IR 05000315/1986034
| ML17324B115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1986 |
| From: | Baer R, Cortland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17324B114 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-86-34, 50-316-86-34, NUDOCS 8611070191 | |
| Download: ML17324B115 (8) | |
Text
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Reports No.:
50-315/86034(DRS),
50-316/86034(DRS)
Docket No.:
50-315 and 50-316 Licensee Nos.:
DPR-58-and DPR-74 Licensee:
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and
Inspection At:
D.
C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
September 8 - 12, 1986 Inspector:
P. Cort an Accompanying Personnel:
B. Jorgensen
~~~ 9 i9b'w Date Sl gne Approved By:
Robert L. Baer, Chief Engineering and Generic Communications Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response
<9i /PFX Date Signed Inspection Summary Inspection on September 8 through 12, 1986 (Reports No.
50-315/86034(DRS),
No. 50-316/86034(DRS))
Area Inspected:
Verification of implementation of an effective program for preventing overpressure transients at low temperatures from adversely affecting safety-related systems.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8gf1P7019'1 861104
" PDRADOCK 05000315
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DETAILS l.
Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel
- A. A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager
- R. W. Hennen, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering
- D. L. Gallagher, Compliance Coordinator, guality Control
- M. M. Terry, Compliance Coordinator, guality Control
- R. Russell, Planning/I&C
- W. A. Nichols, Training Manager, Administration
- L. S.
Gibson, Administration
- J.
R.
Sampson, Production Supervisor, Operations E. A. Abshagan, Staff Engineer, Planning/I&C D.
M. Draper, Procedure Coordinator S.
DeLong, Supervisor, I&C M. Stark, Performance W. Davidson, Senior Instructor, Administration AEPSC Personnel
- K. R. Worthington, Senior Auditor, Site guality Assurance T. Satyansharma, Safety and Licensing A. J.
Lewandowski, Piping and Valves C.
C. Savitscus, Instrumentation and Controls USNRC Personnel
- B. Jorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also interviewed other personnel during the course of the inspection including members of the licensee's technical, operating, and administration staff.
2.
- Denotes persons attending the exit meeting of September 12, 1986.
Inspection Scope and Objectives The objective of this inspection was to verify that Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 have implemented an effective program for preventing overpressure transients at low temperatures from adversely affecting safety-related systems.
To accomplish this objective, selected portions of the Safety Evaluation Reports of March ll, 1982 and August 9, 1985 and Amendments 53 and 88 (DPR-58)
and 39 (DPR-74) to the Technical Specifica-tions were reviewed for their implementation.
This inspection has been divided into several areas:
design, administra-tive controls and procedures, training and equipment modification, and surveillance.
The plan was to summarize the observations as follows:
a.
Items that have been verifie b.
Items that have been verified using alternate methods.
c.
Items scheduled for implementation.
d.
Items not scheduled for implementation, 3.
Design a.
b.
Design in accordance with the
CFR 50 Appendix G limits.
The SERs dated March ll, 1982 and August 9, 1985 show that the system was designed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix G limits.
The system protects the vessel given a single failure in addition to a failure that initiated the transient.
C.
Description of system protection for the additional failure was found in the 1982 SER and an AEPSC letter dated January 25, 1977.
The system is not vulnerable to an event which both causes a pressure transient and a failure of equipment needed to terminate the transient.
d.
The design has redundant air and electrical systems.
In addition, the circuit drawings show that in the event of loss of offsite power, the PORV solenoids are battery powered and the block valves are powered by the diesel generators.
Active components have analysis for inadvertent actuation.
Inadvertent actuation of a PORV at normal pressures and temperatures will not cause flow because the block valve is closed.
e.
Plant-specific analysis for PORV setpoints.
The setpoint analysis was found in the SERs and ECP 12-NI-05 Rev. 4,
"Low Temperature High Pressure Protection Setpoint Calculation".
CFR 50.59 evaluation.
g, The evaluation was accepted in the SERs.
IEEE 279 design and redundancy in actuation controls.
IEEE 279 is concerned with the separation of electric circuits and two trains are used.
The actuation portions of the systems are redundant.
h.
Findings The pressurizer is never intentionally water-solid.
The system was.
designed to give ten minutes of protection without reactor operator intervention.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Administrative Controls and Procedures
'a ~
Minimize the time in a water-solid condition.
The pressurizer is not water-solid per 1-OHP 4021.001.004 Rev.
13,
"Plant Cooldown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown", the procedure for Unit 1.
The licensee indicated that the procedure is the same for Unit 2.
b.
Minimize temperature differentials between the steam generator and the reactor vessel while water-solid.
c ~
The pressurizer is not water-solid.
Restrict the number of safety injection charging pumps.
Only one pump shall be operable per 1-OHP 4021.001.004.
Tech Specification paragraph 3.5.3 specifies the removal of the additional pumps and circuit breakers.
d.
Installation in accordance with the FSAR.
e.
The system is in accordance with the FSAR.
Caution operators about automatic operation of the system.
The reactor operators are cautioned about spurious safety injections per 1-OHP 4021.001.004.
The operators are given instruction in the automatic operation of the system.
~
~
f.
Manually align the system for operation using verification.
The PORV overpressure protection switches are placed in the unblocked position per 1-OHP 4021.001.004.
The annunciators are automatic and are explained in procedures 2-OHP 4024. 108.034 and 2-OHP 4024. 108.040.
The annunciator setpoints for Unit 1 were changed in 1985, but the procedures contained the old values.
These procedures were corrected during the inspection.
g.
Verify that equipment is deenergized.
The breakers for the accumulator isolation valves, high head injec-tion, safety injection discharge and boron injection tank valves are deenergized per 1-OHP 4021.001.004.
