IR 05000309/1981006
| ML20004E354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Lazarus W, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004E352 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-81-06, 50-309-81-6, NUDOCS 8106120065 | |
| Download: ML20004E354 (13) | |
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h U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50309-810316 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50309-810331 Region I Report No.
81-06 Docket No.
50-309 Category C
License No.
DPR-36 Priority
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Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Wiscasset, Maine Inspection conducted: March 2 - April 7, 1981 Inspectors:
Ra W
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o P/
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, Rea tor Inspector Date signed vAnd
+h/r P. Swetland, Reactor Inspector Date signed Date signed k
20 0 $
R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Date signed Section No. 1A, DRPI Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 2 - April 7,1981 (Report No. 50-309/81-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, regular and backshift inspection by two resident inspectors.
(148 hours0.00171 days <br />0.0411 hours <br />2.44709e-4 weeks <br />5.6314e-5 months <br />) Areas inspected included the Control Room, Turbine Building, Primary Auxiliary Building, Spray Building and Auxiliary Feed Pump Room. Activities / Records inspected included radiation protection, physical security, plant operations, maintenance and surveillance testing, followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars, followup on TMI Action Plan items, followup on events occurring during the inspection and followup of previous inspection findings.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no items of. noncompliance were observed; two deviations from commitments to tre NRC were identified in one area (Failure to
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complete Shift Technical Advisor training as committed; and, Failure to have procedures to sample for airborne iodine - Paragraph 8).
I Region I Form 12 g106120 b l
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted P. Anderson, Administrative Department Head R. Arsenault, Plant Shift Superintendent J. Brinkler, Technical Support Department Head G. Cochrane, Health Physics Supervisor B. Hoyt Security Supervisor W. Paine, Operations Department Head J. Randazza, Vice President, Operations S. Sadosky, QA and Audit Coordinator D. Sturniolo, Technical Assistant to the Plant Manager E. Wood, Plant Manager R. Wyckoff, Senior Plant Engineer The inspectors also interviewed several plant operators, technicians and members of the engineering and administrative staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/80-11-02). The licensee determined that closing these two isolation valves would disable the automatic recharging feature to three of six starting air flasks for each diesel generator (EDG).
Since each EDG has two separate starting
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systems, only one of which is required to start the diesel, the added separation of the closed isolations was outweighed by the complication they would impose on the recharging evolution. The licensee plans to maintain the present system lineup. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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3.
Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation through-out the reporting period.
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a.
Instrumentation Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Annunciator Alarms _
The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equipment associated with various alarms.
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During an inspection tour of the Control Room on March 10, 1981 the inspector noted that the Spent Fuel Pool low level alarm was annunciated on the Main Control Board. Discussions with the Senior Control Room Operator (SCRO) indicated that makeup water was-being added to clear the low level condition and that the cause of the low level had been identified as fuel pool water leaking into the f.uel building sump. The sump would have to be pumped to waste treatment before the source of leakage could be identified.
Further discussions with the SCR0 the afternoon of March 10, 1981 revealed that the leakage had been from the fuel pool pre-and post-filter drain valves which had been partially opened during performance of procedure 1-17-1, " Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification", to place the purification system in service. The valves were partially opened when the operator attempted to match the position indicators on the reach-rods with the " closed" mark. Subsequent investigation revealed that the reach-rod operated globe valves did not have stops for the open and closed positions, making it very difficult to position the valves correctly. A Maintenance Request (MR 0400-81) was issued to install new stops on the valves to insure correct positioning. The inspector verified that this MR had been completed by March 12, 1981.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
c.
Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffeo to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of licenses.
Control room and shift manning were observed to Le in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
d.
Radiation Protection Controls Radiation Protection control areas were inspected.
Radiation Work Pennits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was j
inspected.
Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation l
areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing
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of appropriate personal monitoring devices. There were no unaccep-table conditions identified.
e.
Plant Housekeeping Controls
' br.* age of material and components was observed with respect to
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p. _vention of fire and safety hazards. Plant housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
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f.
