IR 05000341/1989031
| ML20006A104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1990 |
| From: | Creed J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006A091 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-89-31, NUDOCS 9001250225 | |
| Download: ML20006A104 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
E Report No. 50-341/89031(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2200 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name:
Fermi 2 Atomic' Power Plant Inspection at:
Plant Site and NRC Region III Office Inspection Conducted: November 13-22, 1989, and December 5-7, 1989, onsite November 27-29, 1989, and December 8 and 15, 1989, in NRC s
Region III Office
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Inspector:
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6 / L. Pirtle Date
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LFbysicalSecurityInspector I
Approved By:
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/ J/ R. Creed, Chief Date Q5afeguardsSection Inspection Summary:
Routine, unannounced physical security and allegation review between November 13 and December 15, 1989 (Report No. 50-341/89031(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Included Management Support; Protected and Vital Area Barriers; Access Control-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles;' Alarm Stations and Communications; Power Supply;;Testin9, Maintenance, and Compensatory Measures; Training and Qualification; Management Effectiveness for Security Operations; Follow-up on P.evious Inspection Findings; Follow-up on Temporary i
Instruction 2515/102 " Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedures. Verification;".
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(Sims Item MPA L9-07) Allegation Review; and Licensee's Plans:for Coping'with Strikes.
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements I
within the areas inspected except for inadequate closed circuit television coverage of some portions of the isolation zone during the hours of darkness.
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Rnciennre conta;n3
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SAFEGUARDS ligoRMil0N
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Upon Sep. oration This 90012hh900112 Page Is = Decontrolle(
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Four of five previous inspection findings were reviewed and closed.
The j
remaining previous inspection finding pertained to a decline in maintenance
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support for security equipment and remains open.
Security force training files and security screening case files require closer review to identify minor administrative errors of the nature noted during this inspection.
Contingency planning for the land vehicle bomb threat was reviewed and the i
required planning had been completed. The licensee's plans for coping with i
a security force strike were reviewed and considered adequate, j
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The licensee's actions were considere<J appropriate and adequate in reference i
to the allegation addressed in the Attachment to the Report Details.
General management of the security organization and use of available resources
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were effective.
(Details )
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i Enclosure ContsIns
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SAFEGUARDS ll! FORT %T10N Upon separation This
Page is Decontrolled
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ATTACHMENT-ALLLGATION REVIEW t
(Closed) Allegation RIII-89-A-0128 This allegation, which consists of three parts, was received by NRC Pegion III on October 11, 1989. Listed below are the allegations, NRC review actions, and conclusions based upon the inspector's review of the issues, a.
Allegation:
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About September 1,1989, a contract security officer (Burns International Security Services, Inc. - BISSI) was posted to watch closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors used to observe portions of a vital area barrier. The security watchperson allegedly left her post and walked about 20 feet away from the monitor to get a new bottery for her radio. The CCTV monitors were not observed while
she was away from them and getting the battery.
NRC Review Actions:
l Inspector interviews with the General Supervisor, Security Operations, and review of a licensee document in response to their Ombudsman Concern Report No. 89-12 showed that the incident described above occurred on October 28, 1989.
The contract security officer was away from the CCTV monitors for approximately 10-15 seconds.
Her stated reason for leaving
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her post was to obtain a battery for her radio so she could advise security management that she was approaching her maximum allowed time on
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that specific post.
Her radio did not work properly when she tried it
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earlier.
The contract security officer advised a licensee security officer that she had left her post to get a battery. Disciplinary
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action was initiated against the security officer, and interview results confirmed that the incident was included in the Security Event Log which is reviewed by the NRC on a quarterly basis.
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Conclusion:
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The incident happened generally as described in the allegation, and the security officer's actions violated the licensee's security procedures.
This incident meets the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2. Appenoix C.
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Section V.G.1 as a licensee identified item.
Therefore, a separate
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Notice of Violation will not be issued (NCV 341/89031-04),
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Allegation:
Approximately mid-September 1989, a contract security officer allegedly i
issued the wrong security key-card to an individual who was entering the protected area.
When the individual tried to advise the security officer of the error, the security officer allegedly argued that the individual should accept the wrong security key-card.
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NRC Review Actions:
Inspector interview by telephone with the individual involved and review I
of a licensee's Nuclear Security Incident Report, dated November 15,
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1989, showed that the individual was not issued the wrong security
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key-card. The individual stated that the security officer initially issued the wrong security key-card to him. When he noticed the incorrect r
key-card, he advised the officer of that fact.
The individual further
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stated that the security officer either did not hear or misunderstood his comments so he (the individual) repeated in a louder voice that the officer mistakenly issued the wrong key-card. The individual further i
stated that the security officer did not try to reissue the wrong
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key-card to him and no argument occurred between him and the security
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officer.
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i conclusion:
A contract security officer did initially issue an incorrect key-card to
an individual. The error was noticed by the individual, the security
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officer was advised of the error, and the correct key-card was then issued. The allegation was not substantiated and no NRC requirements
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were violated, c.
Allegation:
t On October 10, 1989, a manager on the licensee's staff allegedly advised
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the on-duty security shift supervisor (SSS) that he observed a contract
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security officer in a non productive mode" (sleeping or with eyes shut).
NRC Review Actions:
l The inspector interviewed the SSS and reviewed a document prepared by the
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SSS in reference to the October 10, 1989, incident.
The SSS was advised by a licensee manager that he observed a contract security officer asleep as he was exiting the Primary Access Portal (PAP). When asked if he observed the officer asleep. "the manager stated that she had her head down(lookingdown)".
When questioned by the SSS, the contract security j
officer denied being asleep or dozing off. She stateo that she was looking down because she was writing her post rotation schedule in her notebook and she showed her notebook tc the SSS. The SSS questioned
onother contractor security officer and a licensee security officer in the immediate area to determine if either of them observed the first security officer asleep or inattentive. Neither officer observed the first security officer asleep or inattentive.
The SSS then assigned the contract security officer to a post outside of the protected area.
The General Supervisor, Security Operations, was advised of the incident on October 11, 1989.
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Conclusion:
The allegation was not substantiated. A contract security officer's alertness was questioned by a licensee manager on October ', 1989. The security supervisor's inquiries to resolve the issue wen nr-Ste and timely. The alleged inettentiveness was not confirmed.
In the three issues described above, a concern was expressed that the contract security officers received less severe disciplinary action than licensee security officers would have received for similar incidents.
In this case, different disciplinary actions may occur since the license security officers are represented by a union and the contractor security officers are a separate entity not included in existing collective bargaining agreements.
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