzing the data to determine the root cause.
Preuently, the licensee intends to inspect all three low pressure turbines and remove the fifth stage from two of the three low pressure turbines.
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Lubrication Prograt - The licensee reported the status of tho immediate actions of the program.
The status and the actions are:
Update the computerized data base (CECO) with lubrication
information - complete
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Verify that adequate controls exist for the lubrication
information in CECO - complete Change administrative procedure to establish CECO as the
lead design document for lubrication - to be completed by November 1, 1989 Verify CECO lubrication information is consistent with
environmental qualification data - to be completed by December 1989 The licensee briefly outlined the short term and long term actions dur to time constraints.
The NRC questioned whether the ERD report on the most current CCHVAC fan failure had been received.
The
. licensee stated no but it should be ready by the ead of the month.
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Long Term E0P Improvements - The licensee provided information on containment venting and emergency procedure flowcharting.
Venting
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will be reviewed in 1990.
Presently, a number of contractor formats
are being reviewed by operations / training personnel.
Upon
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completion of this review a decision on flowcharting will be made, and if positive, a bid' specification will be drafted.
The time frame for specification issuance is spring 1990.
If flowcharting is
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i accepted, implementation vould probably not occur until mid-1991.
l-The NRC requested information on the simulator upgrade progress and l
the reviews to explore scenarios in which drywell cooling could be reinitiated. The licensee indicated that the hardware for the upgrade had been delivered but a more detailed schedule needed to be established with the contractor for Deco to have better control on I
their activities.
The licensee indicated that the drywell cooling
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reinitiation issue was targeted for completion in 1990 and more
1 detailed information would be provided after the meeting.
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Maintenance Organization Changes - The licensee informed the NRC that a new maintenance superintendent had been hired and would be onsite by the end of the month.
The licensee indicated that the present maintenance superintendent would assume the role of assistant maintenance superintendent with duties including oversight of the support groups (administrative, M&TE, principle engineer and maintenance support engineer).
The licensee informed the NRC that a new I&C supervisor had been hired and was in the position.
Also,
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additional-resources'have been temporarily added for the refueling outage to mechanical, maintenance to help provide parts, procedures, etc. to support ongolng work.
Design Bases Task Force.- The licensee provided a' status on the training ptogram for the design bases task force.
There are 6 training. modules to be performed, of which, modulit 1 is completed and module 2 is beginning.
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Commitment Deferrals - The status of the two outstanding commitment deferrals was discussed.
Regarding the first on MSIV actuation indicat. ion status, a letter from DECO to NRR would be sent on October 16.
Regarding, the second on replacement of Jamesbury valve parts, a letter was targeted to be sent to Region III oy the end of next week, b.
On September 4, 1989, the NRC Region III, Division of Reactor Projects Director made a presentation to Detroit Edison management /
employees on recent problems at other nuclear facilities during refueling outages.
The information was provided with the intent to prevent such problems during the prevent Fermi outage.
. 13.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations.
An. unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
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discussed in Paragrapt. 8.
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14.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
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on October 18, 1989, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
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inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such
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documents / processes as proprietary.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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