IR 05000321/2003004
| ML032900755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/2003 |
| From: | Brian Bonser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-03-004 | |
| Download: ML032900755 (19) | |
Text
ber 17, 2003
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2003004, 05000366/2003004
Dear Mr. Sumner:
On September 27, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 30, 2003, with Mr. George Frederick and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000321/2003004 and 05000366/2003004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57, NPF-5 Report Nos: 05000321/2003004 and 05000366/2003004 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility: E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location: P.O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates: June 29, 2003 - September 27, 2003 Inspectors: D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector N. Garrett, Resident Inspector L. Mellen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, and 4OA1)
B. Sartor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, and 4OA1)
R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, and 4OA1)
Approved By: Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000321/2003-04, 05000366/2003-04; 06/29/2003 - 09/27/2003; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 & 2; routine integrated report.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by regional emergency preparedness inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) during the inspection period, except for a brief power reduction following the loss of the Baxely loop on August 9.
Unit 2 operated at or near full RTP until July 22, 2003, when power was reduced to 86 percent RTP following trip of the A condensate pump. On July 23, power was increased to 92.5 percent RTP and the unit was returned to full RTP on July 26 following replacement of the A condensate pump motor. The unit operated at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period except for a brief power reduction on August 9, following the loss of the Baxley loop.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns of the following redundant trains or systems. The inspectors checked system valve position, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the redundant trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 B standby gas train (SBGT) and the Unit 2 A and B SBGT when the Unit 1 A SBGT was removed from service for maintenance
- Unit 1 A and B emergency diesel generators (EDG) when the Unit 1 C EDG was removed for maintenance
- Unit 1 B loop of residual heat removal (RHR) and the Unit 1 A and B loop of core spray when the Unit 1 A loop of RHR was removed for maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down nine risk significant areas, as identified in the licensees Independent Plant Evaluation for External Events, to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment and to verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire Protection Program, and conducted area walkdowns to assess the licensee's control of transient combustibles. The inspectors also reviewed the Site Fire Hazards Analysis and applicable Pre-Fire Plan drawings to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, was in place.
- Unit 1 Turbine Lubricating oil storage tank room - elevation 112'
- Unit 2 Turbine Lubricating oil storage tank room - elevation 112'
- Control Building air compressors - elevation 112'
- Control Building cableways - elevations 112' and 130'
- Control Building carbon dioxide and computer rooms - elevation 147'
- Control Building Reactor Protection System (RPS) Battery rooms - elevation 112'
- Control Building station battery rooms - elevation 112'
- Control Building equipment rooms - elevations 112' and 130'
- Control Building Health Physics areas - elevation 130'
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed plant design features that protect against external flooding and related procedures to verify the licensees flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. This included inspection of underground cable tunnels. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports and maintenance work orders to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of simulator scenario LT-SG-50343-10 which included a loss of B recirculation pump, a fire in the cable spreading room and a loss of coolant accident in the drywell. The inspectors reviewed procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence; and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors also reviewed procedure 73-EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, to verify that the event action level was correctly identified and reported.
The inspectors reviewed the previous crew critique report to identify continuing weaknesses. The inspectors attended the post exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two performance-based problems associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (MR) (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated condition reports (CR), maintenance work orders (MWO), and system health reports. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees MR reports and the MR scoping documents to determine that the systems were properly scoped, in the proper MR category, and appropriate actions were being taken on the systems. The review was conducted to determine if equipment failures were being identified, being properly assessed, and corrective actions were established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 instrument and service air system
- Unit 2 residual heat removal service water system
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five licensee Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. In addition, when emergent work was identified, the inspectors held discussions with licensee personnel and walked down plant systems to verify that actions were taken to minimize the probability of an initiating event and maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems.
- POD for Week 7/12 - 7/18
- POD for Week 7/19 - 7/25 including failure of Unit 2 A condensate pump
- POD for Week 8/16 - 8/22
- POD for Week 9/6 - 9/12
- POD for Week 9/13 - 9/19
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions
a. Inspection Scope
For the two non-routine events described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs and plant computer data, as applicable, and reviewed plant procedures to verify proper operator actions were taken.
- On July 22, 2003, the Unit 2 A condensate pump tripped when a ground occured in the pump motor. The unit was derated to approximately 86 percent RTP. The inspectors reviewed procedure 34AR-650-901-2S, ARPs (Alarm Response Procedures) for Control Panel 2H11-P650 Alarm Panel 1.
- On August 9, 2003, area electrical transients caused a loss of the Baxley Loop electrical supply, resulting in a loss of the helper cooling towers, and a derating to approximately 92.5 percent. The inspectors reviewed procedures 34AB-R81-001-0, Loss of the Baxley Loop, 34AB-N71-001-2, Circulating Water System Failure, and 34AB-N61-002-2, Main Condenser Vacuum Low.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors compared the following five operability evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specifications (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 Low Pressure Coolant Injection isolation valve 1E11F060A
- Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection Turbine Control Valve 2E41F3052
- Class 1E 250 VDC Station Service Batteries 1R42-S001B
- Class 1E 250 VDC Station Service Batteries 2R42-S001B
- Unit 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve 2B21F022C
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five MWOs to verify the requirements of procedure 95IT-OTM-001-0, Maintenance Work Order Functional Test, were met. The inspectors also reviewed the MWOs to determine if the scope of testing demonstrated that the work performed was correctly completed and the affected equipment was functional and operable. The inspectors reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function.
Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The MWOs reviewed included the following:
- MWO 20301959, Replacement of the 30 Amp Control Power Breaker in 2R22-S007 Frame 7
- MWO 10100626, Repair or Replace the Existing Seismic Breaker Supports for 1R22-S005 Frame 7 to Avoid Interference
- MWO 10102886, Replace Degraded Cables for the Unit 1 A RHRSW Pump
- MWO 20203333, Replace Unit 2 125V Vital AC Battery
- MWO 10203660, Inspect Unit 1 C Emergency Diesel Generator Intake Piping for Foreign Material
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for pre-conditioning of equipment, procedural adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended briefings to determine if procedural requirements were met.
- 34SV-R43-005-2, Diesel Generator 1B Semi-Annual Test
- 57SV-CAL-003-1, Analog Transmitter Trip System Transmitter Calibration
- 34SV-E11-001-2, Residual Heat Removal Pump Operability (IST)
- 34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability
- 34SV-C41-002-2, Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following two temporary modifications and assessed each using criteria as defined in licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018-0, Temporary Modification Control. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were assessed using the design basis information provided in the FSAR to verify the modifications did not affect the safety functions of these systems. The inspectors also verified the modifications were installed in accordance with the temporary modification requirements.
- TMM 01-03-010, 1N21/1P11/1P21 Condensate Pump Seal Water
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the scope, objectives, and scenario for the 2003 biennial, full-participation emergency response exercise conducted on August 20 to verify that they were designed to suitably test major elements of the licensees emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Section IV.F.2.f requirements. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in the exercise, as well as selected activities related to the licensees conduct and self-assessment of the exercise. The inspectors observed the conduct of the exercise to ensure that employees of the licensee were familiar with their specific emergency response duties in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Section IV.F.1.(a). Licensee activities observed during the exercise included those occurring in the control room simulator, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspectors evaluation focused on the risk significant activities of event classification, notification of governmental authorities, onsite protective actions, offsite protective action recommendations, and accident mitigation. The inspectors also evaluated command and control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, adherence to procedures, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensees self-assessment process, as well as the presentation of critique results to plant management.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed changes to the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) as contained in Revision 18, against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine whether any of the changes decreased REP effectiveness.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency plan drill conducted on July 23, 2003. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and EOF to verify implementation of procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0S, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated event and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed procedure 73EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PI) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation And Reporting Of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS Leakage The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected between July 2002 and June 2003 for each of the indicators identified below and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly.
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Systems Unavailability - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected between June 2002 and June 2003 and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify it was correctly included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report and calculated correctly.
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill/Exercise Performance
- ERO Drill Participation The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance (DEP) over the past eight quarters through review of a sample of drill and event records.
The inspectors reviewed training records to assess the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation during the previous eight quarters for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of CR 2003000989. This CR was associated with a leaking outlet valve for the 2A emergency diesel generator cooling water (2P41F339A). The report was reviewed to ensure the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the report against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in procedures 10AC-MGR-004-0, Corrective Action Program, and AG-MGR-64-1198N, Condition Report Processing; and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors noted the operability determination performed for this valve assumed the same failure mechanism as a similar valve, and subsequent operability based upon this assumption. However, upon disassembly of this valve, it was noted the failure mechanism was different than the similar valve. This called into question the validity of the operability determination for the valve being evaluated. Furthermore, it was noted the CR disposition had been changed, rather than updated, when additional information was found. This resulted in a loss of historical data for this valve failure, as well as the assumptions for the original operability determination.
Although the operability determination was incorrect, the valve function was determined to have remained operable. The inspectors verified the corrective actions associated with the CR revision had been appropriate and timely.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
1. (Closed) LER 05000321/2003001-00, Broken Reactor Protection System (RPS) Neutral
Bolt Resulted in RPS Bus Trip On June 6, 2003, the Unit 1 RPS bus A tripped when the bolt connecting the neutral cable to the RPS bus broke removing the normal power source. The bus trip resulted in a half scram signal and the corresponding containment isolation and other automatic actions. The licensee aligned RPS power to the alternate power source and reset the half scram signal. The licensee subsequently replaced the bolt and returned RPS to the normal power source. No findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented the equipment failure in CR 2003006522.
2. (Closed) LER 05000366/2003002-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System
Inoperable After Performing Major Maintenance On March 29, 2003, surveillance procedure 34SV-E41-005-2, HPCI Pump Operability 165 PSIG Test, was being conducted after performing major maintenance on the system during the refueling outage. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the turbine control valve did not open. Subsequent investigation showed two electrical links were found open from previous maintenance activities. These links were closed and the surveillance procedure performed again. However, the turbine control valve went to the fully open position. Investigations showed the magnetic speed pick-up sensor had been incorrectly set sending a speed value of zero to the governor control system. The sensor setting was adjusted and the surveillance completed successfully. No findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented the equipment failures in CR 2003004069 and 2003004076.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On September 30, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
George Frederick and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- J. Betsill, Engineering Support Manager
- V. Coleman, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
- D. Davis, Plant Administration Manager
- R. Dedrickson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- G. Frederick, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
- M. Googe, Performance Team Manager
- J. Hammonds, Operations Manager
- W. Kirkley, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Madison, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- R. Reddick, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
- R. Varnadore, Outage and Planning Manager
NRC Personnel
- B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- L. Plisco, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000321/2003001-00 LER Broken Reactor Protection System (RPS) Neutral Bolt Resulting in Bus Trip (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000366/2003002-00 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable After Performing Major Maintenance (Section 4OA3.2)