IR 05000334/2024004

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Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2024004 and 05000412/2024004
ML25043A037
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 02/12/2025
From: Matt Young
Division of Operating Reactors
To: Blair B
Vistra Operations Company
References
IR 2024004
Download: ML25043A037 (1)
v • d • e


Text

February 12, 2025

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2024004 AND 05000412/2024004

Dear Barry Blair:

On December 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On January 15, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000334 and 05000412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000334 and 05000412

License Numbers:

DPR-66 and NPF-73

Report Numbers:

05000334/2024004 and 05000412/2024004

Enterprise Identifier: I-2024-004-0034

Licensee:

Vistra Operations Company, LLC

Facility:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Shippingport, PA

Inspection Dates:

October 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024

Inspectors:

N. Day, Senior Resident Inspector

A. Nugent, Resident Inspector

A. Christiano, Reactor Engineer

B. Dyke, Operations Engineer

N. Floyd, Senior Reactor Inspector

K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector

M. Patel, Senior Operations Engineer

R. Rolph, Senior Health Physicist

N. Warnek, Senior Project Engineer

D. Werkheiser, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved By:

Matt R. Young, Chief

Projects Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Automatic reactor trip due to reactor coolant pump loss of voltage.

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000334/2024004-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) was identified when the licensee failed to maintain procedures for transition from offsite to onsite power sources which resulted in a loss of Normal 4kV 1B bus voltage and automatic reactor trip.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000412/2023-003-01 LER 2023-003-01 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2,

Missile Barrier Door Left Open Resulting in a Loss of Safety Function 71153 Closed LER 05000334/2024-002-00 LER 2024-002-00 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1,

Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Low Reactor Coolant Flow Caused by Transformer Overexcitation Protection Relay Actuation 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 started the inspection period at full rated power. On December 7, 2024, the unit was downpowered to 90 percent power for turbine valve testing and maintenance and returned to full power December 9, 2024. Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of inspection period.

Unit 2 started the inspection period at full rated power. On October 13, 2024, the unit was shutdown for a planned refueling outage. The planned refueling outage was over November 14, 2024, and the unit was restarted obtaining near full power on November 17, 2024. Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures, for the following systems on December 10, 2024, per procedures 1OST-45.11B, 2OST-45.11B, and 1/2OST-45.1A:
  • Alternate intake structure
  • Unit 2 turbine building
  • 24-ton (CO2) backup storage tank
  • Rad waste storage tank

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2, spent fuel pool cooling, October 23, 2024
(2) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator (EDG) 2-1 lube oil system partial walkdown following maintenance and auto-load test, November 8, 2024

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system on December 30, 2024.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Units 1 and 2, yard area with focus on header isolation performed, October 8, 2024
(2) Unit 1, EDG 1-1 area, November 20, 2024
(3) Unit 1, EDG 1-2 area, November 20, 2024
(4) Unit 1, safeguards building 722' elevation, December 19, 2024

===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities in Unit 2 during refueling outage 2R24 from October 22 to October 31, 2024:

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 71111.08

The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:

(1)

  • Manual ultrasonic testing of the loop B cold leg injection piping (NDE Report UT-BV 2R24-002) and loop B hot leg injection piping (NDE Report UT-BV

2R24 -003). These examinations were performed in accordance with MRP-

146, Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines.

  • Automated ultrasonic testing of the containment dome liner (Work Order

===200917991). This examination was performed in accordance with the Unit 2 license renewal commitment number 33.

  • Direct visual examination of the reactor pressure vessel bottom mounted instrumentation nozzles (NDE Report VT-BV 2R24-001). This examination was performed in accordance with ASME Code Case N-722-1, Additional Examinations for PWR Pressure Retaining Welds in Class 1 Components Fabricated with Alloy 600/82/182 Materials.

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02)===

Main article: IP 20091

The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:

(1)

  • Bare metal visual examination of all penetrations and adjacent head surfaces.

