IR 05000327/1986071

Insp Repts 50-327/86-71 & 50-328/86-71 on 861211-870105.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification Including Operations Performance, Sys Lineups & Radiation Protection

ML20207T290
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/11/1987
From:	Harmon P, Jenison K, David Loveless, Mccoy F, Poertner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T251	List: IR 05000327/1986071 ML20207T250
References
50-327-86-71, 50-328-86-71, NUDOCS 8703230400
Download: ML20207T290 (12)

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M . UNITED STATES kiY, pn 4d d

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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.5 .7 'yl ~ 101 MARIETTA STREET. 'l a# ' * *

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8 [ Report;Nos.: 50-327/86-71, 50-328/86-71 ^ I'

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1 Licensee: ' Tennessee Valley Authority ~ _

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. Docket'Nos.* 50-327 and.50-328

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- -License N.os;:' DPR-77 and DPR-79

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- Facility Name: .Sequoyah Units'1 and 2' '(4

,.g I nspection Conducted: December 11, 1986 hhruJanuary.5,1987

[ 1 .knspectors: J N-

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Date Signed e yK.JenTsongSeniorResident. Inspector

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P[E.Harmon,psidentInspector Date Signed 4e L a

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7. P. . Loveless / Resident Inspector

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' Date Slgned-y.K.PoertnergRdsidentInspector Approved by: [, dyh F. R,' McCoy, Ch1EG 5ecTion 1A @gte Signed ,

Division of Reactor Projects.

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. -SUMMARY'

Scope: This- routine,- announced inspection -involve'd inspection onsite by the-

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Resident Inspectors in the areas of: operational safety. verification (including operations performance, system lineups, radiation ' protection, safeguards and housekeeping' inspections); m'aintenance observations; review of previous inspec-tion findings; followup of events; review of licensee identified items; review of IE Information Notices; and review of inspector-followup item Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ,m t 1pul D bbb G

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director

• P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager

• L. M. Nobles, Operations and Engineering Superintendent

• B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent

• R. J. Prince,' Radiological Control Superintendent

• R. Harding, Licensing Group Manager W. E. Andrews, Site Quality Manager D. W. Wilson, Project Engineer R. W. Olson, Modifications Branch Manager J. M. Anthony, Operations Group Supervisor

• R. V. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

• A. Skarzinski,-Electrical Maintenance Supervisor H. D. Elkins, Instrument Maintenan; Group Manager J. T. Crittenden, Public Safety Service Chief (,

j' R. W. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor

• G. B. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor

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D. C. Craven, Quality Assurance Staff Supervisor

. *J. H. Sullivan, Regulatory Engineering Supervisor J. L. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager ( D. I Cowart, Quality Engineering Supervisor

• H. R. Rogers, Plant Operations Review Staff R. C. Burchell, Compliance Engineer R. H. Buchholz, Sequoyah Site Representative

• M. R. Cooper, Compliance Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift engineers, security force members, engineers and maintenance personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Manager and members of his staff on January 6,1987. No violations or deviations were discussed. The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection finding . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) Violation 328/84-11-01, Failure to Control Configuration During Modification Activitie The licensee's response of July 16, 1984, was reviewed to determine if appropriate corrective action had been taken. The inspector verified that the specific corrective actions identified in the

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licensee's response had been implemented. However, as described in para-graph 4 (unresolved item 327,328/85-23-07) of this inspection report, overall configuration control during maintenance and surveillance activities is still unresolved. This item is close (Closed) Violation 328/84-11-03,. Failure to Retrieve Quality Assurance Records. The licensee's response of July 16, 1984, was reviewed to deter-mine if apnropriate' corrective action had been taken. The' inspector verified that specific corrective actions identified in the licensee's response had been implemented. However, this issue may have been the result of a programmatic problem in the area of drawing control. Drawing control and legibility is a current issue and is being followed under inspector followup items 327,328/86-20-06, 327,328/86-37-07 and 327,328/86-49-0 This item is close (Closed) Violation 328/84-11-04, Failure to Adequately Test Modification The licensee's response of July 16, 1984, was reviewed to determine if appropriate corrective action had been taken. The inspector verified that specific corrective actions identified in the licensee's response had been implemented. This item is close (Closed) Violation 328/84-21-02, Failure to Have an Adequate Procedure to Perform Inservice Testing of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. The inspector . reviewed the licensee's response dated December 3, 1984, to determine if appropriate corrective action had been taken. The inspector verified that the specific corrective actions identified in the licensee's response had been implemented. This item is close (Closed) Violation 328/85-06-01, Failure to Make a Followup Notification in Accordance With 10 CFR 50.72(c). The licensee's response of March 22, 1985, was reviewed and corrective actions evaluated. This item is close (Closed) Violation 327,328/86-31-02, Failure to Control Configuration during Maintenance. The licensee's response of September 17, 1986, was reviewed and specific corrective actions evaluated. The corrective actions described in the licensee's submittal are adequate for this specific issue. However, as described in paragraph 4 (unresolved item 327,328/85-23-07) of this inspection report, overall configuration control during maintenance and surveillance activities is still an unresolved ite . Unresolved Items i

