IR 05000321/2003003
| ML032050581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/2003 |
| From: | Moorman J NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-03-003 | |
| Download: ML032050581 (20) | |
Text
uly 24, 2003
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2003003, 050000366/2003003
Dear Mr. Sumner:
On June 28, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 9, 2003, with Mr. George Frederick and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
James H. Moorman, III, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000321/2003003 and 05000366/2003003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5 Report Nos.: 05000321/2003003 and 05000366/2003003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility: E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: P.O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates: April 6, 2003 - June 28, 2003 Inspectors: D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector N. Garrett, Resident Inspector C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer Approved By: James H. Moorman, III, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000321/2003-003, 05000366/2003-003; 04/06/2003 - 06/28/2003; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2; routine integrated report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a senior project engineer. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until April 13 when the B reactor recirculation pump tripped as the result of a motor ground. The unit operated at or near 44 percent RTP until April 19 when the unit was shut down for a forced outage to replace the B reactor recirculation pump motor. The unit was restarted on May 1 and reached 100 percent RTP on May 4. The unit operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period except for a short derating on June 23 following the loss of the Baxley loop.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP except for a short derating on April 13 following the loss of the Baxley loop. On May 18, power was reduced to approximately 46 percent RTP due to a trip of the B reactor recirculation pump. The B reactor recirculation pump was restarted on May 19, and the unit operated at or near 100 percent RTP. On June 21, power was reduced to approximately 20 percent RTP to repair a main generator stator cooling system leak. On June 22, the main generator was placed on line. The unit operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period, except for a short derating on June 23 following the loss of the Baxley loop.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a seasonal review of the licensee hot weather preparations.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure DI-OPS-56-0293N, Hot Weather Operation, and walked down the completed portions of the procedure which included the Control Building Chilled Water system lineups, the Station Service Battery cooling water lineup, and the fire pump house ventilation lineup. The inspectors reviewed the licensee documents HNEL-WP-59, Drought Continency Actions, and 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena, to verify that the Ultimate Heat Sink will remain operable for known summer related conditions. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications (TS) and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to verify that the Plant Service Water (PSW), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) would remain operable during peak high temperature summer months. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns: The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns of the following systems to verify the availability of redundant or diverse systems and components, and to verify that defense-in-depth was maintained during periods when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors compared system configuration to the associated licensee procedures, system and component checklists, and system drawings to verify systems and components were properly aligned. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed selected Condition Reports (CRs) to verify that equipment alignment issues were being identified and adequately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) System, and Unit 2 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
- 1A, 1C, 2A, and 2C EDGs
- 2A Loop Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pumps Complete System Walkdown: The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 1 RHR System. The inspectors compared actual system configuration to that required by Procedure 34SO-E11-010-1, Residual Heat Removal System, to verify that the system was properly aligned and electrical power was available. In addition, the inspectors walked down the system to verify that hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional, support systems were operational, and system components were properly labeled. The inspectors reviewed the associated system health report, CRs, and Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs) to verify that issues were being appropriately resolved.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors toured the following six risk significant areas, identified in the licensees Independent Plant Evaluation (IPE) for External Events, to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment and to verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire Protection Program, and conducted area walkdowns to assess the licensee's control of transient combustibles. The inspectors also reviewed the Site Fire Hazards Analysis and applicable Pre-Fire Plan drawings to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 1B EDG room and 1F switchgear room, battery room, and oil storage room
- Unit 1 & 2 130' Control Building
- Unit 1 164' Reactor Building.
- 1C EDG room, 1G switchgear room, battery room, and oil storage room
- 2C EDG room, 2G switchgear room, battery room, and oil storage room
- Unit 1 185' and 203' Reactor Building,
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The Inspectors reviewed the FSAR and Plant Hatch IPE for internal flooding events.
The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown for the following four areas to determine potential sources of interior flooding, and the condition of penetrations and sumps in these areas. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the preventative maintenance records for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Leak Detection System level probes and isolation valves in all the diagonals, both reactor buildings, and both torus rooms. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 Northeast diagonal - Loop B RHR/Core Spray (CS)
- Unit 1 Southeast diagonal - Loop A RHR/CS
- Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection room
- Unit 1 Torus
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of simulator scenario LT-SG-50325-12, Loss of Reactor Protection System Power and Loss of Air. The inspectors reviewed Procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence; and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors also reviewed Procedure 73-EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, to verify that the event action level was correctly identified and reported. The inspectors attended the post exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the following three systems. The inspectors performed a system walkdown and interviewed the system engineer to determine the existing system configuration and deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed the system health reports, MWOs, CRs, and system modifications to assess overall system condition and maintenance related issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees maintenance rule (MR) reports and scoping documents to determine that the systems were properly scoped, in the proper MR category, and appropriate actions were being taken on the system. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 main control room air conditioners
- Unit 2 main control room air conditioners
- Unit 2 PSW System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. In addition, when emergent work was identified, the inspectors held discussions with licensee personnel and walked down plant systems to verify that actions were taken to minimize the probability of an initiating event and maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems.
- POD for Week 4/12 - 18, Failure of Unit 1 B recirculation pump
- POD for Week 5/10-16
- POD for Week 5/17 - 23
- POD for Week 5/24 - 30, Failure of B main control room air conditioner to start
- POD for Week 6/16 - 20
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions
a. Inspection Scope
For the four events described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs and plant computer data, as applicable, and reviewed plant procedures to verify that proper operator actions were taken.
