IR 05000335/1981022
| ML17212B256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1981 |
| From: | Dance H, Elrod S, Gibb H, Rogers R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17212B252 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-81-22, 50-389-81-18, NUDOCS 8112230322 | |
| Download: ML17212B256 (22) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos.
50-335/81-22 and 50-389/81-18 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Units 1 and
Docket Nos.
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.
DPR-67 and CPPR-144 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on August 11 - September 10, 1981 Areas Inspected
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Da e Signed This routine inspection involved 265 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup of previous findings, followup items, maintenance, plant operations, actions taken to implement the Three Nile Island action plan, surveillance, and licensee identified items.
Results Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in six areas; two items of noncompliance were found in one area (Violation - Failure to implement procedures - paragraph 12, (three examples),
Violation - Failure to test a plant modification - paragraph 12).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. M.
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D. A.
- N. G.
R. J.
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Wethy, Plant Manager Barrow, Operations Superintendent Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent Sager, Operations Supervisor Roos, guality Control Supervisor Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor Leppla, Instrument 8 Control Supervisor Fincher, Training Supervisor Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor Mikell, Outage Coordinator Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor Ruby, Plant Administrative Supervisor West, Security Supervisor Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Burton, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Vincent, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Electrical Dillard, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical Bailey, equality Assurance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 28, and September 16, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The violations were discussed.
The plant manager requested that the inspector refer to the response for IE Bulletin 80-15 concerning test of the ENS modification.
Subsequently the inspector did so.
The response, quoted in part in paragraph 12, reinforces the inspectors position that plant modifications should be tested.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a ~
(Closed) Infraction 50-335/80-25-01; Use of a Superseded Version of Startup Procedure 0030122.
This item is closed based on review of Florida Power and Light, FP&L, response letter L-80-308 dated September 17, 1981, inspector on-site review, and discussion with the originating inspector.
This appears to be an isolated instance of failing to purge control room files of all copies of superseded procedure O tg I
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Followup of Previously Identified Items
'a ~
b.
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d.
e.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/81-08-43; gP 2.3 did not describe periodic review( or cancellation of quality procedures.
The inspector reviewed quality procedure 2.3, Revision 5 dated June 18, 1981, entitled Preparation and Revision of guality Procedures.
Sections 5.6 and 5.7 have been added to address the subject topics and appear to be adequate.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-35-03; Review of Administrative Procedure AP 0010120 for TMI requirements.
Revision
to the'ubject procedure, entitled Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift has been approved by the facility review group.
This revision incorporates, in Appendix B, the administrative duties of the nuclear plant supervisors and the nuclear watch engineers.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Fol 1owup Item 50-335/81-08-13; Inadequate Instruc-tions for Jumper Log.
This item is closed based on paragraph 7.a. of inspection report 50-335/81-18.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/81-08-27; Failure to Retain Check Sheets for Valve Lineups and quarterly Review of Valves, Locks and Switches.
This item was based on the licensee retaining a checkoff sheet that appropriate valve lineups were completed, rather than a copy of the objective evidence, i.e., completed, signed copy of the actual procedure.
The inspector reviewed numerous system lineup procedures and administrative procedure 0010123, Revision 24, Administrative Control of Valves Locks and Switches.
These procedures have been revised to require retention of completed copies in the plant files.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/81-08-47; Failure of Hanagement to Review gA Audit Checklists.
This item stems from a policy of management review of changes to checklists, rather than the entire checklist, upon each use.
Interviews with gA department management showed that checklists are now stored with no management signatures, such that management review occurs each time prior to use.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Foll owup Item 50-335/81-08-49; Insufficient Audit Independence Between gA Department and Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB).
This item concerned an NRC Performance Appraisal Branch thesis that poor management controls regarding CNRD activities might have been more effectively highlighted by the gA department if there had been more independence between the two bodies.
Subsequently, on February 9-13, 1981, a joint utility management audit (JUHA) was
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conducted (QAS-QAD-81-1).
This audit included specifically the functioning of the CNRB and the QA committee.
Quality Instruction QI-18-QAD-2, Rev. 0, Auditing of the Quality Assurance Committee, CNRB, and the QA Department was issued July 31, 1981.
This instruction requires the continuation of such independent audits.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
g.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/81-08-44; Update of Quality Assurance Department Organization Manual.
This item reflected the situation where the subject manual had not been updated since 1974.
The manual was subsequently updated effective December 1,
1980 and the licensee has committed to place this item in the QA systems and audits section tickler file to enhance timeliness of future updates.
h.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/81-08-45 -
No Minutes Preserved for Two QA Committee Meetings in 1980.
Inspector followup identified that QA committee meetings were conducted using view graph present-ations.
The view graphs represent the subjects covered much as recorded minutes would.
Change 3 of the QA committee charter dated November 19, 1980 requires minutes be prepared and distributed.
The inspector reviewed written minutes for January 26 and March 18, 1981 meetings.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/79-32-01; Formal Program to Analyze Events that Challenge Safety Systems.
The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure AP-0005724, Rev.
dated July 14, 1981 and concluded that it met the FP8L commitment given in their letter L-79-321 dated November 8, 1979 to provide a formal program to analyze events at nuclear plants, both within and without FP&L, and disseminate such information throughout the plant staff on a
continuing basis.
This commitment had been accepted as satisfactory by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in a letter dated April 6, 1981.
6.
Actions Taken to Implement the Three Mile Island Action Plan (Closed) T.A.P. 1.A. 1.2; Delegate Non-Safety Shift Supervisor Duties.
This item was open pending revision of administrative procedures to clarify the duties involved.
These have been added to Administrative Procedure 0010120, Revision 15, Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
7.
Licensee Event Reports Review The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appro-priate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions
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were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
- LER 335/81-33
- LER 335/81-34
- LER 335/81-35
- LER 335/81-38 8.
IE Bulletins (Unit 1)
hiissed battery charger surveillance Channel
"C" containment pressure setpoint out of tolerance CEA No.
61 Dropped while being inserted for periodic exercise 1A and 1B charging pumps isolated to find unidentified reactor coolant leakage Emergency Diesel Generator
"A" output breaker failed to close The following IE Bulletins were reviewed to determine whether they had been received and reviewed by appropriate management; responses, where necessary, were accurate and complete; and that action taken, if required, was complete.
a.
(Closed)
IEB 79-06C Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island - Supplement The inspector reviewed the completion status of this Bulletin which involved reactor coolant pump (RCP) control during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Licensee actions were divided into both short and long term requirements.
The short term requirements were reported closed in IE report 50-335/79-19.
The long term requirements associated with automatic tripping of RCP's have been incorporated into NUREG 0737 task action plan item II.K.3.5.
Since the long term portion of IEB 79-06C is adequately addressed by NUREG 0737, this Bulletin is administratively closed.
The licensee has taken no action as yet on II.K.3.5 other than owner's group participation on this issue.
9.
IE Circulars (Units 1 and 2)
The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determine whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate action had been taken or planned:
a ~
(Closed-Units 1 and 2)
The role of shift Technical Advisors and Importance of Reporting Operational Events.
This IE Circular is closed based on licensee management review, forwarding to all licensed operators, review with nuclear plant supervisors and shift technical advisors, and issuance of a joint technical staff/operations supervisor memorandum (Technical Staff letter Book 0'223) reinforcing the existing plant instructions.
Since the operations and shift technical advisor staff for unit 2 will be the same as for unit 1, closure applies to both unit ~
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(Closed-Unit 1)
IE Circular 81-06 Potential Deficiency Affecting Certain Foxboro lot-50 Milliampere Transmitters.
This IE Circular is closed for Unit 1 based on licensee determination that unit one has no such transmitters.
co (Closed-Unit 1) IE Circular 81-09 Containment Effluent Water that Bypasses Radioactivity Honitor.
This IE Circular is closed for Unit 1 based on licensee investigation which shows that the condition does not exist for Unit 1.
d.
e.
(Closed-Units 1 and 2) IE Circular 81-11 - Inadequate Decay Heat Removal During Reactor Shutdown.
This IE Circular applies to BWRs arid was not'sent to St. Lucie.
It is closed as not applicable.
(Closed-Unit 1) IE Circular 81-12 Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Protection System.
This IE Circular is based on a condition identified at St. Lucie Unit
(IE Report 50-335/80-38).
Corrective action was taken prior to this IE Circular being issued, therfore, it is closed for Unit 1.
10.
IE Information Notices (Unit 1)
The following IE Information Notices were reviewed to ensure their receipt and review by appropriate management.
IE Information Notices are considered closed upon receipt and review.