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Unresolved items (URI) are matters about which more infenuation is required *

to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. Four unresolved items were identified during this inspection, and are identified in paragraphs 5, 8, and 1 (0 pen) URI 327,328/85-23-07, Configuration Contro The inspector reviewed the licensee's configuration control activities at described in Instrument Maintenance Instruction IMI-134 and Maintenance Instruc-tion (MI) 6.20 in an attempt to resolve URI 327,328/85-23-0 In discussion with a recent NRC Safety System Operations and Modifications l

Inspection Team (Inspection Report 327,328/86-61), it was determined i that configuration control may still not be adequately controlled i

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during normal maintenance and . surveillance activitie A recent example of this -issue is described in Inspection Report 327,328/86-61 and involved the substitution of :an upgraded . subassembly into a com-ponent. The general issue of configuation . control will be addressed in ' Inspection Report .327,328/86-61. ' This item will. remain open pending -TVA's resolution of configuration control concerns identified in Inspeciton Report 327,328/86-6 (Closed) URI . 327,328/85-47-05 Axial Flux Curve. This -issue was addressed in . inspection report 327,328/86-39 and Violation 327,328/

86-39-01 was issued. This URI is close (Closed) URI 327,328/86-69-04, Control Building Isolation Three building isolations were addressed in this UR These issues were included in paragraph 9 of this report and will be addressed as- URI 327,328/86-71-0 . Operational Safety Verification (71707) Plant Tours The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentatio The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, and verified compliance with Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). The inspectors verified that mainte-nance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the license Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine build-ings, and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment condi-tions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness condition The inspectors wal_ked down accessible portions of the following safety-related system on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System (Units 1 and 2)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; and badge issuance and retrieval; patrols and compensatory post In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity. The inspectors visited the central elarm station and interviewed security personnel regarding their respective dutie N

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No violations or deviations were identifie Radiation Protection The inspectors observed Health Physics (HP) practices and verified implementation of radiation protection control. On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activi-ties were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in accordance with applicable RWPs. Selected radiation protection instru-ments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were reviewe The licensee has partially implemented changes in its As low As Reasonable Achievable ( ALARA) Program, Radiation Work Permit (RWP)

Program and Health Physics Organization. A system of standing RWPs has been established effective January 1,1987, for general, repetitive work requiring an RWP. The following RWPs were reviewed:

87-0001-001 87-0002-001 87-0009-001 87-0015-001 87-0017-001 87-1152-002 87-1103-001 87-1100-001 The changes in the Health Physics Organization and procedures will be reviewed as IFI 327,328/86-71-01 The inspector observed personnel leaving a restricted area without frisking out. The inspector reviewed the Health Physics procedures and did not find approval of such actions. This will be reviewed to determine acceptability. This item will be followed as URI 327,328/

86-71-02 pending further NRC revie No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed TS required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that LCOs were met; that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; that deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and that system restoration was adequat For complete tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individual Surveillance Instruction (SI)-484, Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Periodic Calibration. The inspector witnessed the calibration of the scaling circuit for the reactor coolant system hot leg temperature (T-hot) that is used in fluid density compensation. During one step of the procedure, the instrument technicians were unable to locate printed circuit card 68-430. The card was not in the referenced instrument rack. The card had been misplaced in an adjacent rack. Westinghouse technicians had installed and functionally tested the RVLIS equipment, and had apparently misplaced the card. The system was being calibrated for the first time by TVA personnel. The issue of how the card was misplaced and why it was not