- On April 13, 2003, the Unit 1 B reactor recirculation pump tripped when a ground occurred in the motor windings. The unit was derated to approximately 44 percent RTP in single loop operations. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 34AB-B31-001-1, Reactor Recirculation Pump(s) Trip or Recirc Loops Flow Mismatch.
- On April 13, 2003, the Baxley loop tripped resulting in the loss of the Unit 2 helper cooling towers. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 34AB-R81-001-0, Loss of Baxley Loop, to verify that the operators responded properly to the loss of power.
- On May 18, 2003, the Unit 2 B reactor recirculation pump tripped following a lightning strike at the plant. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 34AB-B31-001-2, Reactor Recirculation Pump(s) Trip or Recirc Loops Flow Mismatch.
- On June 23, 2003, the Baxley loop tripped resulting in the loss of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 helper cooling towers. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 34AB-R81-001-0 to verify that the operators responded properly to the loss of power.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following three operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the TS and the FSAR to ensure that operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- CR 2003002130, Control Room Chiller 1Z41-B008A, Rev. 2
- CR 2003005388, Safety Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Electrical Connections
- CR 2003006096, Control Room Chiller 1Z41-B008B
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds
a. Inspection Scope
Using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.16, Operator Workarounds, the inspectors reviewed conditions on both units that required compensation by the operators. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator workarounds, significant operator workarounds, and operations needs list dated May 20, to assess the increase in plant risk due to the cumulative effects of all the items combined. The inspectors focused on the ability of operators to operate equipment affected by the workarounds during a plant event.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and observed personnel performance during the following five maintenance and testing activities to verify procedural requirements were met. The inspectors also reviewed the activities to determine if the scope of testing demonstrated that the work performed was correctly completed and the affected equipment was functional and operable. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- MWO 10300245, Perform hydrostatic test for 1G11-F020 valve,
- MWO 20202160, Repair and Replace Unit 2 HPCI EGM
- MWO 20301501, 2E41-F008 stem bent
- MWO 20200645, Repair to 2B RHRSW pump
- MWO 10302888, Isolate low voltage cell on 1B EDG battery
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed LR-REG-005-0403, Safety Assessment for the 2003 Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation Trip Outage and the outage schedule to verify the appropriate use of risk management techniques and incorporation of operating experience and past lessons learned from previous outages. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the outage safety assessment to verify that the licensee had contingency plans and that these plans included sufficient equipment to maintain a defense-in-depth approach to safety.
The inspectors also reviewed Procedure DI-OPS-57-0393N, Outage Safety Assessment, to verify the licensee was correctly maintaining required equipment in service in accordance with the overall outage safety assessment. During the forced outage, the inspectors monitored licensee control over the outage activities listed below.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Plant shutdown including insertion of manual scram and the following reactor coolant system cooldown to verify the cooldown rate did not exceed TS limits.
- Two clearances to verify implementation of the clearance process and the associated equipment was properly configured to support the function of the clearance.
- Calibration of reactor instrumentation used to monitor reactor water within surveillance requirements.
- TS and licencee procedures to verify mode change requirements were met.
- Walkdown of the drywell to verify material conditions supported plant operations.
- Plant startup, heatup, and power ascension.
- Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to forced outage activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five surveillance test procedures and either observed personnel performance or reviewed test results to verify the scope of the test adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed Procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. The inspectors also reviewed CRs 2003006929 and 2003006951 to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting problems associated with surveillance testing.
- 34SV-E11-004-1, RHR Service Water Pump Operability (IST)
- 34SV-R43-001-1S, Diesel Generator 1A Monthly Test
- 52SP-05-14-03-IJ-1-0, SRV Solenoid Circuit Continuity Measurement
- 34IT-E41-003-2S, HPCI Turbine Speed Control Test
- 34SV-C41-002-2, Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On May 21, 2003, the inspectors observed an emergency plan drill. The inspectors observed activities in the simulator, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility to verify implementation of Procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0S, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated event and the development of protective action recommendations to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with Procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed Procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Offsite Emergency Notification, to verify the licensee made proper offsite notifications. The inspectors attended the post-drill exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas for improvement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PI) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2 and Procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation And Reporting Of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS Activity (data dates 6/2002 - 4/2003)
The inspectors reviewed raw PI data for each of the indicators identified below and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly.
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Systems Unavailability - Emergency AC (data dates 6/2002 -
4/2003)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Systems Unavailability - High Pressure Coolant Injection (data dates 6/2002 - 4/2003)
The inspectors reviewed raw PI data and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify it was correctly included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sample of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report and calculated correctly.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other
Licensee Strike Contingency Plans
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's strike contingency plan to determine if reactor operation, facility security, and fire protection would be maintained consistent with site technical specifications and regulatory requirements in the event of a strike. This review was also conducted to determine if the licensee would have qualified personnel available to adequately staff the emergency response organization. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee had notified local law enforcement of a potential strike, verified local fire departments and emergency medical services would have unimpeded access to the site, made arrangements to receive support services and consumables from off-site vendors.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On July 9, 2003, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. George Frederick and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. Proprietary information was examined during the inspection, but is not included in this report.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- J. Betsill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- V. Coleman, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
- D. Davis, Plant Administration Manager
- R. Dedrickson, Engineering Support Manager
- G. Frederick, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
- M. Googe, Performance Team Manager
- J. Hammonds, Operations Manager
- W. Kirkley, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Madison, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- R. Reddick, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- P. Roberts, Outage and Planning Manager
- J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager