IR 05000335/1981014
| ML17212A587 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1981 |
| From: | Bibb H, Dance H, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17212A583 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-81-14, NUDOCS 8109010312 | |
| Download: ML17212A587 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-335/81-14 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
St
~ Lucie No.
Docket No. 50-335 License No. DPR-67 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors:
S. A.
od, enior Reside Inspector H. E.
'bb at Signed ZSXJ't Signed t
Approved by:
. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection Da e
igned SUMMARY Inspection on May ll June 10, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 145 resident inspector-hours onsite in the areas of Followup of IE Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices; Licensee Event Report followup; followup of previously identified items; onsite review committee audit; operational safety verification; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of plant operations.
Results Of the 10 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in nine areas; one apparent'iolation was found in one area (Violation Failure to conspicuously post the entrance to a high radiation area - paragraph 10).
8io90i03i2 Si08i7 PDR ADOCK 05000335
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C.
M.
J.
H.
J.
E.
D. A.
N.
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R. J.
C.
F ~
P.
L.
R.
R.
R.
K.
H. F.
J.
H.
J.
G.
O. D.
L. W.
N. D.
C. L.
M. B.
T. A.
A. W.
Wethy, Plant Manager Barrow, Operations Superintendent Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent Sager, Operations Supervisor Roos, Quality Control Supervisor Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor Leppla, Instrument and Control Supervisor Fincher, Training Supervisor Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor Ryall, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor Ruby, Plant Administrative Supervisor West, Security Supervisor Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Burton, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Vincent, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Electrical Diliard, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Mechanical Bailey, Quality Assurance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift technical advisors, mechanics, and security force members.
"Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 17, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee acknowledged the violation but stated that the conditions were corrected immediately upon report.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspecti'on Findings (Closed)
VI 5 50-335/81-02-20:
This violation dealt with failure of the licensee to establish a fire watch when penetrations to the cable spreading room were violated during backfit work.
This item is closed based on licensee response L-81-158 dated April 6, 1981 and subsequent onsite inspection of electrical penetration work during the period May 10-June 10, 198 (Closed)
Unresolved Item 50-335/80-35-09.
This item concerned plant policy of having the Nuclear Plant Supervisor and Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
determine who was desired to man the Technical Support Center under accident conditions, then having the STA contact them individually.
The policy proved to be an interim one which has been superceded by a policy of having the duty supervisor make the contacts.
This frees the STA for duties more directly connected with accident assessment.
The inspector considers that, due to the evolving nature of emergency planning, the unresolved item did not constitute a violation.
This item is closed.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
IE Bulletins The following IE Bulletin was reviewed to determine whether it had been received and reviewed by appropriate management, responses, where necessary, were accurate and complete, and that action taken, if required, was complete.
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(Closed)
IEB-80-24:
Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment.
This IE Bulletin is closed based on review of information provided by FP&L letter response L-81-5 dated January 6, 1981.
6.
Circulars The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determine whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate action had been taken or planned:
(CLosed)
IEC-80-10:
Failure to Maintain Environmental gualification of Equipment.
This IE Circular is closed based on review with plant personnel and telephone discussions with Region II management.
FP&L internal actions were determined to be satisfactory.
7.
Information Notices The following IE Information Notices were reviewed to ensure their receipt and review by appropriate management.
IE Information Notices are considered closed upon receipt and review.
IEN-81-15:
Degradation of Automatic ECCS Actuation Capability by Isolation of Instrument Lines.
8.
Licensee Event Reports Review The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appro-priate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more
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detailed review was p'erformed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
- LE R-81-16
"LER-81-17
"LER-81"18
"LER"81-20
"LER-81-21
"LER"81-22
"LER-81-23
- LER-81-25 Refueling Water Tank Outlet Valve Component Cooling Water Valve Stroke Time Power Operated Relief Valve Block Valve Dropped CEA 66 Failure of "B" Containment Pressure Detector Radiation Channel
"MD" Failure of Component Cooling Water Valve to Shut RPS Trip Unit Failure Followup of Previously Identified Items (h.osed)
Licensee Identified Item 335/78-26-01 (LER-78-25).
