IR 05000341/1989027

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Safety Insp Rept 50-341/89-27 on 890918-1013.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Refueling Activities (Core Offload) During First Refuel Outage
ML19325E282
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/25/1989
From: Phillips M, Rescheske P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19325E281 List:
References
50-341-89-27, NUDOCS 8911060079
Download: ML19325E282 (6)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f

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REGION III

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I Report No. 50-341/89027(DRS)

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Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 r.

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u Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company

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6400 North Dixie Highway i

Newport, MI 48166

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b Facility Name: Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Station j

L Inspection At: Newport, MI 48166

Inspection C ted:

Sep,t..mber 18 ough October 13, 1989

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Inspector:

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Approved By. Monte Operational Programs Section Date

i Inspection Summary

t Inspection On September 18 Through October 13, 1989 (Report No. 50-341/89027(DRS))

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced, safety inspection of refueling

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j activities (core offload) during the first refuel outage at the Fermi 2 plant I

(IP 60705, 60710, 86700).

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Results: No violations or concerns were identified during this inspection. A

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previously identified open item (341/86007-01) regarding fuel handler training was closed. Two training issues discussed in Inspection Report No. 341/89013

L were also closed. The core offload was considered a successful operation; no

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significant problems were encountered by the licensee, with only minor fuel

p handling equipment failures, y

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8911060079 891026 d

PDR ADOCK 05000341 I

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DETAILS I

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Persons Contacted j

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R. B. Stafford, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurane.e and Plant Safety t

G. V. Cranston, General Director, Nuclear Engineering

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D. R. Gipson, Plant Manager, Nuclear Production i

L. S. Goodman, Director, Nuclear Licensing

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T. S. Hsieh, Supervisor, fuel Performance

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f R. McKeon, Superintendent, Operations

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R. L. Matthews, Acting Superintendent, Maintenance and Modifications L

T. L. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance t

A. C. Settles, Superintendent, Technical Engineering

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R. K. Thorson, Outage Manager i

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All the above persons attended the exit meeting helt. on October 13,

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1989. Other persons were contacted during the inspection, including

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members of the licensee's operations staff, and members of the Westinghouse fuel handling staff, j

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Action On Previous Inspection Items

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a.

(Closed) Open-Item (50-341/86007-01):

Licensee to address method of

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moving fuel (suspended on grapple) should a loss of offsite power

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occur. The inspector reviewed information and held discussions with

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licensee representatives regarding this issue. The classroom portion j

of the lesson plan for refueling outage training for operators and

fuel handlers included a discussion of bridge movement with no

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electrical power, and the actions necessary to properly position a

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fuel bundle with no electrical power upon slowly lowering fuel pool

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level. Training was completed and documented prior to refueling activities performed during the first refuel outage. This open item

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is considered closed.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-341/P8037-06):

Classroom training

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materials not being maintained.

This item was identified during the

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NRC Diagnostic Evaluation Team Inspection (DET), and is considered i

i closed based on the review and followup documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 341/89013.

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l As a result of the DET inspection, a concern was identified regarding

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the licensee's lack of formal programmatic controls to address

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training of personnel on procedure changes.

The followup inspection

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(341/89013) further discussed the concern (Paragraph 7).

Subsequently, i

the licensee revised administrative procedure No. FIP-PRI-01,"

l Procedures, Manuals, and Orders." Revision 4, dated September 1, 1989,

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added the requirement that authors of procedures address

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f implementation plan issues, such as training needs, when they write or revise a procedure.. Based on the licensee action, the identified

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cor:ern is considered closed.

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Refueling Activities The first refuel outage at the Fermi 2 plant commenced in September 1989.

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Westinghouse was contracted by the licensee to perform the fuel handling and other refueling activit%s.

Entry into Operational Condition 5 (Mode 5) was achieved on September 9, 1989, and the reactor was completely

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offloaded by September 25, 1989. The inspection focused on preparations for core offload and refueling activities. Subsequent to the inspection period, on October 16, 1989, the licensee coninenced core reload. The NRC Retident Inspector Office will foliow this plant evolution, and the results of their inspection will be documented in subsequent inspection reports.

The residents will also followup on a concern with health physin during.

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movement of a Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) from the reactor (high

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radiation levels in the drywell).

The inspector performed a review of the procedures used by the licensee in preparation for the refueling and during core offload. The procedures included administrative controls and the requirements of Technical

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Specifications (TS) Section 3/4.9, Refueling Operations. The inspector directly observed portions of the refueling operations in the control room and on the refuel floor during regular hours, a shift turnover, and a backshift. The types of activities observed or evaluated included:

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fuel movement and the associated documentation, updating the fuel status boards, communications between the refuel stations, housekeeping and i

material accountability, and radiation protection practices.

In the area of communications, the inspector observed that the licensee utilized a microphone / intercom type system, rather than the commonly used headsets.

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This method of communication on the refuel bridge allowed easier discussions between the fuel handlers and less cumbersome movement on the bridge.

The following procedures, completed surveillances, and other documentation related to refueling, were reviewed during the course of the inspection.

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a.

Surveillance Procedure No. NPP-24.000.03, " Mode 5 Shiftly, Daily.

Weekly, and Situation Required Surveillances," was used by the operations staff to perform the periodic TS surveillarces associated with. Mode 5, Refueling (with fuel in the reactor and the vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned). The inspector reviewed the completed surveillances for September 1989, which were performed prior to and during core alterations. The results of the review indicated that the licensee was satisfying the TS requirements, t

Administrative Procedure No. NPP-HK1-01, " Plant Housekeeping,"

prescribed the methods for ensuring system and area cleanliness.

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V The procedure identified the general recuirements for maintaining the different housekeeping zones and definec cleanliness classifications.

NPP-0P1-13. " Conduct of Refueling and Core Alterations," was used by

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the licensee to control operations activities on the refuel floor

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during core alterations. The procedure included general requirements for access control, radiation protection, housekeeping, shift

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turnovers, and logkeeping.

Operations Event Critique No.89-013 was written by the licensee to document problems identified with housekeeping practices on the refuel floor on September 17-18, 1989. The problems led to a temporary shutdown of refuel floor activities until corrective actions were taken. The document concluded that tool and material control and accountability was not being maintained.

Subsequent observations by the inspector indicated that the actions taken by the licensee were effective in correcting the problem. The inspector observed that

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refuel floor personnel understood and were implementing good housekeeping practices, and that the tool and material control-logs were being maintained.

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Surveillance Procedure No. NPP-24.623, " Reactor Manual Control / Reactor Mode Switch / Refueling Platform - Refueling Interlocks," was used by the licensee to satisfy certain periodic TS surveillances, prior to and during core alterations, and during Control Rod Drive (CRD)

movement / work.

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Fuel Handling Procedure No. NPP-82.000.04, 6 Refueling and' Core Post-Alterations Verification," gave general guidance for performing refueling, transferring fuel, and core verification.

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Operations - Systems Frocedure No. NFP-23.710 " Fuel Handling System,"

i described the fuel handling equipment and the methods of use, f.

Procedure No. FIP-SE3-01, " Control of Special Nuclear Material," was l

used for contro11ihg and maintaining specia! nuclear material (SNM)

accounts and inventories. The inspector observed that, during fuel movement, the licensee used the "SNM/ Component Transfer Forms" to l

document all the locations of fuel bundles offloaded from the reactor, e

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Deviation Event Report (DER) No. 89-1034 documented that an allen wrench had been accidentally dropped into the reactor vessel (onto j

a fuel bundle) on September 16, 1989. The report also identified l

I other related incidents of inadequate housekeeping, all of which were included in the critique discussed above. Subsequently, the l

fuel bundle was inspected and the allen wrench was retrieved.

J DER No. 89-1021 documented that a shipping crate containing seven

LPRMs was tipped and fell off the forklifts in the warehouse on

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I September 12, 1989. Following the incident, the LPRis were ins 3ected-by the licensee, with no indication of damage found.

On Septem)er 18 ([

1989, the LPRMs were successfully tested prior to installation.

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Additional actions taken by the licensee included required reading for warehouse personnel of a lessons letrned memo re-emphasizing the need for proper handling of material (per procedure FIP-PM3-01),

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The inspector reviewed portions of the refueling outage training for operators and fuel handlers, and verified that the training was documented as completed (Reference: course plan CP-0P-474, and associated lesson plan No. LP-0P-474-001). The training course consisted of classroom presentations and actual use of the fuel handling equipment. The presentations included discussions of conduct of operations (administrative and operations procedures),

i the applicable TS and surveillances, abnormal procedures, personnel safety, and scheduled refueling work. A previously identified Open Item (341/86007-01) related to fuel handler training was closed (Paragraph 2).

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Modification EDP-10093, " Refueling Bridge Grapple Modification,"

installed Per Work Request No. 008C-890512, was completed by the

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licensee on September 2, 1989, prior to refueling. This modification

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was initiated in response to GE SIL No. 181 (June 1986), and IE

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Circular No. 77-12 (September 1977), which discussed dropped fuel assemblies at BWRs and recommendations for administrative controls and modifications to the fuel grapple. The inspector reviewed this modification in light of a recent fuel drop event at another BWR plant.

Prior to this modification, the licensee had a single hook grapple with positive indication of closure, and administrative controls to verify closure prior to raising a load. As recommended by GE SIL with a double hook (for redundancy) grapple by replacing the hook No. 181, the licensee modified the

, and adding an interlock to prevent motion in lifts greater than 500 pounds without the hook fully closed.

The licensee's evaluation and implementation of industry and vendor recommendations was considered to be a good practice, s

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Based on observations, discussions, and reviews, the inspector considered the core offloed to be a successful operation. No significant problems were encountered by the licensee with only minor fuel handling equipment failures.

Initial concerns with material control and accountability were

identified by the licensee and the NRC Resident Inspector Office; however,

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the subsequent actions taken by the licensee appeared to correct the problem. Management involvement and coverage was evident during the

refueling activities.

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Exit Meetina

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The.: ins)ector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph'1).

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.on Octo>er 13,,1989, and-summarized the scope and findings of the

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inspection. : The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the F-f:

inspector,:and did not. identify any information which may appear in

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, the inspection report as proprietary.

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