Fire Protection / Prevention The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. Combustible materials were ceing controlled I
and were not found near vital areas. Seleted cable penetrations i
were examined and fire barriers were found intact. Cable trays were clear of debris.
g.
Control of Equipment _
During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined.
Equipment conditions were consistent with information in plant control logs. The inspector verified the proper return to service condition of a containment spray pump (Local Control Tagout 155-81) on March 25, 1981.
No a6 normal cor-ditions were identified.
h.
Equipment Lineups The inspector verified that the major valve and switch positions we e correct to insure Operability of the Safety Injection System, Safety Injection Accumulators, Containment Spray, and Emergency Diesel Generators, by observation of the Main Control Board and inspections in the Diesel Generator Rooms and Spray Building.
No abnormal conditions were identified.
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Radioactive Waste System Control The inspector observed the release of radioactive i1 quid waste authorized by discharge permits #1552 and 1558 on March 11 and 25, 1981, respectively. The discharge permits were reviewed to verify that proper approval was obtained, samples were taken and Balyzed, and that effluent release controls were set and working properly.
The inspector witnessed the line up of the "A" test tank on March 11, 1981 in accordance with procedure 1-19-2 Rev 13, Test Tank Release and Recycle.
No inadequacies were identified.
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Emergency Plan Training Reference: MYEP 2.50.0-18, Revision 0 On March 24, 1981, the inspector attended training lectures for plant operating personnel covering the implementing procedures for the revised Emergency Plan (which becomes effective on April 1, 1981). Attendance was observed to be in accordance with the training schedule and the content of the program was satisfactory. No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and records cova-ing the inspection time period against Technical Specifi-cations and Administrative Procedure Requirements.
Included 1n the review were:
Control Room Log
- daily during control room surveillance Jumper and Lifted Leads Log
- all active entries Mehtenance Requests and Jub Orders
- all active entries Safety Tag Log
- all active entries Plant Recorder Traces
- daily during control room surveillance Plant Process Computer Printed Output
- daily during control room surveillance Night Orders
- daily during control room surveillance The logs and recordt were reviewed to verify that entries are properly made and communicate equipment status / deficiencies; records are being reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Tech-nical Specifications; logs detail no violations of Technical Specifica-tion or reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accmfance with Technical Specification and Administrative Control Procedure requirements.
Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and discussion with licensee personnel. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
Observation of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures.
a.
Physical Protection Security Organization Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full
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time member of the security organization with authority to di,ect physical security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to
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be as required.
b.
Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of iso-lation zones was performed.
Observations of truck and car searches were mad.
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Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging
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Access control searches
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Escorting
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Communications
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Compensatory measures when required.
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At approximately 4:00 PM on March 16, 1981, the Resident Inspector observed an apparent noncompliance regarding the licensee's I
security program. A Region I physical protection specialist was dispatched to the site on March 18,198i.
Details of that inspec-tion are included in the IE Inspection Report 050-309/81-08.
i-6.
Followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars
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Licenste action concerning the following IE Bulletins and Circulars was reviewed to verify that:
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The Bulletin or Circular was forwarded to appropriate onsite
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managemant.
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A review for applicability was performed.
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When applicable, appropriate corrective actions have been taken
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or are scheduled to be taken.
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And in the case of the IE Bulletins:
Written response (when required) was within the stated time period
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and contains the required information.
Information on the licensee's written response was accurate.
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References:
(a) Maine Yankee Letter WMY 80-76,5/14/80
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(b) Maine Yankee Letter WMY 80-155,12/3/80
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(c) Maine Yankee Letter WMY 80-156,12/3/80 (d) MYMP 4220 Revision 0 (e) Maine Yankee Memorandum dated 11/21/80 (f) Anchor / Darling Letter dated 11/24/80
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a.
IEC 80-23, Potential Defects in Beloit Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
A Plant Engineering evaluation of the subject concern determined that no Beloit EDG's are installed at Maine Yankca.
b.
IEB 80-09, Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies c.
IEB 80-21, Valve Yokes from Malcolm Foundry Company d.
