IR 05000335/1981018
| ML17212A972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1981 |
| From: | Bibb H, Dance H, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17212A968 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-81-18, NUDOCS 8111050731 | |
| Download: ML17212A972 (16) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No.
50-335/81-18 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit No.l Docket No. 50-335 License No.
DPR 67 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce Florida.
Inspectors: S..
lrod H.
E.
jbb t
Approved by:
H.
C.
Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on July ll - August 10, 1981 Areas Inspected:
ate Signed
~rl Da e igned Date igned This routine inspection involved 131 Resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup of previous findings, Actions taken to implement the Three bile Island, Action Plan, Followup of a Confirmation of Action Letter, Surveillance, Maintenance and Plant Operations.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five areas; two violation were found in one area failure to follow health physics procedures
- paragraph and; failure to maintain fire barriersp - paragraph~lO.d.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. t1. Wethy, Plant tlanager
- J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent J.
E. Bowers, Haintenance Superintendent D. A. Sager, Operations Supervisor
- N. G.
Roos, guality Control Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor C.
F. Leppla, Instrument and Control Supervisor P.
L. Fincher, Training Supervisor R.
R. Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor
- H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor J.
H.
Ruby, Plant Administrative Supervisor J.
G. West, Security Supervisor 0.
D. Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor L. W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor N. D. West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor C. L. Burton, Nuclear Plant Supervisor H. B. Vincent, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Electrical T. A. Dillard, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Hechanical A.
W. Bailey, guality Assurance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 17, 1981, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee acknowledged without comment the two violations, and presented new information concerning the item of paragraph 10e.
The inspector then deemed the item unresolved pending review of this new information.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 50-335/80-38-01 - Failure to Update Procedures.
On 7-31-81 the inspector reviewed OP 0030131, Rev.
16 and tlaintenance Procedure 0110060, Rev.
9 for correction of the above discrepancies.
It was found that adequate corrective measures have been taken.
This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolve items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 10 l il N
5.
Followup of Previously Identified Items
'a ~
b.
c ~
d.
e.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/79-09-01.;
Review of Procedures Distribution to Applicable Log Books.
The inspector audited the jumper log book in the control room and confirmed that administrative procedure 0010124 is no longer kept in the log book.
An up-to-date copy of the procedures is kept in the control room in a separate file of administrative procedures.
,Other log books audited were:
Pump and Valve Test Summary, Night Orders, Operating Log, Blue Tag Clearance Log, and Caution Tag Log.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/79-09-03, Review of Procedures for Correction of Stuck Control Element Assembly.
The inspector reviewed the procedure written and used by Combustion Engineering to free the stuck dual element control element assembly.
It was determined that adequate controls were employed to prevent inadvertent criticality.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Inspector Foll owup Item 50-335/79-11-02, Review of Calibration Procedures for Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Gage.
The inspector reviewed the calibration procedure for the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank and determined that the procedure did not appear to have caused the gage failure.
A review of the gage technical manual, the plant work order used to repair the gage, and discussions with ISC personnel have indicated this type of failure is not a frequent occurrence and not of generic concern.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/79-19-03, Modification of Component Cooling Water Restraints. 'he inspector reviewed PCM-568-79 on file in the quality control records vault.
The package contained the necessary documentation from EBASCO.
All documentation was found to be complete and involved no unresolved safety questions.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Inspector Foll owup Item 50-335/79-10-01, Procedure Modifi-cation for Restoring-to-operable Control Room Indicators Once Equipment Has Been Repaired.
The inspector traced response on this item to corrective action request (CAR) 05-03-79.
Action taken was revision of Operating Procedure 0010122, In-plant Equipment Clearance Orders, and Administrative Procedure 0010432, Plant Work Orders.
There appear to be adequate controls now to assure that all work is completed prior to
'learing tags, and that tags are removed prior to completing a plant work order.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/81-08-37, No Formal Training for New Facility Review Group Members or Alternates.
The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure AP-0010520, Rev.
7, Facility Review Group.
This procedure has been revised to include the subject training
- to be administered by the technical staff.
The training consists of documented review of procedures and requirements directly affecting
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Facility Review Group (FRG) activities.
The inspector verified that this training program has been implemented.
g.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/80-35-05, Shift Turnover Procedures.
This item concerned the plant practice of conducting shift turnover on station using the logs and turnover sheets - then conducting of tours after turnover.
No specific shift overlap was specified in plant procedures.
This practice has been observed by the inspector for several months and has been discussed with IE Region II management.
Since this procedure has not appeared to cause operational problems, this item is closed.
h.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/79-06-03, Change Instru-mentation Power Supplies.
