IR 05000333/2025003
| ML25353A381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2025 |
| From: | Jason Schussler NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Mudrick C Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| EAF-NMSS-2025-0217 IR 2025001, IR 2025003 | |
| Download: ML25353A381 (0) | |
Text
December 22, 2025
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2025003 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200012/2025001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Christopher Mudrick:
On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On November 20, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Garrick Olson, Site Vice President (Acting), and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 1, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the Regional Offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025, third quarter integrated inspection reports normally issued by November 15, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC will resume the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on a quarterly basis beginning with the calendar year 2025, fourth quarter integrated inspection reports, which will be issued 45 days after the fourth quarter ends on December 31, 2025. Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The NRC identified a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72.48, paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (d)(1), and provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 that resulted from a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holders failure to comply with 10 CFR 72.48 for a CoC holder-generated change for the Holtec continuous basket shim multi-purpose canister variant design. However, an Interim Enforcement Policy issued in August 2025 is applicable to this violation. Specifically, Enforcement Policy Section 9.4, Enforcement Discretion for General Licensee Adoption of Certificate of Compliance (CoC) Holder-Generated Modifications under 10 CFR Part 72.48, provides enforcement discretionto not issue an enforcement action for this violation. The licensee will be expected to comply with 10 CFR 72.212 provisions after the NRC dispositions the noncompliance for a CoC holder-generated change that affects the General Licensee.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Jason E. Schussler, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000333 and 07200012 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000333 and 07200012
License Number:
Report Number:
05000333/2025003 and 07200012/2025001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-003-0043 and I-2025-001-0103
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2025 to September 30, 2025
Inspectors:
G. Stock, Senior Resident Inspector
V. Fisher, Resident Inspector
E. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Beacon, Senior Project Engineer
C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Analyst
C. Borman, Health Physicist
C. Hargest, Health Physicist
E. Iliyev, Reactor Engineer
Approved By:
Jason E. Schussler, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Address Downscale Failures of the Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000333/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for Constellations failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the A reactor building exhaust radiation monitor. Specifically, between December 2024 and August 2025, Constellation staff failed to identify and correct repeat downscale failures that caused the radiation monitor to be inoperable.
Failure to Evaluate Operability of A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Battery Cells Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000333/2025003-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152A The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions,
Procedures, and Drawings, when Constellation failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the A LPCI IPS battery cells in accordance with station procedures. Specifically, following a voltage drop event on the A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Independent Power Supply (IPS) on January 27, 2025, Constellation failed to adequately evaluate individual battery cell conditions despite available information suggesting that a battery cell deficiency may have affected operability.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000333/2023004-02 Use of Holtec Multipurpose Canister Continuous Basket Shim Variant 60855 Closed EDG EAF-NMSS-2025-0217 Noncompliance Related to a General Licensees Use of Non-Qualified Spent Fuel Casks (IEP 9.4)60855 Closed
PLANT STATUS
FitzPatrick began the inspection period operating at rated thermal power. On July 8, 2025, operators reduced reactor power to 84 percent due to an emergent electrohydraulic control system fluid leak. Following repair, on July 9, 2025, operators restored power to rated thermal power. On September 5, 2025, operators reduced reactor power to 75 percent to perform turbine valve testing, control rod scram time testing and a control rod pattern adjustment. On September 6, 2025, operators restored power to rated thermal power. On September 7, 2025, operators reduced reactor power to 84 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment.
Operators restored power to rated thermal power the same day. FitzPatrick remained at, or near, rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Alternate standby liquid control injection to the control rod drive system on July 15, 2025 (2)
'B' residual heat removal (RHR) system on July 16, 2025 (3)
'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators (EDG) on August 26, 2025
- (4) Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) on August 29, 2025 (5)115 kilovolt system on September 7, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) East crescent 227' and 242', fire area/zone XVII/RB-1E on August 22, 2025
- (2) West crescent 227' and 242', fire area/zone XVIII/RB-1W on August 22, 2025
- (3) Turbine building south 272' and 242', fire area/zones IE/TB-1 and OR-2 on August 22, 2025
- (4) Turbine building north 272' and 242', fire area/zone IE/TB-1 on August 22, 2025
- (5) Main control room and control room heating, ventilation and air conditioning 300', fire area/zone VII/CR-1 on August 29, 2025
- (6) Emergency diesel generator spaces south 272', fire area/zones V/EG-1, EG-2 and EG-5 on September 15, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on July 30, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during testing of main turbine combined intercept valve 3 following electrohydraulic control fluid leak and power reduction on July 8 and 9, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a simulator evaluation that included an earthquake, a loss of offsite power, and a station blackout on September 16, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Containment atmosphere dilution shack and adjacent reactor building wall with concrete degradation on July 17, 2025
- (2) East pipe tunnel structure on August 12, 2025
- (3) Turbine building 252' condensate pump pit structure on August 20, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Commercial grade dedication associated with 'A' and 'B' standby liquid control pumps lubricating oil on September 29, 2025.
Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:
- (1) Fire pipe inspection of water spray curtain 2, 4"-WF-151-133 on reactor building 272',
on July 2, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Emergent removal of 'A' reactor protection system motor generator set from service due to lowering voltage on August 21, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Elevated boron and molybdenum counts in lube oil sample associated with 'B' EDG system on July 15, 2025
- (2) Class 1E 'B' 125 volt direct current (VDC) station battery following NRC identification of battery anomalies on July 22, 2025
- (3) Control room air conditioning system following failure of both trains on July 31, 2025 (4)
'A' reactor building exhaust radiation monitor following a downscale failure on August 6, 2025 (5)76P-1, west diesel fire pump following identification of abnormal current reading on battery bank 1 on August 18, 2025 (6)13MOV-16, RCIC outboard steam supply isolation valve following American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code evaluation for seal weld repair on August 26, 2025
- (7) Reactor pressure vessel water level top of active fuel reference value discrepancy on September 8, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Temporary Modification: Seal weld repair of 13MOV-16, reactor core isolation cooling outboard steam supply containment isolation valve, following body-to-bonnet leakage on September 8, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)67UC-16B, east electric bay unit cooler following leak repairs on July 10, 2025 (2)17RM-452A, 'A' reactor building exhaust radiation monitor following a downscale failure on August 4, 2025 (3)39AC-2B, 'B' instrument air compressor following planned preventive maintenance on August 27, 2025 (4)14CSP-62A, 'A' core spray keep-fill system discharge check valve following planned maintenance on September 3, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) ST-9BB, EDG 'B' and 'D' Full Load and ESW [emergency service water] Pump Operability Test, on August 11, 2025
- (2) ST-2AU, RHR Loop 'A' Keep-Full Check Valve Functional Test, on August 27, 2025
- (3) ST-2AM, RHR Loss of Offsite Power 'B' Quarterly Operability Test, on September 23, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario of an earthquake, a loss of offsite power, and a station blackout, resulting in the declaration of a General Emergency, on September 16,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)===
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Issue Reports (IRs) 04678583 and 04868690 - Probabilistic Risk Assessment Configuration Control; Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2023/02; and PRA Updating Requirement Evaluations for High Pressure Coolant Injection
- (2) IRs 04832611 and 04835886 - 'A' LPCI Power Supply System Loss of Voltage
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated an electro-hydraulic control fluid leak on main turbine combined intercept valve 3 and power reduction to 84 percent on July 8, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated an 'A' reactor water recirculation unexpected speed change and 0.5 percent power reduction on July 31, 2025.
- (3) The inspectors evaluated an 'A' reactor water recirculation unexpected speed change and 0.7 percent power reduction on September 7,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
===60855 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel and Reactor-Related Greater-than-Class C Waste at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) and for 10 CFR Part 71 Transportation Packagings."
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation===
- (1) The inspector conducted a periodic in-office follow-up that focused on the review of the licensees implementation of the 10 CFR 72.48 process and associated corrective actions related to Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) activities. The review included:
- 72.48 Evaluations and Screenings: Reviewed the licensee's 72.48 process and associated evaluation associated with the adoption of the continuous basket shim (CBS) basket variant
Corrective Action Program (CAP): Reviewed condition reports related to the design change of the CBS basket variant
===60859 - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Renewal Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ISFSI license renewal program from June 2, 2025, through August 31, 2025, including review of the licensees baseline canister inspection and review of licensee compliance with NRC regulations, license conditions, and Technical Specifications as required under 10 CFR and the Certificate of Compliance 1014, License Amendment 8, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Revision 11.2.
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Renewal Inspection===
- (1) The inspectors conducted the following activities and interviewed site personnel to assess compliance with NRC regulations, license conditions, and technical specifications:
1. Review of the sites baseline aging management inspection
2. Review of the licensees aging management basis documentation to include
identification and evaluation of site-specific time limited aging analyses and lead canister selection criteria, aging management inspection acceptance criteria, and aging management corrective action procedures
3. Review of the licensees scoping, planning, and subsequent implementation of
ISFSI aging management programs (AMPs) required for the various structures, systems, and components which required an AMP per licensing requirements
renewal and aging management activities
5. Assessment of the licensees acceptance criteria and corrective action
program for the AMPs, with a focus on assessing the licensees planned measures in the event of an aging management acceptance criterion not being met
6. Review of the licensees method(s) to collect and assess the effectiveness of
the operating experience associated with the ISFSI license renewal and aging management activities throughout the period of extended operation or identify the need for AMP modifications, as warranted
7. Review of licensee administrative controls (i.e., aging management
procedures and preventive/corrective action procedures) associated with ISFSI license renewal and aging management activities
INSPECTION RESULTS
Enforcement Discretion Enforcement Action EAF-NMSS-2025-0217: Noncompliance Related to a General Licensees Use of Non-Qualified Spent Fuel Casks (IEP 9.4)60855
Description:
Holtec International (also referred to as the CoC (Certificate of Compliance)
Holder) implemented a design change to its multi-purpose canister (MPC) fuel basket, known as the continuous basket shim (CBS) variant, which altered the structural configuration from welded to bolted shims. This change resulted in a departure from the method of evaluation (MOE) described in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) used to establish the design basis for tip-over events. Holtec did not fully evaluate the cumulative impact of the MOE changes or apply them consistently with the licensing basis. As a result, the NRC issued three Severity Level IV violations to Holtec for noncompliance with 10 CFR 72.48 requirements (see U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 07201014/2022-201, Holtec International, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML23145A175 and Holtec International, Inc. - Notice of Violation; The U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report No. 07201014/2022-201, ML24016A190).
When the licensee (also referred to as a general licensee (GL)) chooses to adopt a change the CoC holder made pursuant to a CoC holder's change authority under 10 CFR 72.48 (referred to herein as a CoC holder-generated change), the licensee must perform a separate review using the requirements of 10 CFR 72.48(c). Accordingly, when the licensee chooses to adopt a CoC holder-generated change, and that change results in a non-conforming cask, there is a violation of 10 CFR 72.48 and certain provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 by the licensee, in addition to a CoC holder violation of 10 CFR 72.48. As it relates to the adoption of the CBS variant casks, the licensee failed to recognize the noncompliance with 10 CFR 72.48 requirements made by the CoC holders design change and subsequently loaded the CBS variant casks.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this into its corrective action program with actions to restore compliance with the 10 CFR 72.212 provisions that require each cask to conform to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed in 72.214.
Corrective Action References: IR 04746823-05
Enforcement:
Significance/Severity: This violation was dispositioned in accordance with Section 9.4, Enforcement Discretion for General Licensee Adoption of CoC Holder-Generated Changes Under 10 CFR 72.48, of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Specifically, as stated in the Policy, the NRC will exercise enforcement discretion and not issue an enforcement action to a General Licensee, for a noncompliance with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(1) and
- (2) and (d)(1) of 10 CFR 72.48 and with provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 that require GLs to ensure use of casks that conform to the terms, conditions and specifications of a CoC listed in 10 CFR 72.214, when the noncompliance results from a CoC holders failure to comply with 10 CFR 72.48 for a CoC holder-generated change.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.48 (c)(1) requires, in part, that a licensee or certificate holder may make changes in the facility or spent fuel storage cask design as described in the FSAR (as updated), without obtaining:
- (ii) CoC amendment submitted by the certificate holder pursuant to § 72.244 if:
- (c) The change, test, or experiment does not meet any of the criteria in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
Title 10 CFR 72.48(c)(2) requires, in part, that a general licensee shall request that the certificate holder obtain a CoC amendment, prior to implementing a proposed change, if the change would: (viii) Result in a departure from an MOE described in the FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.
