IR 05000335/1981005
| ML17209B019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1981 |
| From: | Dance H, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209B018 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-81-05, 50-335-81-5, NUDOCS 8105010162 | |
| Download: ML17209B019 (8) | |
Text
shift technical advisors, and security force members.
~Attended one or more exit interviews 2.
Exit Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, and March 12, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
'a ~
b.
(Open)
(IFI 335/77-19-01)
Technical Specifications containing conflicting valve closure times.
Florida Power and Light Co. Letter L-79-44 of February 21, 1979 requested a
change to the Technical Specifications to resolve this issue.
This issue remains open pending NRC review of that request.
(Closed) IFI (335/77-19-04)
Implement measures to insure the review of logs is documented.
The inspector interviewed the guality Control Supervisor concerning the background of this item and reviewed two Administrative Procedures:
AP 0010120, Rev
Duties and Responsi-bilities of Operators on shift; and AP 0010125, Rev 35 - Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations.
Subsequent to inspection
77-19 the review of logs listed in AP-0010120 was included in Check Sheet
(Sur veil lance Per formed each shi ft of AP 0010125.
The inspector had no further questions about this item.
~
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
IE Bulletins The following IE Bulletins were reviewed to determine whether they had been received and reviewed by appropriate management, responses, where necessary, were accurate and complete, and that action taken, if required; was complete.
a.
(Closed)
IEB 79-07 - Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping.
This IE Bulletin was directed toward verification of the computer programs used for seismic analysis of safety related piping to ensure that forces and moments had not been summed algebraically.
It is closed based on review of FPL responses L-79-102, L-79-137, L-79-164; vendor correspondence supporting these responses, and con-currence by IE Headquarters staff (Reactor Engineering Branch).
The above responses indicate that none of the computer programs used for analysis of St.
Lucie Unit 1 piping used algebraic summation of forces and moments.
b.
C.
d.
(Closed)
IEB 79-09 Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in Safety Related Systems.
This IE Bulletin has been addressed previously in IE Inspection Reports 79-19, 79-32 and 80-38, remaining open pending revision of Maintenance Proced'ure MP-0110060.
The inspector reviewed revision 9 of the procedure and had no further questions.
(Reopened)
IEB 80-04 - Analysis of Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition.
This IE Bulletin was erroneously closed in inspection report 50-335/80-36.
It remains open pending review of FPL's response by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
(Closed)
IEB 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System Operability.
This IE Bulletin addressed measures to be taken by power plants to reduce the liklihood of losing decay heat removal capability. It is closed based on review of:
FPL response L-80-179 dated June ll, 1980; Operating Procedure 0030127, Rev.
Reactor Plant cooldown Not standby to Cold shutdown; Operating Procedure 0010122, Rev.
In-plant Equipment Clearance Orders; Off-normal Procedure 0440030, Rev.
Shutdown Cooling/Low Pressure Safety Injection Offnormal operation; and FPL request for amendment to Technical Specifications L-80-358 dated October 30, 198 e.
(Closed)
IEB-80-21 - Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
This IE Bulletin is closed based on:
Review of FPL responses L-80-403 of December 11, 1980 and L-81-34 of February 2,
1981; Review of FPL internal correspondence identifying the specific valves and components provided by Malcolm Foundry, applicable plant drawings showing the functions of these valves and a
valve detail drawing showing the components.
The components are gear boxes and covers.
These are not pressure boundry parts; Review of FPL internal correspondence verifying that responses on this subject have been received by FPL from all valve vendors queried.
6.
IE Circul ars The following IE Circular was reviewed to determine whether it had been received by station management for applicability and appropriate action had been taken or planned.
(Closed)
IEC 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Work Hours.
This IE Circular was reopened in inspection report 50-335/80-36 because position 1.b, time off between work periods, was not addressed in Administrative Procedure AP-0010119 when issued:
AP 0010119 has since been revised to include circular position lb. for licensed operators and senior operators.
NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, section I.A.1.3, shift manning clarifies and superceeds IEC 80-02.
Any future developments in this area will be addressed under the TMI Action Plan.
7.