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discovered in functional testing will be followed as IFI 327,328/86-71-0 SI-275.2, Testing of Non Class 1E Load Circuit Breakers Fed From Class IE Busses. The inspector witnessed the testing of breaker 9A on board BD 2A2-A, Control Rod Drive (CRD) equipment room A/C 2A. No discrepancies where noted. The licensee has tested a total of 281 breakers and has identified 23 failures. The licensee is presently evaluating the breakers that failed. This issue is being followed as IFI 327,328/85-46-0 SI-291, Readjustment of Setpoint for Radiation Monitors with Variable Setpoints. The inspector observed the setpoint adjustment for radiation monitor 0-RM-90-122 to support radioactive effluent liquid release 86-363-07-232. The adjustment was made in reference to a background count rate. The background count rate and the new alarm setpoint were computed in volts and input into radiation monitor 0-RM-90-12 SI-400.1, Liquid Waste Effluent Batch Release. This surveillance was used to verify the background count rate for radiation monitor 0-RM-90-122. The background count rate used during the readjustment of the setpoint for radiatimn monitor 0-RM-90-122 was different from that derived in SI-40 Section 7 of Technical Instruction (TI)-18, Radiation Monitoring, allows for the calculation of the background counts in a different manner than SI-40 and the TI-18 value was used in the readjustment observed by the inspecto SI-400.1 will be further discussed with the licensee to determine if it was adequately implemente In addition, revision 14 to SI-400.1 provides a procedure for the Shif t Engineer to authorize a liquid release when the release path radiation monitor was not operable. These two issues will be reviewed as URI 327,328/86-71-0 . Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703) Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with T The following items were considered during this review: LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair record accurately reflected what actually took place; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved Quality Assurance (QA) program; and housekeeping was actively pursue . .

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6 Portions of the performance of Maintenance Instruction (MI)-10.1 E/1.5Y, Emergency. Diesel Generator -(EDG) - 18 Month Electrical.' Preventive

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Maintenance Inspection .forL EDG 2A-A, were observed. This: instruction

'_ requires the routine removal and replacement of the sealed bearings'fo the-circulating lube oil pumps for each EDG; a total of six ' pumps per lEDG. - Another part of the test is the inspection of the cooling water t heater elements. - Both. heater elements' for EDG 2A-A required replace .

. menti due 4 to excessive tscale -build-up. No procedural or personnel errors were observe The inspector. observed part of the maintenance activities conducted on ERCW pump LK This ' Maintenance activity was conducted on MR B-132007- and involved changing out' the pump packing. As a result ' of-this maintenance the licensee determined that the stub shaft had to be replaced. The licensee-is presently waiting on a procedure revision-to begin work on replacing the stub shaf No discrepancies -were note The completed work package associated with MR-132005 was also reviewe This maintenance activity involved replacing the pump packing on the JA ERCW pump. 'No discrepancies were note ' Portions of Engineering Change Notices (ECN) L6715 and L6746 implement-ing work packages were observed. Maintenance implemented by the above ECNs was characterized by the licensee to be Unit 2 startup related and was intended to change the load sequencing delay time of the Contain-ment Spray (CS) pumps. The load sequencing delay time for the CS pumps is the time between a loss of power to the 6.9KV shutdown electrical

' boards and the start of the CS pump. The sequencing delay time was being adjusted from 30 seconds to three minutes as a result of a potential diesel generator overloading problem which was identified by the licensee's electrical calculations task force. The electrical calculations task force was part of the licensee's Design Basis Verifi-cation Program.' The electrical calculations and esintenance of the CS pump were intended to ensure that the diesel generator load sequence after a loss of offsite power concurrent with a Safety Injection did not overload and cause a stall of the diesel generator ECNs L6715 and L6746 also addressed the CS pump room cooler fan and the CS supply header isolation valv The following additional documents were reviewed:

Administrative Instruction (AI) - 19, Plant Modifications AI-3, Clearance Procedures Modifications and Additions Instruction (M and AI) - 4, Control Power and Signal Cables M and AI - 6, Revision of As-Constructed Drawings M and AI - 11, Fabrication, Installation, and Documentation of Seismic Supports M and AI - 13, Electrical Pressure Seal, Firestop Barrier and Flame Retardant Cable Coating Design Change Request (DCR) 2259 Instruction Change (IC) 86-1438 Support Variance 56-16-A-27

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Hold Orders (HO) 2983 and 2987 Significant Condition Report (SCR) SQN EEB 86-29 Field Change Request (FCR) 4939 FCR 4899