Title 10 CFR 72.48(d)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee shall have a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a CoC amendment pursuant to 72.48(c)(2).
Title 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) requires, in part, a general licensee must ensure that each cask used by the general licensee conforms to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed in 72.214.
Contrary to the above, in September 2023, the licensee loaded the first CBS design variant and failed to maintain records of changes in the spent fuel storage cask design made pursuant to 72.48(c) that include a written evaluation which provided the bases for the determination that the change did not require a CoC amendment. The licensee failed to request that the certificate holder obtain a CoC amendment, prior to implementing a proposed change, if the change would: (viii) result in a departure from an MOE described in the FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Further, the licensee failed to ensure each cask conformed to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or amended CoC listed in 72.214.
Basis for Discretion: When a general licensee chooses to adopt a CoC holder-generated change, and that change results in a non-conforming cask, there is a violation of 10 CFR 72.48 and certain provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 by the GL, in addition to a CoC holder violation of 10 CFR 72.48. And, when a general licensee chooses to adopt a CoC holder-generated change without performing a separate 10 CFR 72.48 analysis, the general licensee is in violation of 10 CFR 72.48. These requirements could lead to enforcement actions being issued against both the general licensee's 10 CFR 72.48 program (as well as certain 10 CFR 72.212 violations) and the CoC holder's 10 CFR 72.48 program for changes that originated with the CoC holder. The NRC has concluded that this enforcement approach would be inconsistent with efficiency, which is one of the NRC's Principles of Good Regulation, and NRC's mission of efficient and reliable oversight.
Since this violation meets the conditions of the NRC's Enforcement Policy Section 9.4, "Enforcement Discretion for General Licensee Adoption of Certificate of Compliance Holder-Generated Changes under 10 CFR 72.48" (ML25224A097), and the licensee has entered the noncompliance into the corrective action program, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for this violation.
The disposition of this violation closes URI: 05000333/2023004-02.
Failure to Address Downscale Failures of the Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity
Green NCV 05000333/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for Constellations failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the A reactor building exhaust radiation monitor. Specifically, between December 2024 and August 2025, Constellation staff failed to identify and correct repeat downscale failures that caused the radiation monitor to be inoperable.
Description:
FitzPatricks secondary containment, also known as the reactor building, contains automatic isolation instrumentation. This includes the ability to isolate supply and exhaust fans and start the standby gas treatment system (SGT), which contains a filtration system capable of preventing release of radionuclides during a design basis accident. The reactor building exhaust radiation monitors provide isolation signals and SGT start signals for high radiation and when the detector fails downscale.
FitzPatrick staff documented five failures between December 5, 2023, and August 5, 2025, of the A reactor building exhaust radiation monitor. Each failed in the same manner, with a sudden drop in counts to downscale. The drop to downscale should have resulted in an alarm in the main control room to indicate the failure and provided one of the two required signals to start SGT but did not.
In November of 2024, the inspectors identified an adverse trend with the radiation monitors performance and brought the trend to the stations attention. The station wrote a corrective action program issue report (IR) 04819213 to document the trend and investigate further. The station determined that a work group evaluation (WGE) was not warranted and further validated that preventive maintenance was appropriately being performed.
Following a downscale failure of the radiation monitor on June 5, 2025, the station generated IR 04871128 and conducted a WGE to determine the cause of the repeat failures. The WGE concluded that years of removal and reconnection of the amphenol cable in the back of the radiation monitor resulted in intermittent connection. On August 5, 2025, another downscale failure of the radiation monitor occurred. Troubleshooting determined that the amphenol connector showed adequate resistance readings and connection. The station determined no action was necessary with the cable because the resistance was adequate and continued troubleshooting. The station determined the Geiger-Mueller detector was the likely cause and replaced it on October 23, 2025.
Title 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI states in part, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. The inspectors determined that between December 5, 2023, and August 5, 2025, FitzPatrick failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the A reactor building exhaust radiation monitor. As a result, the failures prevented the ability of the instrument to provide a downscale alarm to operators and enable an initiation signal to SGT.
Corrective Actions: The station replaced the Geiger-Mueller detector locally in the field on October 23, 2025.
