IR 05000309/1981012
| ML20005B158 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Lazarus W, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005B152 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-81-12, NUDOCS 8107060380 | |
| Download: ML20005B158 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-309/81-12 Docket No. 50-309 License No. OPR-36 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 1671 Wercester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Wiscasset, Maine Inspection ccrdu,t
ril 13-24, 1981 Inspectors:
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I R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects date' signed Section No. IA, ORPI Inspection Summary:
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Inspection on April 13-24, 1981 (Report No. 50-309fol-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, regular and backshift inspections by two resident inspectors.
(58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br />) Arets inspected included the Control Room, Turbine building, Primary Auxiliary Building, Spray Builoing and Auxiliary Feed Pump Room. Activities / Records inspected included radiation protection, physical security, plant operations, follow up on previous inspection findin g,
followup on IE Bulletins and followup on events occurrirg during the inspection.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no item; of noncompliance were observed in five areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were identified in one area (Failure to identify and correct containment leak rate in excess of Technical Specification limits; Performance of an activity important to safety without a procedure.
Daragraph 7.)
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8107060380 DRADOCKOOh[9 o
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Arsenault, Plant Shift Superintendent D. Boynton, Reactor Engineer J. Brinkler, Technical Support Department Head G. Cochrane, Health Physics Supervisor T. Gifford, Engineer, PEQAG W. Paine, Operations Department Head D. Sturniolo, Technical Assistant to the Plant Manager E. Wood, Plant Manager The inspe~ tors also interviewed several plant operators, technicians and c
members of the engineering and administrative staffs.
2.
-Followup on' Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Noncompliance (309/30-12-01) The inspector verified that the Cardox system gauges had been calibrated and that the level conversion charts for the diesel fuel oil and primary water tanks had been reviewed, approved and placed in the site technical data book, b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/80-12-02) The inspector verified that the kilowatt and ampere meters for both diesel generators have been calibrated.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/80-18-04) The inspector reviewed c.
Revision 18 to procedure 3.1.2, E;CS Routine Testing dated March 1981.
The licensee has determir.ed acceptable valve opening stroke times and, incorporated these values into the above procedure.
d.
(Closed) Noncompliance (309/60-19-01) The insper. tor reviewed Amendment 35 to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which changed the allowable valve stroke time to 13 seconds. The amendment had not been entered in the control room copy of the FSAR.
Appropriate changes were made to the subject procedure as specified in paragraph 2.c.
Based on this information this item of noncompliance was withdrawn.
3.
Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout the reporting period.
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a.
Instrumentation Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Annunciator' Ala_r_ms, m
The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required.
During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equipment associated with various alarms.
No unac'eptable conditions were identified, c
c.
Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of licenses.
Control room and shift manning ware observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
d.
Radiation protaction Controls
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Radiation Protection control areas were inspected.
Radiation Work Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspected.
Proper posting ar.d control of radiation and high
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radiation areas was ratiewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personal monitoring devices.
There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
Plant Hou'sekeeping Controls e.
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to prevention of fire and safety hazards.
Plant housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
There were no unacceptable cor.ditions identified, f.
Fire Protection / Prevention
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The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment.
Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays were clear of debris. No abnormal conditions were identified.
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g.
Control of Equipment
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During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined.
Equipment conditions were consistent with information in plant control logs.
h.
Equipment Lineups The inspector verified that the major valve and switch positions were correct to insure Operability of the Safety Injection System, Safety Injection Accumulators, Containment Spray, and Emergency Diesel Generators, by observation of the Main Control Board and inspections in the Diesel Generator Rooms and Spray Building.
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4.
Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and records covering the inspection time period against Technical Specifications and Administrative Procedure Requirements.
Included in
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the review were:
Control Room Log
- daily during control room surveillance Jumper and Lifted Leads Log
- all active entries Maintenance Requests and Job Orders
- all active entries Safety Tag Log
- all active entries Plant Recorder Traces
- daily during control room surveillance
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Plant Process Computer Printed
- daily during control Output room surveillance Night Orders
- daily during control room surveillance
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The logs and records were reviewea to verify that entries are properly made and communicate equipment status / deficiencies; records are being reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Technical Specifications; logs detail no violations of Technical Specification or reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accordance with Technical Specification and Administrative Control Procedure requirements.
Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and discussion with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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5.
Observation of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical securi'.y plans and approved procedures.
a.
Physica! Protection Security Organization Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full
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time member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
' Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to be
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as re.,;1 red.
b.
Physical Barrie:s Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed. Observations of truck and car searches were made. -
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c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging
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Access control searches
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Esco,rting
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Communications Compensatory measures when required
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Followup on IE Bulletins Licensee action concerning the following IE Bulletins was reviewed to verify that:
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The Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate onsite marcgement.
A review for applicability was performed
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Written response (when required) was within the stated time period
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and contained the required information.
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Information on the licensee's written response was accurate.
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Corrective action taken by the licensee is as described in the
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written response.
a.
IEB 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System Operability The inspector reviewed the licensee response dated June 9, 1980 (Maine Yankee letter WMX 80-90).
The inspector verified that the required reviews had been performed.
Further, NRC licensing action in this area resulted in a change to the licensee's technical specifications which requires two operational decay heat removal trains. These requirements were incorporated as amendment 54 to the facility operating license.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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b.