These examinations were performed in accordance with approved NRC relief request 2-TYP-4-RV-04 (ML18227A733).

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:

(1)

  • The inspectors performed direct observations inside the containment building on October 30, 2024.

===08306).

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.04)===

Main article: IP 08306

The inspectors verified that the licensee is monitoring the steam generator tube integrity appropriately through a review of the following examinations:

(1)

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the unit 2 requalification annual operating exam completed on October 1, 2024.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during unit 2 startup activities on November 13, 2024.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator drill and training on December 12, 2024.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 1, reactor coolant system (RCS), December 30, 2024
(2) Unit 2, RCS, December 30, 2024

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) Unit 2, pressurizer pilot operated relief valve 2RCS-PCV-455C

Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:

(1) Unit 1, manholes, system 75, "Structures" as discussed in CRs 2024-06768, 2024-

===06959, 2024-07094, and 2024-07095

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 06959

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 2, refueling outage risk plans for 2R24, October 11, 2024
(2) Unit 2, observation of yellow risk drain down to reactor vessel flange during 2R24, October 16, 2024
(3) Unit 2, reactor vessel head lift activities, October 18, 2024
(4) Unit 2, yellow risk for planned EDG 2-1 maintenance activities, October 21, 2024
(5) Unit 1, repairs and placement of automatic control of heater drain tank level control valve LCV-1SD-106B, December 18, 2024

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, quench spray 'A' test line check valve with boric acid deposit as described in CR 2024-07753, October 3, 2024
(2) Units 1 and 2, service water intake structure flood door seal system operability evaluation following failure of 1/2OST-30.21B, as described in CRs 2024-06045 and 2024-06266, October 4, 2024
(3) Unit 2, review of Mode 4 restraints and resolutions during 2RF24, October 8, 2024
(4) Unit 2, main steam isolation valve 'C' failed closure test as described in CR 2024-

===08868, November 11, 2024

(5) Unit 1, main feedwater regulation valve (MFRV) 'A' demand of movement as described in CR 2024-09439, December 19, 2024

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 08868
(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 planned refueling outage 2RF24 from October 13 to November 14, 2024.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1) Unit 2, MFRV bypass valve 'B' positioner replacement post-maintenance test performed per 2OST-47.3K, October 3, 2024
(2) Unit 2, auxiliary feedwater pump 'A' auto-start circuitry realignment tests per 2OST-24.5, October 15, 2024
(3) Unit 2, EDG 2-1 cylinder liner replacement post-maintenance test per 2OST-36.1A, October 31, 2024
(4) Unit 2, main transformer reservoir repair post-maintenance level and thermography testing, November 22, 2024
(5) Unit 2, quench spray 'B' suction valve torque switch replacement post-maintenance test per 2OST-47.3O, December 8, 2024

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) Unit 2, EDG 2-2 auto-load test per 2OST36.4, November 7, 2024
(2) Unit 2, EDG 2-2 test per 2OST-36.4, December 11, 2024
(3) Unit 1, motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 'A' test per 1OST-24.2, December 23, 2024

Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, containment penetration 43 leak rate test per 2OST-47.121, November 3,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &

Transportation

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04)

Main article: IP 71124.08
(1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment B5514 of high radiation drums of dry activated waste on December 19,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10)===

Main article: IP 71151
(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023 through September 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023 through September 30, 2024)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023 through September 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023 through September 30, 2024)

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2023 to September 30, 2024

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2023 to September 30, 2024

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71152
(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. In their review, the licensee combined eight distinct events that occurred in late 2023 and early 2024. The inspectors reviewed the combined issues that were documented per CR 2024-00380, to assess updated corrective actions to prevent additional examples or more significant trends.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71153