IEB 80-23, Failure of Valcor Engineering Corp Solenoid Valves The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to items b, c and d.
Evaluations by the plant engineering staff documented in accor-dance with reference (d), concluded that none of the components referred to in the three bulletins were installed in safety-related systems at Maine Yankee. The inspector reviewed the facility component and valve listings and examined selected valves during plant tours. None of the subject components were identified.
The licensee s evaluation / corrective actions for these Bulletins and Circulars were appropriate.
7.
Observation of Maintenance and Surveillance Testing The inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specification;; compliance with applicable codes and standards; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; appropriate personnel qualifications; proper radio-logical controls for worker protection; adequate fire protection; and appropriate retest requirements. The inspector also ascertained re-portability as required by Technical Specifications.
The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the surveillance test procedure was properly approved and in use; test instrumentation required by the pro-cedure was properly calibrated and in use; technical specifications were satisfied prior to removal of the system from service; test was performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; and, test results satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly dispositioned.
Maintenance was performed on Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-25C (MR 0398-81)
a.
to adjust the lube oil delivery to the inboard pump bearing. The inspector verified the proper removal from and restoration to service of this safety related component in accordance with Local Control Rules tagout #0159-8.
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b.
The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance tests:
Emergency Safeguard System Monthly Testing (SP 3.1.2)
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Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Testing (SP 3.1.4)
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Steam Generator Level Monthly Testing (3.6.2.2.5)
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Containment Isolation Testing (3-1-20)
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c.
The inspector reviewed the surveillance testing of Containment Isolation valves conducted on March 16, 1981.
During this test the automatic isolation valve for the service air line to containment (SA-A-138) failed to close when required. The licensee determined the failure to be a sticking pawl on the valve operator. The valve was repaired on March 16, 1981 under maintenance request #0419-81.
The service air line to containment k normally isolated by locked closed manual valves which were closed during this test and remained closed while the automatic closure device was out of service. During normal operations this containment penetration is periodically unisolated to verify operation of the containment leak monitoring computer program.
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Technical Specifications require the following:
Limiting Condition for Operation 3.11,... Containment Integrity r-shall be maintained whenever the reactor coolant system is
above 210 F.
Containment Integrity is defined to exist when... d. All
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automatic containment isolation valves are operable or are locked closed.
Reporting Requirement 5.9.1.7.c,... events listed below shall
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be the subject of written reports... d. Abnormal degradation of systems... designed to contain radioactive material resulting from the fission process.
The service air line had been isolated since the previous test of SA-A-138, therefore actual containment integrity was not lost in this instance.
Because this line is periodically unisolated during normal operation, however, failure of the automatic trip valve constitutes a degradation of the containment isolation system which is reportable by Technical Specifications. Additionally, surveillance procedure 3.1.20 does not have adequate acceptance criteria in that no acceptable range of valve stroke times is listed nor does the failure of automatic trip valves require immediate corrective action or notification of management. The inspector discussed this event L
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with the Assistant Plant Manager and the Operations Department Head on April 3, 1981. The licensee stated that the procedure is being revised to meet expanded in-service testing requirements and that these deficiencies would be corrected prior to April 30, 1981. This issue remains unresolved pending revision of surveillance procedure 3.1.20 and receipt of a Licensee Event Report.
(309/81-06-01)
8.
Followup on TMI Action Plan Item _s, References:
(a IE Temporary Instruction 2515/42, 43, 44 and 45; Revision 2 (b NUREG 0737 (c NUREG 0660 (d MYAPC letter WMY 80-162,12/15/80 (e MYAPC letter WMY 80-167,1/8/81 (f MYAPC lette. FMY 81-10,1/16/M (g) MYAPC letter FMY 81-39,3/16/81 The inspector reviewed licensee commitments and actions in response to items required by NUREG 0737 to be implemented prior to January 1,1981 to verify that:
the licensee's commitment adequately addresses the Action Plan
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Concern.
the licensee has implemented changes in accordance with his written
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commitment.