The inspector reviewed PCM-413-78 and noted that it had been cancelled by the Facility Review Group on 8-3-79 and incorporated into new PCM-583-79.
The 18C group has this work package and will perform the work during the upcoming October outage.
The inspector will verify completion of PCM-583-79 (335/81-18-01).
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-335/79-11-01, Complete Briefings of Operators on TMI Event.
This item is closed based on Inspection Report 50-335/80-03 and closure of IE Bulletin 79-06-B.
Followup of Licensee Actions with Respect to a Confirmation of Action Letter Dated June 30, 1980.
This letter referred to short-term actions to be taken by the licensee as a
result of concerns identified during an emergency preparedness program appraisal inspection (IE Report 50-335/81-13).
The inspector verified that temporary instructions regarding the inter-pretation of delta-temperature meterological data were included in the night order book for the nuclear plant supervisor.
The inspector had no further questions about this commitment.
The inspector ascertained by review of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)
3100033E, Rev. 2, that verification of radiation readings of the post los of collant accident monitors is required prior to estimation of the projected off-site dose.
The procedure was approved on July 13, 1981.
The inspector had no further questions about this commitment.
The inspector reviewed Health Physics Procedure HP-202, Rev. 0, issued July 13, 1981 - Interim Offsite Environmental Monitoring During Emergencies.
This procedure establishes two monitoring teams to operate in the field until the State of Florida's Mobil Emergency Radiological Laboratory arrive.
The procedure lists required material for the teams, preselected survey points, and information the teams are required to obtain.
The inspector reviewed records of training on HP-202 with the instructor, and verified that the required instruments wer e availabl II
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7.
Actions Taken to Implement Three Mile Island Task Action Plan (TAP)
NUREG 0660/0737.
a.
(Closed)
TAP 1.C.6 Guidance on Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities.
This TAP item has previously been inspected (IE Report 81-16)
and remained open pending revision of Administrative Procedure 0010124, Rev. 7, Control and Use of Jumpers and Disconnected Leads in Safety Related Systems.
Revised 8 of the procedure has been issued and reviewed by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
b.
(Closed)
TAP II.B.4.2.a, Initiate Training for Mitigating Core Damage.
This item concerned commencement of such training by April 2, 1981.
FPL letters L-80-418 and L-81-229 indicate that training materials would be ready to commence training by June 30, 1981, and complete by Ocotber 1, 1981.
This training program, based on CE owners group material, has commenced for St. Lucie Unit 1, most of these required to attend have attended.
Stragglers are scheduled for the September time frame.
TAP II.B.4.2.b (complete training) remains open.
c.
(Closed)
TAP II.E.4. 1, Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations.
.This item was t
previously inspected in Inspection Report 50-335/80-35 and Safety Evaluation Dated April-17, 1980.
An additional line item under TAP II.E.4. 1 is to install the upgraded design system.
St. Lucie Unit 1 uses internal hydrogren recombiners, therefore no upgraded design was required.
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8.
Monthly Survei1 1 ance Observati on The inspector conducted an in-depth inspection of monthly surveillance testing being conducted on the
"B" train valves and 1B and 1C component cooling water pumps in accordance with Administrative Procedure 0010125, Rev.
35.
Additional surveillance procedures reviewed during the inspection period were:
I OP-1200051 Rev.
7, Nuclear and At Power Calibration OP-1400051 Rev.
11, Meteorological Data System Daily Channel Check AP-0010125 Rev. 36, RCS Water Inventory Balance Data Sheet
OP-3200020, Rev. 9, Primary System Manual Calorimetric Data Sheet
On July 31 the inspector confirmed that the status of valves, locks and switches was being verified quarterly by personnel observation of the past two quarters of signoffs in Administrative Procedure 0010123, Rev.
25.
No violations or deviations were identified in this are ~
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The inspector audited maintenance procedures.
An in-depth look was taken at eleven attributes including - compliance with limiting conditions for operation, proper removal from service, use of approved procedures, qualified personnel, use of certified parts, proper radiological controls, equipment properly tested prior to return to service, etc.
A detailed review was made of work done in replacing a cracked sight glass on the sodium-hydroxide storage tank.
Four other plant work items were looked at in less detail; charging pump isolation valve packing, waste gas decay tank, area radiation monitors, and turbine cooling water heat exchanger tube cleaning.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
10.
Review of Plant Operations a.
The inspector observed routine control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requrests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify 'that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,
CFR and facility procedures.
b.
Failure of a Motor-Operated Block Valve.
On August 2, 1981, while cycling valves for quarterly surveillance, motor operated valve MV-1403, a block valve for a pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV), failed to shut from the control panel.