Corrective Action References: IR 04888312
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that Constellation failed to adequately identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with repeat downscale failures of the A reactor building exhaust radiation monitor between December 5, 2023, and August 5, 2025.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, between December 5, 2023, and August 5, 2025, the A reactor building exhaust radiation monitor experienced downscale failures without receiving an alarm, reactor building isolation signal and start signal for SGT. As a result, this rendered the radiation monitor inoperable.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, because it represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the reactor building.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, when previous decisions regarding repeat failures of the reactor building exhaust radiation monitor occurred, the station did not re-evaluate previous information and decisions to address the repeat failures.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, between December 5, 2023, and August 5, 2025, FitzPatrick failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the reactor building exhaust radiation monitor. Specifically, the reactor building exhaust radiation monitor experienced downscale failures, malfunctions or deficiencies without receiving an alarm, reactor building isolation signal and start signal for SGT, and these issues were not promptly identified and corrected.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Evaluate Operability of A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Battery Cells Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000333/2025003-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152A The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when Constellation failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the A LPCI IPS battery cells in accordance with station procedures. Specifically, following a voltage drop event on the A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Independent Power Supply (IPS) on January 27, 2025, Constellation failed to adequately evaluate individual battery cell conditions despite available information suggesting that a battery cell deficiency may have affected operability.
Description:
The Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) at FitzPatrick include two subsystems of LPCI that provide emergency make-up water to the reactor core in the event of a design basis accident (DBA). Each LPCI subsystem includes a 419 VDC IPS containing a battery charger, a battery, and an inverter. During a DBA, the IPS subsystems supply power to the three motor operated valves (MOVs) in each LPCI loop and to two MOVs in the recirculation system loop, which are relied upon by the LPCI subsystems to perform their safety functions and to meet the requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO)in Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, ECCS Systems - Operating. Each LPCI battery consists of 186 individual battery cells connected in series, which are required to meet TS LCO 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating. Additionally, each individual battery cell is required to meet the TS LCO 3.8.6, Battery Cell Parameters.
On January 27, 2025, at 2:19 PM, 71BAT-3A battery voltage decreased from approximately 418 VDC to approximately 390 VDC. After one minute and twenty-three seconds, 71BAT-3A battery voltage self-recovered to approximately 418 VDC. FitzPatrick entered TS LCO 3.5.1 and TS LCO 3.8.4 due to battery voltage lowering below Surveillance Requirement (SR)3.8.4.1, which requires that battery voltage be maintained greater than or equal to 396.2 VDC. At 3:39 PM, Constellation successfully performed Surveillance Test (ST)-16GA, A LPCI MOV Independent Power Supply Test and at 4:00 PM declared the A LPCI MOV IPS operable.
Constellation subsequently performed troubleshooting to determine why 71BAT-3A voltage unexpectedly dropped. Troubleshooting did not successfully determine the cause of the failure, so Constellation completed a failure mode causal tree (FMCT) to identify possible causes. The FMCT identified battery cell electrical short-circuit as a possible cause of the drop and recovery in voltage. This was listed as possible due to known adverse trends in several battery cells identified during previous quarterly tests, including visual indications of sediment build up and shedding on some cells. However, the inspectors noted that this possible cause was not refuted. Additionally, at the time of the event, TS LCO 3.8.6 was not entered because no indication of any issue(s) with a specific battery cell was recognized.
Subsequent review of IPS data revealed that the red alarm LED on the 71INV-3A local control panel display had been illuminated and locked in at the time of the event. If appropriately acknowledged by station personnel during evaluation of the issue, this would have informed them that a DC current limit alarm had occurred during the event. A DC current limit likely coincided with an electrical short of a degraded battery cell. The inspectors concluded that further investigation of the alarm should have driven Constellation to evaluate individual battery cell operability to ensure compliance with TS LCO 3.8.6. Inspectors also noted that multiple previously documented IRs existed that documented 71BAT-3A's increased age, decrease in discharge performance, and low individual cell voltages.
On February 8, 2025, at 5:51 PM, 71BAT-3A battery voltage decreased from approximately 418 VDC to approximately 369 VDC. The station entered TS LCO 3.5.1 and TS LCO 3.8.4 due to battery voltage lowering below the SR 3.8.4.1 requirement of 396.2 VDC. The licensee performed a visual inspection of 71BAT-3A and identified degradation in battery cell 162 indicative of a short-circuit. Specifically, the battery cell cover was cracked near the post terminals, the electrolyte was cloudy, the cell plates were discolored, and excessive sediment had accumulated at the base of the cell jar.