The inspector discussed his findings with members of the plant staff at a meeting on March 18, 1981.
Corrective measures to satisfy the NUREG 0737 requirements are described below. Discussions of Action Plan Items are numbered to correspond to the NUREG 0660 reference scheme.
I.A.1.1 Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Reference (b) specified that the training of STA's to meet the TMI lessons learned positions must be completed by January 1,1981, and that a description of the current training program be submitted no later than January 1,1981. Reference (e) reiterated this position and stated that:
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" Maine Yankee has completed the training required under item (1)above. A descriptien of this training and comparison with the October 30,1979 (Denton) letter is included as Enclosure (1)..."
On March 11, 1981, the inspector obtained the list of STA's standing duty commencing January 1, 1981 and reviewed the STA training records
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for these men to verify that the training had been completed as l
described in reference (e). This review disclosed that lectures
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covering ~all the areas had not been conducted and that for those lectures conducted, not all of the STA's on the 1981 duty list had attended all the lectures. This failure ts com Icte the STA training by January 1, 1981 as described in reference (e represents a devia-tion from a commitment made to the Nuclear Regu atory Commission.
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(309/81-06-02)
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The inspector brought this to the attention of the Plant Manager and the Technical Support Department Head during a meeting on March 11,
1981 and by telephone with the Vice President - Operations on March
12, 1981. During a subsequent telephone conversation with the Vice President - Operations, it was agreed that a letter would be sent to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), correcting the
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inaccuracy in their letter of January 8, 1981. This letter (refer-ence (g)) was subsequently reviewed by the inspector on March 18,
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1981.
This letter also states that all qualified STA's will have a letter of qualification in their files after March 20, 1981 and that during requalification, certification examinations will be conducted.
On March 16, 1981 the inspector again reviewed the STA training records and verified that by the afternoon of March 13, 1981, four men had completed the plant specific training of Enclosure (1) to reference (e), and all others had been relieved of STA duties
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pending completion of the training. Completion of taaining and qualification of the remaining STA's will be verified in a subse-
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quent inspection.
(309/81-06-02)
j I.A.1.2 Shift Supervisor Responsibilities I.C.3
Implementation of this item had been initiated in December 1979 l
in accordance with NUREG 0578, Short Tenn Lessons Learned. The
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licensee commitment requires annual review and documentation of management policy with regard to Shift Supervisor Responsibilities.
l The inspector verified that this review had been completed on Decem-ber 1, 1980, and that policy had been redefined by the Manager of Operations with regard to this issue. The inspector had no further
questions in this area.
I.A.1.3 Shift Manning (Overtime)
The licensee issued operating procedure 1-150-3 Rev. O Shift Staffing Overtime, on October 26, 1980 to address this position.
The inspector determined that this procedure met the superceded position of NRR generi c letter of July 31, 1980, however, new
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criteria are specified in NUREG 0737. The following items were not covered by the procedure:
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Operators on shift greater than 8 continuous hours shall be
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periodically relieved of primary duties such that periods of duty at the control board do not exceed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at a time.
There should be a break of at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> between all work
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periods.
The licensee allows the plant manager or his delegated representa-tive to make exceptions to these positions. The inspector informed the licensee that the plant manager must review the documentation of these exceptions when made by his delegated representative. The licensee committed to make changes to the procedure to meet these additional pos.itions.
This revision will be complete by April 15,
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1981 and will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
(309/81-06-03)
I.A.2.1 Upgrade of SR0/R0 Training The licensee submitted a revised training program to the NRC Operator Licensing Branch (0LB) on July 31, 1980 for post implementation review. The inspector reviewed the iinplementation of this revised program. The following procedures were reviewed:
00-00-5 Operator Qualification and Requalification, Rev. 8 18-200-1 R0 Training Program, Rev. 1 18-200-2 SR0 Training Program, Rev. 1 18-200-3 Operator Requalification Program, Rev. 2 18-200-4 Instructor Requalification Program, Rev. 1 The inspector determined that the training programs in progress were in accordance with the revised program under review by NRR. There were no further questions in this area pending OLB review of the
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revised program.