.FCR 4894 FCR 4887 FCR 4873 FCR 7068 Sequoyah Engineering Project (SQEP) Administrative Instruction (AI) - 11A, Field Change Requests A ' copy of FCR 4873 and a marked up drawing were electronically sent to the design engineer and checker engineer in Knoxville. A review was conducted by both engineers in accordance with SQEP AI - 11A, which requires a review of the Unresolved Safety Question Determination of the'affected ECN. During a conversation with the checker engineer, he stated that .he had reviewed the telecopied drawing and FCR in accordance with SQEP AI -11A. When asked by the inspector if he had reviewed for other existing FCRs that could interact with FCR 4873 or if he had reviewed the original DCR, he stated that he had not. The FCR was apparently reviewed as an isolated entity and not as part of an entire design change. A review that does not include all reasonable facets of the design change can not be considered a complete revie CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, states that design changes, including field changes shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original desig This issue will be identified as URI 327,328/86-71-05 pending further NRC evaluatio Diesel Generator freeze protection. The inspectors observed licensee work in preparing the EDGs for cold weather. Work was being performed under an approved work request and procedure. Workers appeared to be prepared and knowledgeable and to be following the procedur No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)

The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that:

reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the LER forms were complete; the licensee had reviewed the event; no unreviewed safety questions were involved; and no violations of regulations or Techni-cal Specification conditions had been identifie LERs Unit 1 327/86-03, Auxiliary Building Isolation This event involved non-safety related maintenance that was performed on a power distribution panel which resulted in a loss of power to a radiation monitor (RM). This resulted in an auxiliary building isola-tion (ABI). This is an example of a non safety related activity which caused a challenge to a safety system required to prevent or mitigate

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an accident, as described in the Sequoyah' Final Safety Analysis Repor This issue will be tracked by Inspector Followup item 327,328/86-60-0 LER 327/86-03 is close /83-10, Diesel Generator Tripped on High Jacket Water Temperature LERs Unit 2 328/84-09, Main Steau Supply Valve Failed to Close on Main Feedwater Pump 328/85-06, Inoperable Containment Spray Pump 9. Event Followup (93702, 62703)

Du-ing the inspection period six separate inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations occurre The events are summarized below: During performance of response time testing of a lower containment radiation monitor, a containment ventilation isolation (CVI) occurre In this instance the senior instrument mechanic failed to follow procedures in that he connected test leads prior to notifying the reactor operato Consequently, the appropriate clearances and Reactor Protection System blocks were not implemented, which would have prevented the ESF actuation, During performance of retest of W-2 type switches, a Control Building (CBI) isolation occurred when the Control Room Isolation Initiation switch was tested. This event was caused by a deficient procedure in the workplan. The engineer who prepared the procedure to test the switch did not read the switch contact development drawing correctl The workplan required one lead to be lifted when two leads should have been specifie During shift turnover routine, the oncoming reactor operator noticed that the Auxiliary Building normal ventilation supply and exhaust fans and the fuel handling area fans were not ranning, and that "A" train dampers were closed. The "A" train Auxiliary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS) was running ("B" train was tagged out at the time), but no valid Auxiliary Building isolation (ABI) signal was present. This event is still under investigation by the licensee, but has been tentatively identified as having been caused by a short-lived spike on radiation monitor RM-90-102, which may have been reset by an operato This event was undetected for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 32 minutes, because no ABI alarm annunciator is presently annunciatea. An ECN has been issued to add an alarm to the annunciator pane During the response time testing of a containment pressure channel, a containment Phase "B" isolation signal occurred. This event was caused by a deficient procedure. This procedure had been revised to specifically omit a step to block both trains of the ESF, and instead prescribed blocking only the train under tes This error allowed the other train to initiate the phase "B" isolation signal when the test signal was inserte .

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_ 9 A CVI occurred when an operator attempted to clear a sample flow alarm-

' . on. Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-106 by adjusting the sample line throttle valve. -The operator was unaware that the instrument .had run out of filter paper.and also needed a charcoal' filter replacement. Adjusting the- throttle ' valve caused an Electromotive Interference- (EMI) spike when the flow was adjusted close' to the flow setpoint .and the . alarm relay. chattered between setting and clearing. This is~similar to other-incidents involving EMI actuations of the radiation alarm f; A CBI occurred when chart paper was changed on radiation monitor 0-RM-90-125. The chart roller is racked out to refill- the roll, and

.the ESF occurred when the roller was racked back in. An EMI spike is

~' suspected, but the root cause has nut been; identified by the license Items a,b, and - d are examples of failure to comply with Technical

. Specification 6.8.1, which requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering activities important to safety and including the activities referenced abov This will be URI 327,328/

86-71-06, due te'several of.the items being still under NRC revie No deviations or violations were identifie . IE Information Notices (92701)-

