IR 05000338/2016001
| ML16117A347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/2016 |
| From: | Steven Rose NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR 2016001 | |
| Download: ML16117A347 (30) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ril 26, 2016
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2016001 AND 05000339/2016001
Dear Mr. Heacock:
On March 31, 2016, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. On April 13, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Bischof and other members of your staff.
Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000338, 05000339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7 Enclosure:
IR 05000338/2016001, 05000339/2016001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information Distribution via Listserv
ML16117A347 SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE GSC1 via email GSC1 /RA via email for/
BDB3 SON AJB1 via email AXS2 via email RSB2 via email NAME GCroon GEatmon BBishop SNinh AButcavage ASengupta RBaldwin DATE 4/21/2016 4/21/2016 4/25/2016 4/21/2016 4/21/2016 4/21/2016 4/22/2016 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE JXV3 via email SDR2 NAME JViera SRose DATE 4/21/2016 4/25/2016 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Letter to David from Steven D. Rose dated April 26, 2016 SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2016001 AND 05000339/2016001 DISTRIBUTION:
S. Price, RII D. Gamberoni, RII L. Gibson, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMNorthAnna Resource
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 05000338/2016001 and 05000339/2016001 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: January 1, 2016 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors: G. Croon, Senior Resident Inspector G. Eatmon, Resident Inspector S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
A. Sengupta, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.3)
J. Viera, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.3)
J. Bundy, Operations Engineer (In-Training) (Section 1R11.3)
Approved by: Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000338/2016001, 05000339/2016001; 01/01/2016 - 03/31/2016; North Anna Power
Station, Units 1 and 2. Integrated inspection report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a senior project engineer, one senior operations engineer, one operations engineer, and two reactor inspectors from the regional office. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and operated at full power for the entire report period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On March 6, 2016, the unit was taken offline for a planned refueling outage. The unit remained offline for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the external flood vulnerability of the North Anna for the auxiliary feedwater pump house. The inspectors also reviewed applicable station procedures and design documents to assess proper surveillance and maintenance for external flood protection features.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Seasonal Susceptibilities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather preparations for cold weather operations specified in 0-GOP-4, Cold Weather Operations, Rev 56, 0-GOP-4.2, Extreme Cold Weather Operations, Rev 36, and 0-GOP-4.2A, Extreme Cold Weather Daily Checks, Rev 8, as well as the licensees corrective action data base for cold weather related issues. The inspectors walked down the risk-significant areas listed below on three occasions to verify compliance with procedural requirements and to verify that the specified actions provided the necessary protection for the applicable structures, systems, or components (SSCs). The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program (CAP) database to verify that weather related problems due to temperature were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the CAP, and appropriately resolved.
- Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel on December 30, 2015 with anticipated weather in the teens for January 1, 2016.
- Unit 1 Aux Feedwater Pump House on January 22, 2016 with anticipated winter storm of 24 of snow and blizzard wind conditions.
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators on January 22, 2016 with anticipated winter storm of 24 snow and blizzard wind conditions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a site specific weather related inspection due to anticipated adverse weather conditions. On January 21, 2016, the inspectors reviewed the licensee response to winter storm warnings, with blizzard conditions and wind warnings of 25 to 35 miles an hour with gusts up to 40 miles per hour for the area. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee adverse weather response procedures, including 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Conditions, Rev 61, and site preparations including work activities that could impact the overall maintenance risk assessments.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted four equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify the operability of a redundant or backup system/train or a remaining operable system/train with a high risk significance for the current plant configuration (considering out-of-service, inoperable, or degraded condition); or a risk-significant system/train that was recently realigned following an extended system outage, maintenance, modification, or testing; or a risk-significant single-train system. The inspector conducted the reviews to ensure that critical components were properly aligned, and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.
- Unit 1, A and B train control room chillers while C train 1 HV-E-4C was out of service for planned maintenance
- Unit 2, control room chillers while 2 HV-AC- 7/8 was out of service
- Unit 1, 1J emergency bus while 2H emergency diesel generator was out of service
b. Findings
No findings were identified
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Fire Protection Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted focused tours of the five areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Rev 10, CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Rev 6, and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Rev 5. The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to:
- (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;
- (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and,
- (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel and 280 Rod Drive
- Unit 1 Yard Fire Hydrants and Hose Houses while Hose House E was non-functional
- Unit 1 Transformers
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the internal flooding vulnerability of the one flood area listed below with respect to adjacent safety-related areas to verify that the flood protection barriers and equipment were being maintained consistent with the UFSAR. The licensees corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that corrective actions with respect to flood-related items identified in condition reports were adequately addressed. The inspectors conducted a field survey of the selected areas to evaluate the adequacy of flood barriers, and floor drains to protect the equipment, as well as their overall material condition.