The valve was manually backed off its back-seat and packing was loosened but the valve still failed to operate electrically.
The licensee manually shut MV-1403 in compliance with Technical Specifi-cation 3.4. 12.
Subsequently a temporary technical specification change allowed de-energizing the PORV to disable it and re-opening and backseating the block valve, MV-1403, to reduce packing leakage and reprocessing of water.
This technical specification change is in effect until October 1, 1981.
Ho violations or deviations were identified in this are ~ ~
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Failure to Follow Health Physics Procedures Health Physics Department Operating Procedure HP-20, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Para.
8.4.2 Rev.
5 requires:
"All personnel shall monitor themselves and their personal items for contamination at the frisking stations provided at the exits to the Radiation Controlled Area.
Health Physics shall be notified if contamination is suspected or detected."
At 11:15 a.m.
on August 3, 1981, the inspector observed a backfit electrician leave the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning room through door 55 and enter the switchgear room (43'evel) without
"frisking" out.
Upon attempting to frisk himself out, the inspector found the Eberline frisker to be out-of-commission.
The switch was on, but the me'ter read zero.
The inspector then exited the area via a different exit which did have an operational frisker.
Health physics supervisors were notified of the two problems and they immediately went to the area, stopped the job, replaced the frisker, closed door 855, and conducted a swipe survey of the work area immediately outside door 855 in the non-controlled area to check for possible spread of loose contamination.
Results proved negative.
The failed 91-14 frisker, serial No. 3010, had been operability checked on July 30, 1981, but was on battery operation and had not been recharged or re-checked for four days.
The Health physics group has a,
rather informal system for conducting daily operational checks of monitoring instruments (HP Form 61).
There is presently no formal program in effect.
However, the inspector was shown a hand-written
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draft of a procedure which, when approved and implemented, will fill this void. Failure to follow procedure HP-20 is an apparent violation of technical specification 6.8'.1(a)
(50-335/81-18-03).
Open Cable Penetrations Through Switchgear/Cable Spreading Room Floor.
During plant tours performed by the inspector on August 6, 1981, five open cable conduits penetrating the floor of the switchgear/cable spreading rooms were found.
These were near safety related motor control centers.
No one was in the vicinity and the nuclear plant supervisor apparently had not been informed by the backfit organization that installed the penetrations, therefore a fire watch had not been established to make periodic patrols of the area as required.
The inspector notified the quality control supervisor who immediately initiated action to seal the penetrations.
This condition appears to be in violation of technical specification 3.7.12 (50-335/81-18-02)
and is similar to a noncompliance previously reported in Inspection Report 81-0 ~
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Operation of Equipment With guality Control Hold Tags Attached.
During a plant tour, the inspector observed a quality cohtrol hold tag on pressure differential transmitter (PDT) 25-13 B, which serves a
safety related purpose.
Investigation showed that the hold tag was installed in early 1980 during receipt inspection, that the PDT had been conditionally released during the spring 1980 outage to allow fit up and that the purpose of the hold (receipt of documentation)
had been satisfied prior to start up.
Review of quality instructions and discussions with quality control personnel indicated no provision for handling hold tags on items conditionally released.
At the exit interview, the gC supervisor stated that a system did exist to preclude use of nonconforming items in operating systems.
This subject is identified as unresolved noncompliance 335/81-18-04 and will be followed up by the resident inspector.
Spill of contaminated liquid outside protected area at about 1:30 p.m.
July 17, the Unit 1 staff was informed that several gallons of water containing radioactive isotopes had been spilled on the ground and the clothing of two construction workers at the adjacent Unit 2 construction site.
The spill resulted from Unit 2 workers drilling a hole 'in a capped (dead ended)
pipe to determine contents.
The pipe is a future cross connection between Unit 1 and 2 waste systems and had been terminated underground a few feet outside the fence separating the units.
The Unit 1 line this cross connect attaches to had previously been contaminated and flushed.
It does not normally carry radioactive liquid since it originates from showers, sink drains, etc.,
in the steam generator Blowdown Building.
The cross-connect portion would not be in the flush path.
The workers were surveyed with no detectable contamination found.
Radiochemical analysis of the water showed slight activity below the limits for release to unrestricted areas.
The licensee, as a pre-caution, dug up two drums of affected soil, plugged the hole in the pipe and labeled it as potentially contaminated and refilled the hole in the ground until cross-connections are made in the future.
Licensee investigation has not revealed any other pipes with similar potential for release.
The inspector discussed this item with an IE Region II health physics supervisor who had no further questions.
No violations or deviation were identified regarding this ite ~
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