On February 9, 2025, battery cell 162 was removed from the circuit using a jumper, and a restart of the battery charger was attempted, but was unsuccessful. In response, Constellation implemented a previously planned replacement of all 186 battery cells. On February 11, 2025, Constellation identified a DC current limit alarm on the 71INV-3A local control panel display. A subsequent evaluation performed by Constellation concluded that the P007 current transducer had failed due to age related degradation, causing the alarm. It further concluded that, because the battery charger automatically disconnected in response to the alarm, the resultant load challenge to the batteries had caused the observed short in cell 162. Following replacement of P007, Constellation restored the A 419VDC LPCI IPS to operable on February 15, 2025 at 2:58 AM.
The inspectors noted that the sequence of events related to the observed cell 162 short and failure of the P007 current transducer on February 8, 2025, remain unclear because failure of either could have plausibly caused the other, and no definitive evidence suggests which initiated the event. However, the inspectors noted that, in either case, the mechanism that allowed the battery to short was the buildup of sediment at the bottom of the battery case from shedding phenomena that occurred over time prior to the event. This sediment buildup ultimately created the conductive pathway for the electrical short, as evidenced by visual indications observed on cell 162.
FitzPatrick procedure OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determination, revision 28, Section 4.1.16 states re-evaluate, as necessary, SSC (structure, system or component) operability following a change in conditions or as additional information about the cause of the deficient condition becomes known.
Procedure OP-AA-108-115-1002, Supplemental Consideration for On-Shift Immediate Operability Determinations, revision 3, Attachment 1, states in part, Does the Issue Report under review involve the following? 1. Adverse trend or degradation mechanism that could impact the ability to meet a surveillance requirement If any of the above are checked, then engage proper assistance as necessary to ensure that immediate operability is thoroughly assessed and to document the results of this assessment in the applicable IR.
The inspectors determined that Constellation failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the A LPCI IPS battery cells given the available information and therefore failed to identify an adverse degradation mechanism that contributed to a short in battery cell 162 which could have impacted the batterys ability to meet the requirements of TS 3.8.6.
Corrective Actions: Constellation entered this issue in their corrective action program and replaced all the battery cells in 71BAT-3A on February 10, 2025.
Corrective Action References: IR 04835886
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately evaluate the operability of the A LPCI IPS battery cells was a performance deficiency within Constellations ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, Constellation failed to adequately evaluate the operability of 71BAT-3A in accordance with OP-AA-108-115 and OP-AA-108-115-1002 following available indications of potential battery cell deficiencies.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Constellation failed to evaluate the operability of 'A' LPCI IPS battery cells, which allowed a degraded condition in battery cell 162 to remain unevaluated until a failure of the 'A' LPCI IPS occurred on February 8, 2025, involving a short-circuited battery cell. This issue is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 3.k because the operability of the batteries was not adequately evaluated and the unevaluated conditions challenged the operability of the system.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Exhibit 2, because it
- (1) did not involve a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC that affected its operability or Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)functionality;
- (2) was not a degraded condition that represented a loss of the PRA function of a single train Technical Specification (TS) system for greater than its TS allowed outage time;
- (3) did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time;
- (4) did not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate TS systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />;
- (5) did not represent a loss of a PRA system and/or function as defined in the Plant Risk Information Book or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and
- (6) did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, Constellation non-conservatively restored a safety-related subsystem to operable using incomplete information.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Procedure OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determination, Section 4.1.16, states in part, re-evaluate, as necessary, SSC operability following a change in conditions or as additional information about the cause of the deficient condition becomes known.
Procedure OP-AA-108-115-1002, Supplemental Consideration for On-Shift Immediate Operability Determinations, revision 3, Attachment 1, states in part, Does the Issue Report under review involve the following? 1. Adverse trend or degradation mechanism that could impact the ability to meet a surveillance requirement If any of the above are checked, then engage proper assistance as necessary to ensure that immediate operability is thoroughly assessed and to document the results of this assessment in the applicable IR.
