IR 05000309/1981017
| ML20032D048 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Lazarus W, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032D043 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-81-17, NUDOCS 8111130329 | |
| Download: ML20032D048 (10) | |
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DCS Nos. 50309-810612 50309-810709 50309-810710 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50309-810718'
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50309-810719 50309-810726 Region I 50309-810812 50309-810814 Report No.
81-17 50309-810821 Docket No.
50-309'
License No. DPR-36 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01/01 Facility Name:
Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Wiscasset, Maine Inspection conducte : July 14-17, 1981 and August 10-31, 1981 Inspectors:. / ! sisd u o
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14. dazarg Reactor Inspector date signed
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5 wetland, Reactor Inspector da'te signed date signed-Approved by:
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R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects date' signed Section No. 1A, DRPI Inspection Summary:
Inspection on: July 14-17, 1981 and August 10-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-309/81-17)
Areas Inspected: Routine, regular and backshif t inspection by two resident inspectors.
(92 hours0.00106 days <br />0.0256 hours <br />1.521164e-4 weeks <br />3.5006e-5 months <br />) Areas inspected included the Control Room. Turbine Building, Pr hary Auxiliary Building, Spray Building and Auxiliary Feed Pump Room.
Activities / Records inspected included plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, followup of previous inspection findings, observation of Surveillance Testing, shipment of Radioactive Waste, followup on IE Circulars,
-followup on Licensee Event Reports, followup of events occurring during the inspec-tion, and followup of periodic reports.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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8111130329 811005
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Region I Form 12 PDR ADOCK 05000309 G
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
' Persons Contacted R. Arsenault, Operations Department Head J.' Brinkler, Technical Support Department Head G. Cochrane, Health Physics Supervisor R. Forrest, Fire Protectici Coordinator D. Hakkila, Administrative Department Head J. Hebert, Director, Plant Engineering B. Hoyt, Security Supervisor W. Paine, Assistant to the Plant Manager J. Stevens, Plant Chemist E. Wood, Plant Manager
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The inspectors also interviewed several plant operators, technicisns and members of the engineering and administrative staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (309/80-14-02, 03, 04, 05). The inspector verified by review of the safety evaluation report issued to Maine Yankee June 1, 1981 and by telcon with Mr. A. Finkel, NRC Region I that these items had been incorporated into the technical evaluation issued by the Environmental Qualification Branch (NRR). Further evaluation and resolution will be conducted by the EQB.
b.
(Closed) Noncompliance (309/80-18-01). The inspector reviewed licensee changes to the Maine Yankee tagging rules dated July 15, 1981 which incorporate measures to insure proper administrative control of safety related equipment. Frequent review of tagging operations and maintenance have revealed no further items of non-compliance.
c.
(Closed) Noncomplianca (309/81-12-02). The inspector reviewed the
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licensee change to quality assurance procedure 00-01-01, Design Changes, Revision 0 dated August 28, 1981. The procedure requires modifications of any system that could result in a radioactive release to be formally l
l documented and approved. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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3. ' Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout the reporting period. Except as noted below, conditions were found to be in compliance with the following licensee documents:
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Maine Ya..kee Technical Specification Maine Yankee Technical Data Book
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Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program
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Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program Maine Yankee Tagging Rules
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Administrative and Operating Procedures
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a.
Instrumentation Control room process ir.strun.ents were observed for correlation between channels and for confonnance with Technical Specification requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Annunciator Alarms The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been re-ceived and acknowleoged. These cor.ditions were discussed with shift personnel who riere knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator response was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision 4, dated June 1979. During plant inspections, the inspector observed the conditions of equipment associated with various alarms. No unacceptable con-ditions were identified.
c.
Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of licenses. Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
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Radiation Protection Controls Radiation Protection control areas were inspected. Radiation Work Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspected.
Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation
l areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personal monitoring devices. There were no unaccep-
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table conditions identified.
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Plant Housekeeping Controls Storage of material and components was observed with respect to prevention of fire and safety hazards. Plant housekeeping was also evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and air-borne contamination. There were no unacceptabie conditions identified.
f.
Fire Protection / Prevention
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The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact. Cable trays were clear of debris. No abnormal conditions were identified, g.
Equipment Lineups The inspector verified that the major valve and switch positions were correct to insure Operability of the Safety Injection System, Safety Injectiot. Accumulators, Containment Spray, and Emergency Diesel Generators, by observation of the Main Control Board and inspections in the Diesel Generator Rooms, Spray Building and Primary Auxiliary Building.
