IR 05000335/1981032
| ML17212B359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1982 |
| From: | Bibb H, Dance H, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17212B358 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-81-32, NUDOCS 8202050206 | |
| Download: ML17212B359 (15) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303
Report No. 50-335/81-32 Licensee:
Florida. Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami,, FL 33152 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 License No. CPR-67 Inspection at St. Luci site near Ft.'ierce, Florida Inspectors:
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. Elrod
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E ibb sf gd-D te Signed rr F~
ate Sig ed Approved by:
C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection te igned SUMMARY Inspection on November 25 December 10, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, inspection involved 106 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of surveillance, maintenance, Plant Operation Review, IE Info'rmation Notices, and Operational Safety Verification.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C.
M. Wethy, Plant Manager
"J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent J.
E. Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent D. A. Sager, Operations Supervisor
- N. G. Roos, Quality Control Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor C.
F. Leppla, Instrument and Control Supervisor P.
L. Fincher, Training Supervisor R.
R. Jennings, Technical Department Supervisor B. W. Mikell, Outage Coordinator C. A. Pell, Reactor Engineering Supervisor H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor J. G. West, Security Supervisor J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator 0.
D. Hayes, Nuclear Plant Supervisor L. W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor N. D. West, Nuclear Plant Supervisor C. L. Burton, Nuclear Plant Supervisor M. B. Vincent, Assistant Plant Superintendent Electrical T. A. Dillard, Assistant Plant Super inten'dent Mechanical A. W. Bailey, Quality Assurance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, shift technical advisors, security force members.
Other Organizations Combustion Engineering Resident Engineer
"Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 14, 1981, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings UNR-50-335/80-38-06 Originally identified 65 differences in wording between the control panel annunciators and the control wiring diagram 8770-B-327.
Violation SL5-50-335/80-38-01 identified over 80 differences between the
control panel annunciators and off-normal operations procedure 0030131, Plant Annunciator summary.
This report was dated February 11, 1981.
Host of these discrepancies have been corrected but as of December 11, 1981, the following differences are still noted:
Control Room Off-Normal Operating Annunciator tar et Procedure 0030131 R-16 A27 480V HCC 1C 480V SWGR 181 480V SWGR 1B Undervoltage Ground Undervoltage Ground Control Wiring Diagram
'770-8-327 R
(Sheet 1023 Rev.
7)
480V SWGR 1B1 Undervoltage Ground B21 Start-up Transformer 1A Alarm Panel Stand-up Stand-by Transformer 1A Alarm Panel XFHA 2A Alarm Panel Start-up-stand-by Transformer 1B Alarm Panel XFHA 2B Alarm Panel B27
.480V SWGR 1A1 Undervoltage Ground 480V SWGR 1A1/480V HCC 1C 480V SWGR 1A1 480V HCC 1C 480 V HCC 1C Undervoltage Ground Undervoltage Ground D18 Load Frequency Load Frequency Control Control System Trip System Trip F37 External Inst Air to Containment Valve Open M45 Letdown Throttle Letdown Throttle LCV-2110 LCV-2110 and Spray P/g and Spray PCV-1100E/F PCV-1100 E/F Control Isolated Control Isolated (Sheet 803 Rev.
5)
Blank External Instrument Air to Containment Valve Open Letdown Throttle LCV-2110 P/g and Spray PCV-1100(
E/F Control Isolated LY 1110 Bypassed Violation SL5-50-335/80-38-01 was erroneously closed out in IE inspection report 81-18 and is hereby reopened.
Item UNR-50-335/81-38-06 is continued open.
These items will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
IE Information Notices The following IE Information Notices were reviewed to ensure their receipt and review by appropriate management.
IE Information Notices are considered closed upon receipt and review.
81-36 81-35 Replacement Diaphragms for Robertshaw Valve (Model No. VC-210)
Check Valve Failures
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81-34 Accidental Actuation of Prompt Public Notification System 81-33 Locking Devices Inadequately Installed on Hain Steam Isolation Valves 81-31 Failure of Safety Injection Valves to Operate Against Differential Pressure The following IE Information Notice was sent only to medical licensees and is closed as not applicable to St. Lucie.
81-32 Transfer and/or Disposal of Spent Generators 6.
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were ac-complished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
a ~
Plant Work Order 81237 was issued to repair main feedwater regulator upstream block valve, MV-09-6 (Not defined as Nuclear Safety-Related).
The valve shaft was stuck in the shut position and the limitorque operator would not drive the valve open.
A detailed examination of the valve operator internals and the technical manual revealed that the installed clutch gear was a 44 teeth gear and the technical manual called for a 39 teeth gear.
The valve had been operating like this for several years.
A 39 teeth gear was removed from a valve on Unit 2 and installed.
The valve now strokes smoothly.
b.
Plant Work Order 83400 - "A" waste gas compressor
- Diaphragm leak and inlet flange leak.
C.
d.
Plant Work Order 3409 - "18" charging pump - replacement of three suction and discharge valves.
Sticking valves were causing charging flow to vary.
I Plant Work Order 83666 - The inspector conducted frequent observations of disassembly, weld repair, and reassembly of reactor vessel head
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components to repair two seal weld leaks on control element assembly housings.
These were detected when the plant was initially heated up and pressurized following the refueling outage.
Proper procedures were observed throughout the operation.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Review of Plant Operations During the report period, the plant was started up after an extended outage for refueling and major plant modifications.