- Safety related switchgear room
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
System Heat Exchangers
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the risk significant Unit 2 B charging pump lube oil heat exchangers for the 2B gear box lube oil cooler and reviewed inspection records, test results, maintenance work orders, and other documentation to ensure that deficiencies which could mask or degrade performance were identified and corrected. The test procedures and records were also reviewed to verify that they were consistent with Generic Letter 89-13 licensee commitments, and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines. In addition, the inspectors reviewed inspection documentation of the related service water piping to assess general material condition and to identify any degraded conditions. Documents reviewed included Virginia Power Administrative Procedure (VPAP) -0811, Service Water Inspection and Maintenance Program, Rev 6, and licensee procedure ER-AA-HTX-1003, Heat Exchanger Monitoring and Assessment, Rev 6.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities From March 14-18, 2016, the inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk-significant piping and component boundaries, and containment boundaries in Unit 2.
The inspectors either directly observed or reviewed the following non-destructive examinations (NDEs) mandated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code of Record: 2004 Edition with No Addenda) to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code,Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications or defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code, or an NRC-approved alternative requirement. The inspectors also reviewed the qualifications of the NDE technicians performing the examinations to determine whether they were current and in compliance with the ASME Code requirements.
- Penetrant Testing (PT), Component ID,12050-WMKS-0103CB / 2-RC-455 / SW-64, Pipe-to Elbow Weld, Class 1 (reviewed)
- Visual Testing (VT), Component ID, 12050-WMKS-0111Y/3-CH-479/R-7, Restraint, Class 2 The inspectors either directly observed or reviewed the following welding activities, qualification records, and associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code,Section XI and Section IX requirements. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the work order (WO), repair and replacement plan, welder performance qualification records, and NDE reports.
During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service; therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.
Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that for the Unit 2 vessel head, a bare metal visual (BMV)examination was required during this outage, in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D).
The inspectors observed portions of the BMV examination of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations, and reviewed NDE reports for penetration numbers 22, 27, 35, 55, and 59 to determine if the examinations were performed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D).
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the final NDE report, VE-16-004, to determine if the required examination coverage was achieved, and if limitations were recorded in accordance with the licensee procedures.
The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued service. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 2 refueling outage; therefore, no NRC review was completed for these inspection procedure attributes.
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities The inspectors reviewed the licensees boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to determine if the activities were implemented in accordance with the commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants, and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite records review of procedures, and the results of the licensees containment walkdown inspections performed during the current refueling outage. The inspectors also interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensees BACC program requirements, and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions such as boric acid leaks were properly identified and corrected, in accordance with the licensees BACC and corrective action programs (CAPs).
The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations, completed for evidence of boric acid leakage, to determine if the licensee properly applied applicable corrosion rates to the affected components; and properly assessed the effects of corrosion induced wastage on structural or pressure boundary integrity in accordance with the licensee procedures.
- Boric Acid Engineering Evaluation, Condition Report (CR)-577690, Component ID No. 2-SI-19, Refueling Water Storage Tank to Low Head Safety Injection Pump Suction Header, Check Valve, 5/11/2016
- Boric Acid Engineering Evaluation, CR-1000086, Component ID No. 2-SS-TV-201B, PZR Vapor Space Outside Isolation Valve, 7/13/2015
- Boric Acid Engineering Evaluation, CR-5557840, Component ID No. 2-SI-MOV-2865B, 10/5/2014 The inspectors reviewed the following CRs and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
- CR-3026890, Prior to Head Set, Engineering to Evaluate Material Observed on Unit-2 Reactor Vessel Closure Head, 3/18/2016
- CR-1030218, Body to Bonnet Leak found on 2-RC-MOV-2590, 3/13/2016
- CR-1030015, 1-SS-1019, Has A Packing Leak, 3/11/2016
- CR-1031351, Suspected leakage residue at inlet flange of 2-RH-E-1B, 3/30/2016 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that for the Unit 2 steam generator (SG) B tubes, no inspection activities were originally required for this refueling outage, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code, the licensees Technical Specifications (TSs), and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines. Required expansion scope is 20 percent sample per the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, if needed.
The inspectors reviewed the eddy current (EC) examination activities performed in Unit 2 SGs A and C during current refueling outage, to verify compliance with the licensees TSs, ASME BPVC Section XI, and NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines.