On July 16, 1981 the inspector observed two valves which isolate the low pressure Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system piping from the reactor coolant system to be closed and energized. The plant was in the hot standby mode at this tine. Procedure 1-13-2, RHR Shutdown, Revision 11 requires these valves (RH-M-1 and 2) to be shut and tagged de-energized upon securing of RPR prior to heat-up to insure against inadvertent operation. The valves were not deenergized because a procedure change which deleted the previous step in the procedure was improperly incorporated such that the requirement to tag RH-M-1 and 2 was deleted. The valves were immediately deenergized and tagged.
Since the v9ives were closed and no formal requirement to deenergize the motor operators exists, no item of noncompliance was issued.
However, the failure to properly implement procedural changes and the failure to identify the improper system lineup through pro-cedure review and/or operator observations was brought to the atten-tion of the Operatfors Department Head on July 16, 1981 and the Plant Manager on July 20, 1981. No further inadequacies were identified.
h.
Emergency Plan Implementation On August 22, 1981 the Plant Emergency Alert System (PEAS; off-site warning system) was inadvertently initiated at 4:30 and 4:55 p.m.
The PEAS is initiated by radio signal fran the site or from State Police headquarters in Augusta, Maine. The inadvertent initiation was a result of similarities between the PEAS initiation signal and
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a State radio paging (beeper) system.. Upon notification, the control room operators secured the alarm. No formal method for notification-of offsite agencies had been stipulated, consequcntly about~one hour
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passed before the news media reported the false alarm. The event.
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resulted in significant criticism fran the local public. The State Police have suspended use of the " beeper" which caused the event pending evaluation of corrective measures to prevent recurrence.
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The licensee has-initiated a procedure for notification of inadver-
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tent PEAS initiation. The inspector had no:further questions in this area.
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Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and records covering the inspection time period against Technical Specifi-cations and Administrative Procedure Requirements.
Included in the review were:
Control Room Log
- daily during control room surveillance Jumper and Lifted Leads Log
- all active entries Maintenance Requests and Job Orders
- all active entries Safety Tag Log
- all active entries.
Plant Recorder Traces
- daily during control room surveillance Plant Process Computer Printed Output
-_ daily during control room surveillance Night Orders
- daily during control room surveillance
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The logs and records were reviewed to verify. that entries are properly made and communicate equipment' status / deficiencies; records are being
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reviewed by management; operating-orders do not conflict with the Tech-nical Specifications; locs detail no violations of Technical Specification or reporting requirements; legs and records are maintained in accordance with Technical Specificatico and Administrative Control Procedure re-quirements.
Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and discussion with licensee personnel. No unacceptable conditions were
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identified.
5.
Observation of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the
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security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures.
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Maine Yankee Security Plan, dated October 19T9
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15-1, Security Organization and Responsibilit'es, Revision 6,
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April-1980
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15-2, Security Force Duties, Revision 9, February 1981
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15-3, Plaat Personnel Security,-Revision 9, February 1981 15-7, Acce ss Authorizatica and Control, Revision 1,. April-1981-
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15-8,~ Prot ected Area Entry / Exit-Control, Revision 1 September 1980
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a.
Physical Protection Security Organization Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full
--1 time member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed-to
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be as required.
b.
Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of iso-latior. zones was performed. Observations of truck and car searches were made, c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging
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Access control searches
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Escorting
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Cannunications
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Compensatory measures when required.
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d.
Review of Security Events The inspector reviewed the following security event reports submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 t( verify that the details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of-the description of the cause and corrective action.
81-1, Bomb Threat
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81-2, Security Computer Failure
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Bomb Threat.
On July 26, 1981, a security guard on patrol observed the following message written on the floor of the Spent Fuel Area:
" Bomb will go off July 31, 1981". A similar message was written on a notepad nearby.
The licensee took action in accordance with the security plan. An extensive search uncovered no bomb and the threatened date passed without occurrence. An investigation by the Maine State Police is ongoing. NRC, Region I and the FBI have been following the progress of this investigation.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars Licensee actior. concerning the following IE Cire:ube was reviewed to verify that:
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The Circular was forwarded to appropriate onsite management.
A review for applicability *-:as performed.
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Appropriate corrective actions have been taken or are scheduled to be taken.
IEC 80-14, Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water Systems.
The inspector reviewed a memorandum to file dated May 12, 1981 which detailed the licensee's evaluation and recommended corrective action to address this area of concern.
The onsite review comittee reviewed these actions on May 27, 1981. Corrective action scheduled for completion includes the removal of nuclear steam heating from the domestic hot water system.
Other system modifications are under consideration.
AdM nis-tratively, the licensee controls cross connection of its well water and demineralized water systems and prohibits drinking in radiation controlled areas. Further, the licensee samples non-radioactive water sources at regular intervals in relation to the potential for contamination. The inspector had no further cuestions in this area.
