IR 05000335/1980003
| ML17208A433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1980 |
| From: | Andrea Johnson, Mchenry T, Upright C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17208A431 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-80-03, 50-335-80-3, NUDOCS 8004100182 | |
| Download: ML17208A433 (8) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,G EORG IA30303 Report No. 50-335/80"3 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility:
St. Lucie Docket No. 50-335 License No. DPR-67 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Fort Pierce, Florida Inspectors:
T. J.
McHenry Date Signed A. H. Johnso
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Approved by:
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C.
. Upright, Act g Section Chief, RONS Branch
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Date Signed c'~
Dat Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 22-24, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 38 inspector-hours on site in the areas of small break loss of coolant procedures and training, and followup on previous inspector identified items.
Results Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi-fied.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager
- J. H. Barrows, Operations Superintendent
- C. A. Wells, Operations Supervisor
- P. L. Finchner, Training Supervisor
+A.
W. Bailey, QA Supervisor
+J. Walls, QC Supervisor J.
A. Spodick, Training Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included Nuclear Control Center Operators, Nuclear Watch Engineers and Nuclear Plant Supervisors.
<Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 24, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Inspection findings presented in these details were discussed including licensee commitments in paragraphs 5 and 6.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
~ Small Break Loss of Coolant-Operator Interviews The inspectors reviewed and discussed, with licensee plant management, their emergency procedure 0120042(REV.12)
"Loss of Reactor Coolant".
Combustion Engineering guidelines, procedure development, procedure content, and reactor operator training given to terminate or mitigate the consequences of a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) were also discussed.
Upon completion of the above plant management interview, the inspectors interviewed six licensed operators, which included one Nuclear Plant Super-visor (SRO),
one Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO),
and four Nuclear Control Center Operators'(SRO's and RO's).
The licensed operator interviews were performed to determine the adequacy of the appropriate procedures from a functional standpoint and the effectiveness of the training program.
The following areas were covered:
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a.
Understanding of small break LOCA.
b.
Differentiation between loss of coolant accidents (LOCA's) and other depressurization events.
c.
Familiarity with the SBIOCA procedures.
d.
Operator knowledge of appropriate related procedures.
e.
Knowledge of transient response characteristics necessary to guide the licensed operator to the correct procedure.
g ~
Evaluation of any individual or generic deficiencies.
Walk-throughs of the procedures including system-related aspects of the procedures to ensure that the licensed operator actions could be performed.
h.
Confirmation that the appropriate procedures immediate actions were memorized.
i.
Understanding of the procedures subsequent actions and precautions that ensure plant safety.
j.
Abilityto determine break locations.
k.
Recognition of the importance of the primary and backup heat sinks.
l.
Ability to recognize adequate subcooling and core voiding, importance of subcooled versus saturated conditions, indications of inadequate core cooling and implementation of natural circulation.
m.
Recognition of possible instrumentation abnormalities including those encountered during the TMI transient and environmental considerations.
Based on the operator interviews in the above areas, the inspectors deter-mined that the licensee's SBLOCA procedures were adequate.
However, based on these licensed operator interviews and walk-throughs of the SBLOCA and other reactor coolant depressurization events, the inspectors recommended the following procedure changes in emergency procedure 0120042(REV.12),
Ioss of Reactor Coolant.
a ~
Add a "diagnostic chart" to aid the operators in clarifying symptoms and channeling his actions towards the correct procedure.
b.
Remove reference to Table
(valve positions)
from immediate actions and place under subsequent actions.
c ~
Determine if specific core exit thermocouples need to be referenced to assure representative indication of the reactor coolant system tempera-tur d.
Add expected range of NaOH flow indication during containment spray actuation.
e.
Add specific action needed to realign for auto initiation of containment spray.
f.
Add guidance indicating that the reactor coolant system may have to be taken to a solid condition to establish the required 50~F subcooling.
g.
Add the key switch relocking step for valves V 3659 and V 3660 miniflow recirculation valves for HPSI system.
h.