Verification was found for the shutdown of Ouly 23-24, 1986.
h.
Maintain a bubble in the primary system during shutdown.
This is a requirement of procedure 1-OHP 4021.001.004 unless the primary system is opened.
Remove the low temperature overpressure protection system on tempera-ture increase to prevent inadvertent actuatio The overpressure protection switches are placed in the blocked position during startup per I-OHP 4021.001.001 Rev.
12, "Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby".
Findings No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Training and Equipment Modification a
~
Reactor coolant system low temperature overpressure event causes, operation and maintenance of the system that mitigates the events, and the consequences of inadvertent actuation.
The operators have received training in the operation and maintenance of the system that mitigates overpressurization.
The training for all non-licensed personnel planning to become reactor operators is RO-C-NC03, "Pressurizer and Pressure Relief", which is an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> lesson with an examination.
The causes of low temperature overpressurization events is covered in the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> lesson RO-C-NS2A,
The consequences of inadvertent actuation is generally covered in the training on "Pressurizer and Pressure Relief" and RO-C-TN06, "Instrument Failures Affecting Pressurizer Pressure and Level", which is a one hour lesson for licensed operator replacement training.
The training attendance list was furnished for a recent class on
"Pressurizer and Pressure Relief".
Two employees on the list were contacted and they verified taking the course.
b.
Permanent modifications and procedure changes Unneeded high pressure injection and charging pumps are deenergized during the transition from hot standby to cold shutdown.
During RCS cooldown, annunciators will alarm when the RCS pressure is less than a preset value.
This will notify the reactor operator to place the selector switches for the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) 'in the
'UNBLOCKED'osition. If the RCS pressure, as detected by two wide range pressure transmitters, exceeds another preset value while the system is active, the PORVs will open and reduce the RCS pressure.
Annunciators will alarm indicating RCS pressurization and activation of the PORVs.
During heatup, the system has to be manually deacti-vated by placing the selector switches in the 'BLOCKED'osition and the high pressure pumps and valves are manually energized.
Since the system is Seismic Class I and the control air to contain-ment is isolated on a containment isolation signal, a compressed air cylinder was installed for each PORV as a backup air supply to open the valves.
Annunciators will alarm when the pressure in the cylin-ders decreases below a preset leve C.
d.
e.
The annunciators for this system are on the Pressurizer Annunciator Panel in both of the control rooms with the manually operated block switches located below the panels.
The breakers for the Unit I isolation valves, motor control centers, and SIS pumps are located in the Electrical Bay.
The air cylinders are inside containment and were not accessible to the inspector because of the limited time available for the inspection.
Modification placing equipment out of original design basis There were not any modifications to the PORVs.
Annunciators to alert the reactor operator to a transient.
Annunciators 8-029 and 8-039 alert the control room personnel to a reactor coolant system overpressure and the opening of the PORVs.
Backup air supply sufficient for 10 minutes of operation.
Air cylinder calculations are based on the cylinder pressure being slightly above the annunciator low pressure set point.
At this pressure, there was sufficient air for 10 minutes of operation in the original design.
The setpoint was raised in 1985, further increasing the capability of the backup air supply.
Findings No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance a 0 Periodic verification of PORV electronics and setpoints.
The air cylinder low pressure annunciators and their setpoints are tested monthly per I THP 4030 STP.087,
"Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Emergency Air Pressure Alarms Surveillance Test Month-ly".
The most recent test document was examined and the Surveillance History Report system furnished the dates of the last seven monthly inspections.
The interlock bistables of the PORVs are tested monthly per I THP 4030 STP.089,
"Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Interlock Bistables Surveillance Test".
This procedure checks the blocking annunciators and the pressure setpoints.
The most recent test document was examined and the Surveillance History Report system furnished the dates of the last four monthly tests.
Calibration of the equipment is performed every refueling outage per I THP 6030 IMP. 147, "Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure Protection Sets II and III Calibration".
b.
Perform tests prior to shutdow The operability of the PORVs is measured while the plant is in transition from hot standby to cold shutdown per 1-OHP 4021.001.004.
c.
Perform tests after maintenance.
There 'has not been any recent maintenance besides changing air cylinders and tightening the pressure regulators and preoperational tests could not be verified.
d.
Findings No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph I)
on September 12, 1986.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, noting that the review of the calculations had not been completed at that time.
The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector.
The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with the regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
8.
Documents Reviewed 1-OHP 4021.001.001 Rev.
12 Change
1-OHP 4021. 001. 004 Rev.
1-OHP 4024.108.034 Rev.
1-OHP 4030.STP.030 1 THP 4030 STP.087 Rev.
Change
1 THP 4030 STP.089 Rev.
Change
1 THP 6030 IMP.147 Rev.
Change
Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby
- Plant Cooldown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Annunciator Panel Number
Pressure Annunciator 034 Data/Signoff Sheet Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Emergency Air Pressure Alarms Surveillance'est Monthly Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Interlock Bistables Surveillance Test Reactor Coolant System Mide Range Pressure Protection Sets II and III Calibration 2-OHP 4024.208.040 Rev.
12-NI-05 Rev.
Annunciator Panel Number 8 Pressurizer Annunciator 040 Low Temperature High Pressure Protection Setpoint Calculation
RO-C-NS03 Diagrams Pressurizer and Pressure Relief Lesson Plan OP-1-98204-7 OP-2-98055-2 OP-2-98056-7 OP-2-98057-2 OP-2-98058-9 OP-2-98204-11 Letter from D. F. Galino to R. L. Shoberg, dated January 25, 1977, subj:
DC Cook Plant RCS Overpressurization Redundant Protection Scheme RFC-DC-12-1332 8