7.
Observation of Surveillance Testing The inspector verified the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the surveillance test procedure was properb approved and in use; test instrumentation required by the procedure was properly calibrated and in use; technical specifications were satisfied prior to removal of the system from service; test was performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; and, test results satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly dispositione.
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The following docurents were reviewed:
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SP 3.17.5, Surveillance Test of Charcoal and HEPA Filters, Revision 1, dated 12/30/80.
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TP 4-121, Leak Test for HSI-61, 62 and 63, Revision 0, dated 7/81.
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SP 17-100-1, System and Component Pressure / Leak Test, Revision 3, dated 12/80.
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Memo L. Speed to M. Whitney, regarding leak testing of LSI-12, 22 and 32.
No abnormal conditions were identified.
8.
Shipment of Radioactive Materials The inspector observed the preparation, loading and survey of radioactive waste for transportation to burial facilities. The following documen-tation was reviewed:
Shipment records:
Serial #81-400 J, 7/22/81; Serial #81-W-4, 7/22/81; Scrial #81-W-5, 7/23/81.
Maine Yankee Procedure 9.1.15,Rev 7, Shipment of Radioactive Material The inspector verified that the shipments were certified to meet Department of Transporation requirements for placarding and externcl dose limits.
Records show that proper notifications were made in accordance with procedure 9.1.15.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs received in the RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector also determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted on site followup. The following LERs were reviewed:
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81-11 Inability to Obtain Composite Vent Stack Samples (Revisions 0 and 1)
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81-12 Inadvertent Boron Dilution While Shutdown
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81-13 Exceeding Class B/C Leak Test Criteria
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81-14 Failure of Containment Isolation Valve
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81-15 Containment Air Leak
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81-16 Letdown Line Weld Failure 81-17 Failure of RPS Channel A Nuclear Instrumentation Wide Range
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Log Channel
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On Site Followup of LERs During on site followup, the inspector verified that reporting require-ments of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been-met, that_ appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits. The review included discussions with licensee personnel, review of PORC meeting ~ minutes, and applicable logs. The following LERs were reviewed.
a.
81-11 Inability to Obtain Composite Vent Stack Samples The inspector reviewed the original LER and discussed the event with the Assistant to the Plant Manager. The mispositioned filter was a small sample filter in a line tapping off of'the. primary vent stack rather than the safety class vent stack filters themselves as represented by the origiral LER. The licensee revised the LER to clearly document the actual event..-The technician who took the last-sample neglected to replace the filter, the purpose of which is to collect the composite ventstack sample. The inspector reviewed the vent stack continuous particulate detector traces during the period and found no abnormal readings.
Since this continuous particulate monitor samples the same vent gas source as the composite filter, the inspector determined that no adverse affects on public health and safety resulted.
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81-12 Inadvertent Boron Dilution While Shutdown The inspector reviewed the primary chemistry logs to verify that adequate shutdown margin was maintained. Procedure 1-18-3, Deminer-alizer Resin Sluice, Revision 8, was revised (PCR 81-217 and 81-218)
to include measures to insure that reach-rod operated valves are properly positioned. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
c.
81-13 Exceeding Class B/C-Leak Test Criteria The inspector reviewed the progress of containment leak rate testing during the May - July 1981 refueling outage. Upon completion of maintenance and retesting of all valves whose leakage was considered unacceptable, the inspector verified that the total conta:nment leakrate from all penetrations subject to class B/C testing was less than the allowed technical specification limit. The inspector had i
no further questions in this area.
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81-14 and 81-16 Letdown System Failures
The events reported by these LERs are detailed in IE inspection report 50-309/81-20. The inspector determined that the appropriate reporting requirements had been me....
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81-15 Co'ntainment Air Leak From August 12-14, 1981 the containment leak monitoring system showed.
a decreasing weight of air-inside certainment. Evaluation of this information led to an investigation of.possible containment leaks on August 14. The-leak was identified.in the containrrent air parti-culate detector. - previous leaks have been associated with the same component. -The leak was isolated and repaired and the detector returned to service August 15, 1981. ~The performance of the-leak monitoring system and the response of operating and engineering personnel identified and isolated the leak in a timely fashion.
Although this leak would have been isolated during a major reactor accident, a spectrum of less severe possibilities exists which would result in abnormal: radioactive. releases. The licensee's ability to verify the integrity of the containment structure between refueling-periods is exemplary and displays an ongoing commitment to maintain releases as low as reasonably achieveable.
11.
Review of Periodic Reports The inspector reviewed the following periodic reports to verify that the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 5.9 were met.
Monthly Operating Reports for June and July 1981.
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No inadequacies were identified.
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Exit Interviews-At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.