The inspectors reviewed the scope of the EC examinations, and the implementation of scope expansion criteria, to verify that these were consistent with the EPRI Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7. The inspectors reviewed documentation for a sample of EC data analysts, probes, and testers to verify that personnel and equipment were qualified to detect the applicable degradation mechanisms, in accordance with the EPRI Examination Guidelines. This review included a sample of site-specific Examination Technique Specification Sheets (ETSSs)to verify that their qualification and site-specific implementation were consistent with Appendix H or I of the EPRI Examination Guidelines. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of EC data for SG tubes A-R20C48, A-R16C25, C-R47C49, C-R25C18, and C-R40C42, with a qualified data analyst to confirm that data analysis, and equipment configuration, were performed in accordance with the applicable ETSSs and site-specific analysis guidelines. The inspectors verified that recordable indications were detected and sized in accordance with vendor procedures.
The inspectors selected a sample of degradation mechanisms from the Unit 2 Degradation Assessment report (i.e., tube support wear), and verified that their respective in-situ pressure testing criteria were determined in accordance with the EPRI Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines, Revision 3. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed EC indication reports to determine whether tubes with relevant indications were appropriately screened for in-situ pressure testing. The inspectors also compared the latest EC examination results with the last Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment report for Unit 2, to assess the licensees prediction capability for maximum tube degradation, and number of tubes with indications. The inspectors verified that the licensees evaluation was conservative, and that current examination results were bound by the Operational Assessment projections.
The inspectors assessed the latest EC examination results to verify that new degradation mechanisms, if any, were identified and evaluated before plant startup.
The review of EC examination results included the disposition of potential loose part indications on the SG secondary side, to verify that corrective actions for evaluating and retrieving loose parts were consistent with the EPRI Guidelines. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of primary-to-secondary leakage data for Unit 2, to confirm that operational leakage in each SG remained below the detection or action level threshold during the previous operating cycle.
The inspectors review included the implementation of tube repair criteria and repair methods, to verify they were consistent with plant TSs and industry guidelines.
The inspectors review also included the implementation of tube repair criteria and repair methods, to verify they were consistent with plant TSs and industry guidelines. The inspectors verified that the licensee had selected the appropriate tubes for plugging based on the required plugging criteria. The inspectors reviewed the tube plugging procedure, and a sample of tube plugging results for SG 2C tubes R46C49 and R47C49, to determine if the licensee installed the tube plugs in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Furthermore, the inspectors interviewed licensee staff and reviewed a sample of inspection results for the inspection conducted in the secondary side internals of SGs A and C, to verify that potential areas of degradation based on site-specific operating experience (OE) were inspected, and appropriate corrective actions were taken to address degradation mechanisms. This review included the results of Foreign Object Search and Retrieval activities in both SGs, and an evaluation for a potential loose part in the secondary side of SGs A and C.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related issues entered into the CAP to determine if the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated corrective actions. The review also included the licensees consideration and assessment of OE events applicable to the plant. This review included the Control Rod Drive Mechanism seismic support plate inspection requirements per ASME Section XI, Table IWF 2500-1, Item F1.40, supports other than piping supports; and Section XI inspection requirements per Table IWE-2500-1 requirements for Item E1.30 Moisture Barriers. Corrective action documents were initiated for both of these sample areas and are included in the documents reviewed section of the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a licensed operator performance on February 3, 2016, during a simulator scenario which involved loss of vital instrumentation for a pressurizer level channel failing low and a first state pressure channel failing low. This was followed by a subsequent small break loss of coolant accident, a manual reactor trip, and the requirement to manually borate because the automatic function failed. The scenario required classifications and notifications that were counted for NRC performance indicator input.
The inspectors observed the following elements of crew performance in terms of communications:
- (1) ability to take timely and proper actions;
- (2) prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms;
- (3) correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures;
- (4) timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and
- (5) oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Control Room Operator Performance Observations
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted four observations of licensed reactor operators actions and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. As part of this assessment, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance:
- (1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications;
- (2) control board/in-plant component manipulations;
- (3) use and interpretation of plant instruments, indicators and alarms;
- (4) documentation of activities;
- (5) management and supervision of activities; and,
- (6) communication between crew members. The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance during the following events:
- Unit 1, Control rod movement test on January 12, 2016
- Unit 1 and Unit 2, Observe work management, and plant configuration control on January 14, 2016
- Unit 1, Fuel oil transfer pump surveillance and Unit 2 Quench spray pump and valve stroke time testing on February 10, 2016
- Unit 2, shutdown on March 6, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in preparation for this inspection. During the week of January 25, 2016, the inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the facility licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998, American National Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training and Examination. The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator modification request records, simulator performance test records, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding records, and medical records.