The inspector observed all or portions of the following procedures:
OP-0030120 R10 OP-0030121 R21 OP-0030122 R21 OP-0030123 R6 OP-0030124 R16 OP-0030126 R5 OP-0030128 R3 OP-0030221 R4 OP-0110052 R3 OP-0010133 R4 OP-3200051 R9 OP-3200053 R6 OP-3200054 R5 OP-3200059 R3 OP-0110054 R7 Prestart check-off list Reactor Plant heatup-cold to hot standby Reactor Startup Reactor operating guidelines during steady state and scheduled load changes Turbine startup-zero to full load Estimated critical conditions and inverse count rate ratio Reactor shutdown Initial criticality following refueling Zero power physics tests after reload Reactor engineering power ascension program At power determination of moderator temperature coefficient and power coefficient Surveillance requirements for azimuthal power tilt Surveillance requirements for total integrated radial peaking factor Forced Zenon Oscillation Test Periodic Rod drop time test During the performance of these procedures, the inspectors verified compliance with several attributes such as, adherence to the limiting conditions for operation, compliance with the written text of the procedure, proper sign-offs, review of data taken, use of qualified personnel, proper supervision of new personnel undergoing startup
'raining, adequate staffing, calibration of equipment prior to use, proper routing for procedural changes, and proper valve lineups on systems prior to placing equipment in service.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
b.
Preoperational Testing of new or modified systems.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following tests:
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-Power operation relief valve flow monitor test activation with flow.
-Reactor coolant gas vent system preoperational test.
-Auxiliary 'feedwater preoperational test.
All procedures were approved by the Facility Review Group.
The test personnel were observed following the procedure.
The, Reactor Coolant
, gas vent system test demonstrated that the downstream valves, which are pilot operated solenoid valves, all opened whenever one of the upstream valves was opened.
This appeared to be a function of valve design.
The system was manually valved out and de-energized electrically.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
182 Station Prvice Transformer Failure.
On November 25, at 8:38 p.m. while the plant was'hut down the 182 station service transformer (4160V-480V) failed with a primary (4160V)
winding fault.
This failure de-energized vital train 18 480V load centers and the 18 battery charger feed to vital
DC bus - which shifted to battery feed.
About five minutes later the two circuit breakers tripped between vital
DC bus and vital DC swing bus 1AB which was being powered from 18 DC bus at the time.
Loss of DC swing bus 1AB caused loss of announcing system, loss of off site FH radio communication, loss of all RTGB annunciators, and loss of most internal plant telephone communications.
Three direct outside telephone lines, a supplementary in-plant telephone system and hand-held radio com-munication remained in service.
Vital DC swing bus 1AB was restored to service in about 15 minutes - after it was determined not to be faulted.
This action restored the plant annunciators and communicatjon systems.
NRC and state agencies were informed as required.
The transformer was promptly replaced with an equivalent transformer from Unit 2.
The licensee investigated the tripping of the circuit breakers between vital DC bus 18 and vital DC swing bus 1AB.
Investigation revealed
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that the 18-1AB breaker long time thermal overload (left pole)
functioned within the specified time period for the test, however, it functioned significantly sooner than the right pole.
The right pole function was comparable to that of a replacement breaker also tested.
A loose connection was also found on the bus side of this breaker.
Since the breakers did not trip for about five minutes, one trip element tended to trip earlier than usual, and an added source of heat (.loose connection)
was found, it was concluded the reason for the breaker trip had been found.
The instantaneous trip settings for this breaker were also found set on "low" vice "high" as specified but this is not considered to have been a factor.
This breaker was replaced
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with the new just-tested breaker.
The 1AB-1B breaker would have tripped because of under voltage once the 1B-1AB breaker tripped.
Ho violations or deviaitons were identified during this event.
Investigation of water in the main generator hydrogen system.
During September 1981, the plant entered the refueling outage early because of a main generator fault caused by water in the generator.
Investigation showed that internal piping in the generator made the drying system ineffective.
This was corrected.
Several times during plant start up after refueling water had been collected (8-10 ounces)
from generator cooling system drains.
On December 7, 1981, the plant was shutdown to prevent another generator fault while investigation continued.
A reactor trip during that shutdown is discussed in paragraph 7.e.
The investigation determined the problem to be residual water that had collected in the system during the overhaul.
Samples were taken every four hours for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and no more water was found in the sytem.
Samples showed the humidity to be 21% and the dew point to be 37'F.
This was said to be normal.
No violations or deviations were identified.
e.
Reactor Trip during Plant Shutdown On December 7, 1981 power was being reduced from 704 to zero (hot standby).
At 185, the operator attempted to transfer main feedwater regulator valve control from automatic to manual in preparation for shifting to the bypass valve.
An apparent mismatching of demand and desired signals when switching to manual caused the feedwater regulating valve to drive open to about 50%, overfeeding the steam generator.
This caused a turbine trip on high steam generator level which resulted in a reactor trip on loss of load.
The problem was determined to be operator error and the plant was brought back to hot standby conditions while research was conducted'on the original reason for reducing power (water in the turbine generators hydrogen cooling system).
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
f.
During normal operations a
DC ground was noted on the "1A" bus.
The inspector observed the operators troubleshooting to locate and isolate the ground in accordance with approved procedure 0960030 Rev.
section 8.2, DC ground isolation.
Ho violations or deviations were identifie K
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8.
Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, and qualified personnel were used to perform the tests.
The following tests were observed:
1.
I8C procedure 1400164 - Trip bypass logic operability calibration 2.
IEC procedure 1400050 - Reactor Protection System - monthly functional test 3.
INC procedure 0120050 - Reactor Protection System - Low flow trip setpoint determination 4.
OP-0700050 - Auxiliary Feedwater periodic test No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the components cooling water system to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipment ~
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