IR 05000315/1986033
| ML17324B106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1986 |
| From: | Muffett J, Smeenge R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17324B105 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-86-33, 50-316-86-33, NUDOCS 8610210074 | |
| Download: ML17324B106 (12) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/86033(DRS);
50-316/86033(DRS)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licenses No.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Corporate Headquarters, Columbus, OH and D.C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, MI Inspection Conducted:
August 25-28 and September 29-30, 1986 Inspector:
R.
Smeenge Approved By:
James W. Muffett, Chiet Plant System Section Io
~4, ate fo lg 84 ate Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Au ust 25-28 and Se tember 29-30 1986 (Re orts No. 50-315/86033(DRS).
o.
"
86 33 S
~Ad:
R f, d
f y
'
f by Rf f
f p
of l>censee actions on previous inspection findings on April 21-30, 1986 regarding the environmental qualification of electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8610210074 861016 PDR ADOCK 05000315
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted American Electric Power Service Cor oration (AEPSC)
- M. P. Alexich, Vice President AEPSC
"R.
F. Kroeger, AEPSC Manager of QA
"J.
G. Feinstein, Manager of Nuclear Safety and Licensing
"D. T. Cooper, QA Engineer
"R.
L. Shoberg, Assistant Section Manager I8C
~W.
G. Satos, I8C Engineer
"D.
E.
VanDeusen, NS8L Engineers
"L. F.
Caso, Assistant Section Manager EGS-N
~K. J.
Munson, Associate Engineer EGS-N
"M.
W. Evarts, NS8L
"P.
A. Barrett, NSBL Indiana and Michi an Power Com an D.C.
Cook Plant W. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
- "A. A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager
- "J.
E. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager
- "C. A. Ross, Engineering Staff
~"B. A. Svensson, Licensing Activities Coordinator
- "M. M. Terry, QC/ACC
- "T. J.
Kanger, Maintenance/ACC
~"J.
D. Allard, Maintenance Superintendent
"*J. J.
Nadean, AEPSC Site QA B. Harvey, AEPSC Nuclear Safety and Licensing (phone)
"Denotes those present during the exit meeting interview at Columbus, OH on August 28, 1986.
~"Denotes those present during the exit meeting interview at D.C.
Cook site on September 30, 1986.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s a ~
(Open) Potential Enforcement/Unresolved Items (PE/UI) (50-315/86015-03; 50-316/86015-03):
This item addressed Limitorque motor operators containing unqualified jumper wires.
Using Procedure 12MHP-SP-107, the licensee has inspected jumper wires in all EQ identified Limitorque motor operators.
The licensee's inspection, which was, completed during July 1986, identified four operators in Unit 1 and three operators in Unit 2 where unqualified jumper wires were replaced with qualified jumper wires at the time they were identified.
The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure and inspection data sheets and found them to be satisfactory.
This item will remain open pending further review of the licensee's actions in this matte (Open)
PE/UI (50-316/86015-04):
This item addressed the omission of "T" drains and grease relief valves on Eg Limitorque motor operators.
Subsequent to the unresolved item, the licensee inspected all Eg operators for installation of "T" drains and grease relief valves.
As a result of this licensee inspection and a review of qualification test data, the licensee has determined that eight operators in each unit qualified with "T" drains were installed in the plant units.
Installation of "T" drains in these'perators was completed during June 1986.
During the NRC Eg team inspection plant walkdown, an inspector also found that the operator on valve IMO-54 did not have a grease relief valve installed.
The licensee has evaluated the function of this valve and has determined the operator is not required to operate during a DBA.
The operator has been deleted from the list of operators which are required to be environmentally qualified.
This iteq remains open pending further review.
(Closed)
PE/UI (50-316/86015-17):
This item addressed the lack of qualification of the interfaces/associated equipment of ASCO solenoid valve XSO-122.
During this review the licensee has provided an evaluation (File Eg. 0519) which indicated that the solenoid interfaces did not affect the valves environmental qualification.
Based on this evaluation it was determined that failure of any associated equipment would cause the valve to fail in the accident safe position.
The SCEW sheets S'3, S'9, S'l and S'2 have been revised to indicate that associated equipment does not require environmental qualification.
(Closed)
PE/UI (50-315/86015-21; 50-316/86015-21):
This item addressed the installation of Foxboro pressure transmitters.
FFC-230 and FFC-241 were installed without a weep hole in the low-point of the associated electrical conduits or the use of silicon sealant in the conduits to prevent moisture intrusion.
The licensee evaluated the installed configurations as documented in Condition Reports 1-08-86-999, 2-08-86-999, and -999a through-999d.
Based on these Condition Reports, Foxboro informed the licensee that the weep-hole used in the test configuration was to avoid the "backing-up" of condensate from the chemical spray into the integral junction box which housed terminal blocks known to be susceptible to leakage currents when exposed to chemical spray.
The weep-hole design was carried over to the second test configuration which was used at D.C.
Cook.
The second configuration incorporates an internal instrument splice to a Conaxaseal assembly with no integral junction box or terminal block installed.
In both test configurations the conduit looped up after the weep-hole and then was routed down to a penetration at the bottom of the test chamber.
At this penetration the flex conduit was sealed which created a potential for the "pooling" of chemical spray condensate during the test.
In this respect, the tested configuration is similar to what is in the D.C.
Cook Plant configuration.
The licensee reported that due to the construction
of the integral junction box and the location of the spliced pigtails in the box, the splices would not be submerged, and.the licensee agreed to renew the splices in the field to ensure that the splices would not be submerged.
The potential for pigtail submergence failure is also much less of a concern for the D.C.
Cook configuration due to the following reasons:
The speculated submergence involves a steam condensate which theoretically should be at a pH value which is less severe than the chemical spray exposure during the test.
The installed Kapton insulated pigtails of the Conax Seal assembly are individually protected by the application of a heat shrinkable polyolefin jacket.
The test configuration, which exposed the Kapton insulated pigtails to the test chamber environments through the weep-hole, demonstrated the ability of the pigtail wires to withstand harsh chemical conditions even without a protective heat shrink jacket.
The requirement for the sealant in PDS-1341-4 is now considered by the licensee to be an over conservative design.
The conduit/trans-mitter couplings were not sealed during the environment qualification testing of the transmitter.
Omission of the sealant more closely follows the test sample configuration.
Note 2 on PDS-1341-5 has been changed to, "Entrance and Exit of conduit may be sealed with approved RTV silicon caulking compound (Not required)."
This evaluation is located in file Eg 134L.
e.
(Open)
Open Item (50-315/86015-05; 50-316/86015-05):
Thi s item addressed a lack of a definition of harsh environment in the licensees Eg documents.
The licensee reported that they are preparing specific plant profiles to more clearly define 'harsh environments within the scope
CFR 50.49.
The licensee's estimate for completion of this effort is December 1986.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-06; 50-316/86015-06):
This item addressed a lack of procedures to assure that appropriate quality and regulatory requirements were included in Eg procurement documentation, and concerns regarding inadequate document reviews between cognizant engineering groups.
During this review, the inspector determined that the licensee had implemented controlling procedures for the procurement of environmentally qualified equipment and review of Eg data.
The following procedures were reviewed by the NRC inspector and found acceptable.
GP 3.6, "Environmentally qualified Equipment," Revision 0, effective September 2, 1986, with Procedure Change Sheet dated September 25, 1986.
GP 4. 1, "Procurement of Environmental qualified Spare and Replacement Components,"
Revision 0, effective September ll, 198 g.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-07; 50-316/86015-07):
This item addressed concerns regarding the qualification of EP-14 Conax Electrical Penetrations assemblies because the Eg files only provided qualification data for the EP-Ol through EP-13 penetrations.
The licensee has since provided an engineering analysis (File Eg 0001A) for the qualification of the EP-14 penetration based on the qualification of the EP-02 through EP-13 penetrations.
The inspector reviewed this evaluation and found it acceptable.
File Eg 0001B provides information from Conax Corporation which supports the licensee analysis.
h.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-08; 50-316/86015-08):
The qualifica-tion file identified only 10 AWG Kapton insulated feedthrough wires with no supporting data for qualification of other wire sizes.