This item identified an error in the original analysis of a NSF-4 cask drop for the spent fuel pool.
Reanalysis was submitted by FP&L to NRR for review by letter L-80-342 dated 10/16/80.
The item is closed based on NRR issue of license amendment 40 dated May 28, 1981.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 335/80-24-03.
This item identified several jumper and disconnected lead tags that appeared to be of a long-standing or permanent nature and required further review of the jumper log.
A review of this log has been completed to the satisfaction of the inspector.
(Open
)
Inspector Followup Item 335/79-13-03.
This item identified
discrepancies found during operation procedure and drawing review.
All items but one have been corrected.
This item dealt with Operating Procedure 0410021, step 8. 1 which lists a
pressure switch PS-3323.
Drawing CE-300-8770-88 Rev.
12 Zone 2/3-H does not show a PS-3323. It does show two pressure switches identified as PS-3322.
Additionally, it was noted in Zone 2/3-D that pressure switch PS-3342 is double identified and there is no PS-3343.
This item remains open pending final resolution of the drawing update.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 335/79-11-03.
This item concerned review-of the retest following modifications to the Emergency Diesel Generator shaft couplings for the radiator fan drive under Plant Change/Modification (PCM) package 553/79.
The inspector reviewed the documentation and noted that the Emergency Diesel Generators have been operated successfully many times since the modifications were made in 1979.
The inspector had no further questions concerning the retests resulting from these modifications.
It was noted that'CM package 553/79 remains open after two years pending revi sion of reference documents.
This is being followed up under another item, 335/79-06-08 (Timely completion of drawing and procedure changes and training on PCMs).
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(Open) Inspector Followup Item 335/79-11-04.
This item concerned review of the final data package for Plant Change/Modification (PC/M) 550/79 (Control Element Assembly Tube Sleeving).
This PC/M, which modifies fuel assemblies, has not yet been closed by the licensee even though the work was performed two refuelings ago.
On site documentation of certain machining operations (intended to provide clearance for startup sources)
was generated in April 1979 by the contractor as on site work progressed, but was not obtained by the licensee until June 1981.
The PC/M is now ready for final review and closeout by the licensee.
Inspector Followup Item 335/79-11-04 remains open pending final review of the PC/M by the licensee.
Timely review and closeout of PC/M's is subject for inspector followup under Inspector Followup Item 335/79-06-08.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 335/79-11-05.
This item scheduled a review of refueling operations (1979 refueling).
It is closed based on subsequent inspections, including inspection 335/79-13.
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 335/80-36-03 and (Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 335/79-06-02.
These items resulted from many dropped control element assemblies caused by failure of the control system power supplies.
The items concerned the long-term corrective-action to improve power supply reliability.
Since mounting the power supplies on stand offs (Fall 1980) to improve ventilation, power supply reliability has improved dramatically.
Also, the NSSS vendor is presently conducting a test program to evaluate the power supplies in question.
A final report is expected soon.
The licensee continues to plan to complete a dual power supply installation during the fall 1981 refueling outage.
Inspector Followup Item 335/79-06-02 is closed based on the NSSS vendor actively addressing the problem.
Inspector Followup Item 335/80-36-03 remains open pending completion of corrective action.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vib~ations and to verify that main-tenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
On May 19, 1981, during a tour of the Reactor Auxiliary Building, the inspector observed that two sequential radiation barriers leading to a high radiation area, greater than 100 mrem/hr, were ineffectively posted.
The
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chain with signs, at the entrance to the steam generator blowdown tank hallway, was disconnected and hanging such that the entrance way was open and the signs not readable.
The door just beyond, between the steam generator blowdown tank hallway and the pipe tunnel/penetration room, was open-obscuring the signs, which were posted on the door itself.