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000334/2024-002-00, Automatic Reactor Trip Due To Low Reactor Coolant Flow Caused By Transformer Overexcitation Protection Relay Actuation (ADAMS Accession No. ML24163A306). Due to the plant and grid conditions at the time, the procedure that was used by the licensee did not provide steps that were acceptable for the evolution, plant, and grid conditions. The inspectors documented a Green finding and associated non-cited violation due to the failure to establish, implement, and maintain procedures for the activity in the Inspection Results 71153 section of this report. This LER is closed.
(2) LER 05000412/2023-003-01, Missile Barrier Door Left Open Resulting in a Loss of Safety Function (ML24051A155). Due to an error identified by NRC inspectors during the inspection of LER 05000412/2023-003-00, the inspectors issued a minor violation for inaccurate reported dates in the Inspection Results section of Inspection Report 05000412/2023004 (ML24043A001). Therefore, the licensee updated that LER and submitted LER 05000412/2023-003-01 with corrected dates. The inspectors did not identify any new violations in the inspection of LER 05000412/2023-003-01. This LER is closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Automatic reactor trip due to reactor coolant pump loss of voltage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green NCV 05000334/2024004-01 Open/Closed

None (NPP)71153 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) was identified when the licensee failed to maintain procedures for transition from offsite to onsite power sources which resulted in a loss of Normal 4kV 1B bus voltage and automatic reactor trip.

Description:

On April 13, 2024, Unit 1 system station service transformer (SSST) 1A deenergized due to actuation of the overexcitation protection.

Per procedure 1OM-36.4.A, 4KV Station Service System, the tap changer on the SSST 1A was used to manually raise the voltage to match the higher grid voltage on the unit station service transformer (USST). After completion of the Normal 4kV 1A bus transfer to onsite power but prior to returning the tap changer to automatic control, the SSST 1A voltage continued to rise until actuation of the transformer protection, causing PCB-92 (breaker from 138KV switchyard to SSST 1A) to trip open. At this time, the Normal 4kV bus was being energized through the SSST 1A and the 1B reactor coolant pump deenergized, resulting in low coolant loop flow. This caused an automatic reactor trip due to low reactor coolant flow.

Approximately 30 seconds later, when the main generator deenergized, the onsite power distribution through the USSTs deenergized. With this undervoltage condition, EDG 1-1 automatically started to power the 1AE 4kV safety bus. The 1DF 4kV safety bus did not lose its power due to SSST 1B remaining energized.

The licensee performed a causal evaluation and determined that Revision 19 of procedure 1OM-36.4.A did not include appropriate steps to allow for adjustment of load tap changer while the USST and SSST are paralleled, without challenging overexcitation setpoints. This procedure is used to transition from offsite to onsite distribution.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program, performed an extent of condition, performed transformer troubleshooting, reviewed overexcitation setpoints, and revised procedure 1OM-36.4.A.

Corrective Action References: CR-2024-03208

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to maintain procedures for transferring from offsite to onsite power distribution is a performance deficiency. Specifically, the procedure that was used failed to prevent challenging the SSST 1A overexcitation setpoints.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Specifically, the finding caused a reactor trip but did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown.

Therefore, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Section B, Transient Initiators.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1 (a), states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

Section 3(s) of Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends procedures for the startup, operation, and shutdown of offsite and onsite electrical systems.

Contrary to the above, on April 13, 2024, procedure 1OM-36.4.A, Revision 19, was used to transition from the offsite to the onsite electrical system, however, that procedure was not maintained with steps appropriate for that activity. Specifically, Revision 19 of procedure 1OM-36.4.A failed to prevent challenging SSST 1A overexcitation setpoints which caused an automatic reactor trip.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On January 15, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Barry Blair, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
  • On October 31, 2024, the inspectors presented the Unit 2 inservice inspection results to Robert Kristophel, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS

Inspectors reviewed Institute of Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the inspection period.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.08P Miscellaneous

1/2-ADM-2039

Beaver Valley Power Station ISI Ten-Year Plan

Revision 19

1/2-ADM-2099

Beaver Valley Power Station Primary Containment ISI

Program

Revision 5

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