Licensee Event'Reports Review The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a
more detailed review was performed on site to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective action had-been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
- LER 80-21 LER, 80-71
- LER 81-01 lA Diesel Generator Failure to Synchronize Unplanned Boron Dilution in Reactor Coolant System Failure to Maintain Fire Barriers in Reactor Auxiliary Bui 1 ding
- LER 81"02
- LER 81-03
"LER 81-04
- LER 81-05
- LER 81-07
- LER 81-08 Loss of Digital Data Processing System Non-Seismic conditions of Masonary Walls (Bulletin 80-11 related)
Loss of "B" Offsite power source Part 21 Report - GE-HFA Relays Loss of Digital Date Processing System Loss of Digital Data Processing System
With respect to LERs 81-02,
and 08, the licensee stated that a design review was being conducted by the licensee and the vendor.
This is identified as inspector Followup Item 335/81-05-01.
8.
Three Mile Island Action Plan (TAP) Items a.
(Closed)
TAP I.A.1. 1 (NUREG 0578 item 2.,2. l.b) Shift Technical Advisor on Duty.
This action plan item cons'ists of four sub-items:
(1)
Placing shift technical advisors (STA) on duty by January 1, 1980;(2)
Modification of technical specifications to address STAs; (3)
Developing and completing a training program for STAs by January 1,
1981; and (4) Describing the long term program to the NRC by January 1,
1981.
During this inspection, which concludes inspection 50-335/80-35 in this area, the inspector reviewed paragraph 7a of inspection report 50-335/80-35 (same subject);
FPL letters L-80-418, L-81-4; License amendment
and facility administrative procedures as follows:
AP 0005722 Rev-0 Shift Technical Advisor Training Program; AP 0005723 Rev-0 Shift Technical Advisor Requalification Program; AP 0005724 Rev-0 Operating Experience Feedback; and AP 0005725 Rev-0 Duties and Responsibilities of the Shift Technical Advisor Temporary facility procedures have been replaced by permanent procedure, facility license amendment
addressing STAs has been issued, STAs have received qualification letters from facility manage-ment, the STA requalification program is in operation and FPL letter L-81-4 described the long-term STA program.
Inspector Followup Items 335/80-35-01 and 02 are closed.
b.
(Closed)
TAP I,C.5 Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff.
FPL General Office Procedure PR-3418 and St.
Lucie Administrative procedure 0005724 were compared to requirements listed in NUREG 0637 section I.C.5.
These procedures appear to implement the NUREG requirements, The inspector had no further questions at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area of TAP items.
9.
Redesign of Auxiliary Feedwater System During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed FPL letters to NRC L-80-175, L-81-4, L-81-43 and IE Bulletin 79-21 (Temperature Effects on
. Level Measurements for Steam Generators).
The letter s discuss the time delay for initiation of auxiliary feedwater flow, but from different view-points:
The present three-minute delay was initially based on minimizing containment pressure peaks for a steam line break accident (L-80-175)
but, per L-81-43, the three minute delay also prevents auxiliary
feedwater initiation from affecting reactor vessel upper head peak void fraction during an excess load event.
Letter L-81-4 lists as one of the design criteria for a new "smart" auxiliary feedwater control system, a time del'ay not to'xceed two minutes.
IE Bulletin 79-21 addressed time delay resulting from erroneous steam generator level indication caused by reference leg heating due to the steam escaping to the containment.
Licensee internal correspondence, Tech Ltr book ¹181, in response to the inspectors query on this subject indicates that, prior to the installation of the
"smart" system, the appropriate FSAR chapter
events will be re-evaluated for the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analysis.
Since letters L-81-4 and
'-81-43 are currently undergoing review by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-the above considerations were discussed with the Licensing
~
Project Manager.
The inspector will review this area again during future inspections at the time of installation of the "smart" auxiliary feedwater system (Inspector Followup Item 335/81-05-02).
10.
The inspector kept informed on a daily significant safety matters related to planned safety related activities were of the plant management and operations plant operating logs and data sheets period.
basis of the overall plant status and plant operations.
Discussions about held frequently with various members staff.
Selected portions of current were reviewed during this report No violations or deviation items were identified in this area.
Review of Plant Operation The inspector conducted several tours of plant areas.
Observations were made of work in progress, plant housekeeping, and vital area controls.