General area radiation levels in some areas of the pipe tunnel/penetration room were at least 150 mrem/hour.
This is a violation of
CFR 20.203(c)( 1) which states that
"Each high radiation area shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or sign bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words "Caution (or danger)
This is also a violation of Technical Specification 6. 12. l.a, which is an exception to
CFR 20.203(c)(2),
and which requires, in part, that
"High radiation areas in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 100 mrem/hr be barricaded and conspicuously posted.
(335/81-14-01)
This condition was pointed out to a
Health Physics Supervisor who immediately restored the outer chain barrier.
Subsequently both entrance ways have been posted beside the entrance such that removing a chain or opening the door would not obsecure the posting.
It was subsequently determined that the outer barrier did not require high radiation area posting. It is presently. posted as a radiation area.
On May 19, 1981, during a tour of the Reactor Auxiliary Building, the inspector observed that a
1 curie Plutonium/Berrilium source No.
HP-32 was stored in a cabinet in an electrical cable penetration room.
The cabinet doors were wide open such that the posting on the outside of the cabinet could not been seen.
This condition was pointed out to a Health Physics Supervisor who shut and,locked the cabinet.
The source was stored in a
properly marked container.
The inspector reviewed change 12 to operating procedure 0960030 "D.C. Ground Isolation".
There appeared to be error s in the sequencing of the procedure such that an operator could not complete the procedure verbatum.
This was discussed with operations staff members who agreed and will take corrective action through the normal procedure change request.
The inspector will review the procedure again after correction.
(335/81-14-02)
11.
Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the meteorological monitoring instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met.
No violations or deviations were identifie ~ 0
Onsite Review Committee The inspector examined the onsite review (Facility Review Group) functions conducted during the period May 1 through June 1 to verify conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements.
This review included:
changes since the previous inspection in a charter and/or administrative procedure governing review group membership and qualifi-cations; review group meeting frequency and quorum; and activities reviewed including proposed technical specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility and procedure changes and proposed tests and experiments conducted per
CFR 50.59, and others required by technical specifications.
On May 29, 1981, the inspector sat in on a
Facility Review Group (FRG) meeting.
The inspector verified that provisions of technical specifications dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were met.
The inspector also verified that decisions made were reflected in the meeting minutes and that corrective actions proposed were taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and,components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomp-lished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Mork requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Troubleshooting on Failed Radiation Detector Channel 46, "Outside Air Intake A".
Following completion of maintenance on the failed radiation detector, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Review of Plant Operations During the report period, the inspector reviewed the following activities:
a.
Emergency Preparedness The inspector observed an emergency drill based on TMI Action Plan Item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling Capabilities, and verified that the
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licensee completed the required sampling procedures in a
safe and expeditious manner, with the procedures incorporating minimizing radiation exposures and not engangering the public health and safety.
The procedure used during the drill was gI 5-PR/PSL-l, Chemistry Procedure C-110 Rev.
0 of 4/10/81,
"Collecting Initial Set of Post-Accident Samples".
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Venging and Purging Containments During Operations
[Task Action Plan Item II, E.4.2.(6)]
The inspector reviewed the correspondence history on commitments with respect to this item.
Purging activities and records were also examined for the year June 1980 - June 1981.
The licensee has completed modifications to limit purge valve opening to 50 degrees and has submitted analysis to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to support the contention that the
.purge valves will withstand loss of coolant accident forces.
The licensee records and discussion with operators indicates four containment purges have been made within the last year, each for an outage involving significant safety-related maintenance.
Licensee operating procedure 0530021, Controlled. Gaseous Batch Release at Atmosphere
- revision 20, controls containment purges and requires a Gaseous Release Permit from the Chemistry Department prior to containment purge.
Licensee normal practice described above complies with the NRC interim position for containment purge enclosed with an NRC letter dated October 23, 1979, to FP&L.
No violations or deviations were identified in this are A t'
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