Subsequent to the audit, File Eg-0013J has been revised to include environmental qualification reports for Kapton wire sizes 12,
and
AWG and 1000 MCM.'Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-11; 50-316/86015-11):
This item addressed the lack of a qualified life calculation for Limitorque motor operator motors in the qualification files.
Calculations establishing a qualified life in excess of 40 years for all Limitorque motors were verified to have been added to file Eg-0142A.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-12; 50-316/86015-12):
This item addressed documentation errors identified in the Eg file for Limitorque motor operators.
The NRC inspector reviewed the following. correction:
The Master Equipment List (MEL) incorrectly referenced the qualification information for valve operators FMO-211 (page 17),
FMO-221 (page 19),
FMO-231 (Page 21) and FMO-241 (page 23)
to be referenced on SCEW Sheet V-6.
The MEL has since been corrected to properly identify V-12 as the appropriate SCEW sheet.
SCEW sheets TC 13-1 identified the terminal block manufacturer and TC 8-1 identified the splice manufacturer as "not applicable."
TC 13-1 listed a qualified life of 40 years for Penn Union terminal blocks and incorrectly referenced file Eg-177 to support the 40 year qualification of these terminal blocks.
SCEW sheet TC 13-1 has since been revised to identify Marathon and Penn Union, as the terminal block manufacturers, and to correctly identify the qualification files Eg 45C for the Marathon terminal blocks and Eg 117A for the Penn Union terminal blocks.
TC 8-1 has been revised to identify Raychem as the splice manufacturers k.
(Closed)
Open Item.(50-315/86015-13; 50-316/86015-13);.
This item addressed documentation errors identified in Eg files for ASCO solenoid valves and Foxboro Pressure Transmitters.
The NRC inspector reviewed the following corrections made in these files:
ASCO solenoid valve, plant IE XS0-505, Unit 2, SCEW file number 2411-1 had not included an analysis to justify removal of the cable terminations from the Environmental qualification Equipment List (E(EL).
The SCEM sheet has since been revised to identify file Eg 0519 as a reference for justification of removal of cable terminations from the EgEL.
SCEW Sheet TC 13-1 for ASCO solenoid valves, plant ID Nos.
XSO-292 and XS0-297, SCEW sheet TC 13-1 did not identify the terminal block manufacturer.
This item has been discussed in Section 2j of this report.
Pressure transmitter SCEW sheet I-20, for plant ID NPP-152, Unit 2 and the associated qualification documentation had only addressed the originally installed ITT Barton pressure transmitters, even though these transmitters had been replaced with Foxboro transmitters.
The SCEW shee't was verified to have since been corrected to properly identify the Foxboro transmitter Model E-ll GM-HI E2 and associated qualification references.
Foxboro transmitters, plant ID Nos.
FFI-230, FFI-240 and NPS 122, Unit-2 do not have weep-holes at the lowest point of the connected electrical conduit, but do have the conduits sealed with an approved silicon sealant in accordance with construction drawing PDS 1341-4, Note 2.
PDS 1341-4 had not been referenced on the SCEM sheet or other Eg documentation.
An analysis and evaluation of the installed condition verses the tested condition (with weep-holes)
was verified to have since been documented in file Eg-134K.
This file, which contains a copy of PDS 1341-4, has been referenced on the SCEM sheet.
ITT Barton transmitters, plant ID Nos.
NLI-110, 120 and 121 of Unit 1 and No.
NLA-310 of Unit 2 were previously identified as being in the process of being replaced with Foxboro transmitters; however, qualification documentation for these Foxboro transmitters was not in the qualification files.
During this review, the licensee stated that these ITT Barton transmitters (which have a remaining qualified life of 4 years)
will not be replaced at this time.
The NRC inspector determined that the qualification files for these transmitters were acceptable until the transmitters are replaced.
The SCEM sheet for Barton transmitters NLA-310 had previously referenced Eg documentation file 62 for electrical connectors.
This file had also contained superseded documents 62, 62A, 62B and 62C.
The superseded documents have since been removed to an inactive file as part of the general purge of superseded documents from all file '
V P
(Open)
Open Item (50-315/86015-15; 50-316/86015-15):
This item addressed the evaluation of a licensee response to IE Information Notice 84-90.