IEN-81-15 IEN-81-19 I EN-81-20 IEN-81-21 IEN-81-22 Degradation of Automatic ECCS Actuation Capability by Isolation of Instrument Lines Lost Parts in Primary Coolant System Test Failures of Electrical Penetration Assemblies Potential Loss of Direct Access to Ultimate Heat Sink Section 235 and 236 Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 I EN-81-23 Fuel Assembly Damaged due to Improper Positioning of Handling Equipment IEN-81-24 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Bearing Failures The following IE Information Notice was not sent to St. Lucie l. It is closed as not applicabl >>:ww f9,'>>fl,'
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IEN-81-18 Excessive Radiation Exposures to the Fingers of Three Individuals Incurred during cleaning and wipe Testing of Radioactive sealed sources at a sealed-source manufacturing facility 11.
Licensee Identified Items (LII) (Unit 2)
Prior to this inspection, the licensee identified the following items considered reportable under
CFR 50.55(e):
a.
(Open)
Item 389/81-18-01 - Local Control Station Switch Protuberance affects starting of certain pumps.
On June 25, 1981 FPSL notified IE:Region II of a potential 50.55(e)
item concerning certain local control switches for pumps.
The switches (Gould Rundel type 554 and 556) are a spring return to neutral type.
The sympton was that pumps would start when the switch was turned to
"start" but stop when the switch was released and returned to "normal".
Investigation reported in FPSL Ltr L-81-316 of July 24, 1981 showed that the purchase specifications failed to specify contact maintenance during position change.
Returning the switch to "normal" actuated the
"stop" function while the switch was in mid-position.
Current plans are to replace the switches, however temporary modifications are being considered for test purposes.
This item remains open pending completion of corrective action.
b.
(Open)
Item 389/81-18-02 - Lock Ring Omitted from Reliance Electric Supplied Hicroswitches on Reactor/Turbine Generator Board (RTGB)
On June 24, 1981 FP8L notified IE:Region II that cer tain switches mounted on the RTGB rotated during switch operation.
An interim written report was submitted July 24, 1981 (L-81-320), and a final report was submitted on August 24, 1981 (L-81-368).
The problem reported was the result of the RTGB manufacturer not making properly shaped cutouts in the board such that the switch locking ring would fit.
The applicant filed the cutouts to the proper shape and installed the locking rings under Nonconformance Report 1841 E.
FPSL letter L-81-368 is in error in that paragraph III, Corrective Action, references the wrong nonconformance report.
This report remains open pending correction of that letter and Region II review of corrective action.
C.
(Open)
Item 389/81-18-03 - Modutronic Controller/Allen Bradley Selector Switches Improperly thounted.
On June 24, 1981, FP&L notified IE:Region II that certain local control switches for the subject controllers rotated when the switch handle was turned.
The problem resulted from the controller vendor not making properly shaped cutouts in the controller face to accept the lock ring of the switch.
Nonconformance Report 1928E has been writte ~
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(open)
Item'389/81-18-04 - Gould Rundel Local Control Station Switch Locking Devices On February 26, 1981, FPSL notified IE:Region II that certain Gould Rundel switches in local control stations were capable of rotating as the switches are cycled.
A written report was submitted Harch
(FPL-Ltr-L-81-129).
A repair process has been developed but not implemented.
This item will be reinspected at a later date.
12.
Honthly Haintenance Observation The inspector audited maintenance procedures.
An in-depth look was taken at eleven attributes including - compliance with limiting conditions for operation, proper removal from service, use of approved procedures, qualified personnel, use of certified parts, proper radiological controls, equipment properly tested prior to return to service, etc.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
13.
Review of Plant Operations a 0 The inspector observed routine control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators du'ring the report period.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and facility procedures.
b.
On August 26, 1981, the inspector was checking tags in the cable spreading room near door 55 when 5 backfit workers exited the radiation controlled area.
Only one of them was observed using the "frisker".
This is another example of failure to follow procedures as described in the Notice of Violation, Appendix A, paragraph B of IE Report 50-335/81-18.
c.
The inspector was informed by the licensee on August 27, 1981 that power had been lost for about 10 minutes to the emergency notification system (ENS) and to the site (Bell) telephone syste a,<f I
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Operators attempting to locate a ground opened a breaker feeding 480 VAC Power Panel (PP)
135, which contains the feed to the Bell telephone 480/120V main transformer for the ENS and PBX telephones.
Upon determining that this did not clear the ground, the breaker was reclosed.
However, power was not restored to the Bell transformer.
PP 135 contains an internal relay which drops out a portion of the non-vital loads upon loss of off-site power and requires manual reset.
The purpose for this is to minimize unnecessary loads on the emergency diesel generator when it comes on line during a situation blackout.
It was not intended, however, for the ENS and PBX phones to be dropped out during a blackout.
In fact, a special circuit modification (PC/H 112-80)
was performed in September 1980 in response to IE Bulletin 80-15, Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS) with Loss of Off-Site Power, to assure continuity of power to plant phones during a blackout.
FPSL's response to IEB 80-15 stated that, "the new source of power already powers certain security systems and is given periodic testing.
Because it has been verified that the power panel will be powered from the emergency power system, no further testing is felt necessary".
The work was completed, but no test was conducted to assure proper operation.
The Bell transformer ended up being connected to the wrong internal bus in PP 135.
This condition has existed for almost one year.
Had an actual blackout occurred, no phone communications would have been possible until the operators could have reset the open relay.
Additional loads lost during this incident were motor operators for 3 security gates and the air conditioning unit for the security and QA records building.
Failure to properly test the system subsequent to modification is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures and Drawings, as implemented by the Topical Quality Assurance Report and Quality Procedure QP 11.2, section 5.3, - Retests.
(50-335/81-22-02).
Inadvertant containment Isolation -
On August 13, 1981, while the reactor was at power, a containment isolation was initiated by an Instrumentation and Control (18C) technician during maintenance on a failed containment radiation monitor.
The systems functioned as designed.
The cause was corrected and systems returned to normal within seventeen minutes.
NRC Headquarters was informed promptly.
No violations or deviations were identified during this event.
Reactor Trip of September 8, 1981.
The reactor tripped at 4:08 a.m.
when a ground indication in the main generator caused a turbine trip which, in turn, caused a reactor trip.
All systems functioned normally.
The reactor was maintained in hot standby pending investi-gation of the ground indication.
The reactor was still in hot standby
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at the end of this report period.
No violations or deviations were identified during this event.
f.
During a plant tour on September 9,
1981 the inspector observed a
contract backfit worker manipulate a control switch on the front of containment spray pump "A" control panel.
The switch was not one that would disable the pump.
Licensee management was informed.
Strong action appears to have been taken by the licensee.
The inspector considers this matter resolved.
g.
At about 9:30 a.m.
September 9, 1981, the inspector observed a mechanic isolate with a single valve and loosen the discharge pressure gage of 1B auxiliary feed. pump while it was being operated for decay heat removal.
The inspector could find no operating supervisor that had authorized this action nor a plant clearance.
1]hile it is true that a
special test for auxiliary feedwater system flow determination was in progress, the test procedure did not authorize the above action.
It appears that operating procedure No.
0010122 Revision 12, In-plant Equipment Clearance Orders, was not implemented in this case.
This is an example of violation of technical specification 6.8. 1.
(50-335/81-22-01)
h.
llitness of major surveillance test.
The inspector witnessed the setup and portions of the setting of steam generator safety valves on September 10, 1981.
Site quality control personnel and a vendor representative were present to assist and
. certify the settings.
The inspector had no questions concerning the validity of the test results.
14.
Preparation for Refueling On the morning of August 20, 1981, the inspector observed the unloading and storage of new fuel for the upcoming refueling outage.
The inspector noted that the area where the new fuel was being set down was littered with a significant amount of loose material.
The inspector immediately notified the nuclear plant supervisor, health physics supervisor, and quality assurance supervisor.
movement of the new fuel was stopped and the area was cleaned up.
This was an apparent failure to implement OP 1610020, Rev.
6, receipt and handling of new fuel, which requires that new fuel storage areas be clean prior to storage of fuel.
Failure to implement this procedure is an example of an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8. 1.
(50-335/81-22-01).
On Thursday, August 20, the inspector asked to see the signed copy of OP 1630028, Rev. 0, New Fuel Handling Crane Operation.
This procedure is required to be performed prior to any fuel handling evolution involving the new fuel handling crane.
Movement of new fuel elements had already commenced on Wednesday, August 19.
A signed copy of the procedure could not
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be found, and it was determined that the required testing had not been performed.
A major contributing factor to this oversight was the fact that the procedure being followed to unload and store the fuel, OP 1610020, Rev. 6, Receipt and Handling of New Fuel, did not reference or list as a pre-requisite the fuel handling crane procedure.
This is another example of failure to implement approved procedures in violation of Technical Specif-ication 6.8.1 (50-335/81-22-01).
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