Under step 5.3.10, determine the HPSI pump shutoff pressure for added minimum flow guidance.
i.
Place all steps under 5.3.12 after step 5.3.7 to provide continuity in the procedure steps.
j.
Place step 5.3.6 under the "immediate action" section of the procedure.
The licensee agreed to implement the above procedure changes, have operator training on these changes and have procedure walk throughs by March 10, 1980.
This item will be carried as an open item, pending further inspection by the Regional Office (335/80-03-01).
6.
Small Break Loss of Coolant and TMI I,essons Training The inspectors reviewed the training the licensed personnel received on the SBLOCA procedures to insure that training included transient analyses and a
walk through of the procedures in the control room by each licensed operator and senior operator.
The inspectors determined that the following training in the SBLOCA and related areas had been completed by licensed personnel:
Simulator training on small break transient, 5/79 thru 6/79.
Shift training on SBIOCA and Procedure, 12/18/79 thru 1/10/80.
Environmental Qualification of Instrumentation, 9/6/79 thru ll/15/79.
In addition, the inspector determined that training in the following areas had been developed and incorporated into the hot license and requalification training programs.
Fundamentals of Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow SBLOCA Transient Analysis Simulator training, including SBLOCA transient The inspectors reviewed the training outlines, hand-outs, and materials associated with the above training areas.
In addition, training records were reviewed to insure that all licensed personnel had attended training sessions that had been completed prior to the inspection.
Based upon the review of the training program, in conjunction with operator interviews discussed in paragraph 5,
the inspectors determined that the licensees training program was adequate in the areas inspected.
However, the licensee's schedule for all licensed personnel to complete the training in the requalification program extended to the end of 1980.
Therefore, to insure that licensed shift personnel were aware of the, most updated small break transient analysis information in a timely manner, licensee management agreed to conduct additional shift training.
The licensee committed to have all shift licensed personnel read Combustion Engineering Review of Small Break Transients (CEN"114-NP-Amendment 1) sections 1, 2, 3.1, and 3.2 by March 10, 1980.
This item was identified as open pending a followup inspection on the licensee's commitment (335/80-03-02).
7.
Small Break I,oss of Coolant-System Considerations The inspectors reviewed system-related aspects of procedures to ensure that operator actions required subsequent to an SBIOCA could be performed.
System considerations in the following areas were reviewed:
a.
Instrumentation to carry out operator actions in the SBLOCA procedure.
b.
Power operated relief valve position indication.
c.
Equipment response to safety injection reset.
d.
Safety injection effects on containment isolation.
e.
Real-time consideration of SBIOCA procedure actions, including adequate time to switch over from injection to recirculation modes.
f.
Protection of high head safety injection pump against deadheading in the recirculation modes.
No problems were identified with system considerations reviewed.
8.
Review of Previously Identified Items The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in regard to two open items associated with a previous inspection on IEB 79-06 and 79-06B.
These items (335/79-13-01 and 79-13-02),
required the licensee to conduct training in the following areas:
a.
Administrative controls to assure ESF operability following maintenance.
b.
NRC requirement for one hour notification of significant events.
c.
Formation of voids during emergencie The inspectors reviewed training records and determined that all l'icensed personnel had attended training in the areas of concern between 8/79 and 9/79.
In addition, shift personnel were quesioned in the above areas during the operator interviews, paragraph 5.
No problems were identified, therefore, items 335/79-13-01 and 335/79-13-02 were closed.
9.
IEB 79-06 and 79-06B Close-out The inspectors closed IEB 79-06 and 79-06B.
These bulletins were closed based upon the following considerations or actions'
~
Inspector review of previous inspection conducted on these IEB's, Inspection No. 335/79<<13.
b.
C.
Inspector followup and close-out of open items discussed in paragraph 8.
Issuance of TMI short term lessons learned requirements.
d.
No further amendment to IEB 79-06 is currently planned by NRC.