Contrary to the above, from January 27, 2025, to February 9, 2025, Constellation failed to adequately evaluate the operability of 71BAT-3A in accordance with OP-AA-108-115 and OP-AA-108-115-1002. Specifically, Constellation failed to evaluate the operability of A LPCI IPS battery cells, which allowed a degraded condition in battery cell 162 to remain unevaluated until a failure of the A LPCI IPS occurred on February 8, 2025, involving a short-circuited battery cell.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Inadequate Preventive Maintenance on A LPCI Inverter 71152A The inspectors assessed Constellation's evaluation of the January 27, 2025, and February 8, 2025, events and determined the licensee did not replace the P007 current transducer in the A LPCI inverter consistent with the vendor recommended timeframe of 9-10 years. On February 8, 2025, the P007 current transducer in the A LPCI inverter failed after being installed for 15 years. The licensee determined the most likely cause for the current transducer failure was age-related degradation. The failure resulted in an unplanned LCO entry for TS 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating, and TS 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating.
Previous age-related degradation issues in the A and B LPCI inverters were reviewed by the inspectors. On July 6, 2023, output three-phase voltage on the B LPCI inverter lowered from 600 volts alternating current (VAC) to 562 VAC across all three phases. On July 23, 2023, output three-phase voltage on the A LPCI inverter lowered on two of the phases from 600 VAC to 585 VAC and 566 VAC. The licensee and vendor attributed both events to failing capacitors on the A071 interface board. The licensee implemented a 10-year replacement frequency for A071 to align with vendor guidance for other circuit boards.
However, the maintenance strategy was not extended to the P007 circuit board. The enforcement aspects of this observation are captured in this report under NCV 05000333/2025003-02.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On November 20, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Garrick Olson, Site Vice President (Acting), and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 7, 2025, the inspectors presented the 71124.07 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program inspection results to Garrick Olsen, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 24, 2025, the inspectors presented the IP 60859 ISFSI License Renewal inspection results to Joel Reid, Dry Cask Storage Program Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS
The inspectors reviewed the 2025 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations evaluation report that was issued in August 2025.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 10
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Flow Diagram
Procedures
Boron Injection Using Control Rod Drive System
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
Fire Plans
Fire Plan for Main Control Room & Control Room HVAC
Emergency Diesel Generator Spaces - South Elev. 272' Fire
Area/Zone V/EG-1, EG-2. EG-5
Procedures
Portable Fire Extinguisher Inspection Procedure 71111.11Q Procedures
Hydraulic Isolation Restoration of a Main Turbine Combined
Intermediate Valve
and 1
Corrective Action
Documents
04871008
04878361
Procedures
ER-JF-450
James A. FitzPatrick Structures Monitoring Program
Procurement Engineering Process and Responsibilities
Work Orders
05669254
Corrective Action
Documents
04891820
04892254
Corrective Action
Documents
04866478
04867180
04872611
04873774
04875617
04884390
04886604
04888312
04891017
Procedures
MA-AA-716-230-
1001
Oil Analysis Interpretation Guidelines
EDG B and D Full Load and ESW Pump Operability Test
Work Orders
05650822
Engineering
2527
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Changes
Work Orders
05580109
Corrective Action
Documents
04872430
04875873
04880421
Procedures
RCIC Flow Rate and Inservice Test
RHR LOOP B Quarterly Operability Test (IST)
RHR Loop A Keep-Full Check Valve Functional Test (IST)
Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST)
EDG 'B' and 'D' Full Load and ESW Pump Operability Test
Work Orders
05403914
05633197-01
05678913
05684781
05686198
71151
Miscellaneous
Reactor Oversight Program MSPI Basis Document
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Procedures
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Safety
System Functional Failures
Mitigating System Performance Index Data Acquisition &
Reporting
Corrective Action
Documents
04678583
04714037
04714496
04832611
04835886
04868690
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04889972
Miscellaneous
James A. FitzPatrick Probabilistic Risk Assessment Reactor
Oversight Program MSPI Bases Document
Revision 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Risk Management Configuration Control
Revision 9
FPIE PRA Model Update
Revision 21
Fire PRA Model Update and Control
Revision 8
Corrective Action
Documents
04879782
04887237
04895811
Procedures
Lowering EHC Reservoir Level
1