The following IE Information Notices (IEN) were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that: corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the licensee had reviewed the event and that appropriate plant personnel were knowledgeable; no unreviewed safety questions were involved; and that violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions did not appear to occu IE Circular (IEC) 79-06, Failure To Use Syringe And Bottle Shields In Nuclear Medicine. The inspector determined this item to not require any licensee action and is therefore close IEC 79-07, Unexpected Speed Increase Of Reactor Recirculation MG Set resulted.in Reactor Power increase. The inspector determined this item to not require any licensee action and is therefore close IEN 86-37 Degradation of Station Batteries. The licensee determined that the IEN was not applicable to Sequoyah. This determination was based on the fact that the batteries were not of the same make or plate compositio Additionally, TVA has not experienced any type of excessive sedimentation in their batteries. The inspector had no further question . IE Bulletins (92701)

IE Bulletins are documents issued by the NRC which require certain specific actions of the addressee. The inspector has reviewed the actions taken by

.the licensee as a response to the below listed IE bulletins. The inspector verified that: corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the licensee had reviewed the event and that appropriate plant personnel were knowledgeable; no unreviewed safety questions were

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, involved; and that violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions did not appear to occu (Closed) 83-BU-03, Check Valve Failures In Raw Water Cooling Systems of Diesel Generators. Sequoyah conducted the required surveillance of the essential raw cooling water system as reported in TVA-letter O'Reilly/ Mills, dated February 2,198 . Inspector Followup Items Inspector followup ' Items (IFI) are matters of concern to the inspector which are documented and tracked in inspection reports to allow further review and evaluation by the inspector. The following IFIs have been reviewed and evaluated by the inspector. The inspector has either resolved the concern identified, determined that the licensee has performed adequa-tely in the area, and/or determined-that actions taken by the licensee have resolved the concer (Closed) 327,328/85-46-01, Corporate Commitment Tracking Syste (Closed) 328/84-35-02, Post Modification Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater System Cavitating Ventur (Closed) 327/83-29-03, 328/83-29-05, Follow CAR 83-10-033. This will be tracked as part of URI 86-41-0 (Closed) 327,328/84-38-06, Replace OT2 Handswitch with Different Design /

Logic 13. Adverse Conditions and Corrective Actions (71707) The inspector observed partial implementation of a QC inspection effort to identify the scope of an issue identified by a member of a DBVP team. The team member, (who happened to be an electrical inspector in the QC office), noticed several vendor supplied 480-volt breaker and panel splices and connections he considered not up to TVA standard He reported his concerns to his management, and management responded by initiating a scoping survey. A team of five electrical QC inspectors were assigned to inspect 22 breakers and panels, looking for the types of problems identified by the walk-down team member. The results of this initial survey will be evaluated by DNE for further action and resolution. This issue will be followed as IFI 327,328/86-71-0 In response to the issues identified in Inspection Report 327,328/

86-53, the TVA Nuclear Performance Plan, and a Management Meeting held with TVA, the licensee will institute a new corrective action progra The new program is intended to be a standardized corrective action program and will be implemented by March 26, 1987. The new program is intended to meet a Nuclear Performance Plan commitment by the licensee and to reduce the identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality to a single proces The following issues involving licensee corrective action have been reviewed by the inspecto The discrete actions by the licensee necessary to initiate corrective action for the individual issues were found to be adequate and the issues are considered close The programmatic issues concerning licensee corrective actions will be considered with the issues identified in inspection report 327,328/

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327,328/85-26-09, Valve Installation in the Fifth Battery Room-327,328/86-19-06,- Failure to Implement Various Procedures 327,328/86-31-03, Failure to Take Appropriate Corrective Actions for Preoperational Test Deficiencies As a result of a recent Feedwater System line rupture at another

. Region II facility, the licensee has initiated a program to evaluate if wall thinning has occurred in the Feedwater System. The results of this evaluation will be followed as IFI 327,328/86-71-0 . Employee Concern Program Element Report (ECPER) Safety Evaluation Reports (SER)(93701,62700)

The following ECPER were reviewed:

301.12-SQN System 31 Not Operated Properly

.301.11-SQN Valve Closure Problems 301.05-SQN Questionable Design and Construction Practices 308.06-SQN Subjourneyman/ Journeyman 313.07-SQN Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Insulatio Questions concerning ' the adequacy and/or scope of- the ECPERs will be discussed with licensee management at a meeting scheduled for January 6, 198 .

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