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I.C.5 Feedback of Operational Experience The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure MYMP 4220 Rev 0, Evaluation and Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff.
This procedure implements a program which meets the positions of NUREG 0737. The inspector noted that assessment of events which occur on-site would not be timely due to the prolonged period of time presently required to generate Plant Information Reports documeMing these events.
No other inadequacies were identified.
I.C.6 Verification of Operational Activities The inspector reviewed the licenser s implementation of this l.
item.
The facility tagout procedure was revised to incorporate the equipment control requirements of ANSI N18.7 paragraph 5.2.6.
Independent verification of tags is required for safety related systems. Tagging and verification is performed by auxiliary operators l
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qualified by the management to perform tagging duties and under the direction of a senior licensed operator. Not all surveillance procedures had been revised to include the equipment control re-quirements of ANSI N18.7. The licensee committed to review all surveillance procedures and make revisions as necessary prior to April 24, 1981. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(309/81-06-04)
II.E.4.2 Containment Isolation Dependability (Item 6)
NRR interim criteria for purging operations require the containment 0 open prior to opening any purge purge valves to be limited to 50 valve.
Purge valves at Maine Yankee are not limited to 50 unless temporary restraining straps are installed. The temporary straps are required by administrative controls prior to opening the valves.
The licensee committed to install a permanent limiting device prior to May 30, 1981. Thi:: item will be reviewed after installation of the permanent modification.
(309/80-07-03)
III.D.1.1 System Leak Reduction Program The licensee performed a leak inspection as part of the Short Term Lessons Learned Requirement. A continued program on a refueling interval basis was required. The inspector reviewed the proposed surveillance procedure 3.17.7 Rev. O, Visual Examination of High Radiation, Post Accident Systems, which will implement this program.
The procedure requires systems to be at operating pressure during the inspection only where practical. The inspector informed the licensee that a leak ched on an unpressurized system did not meet the intent of leak reduction program and asked that specific limitations on "where practical" be specified.
The licensee agreed to correct this deficiency prior to issuing the procedure.
This item will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
(309/81-06-05)
III.D.3.3 Inplant Radiation Monitoring (Iodine)
Reference (b) specified that each licensee provide equipment and associated training and procedures for accurately determining the airborne concentration in areas within the facility prior to January 1, 1981. Reference (d) stated that, "By January 1, 1981 Maine Yankee will have available equipment and associated procedures for accurately determining the airborne iodine concentration via absorption on charcoal or other media..."
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for post-accident sampling. After discussion with the Emergency Plan Coordinator, it was determined that there was no procedure defining the method for taking airborne samples for iodine. This failure to have
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procedures for determining the airborne iodine concentration represents a deviation from a commitment made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(309/81-06-06)
The inspector brought this matter to the attention of the plant manager and other staff members at a meeting on March 18, 1981.
9.
Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection Security Force Union Activities - The inspector monitored the licensee's continued implementation of strike contingency plans after the guard force walk out on February 27, 1981.
The guards returned to duty at 7:30 AM March 5,1981. The transition was conducted in an orderly manner. Union and security contractor lawyers resumed negotiations which resulted in a tentative contract. Differences between the union, the contractor and the licensee subsequently widened and resulted in a mutual agreement between the licensee and Blanchard Security Inc. to terminate the security contract effective 2:00 PM April 1,1981.
The inspector observed the transition to an interim contractor, Hall Security Services, Inc. Adequate numbers of personnel from the previous contractor were retained by Hall Security to meet the minimu:n standards.
No items of noncompli ance were identified.
A physical protection inspector from IE Region I was on-site March 5,
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1981 to review the qualifications of the interim contract personnel.
Details of this inspection will be found in IE Inspection Report 050-I 309/81-10.
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10.
Unresolved Items l
l Unresolved items are matters about which more infonnation is required l
in order to determine whether they are acceptable items or items of l
noncompliance. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are I
discussed in paragraph 7c.
11.
Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were
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held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and l
findings.
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