The licensee has contracted INPELL to provide a
plant specific analysis of the D.C.
Cook plant with regards to the Mestinghouse revised mass and energy release from MSLBs.
The initial analysis, received and reviewed by AEPSC in July, 1986, used some assumed inputs which were identified during the AEPSC review to be inconsistent with plant parameters.
The revised analysis is now scheduled to be completed during September, 1986.
Implementation of the new values into the APESC Eg program is now scheduled for December 1986.
From the initial analysis and based on what is known at this time APESC does not anticipate any major problems with equipment, installed in the plant.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-20; 50-316/86015-20):
This item addressed Eg files for ASCO solenoid valves plant, ID Nos.
XSO-292 and XSO-297.
These files did not contain an evaluation to establish requirements for drain holes in the valve terminal block enclosures.
During this review, the inspector determined that file Eg 0519 had been updated to provide an evaluation which indicated that the failure of any associated equipment, including the terminal blocks, would cause the valve to fail in an accident safe position.
Thus drain holes would not affect the qualification of the ASCO solenoid valves.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-18; 50-316/86015-18):
This item addressed electrical conduits for Foxboro Transmitters, plant ID Nos.
NPP-152, Unit 2; FFC-241, Unit 1 and FFC-230, Units 1 and 2.
The installed conduits connected to these transmitters did not have the tested configuration of weep-holes at the low point of the conduit, but had silicon sealing in accordance with construction drawing PDS 1341-4.
The analysis in the Eg file, however, did not address the installed configuration of silicon sealant connections.
As previously discussed in Section 2d of this report the licensee has provided this analysis in file Eg 134K and this analysis has now been identified on SCEM sheet Tl-17 for both units.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86015-19; 50-316/86015-19):
This item addressed discrepancies in the documentation and field identification of cables used in the Victoreen radiation systems.
This system was a new installation and all documentation had not been updated prior to the initial review.
The cable pull card records and HEL pages 249 and 250 have subsequently been revised to identify the cables installed.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-316/86015-16):
This item addressed a loose conduit at the junction box for Unit 2 Limtorque motor operator FHO-211.
The licensee has tightened the loose conduit which was verified by the NRC inspecto 'imitor ue Motor 0 erators Malkdown Ins ection The NRC inspector performed a visual inspection of Limitorque motor operators which had jumper wires replaced or "T" drains installed.
The following valves were included in this inspection:
Unit 2:
MM0-714, 724 and 726 Unit 1 IMP-910 Units 1 and 2:
FMO 211, 221, 231 and 241 The NRC inspector verified that "T" drains had been installed on the FMO valves in accordance with a Request For Change (RFC) 12-2930.
The inspector also observed that on the Unit 2 valve operator MM0-726, did not have one corner bolt tightened down.
The licensee issued Job Order 700454 to tighten this bolt and the completion of the work was verified by the NRC inspector.
On the Unit 1 operator for valve FM0-231, the NRC inspector found a loose
"sealtite" conduit connection at the Limitorque housing.
The licensee issued Job Order 004736 to tighten the "sealtite,"
however, the "sealtite" could not be tightened and needed to be replaced because of damaged threads.
Upon further investigation it was determined that this conduit had recently been installed to accommodate signal cables from the operator to the Technical Support Center (RDR/RFC 12-2456).
All wor k on this RDR/RFC has not been completed and records could not be located in a timely manner for the NRC inspector's review during this inspection.
Valve FMO-231 is the control valve for the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump to steam generator No.
3 and is located in the Startup Blowdown Flashtank room near the pipe tunnel.
The licensee stated that this valve is normally open and in the event of an accident this valve is required to stay open.
The safety significance of this loose "sealtite" is that in the event of an accident, moisture could enter the Limitorque housing and prevent the Limitorque from operating, however, since the valve is not required to activate during or after an accident, no immediate concerns were identified.
Pending NRC's review of the licensee's evalution of the operablility of this valve, replacement of the "sealtite,"
and review of the records for RDR/RFC 12-2456 this is considered an Unresolved Item.
(50-315/86033-01(DRS) )
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are 'acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph S.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspe'ctor summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of this inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by 'the inspector during this inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.