The records were inspected using the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are documented in the List of Documents Reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
For the four equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev 6. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- CR1027757, Increasing vibrations on 1-CH-P-1A
- CR1027869, SBO diesel radiator fan motor replacement
- CR1026632, Spent fuel pool makeup from fire protection removed from service
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the three activities listed below for the following:
- (1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;
- (2) management of risk;
- (3) appropriate and necessary steps taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities upon identification of an unforeseen situation; and
- (4) adequate identification and resolution of maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify that deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.
- Emergent work for replacement of the positioner transmitter on the 2B S/G blowdown flash tank inlet flow control valve, (2-BD-FCV-202B) on January 6, 2016
- Emergent work to recalibrate the power range mismatch enabling the control rods to returned to automatic on February 11, 2016
- Emergent work for the recovery of five set screws from the instrument gauge used in the core up-flow modification project on March 24, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability and Functionality Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations and functionality assessments, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1)the technical adequacy of the evaluations;
- (2) whether continued system operability was warranted;
- (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensatory measures;
- (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and
- (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance with the Significant Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors review included a verification that operability determinations (OD) were made as specified by procedure OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Rev 12. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- Review of operability determination for CA3018583, Emergency Diesel Generator Coolant Corrosion
- Review of OD 000611, Through Wall Leak Occurring on U1 2-RC-56-1502-Q1
- Review of OD 000597, Degraded Areva AMBW Fuel
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the one completed permanent plant modification design change packages listed below. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the installation, discussed the desired improvement with system engineers, and reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Review/Regulatory Screening, technical drawings, test plans and the modification package to assess the TS implications. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- DC-NA-13-00016, Station Service Bus to Emergency Bus Crosstie Installation
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, listed below, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether:
- (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;
- (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;
- (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;
- (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;
- (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;
- (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and
- (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Rev 14.
- 1-BY-BC-1.1, Commence PMs and replace AC/DC Breakers
- 1-PT-82H, Replace insulation Pads on 1H Emergency Diesel Generator
- 2J emergency diesel generator start after periodic maintenance
- 1H emergency diesel generator start after six year maintenance
- 2H emergency diesel generator start after isolation relay replacement during U2 outage
- 2J emergency bus after cross tie modification during U2 outage
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Unit 1 Refueling Outage
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Review (OSR) and contingency plans for the Unit 2 refueling outage, which began March 6, 2016, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. The inspectors also confirmed that the licensee had mitigation/response strategies in place for any losses of key safety functions. Using NRC inspection procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, the inspectors observed portions of the refueling, and maintenance activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan and applicable TS. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.
- Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate maintenance of defense-in-depth commensurate with the OSR for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.
- Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing.
- Installation and configuration of Reactor Coolant System instrumentation for system pressure, level, and temperature to provide accurate indication, and an accounting for instrument error.
- Implementation of licensee procedures for foreign material exclusion.
- Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that TS and outage safety plan requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities.
- Controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system.
- Reactor inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss.
- Controls over activities and SSCs which could affect reactivity.
- Fatigue management in accordance with meeting the rule requirements for each process.
- Refueling activities, including fuel handling operations (inspection, sipping, reconstitution and insertion), and fuel assemblies tracking, including new fuel, from core offload through core reload.
- Refueling activities, including fuel handling operations (inspection, sipping, reconstitution and insertion), and fuel assemblies tracking, including new fuel, from core offload through core reload.
- Controls over containment penetrations, per TS, such that containment closure could be achieved at all times.
- Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities.
- Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisities, walkdown of the containment to verify that debris had not been left which could block emergency core cooling system strainers, and the review of reactor physics testing.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the seven surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.
In-Service Test:
- 2-PT-213.5J, Valve Inservice Inspection (2-QS-MOV-201B - B Quench Spray Pump Discharge Valve), Rev 10 RCS Leakage:
- 1-GOP-52.2A, Identifying Increased RCS Leakage, Rev 01 Containment Isolation Valve:
- 2-PT-57.5A, Leak Rate Test of 2-SI-P-1A and Associated Piping and Inservice Inspection for 2-SI-6, Rev 21
- 2-PT-57.5B, Leak Rate Test of 2-SI-P-1B and Associated Piping and Inservice Inspection for 2-SI-29, Rev 21 Other Surveillance Tests:
- 0-PT-100.6, Fire Protection - Main Fire Loop Flow Test, Rev 6
- 1-PT-82.4A, 1H Diesel Generator Test (Start by ESF Actuation), Rev 51-MR-1
- 2-PT-14.2, Unit 2 1B Charging Pump, Rev 19
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On February 9, 2016, the inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of a drill that involved a General Area Emergency where a large break LOCA led to an offsite releases exceeding EPA PAG exposure levels. The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classification, notifications, and the licensees identification and entrance of any problems into their corrective action program. This inspection evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and performance critique. Exercise issues were captured by the licensee in their corrective action program as CRs. Requalification training deficiencies were captured within the operator training program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the three Unit 1 and 2 PIs listed below to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 data reported to the NRC for the period April 1, 2015 through March 31, 2016. Documents reviewed included applicable NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs.
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)
- Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours(IE03)
- Unplanned Scrams With Complications (IE04)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
As required by NRC inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.
.2 Annual Sample: Review of CR1030800 FME Inspection of Long Handled Tool Working
in Cavity
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions for CR1030800, FME Inspection of Long Handled Tool Working in Cavity, to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in licensee procedure, PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program, Rev 23 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. In general, the inspectors verified that the licensee had identified problems at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the CAP database, and had proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions.
4OA3 Event Followup
a. Inspection Scope
(Closed) LER 05000338, 339/2016-001-00, Emergency Diesel Generators Automatic Start Due to Loss of Power to "C" Reserve Station Service Transformer The inspectors followed up on actions taken in response to the autostart of the 1H and 2J emergency diesel generators on loss of C Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) resulting from the opening of the L102 breaker. The inspectors reviewed the problem resolution documents and the licensee actions taken to ensure appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
On January 23, 2016, with Unit 1 and 2 both in Mode 1 and at 100 percent power, switchyard breaker L102, supply to 34.5kV bus #3, tripped open on low gas pressure.
This resulted in loss of "C" RSST which supplies "F" transfer and 2G intake structure 4160VAC buses. The 2G bus fast transferred to the 1G bus allowing all Unit 2 circulating water pumps to continue to run being supplied by Unit 1. The "F" transfer bus supplies the 1H and 2J emergency buses. Their associated EDGs started and loaded to recover those buses.
The 1H bus was swapped to its alternate supply from 1B station service and the 1H EDG was shutdown and returned to auto standby. Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) (3.8.1) on Unit 1 was exited on January 24, 2016 at 1538.
The 2J EDG continued to power the 2J bus until repairs to L102 were completed and the Unit 2 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was exited on January 24, 2016 at 1802. L102 SF6 gas pressure switch was found defective and replaced.
The cause of the event was the inadvertent opening of the L102 breaker due to wind driven snow intrusion into the breaker cabinet. The preventive maintenance procedure was being revised to include an additional check for snow and moisture intrusion paths into cabinets and seal as appropriate for the breakers in question. The inspectors reviewed the Licensee Event Report (LER), the licensees apparent cause evaluation, and corrective action documents to verify the accuracy of the LER and that the corrective actions were appropriate. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as CR1024928.
b. Findings
No findings or violations were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Contingency Plans for Licensee Strikes or Lockouts (IP 92709)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the content of the licensees strike contingency plans in response to the labor contract agreement between Dominion Virginia Power and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers set to expire on March 31, 2016, to determine if reactor operations, facility security, emergency preparedness and fire protection were to be maintained consistent with site technical specifications and regulatory requirements in the event of a strike.
The inspectors reviewed the process used by the licensee to train non-licensed personnel who could be performing functions they are not normally assigned. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees nuclear business continuity plan and discussed this plan with licensee management to ensure there would be provisions to maintain site coverage for licensed operators, other workers to operate the site, and to implement the site emergency plan.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 13, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the quarterly inspection results to Mr. G. Bischof and other members of the staff. The licensee acknowledged the results of these inspections. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning
- G. Bischof, Site Vice President
- B. Gaspar, Manager, Nuclear Site Services
- R. Hanson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Site Engineering
- L. Hilbert, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing
- J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
- P. Kemp, Supervisor, Station Licensing
- J. Leberstien, Technical Advisor, Licensing
- F. Mladen, Plant Manager
- J. Plossl, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures
- J. Schleser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness
- J. Slattery, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- W. Standley, Manager, Nuclear Training
- M. Whalen, Technical Advisor, Licensing
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
- 05000338, 339/2016-001-00 LER Emergency Diesel Generators Automatic Start Due to Loss of Power to "C" Reserve Station Service Transformer (Section 4OA3)
Discussed
None