IEB 80-15 Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS)
The inspector verified that the ENS phone at the Alternate Emergency Operation Center receives backup power from the local Civil Emergency Preparedness Department's emergency electric generator.
This source prevents the loss of this ENS phone should offsite power be lost.
This modification completes the action required by this bulletin.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
c.
IEB 80-19 Failure of Mercury Wetted Matrix Relays The licensee replaced the subject relays with qualified dry contact relays.
The inspector reviewed the installation and test procedures as well as surveillance testing results on the new relays (SP 3.6.2.2.11, Logic Trip Relays Test) conducted March 13, 20, 27 and April 2,.1981.
No further relay failures have been observed.
d.
IEB 80-24 Water Leakage Inside Containment Followup in this area was reported in IE Inspection Report 50-309/80-19.
Based on a telephone conversation between Mr. H.
Woods, IE:HQ and the inspector it was determined that the licensee has adequately addressed t':e concern of this bulletin and no further corrective action is required at this time.
7.
Containment Integrity a.
Followup on ENS Notification During a routine review of the Control Room Log on April 20, 1981 the intrector noted an entry for 5:20 p.m. on April 17, 1981 concerning a report made to NRC Headquarters via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) at that time.
The notification was made l
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in compliance with 10 CFR 50.72 and concerned an inadvertent or unscheduled release of radioactive gas.
Investigation into this event included interviews with several operations, engineering and management personnel, a playback of a recording made of the ENS report by NRC Headquarters, and a review of various logs and records concerning the release of radioactivity and the monitoring of containment leak rate. The following information was developed.
The inadvertent release reported via the ENS on April 17, 1991 consisted of a total of 0.03 curies, principally isotopes of xenon.
A review of the containment leak rate data and the concentration of airborne activity in the containment by the inspector confirmed the licensees calculations in this area. The release was below Technical Specification limits.
The release had taken place over a period of 9 days, from April 8-17, 1981 as a result of a recently installed valve in the containment Air Particulate Detector (APD)
sample line being left open on April 8, 1981 following a test of a sample rig used for taking containment air samples.
Investigation into this incident revealed the following sequence of events.
A sample collection assembly was installed in the containment APO sample line outside of the automatic containment isolation valve in accordance with Maintenance Request (MR) 0293 on February 21, 1981.
On April 8,1981 the sample collection assembly was partially disconnected from the APD sample line and the sample line inlet valve was inadvertently left open.
This allowed air to les
- ut of containment at an average of 57.9 Lbm/ day until April 17, 1981.
(Using an average containment pressure of 32.55 in. Hg and a vapor pressure of 0.77 in. Hg, the inspector calculated the leak rate at
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accident pressure (50 psig) to be 0.318 weight percent / day).
The containment weight of air is automatically calculated at 1:00 p.m.
each day by the plant computer.
This value was plotted on the
" Containment Weight of Air vs. Time Plot" daily by the Control Room reactor operator in accordance with procedure 1-12-2, " Containment Leak Monitoring".
This plot for the period 4/8-17/81 shows a loss of about 68 lbm/ day from containment.
This information was not relayed to plant management until the afternoon of April 17, 1981 following rotation of a different shift crew to the day shift. On April 17, 1981 at 1:00 p.m. the operator plotted the containment weight of air and noted that the point fell outside the 500 lbm boundary line which required notification of the Plant Engineerirg/
Quality Assurance Grcup (PEQAG).
(Previous points for April 14 and 16 had also been outside the boundary, but had not been reported).
Following investigation by the cognizant PEQAG engineer, it was determined that the computer inputs were correct, and thus a containment leak rate in excess of Technical Specification Limits existed.
Subsequent investigation by licensee personnel identified the open valve in the APD sample line which was then shut at 3:15 p.m.
A plant staff meeting was held at about 4:00 p.m. at which the incident was discussed and the determination made that a report of
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the inadvertent release which resulted from the open valve was re-quired by 10 CFR 50.72, resulting in notification of NRC Headquarters at 5:20 p.m. via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).
Based on discussion with the Reactor Engineer and the Plant Manager who both attended this meeting at 4:00 p.m., the inspec.;r learned that the i
fact that the allowable containment leak rate had been exceeded during this incident, had also been discussed but not imediately reported.
Licensee Event Report (LER) 81-003/01T relative to this event was submitted on April 21, 1981.
The following inadequacies were identified as a result of the investi-gation of this event:
Technical Specification 3.ll. A requires that "known" containment leak
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rate be less than 0.15 weight percent per day at 50 psig during reactor operation.
This requirement is intended to prevent exceeding the offsite dose limits specified in 10 CFR Part 100 in event of an accident.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B; the Yankee Operational Ouality Assurance Program; and ANSI N18.7-1976, Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants specify requirements for the prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to safety. Those
requirements must be implemented by appropriate written procedures as specified by Technical Specification 5.8.1.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Contrary to these requirements, the licensee's program for maintaining containraent integrity; consisting of procedures 1-12-2,
" Containment Leak fionitoring" and 3.17.100, " Continuous Leak Rate Follow"; did not provide adequate measures to promptly identify a leak in containment which existed from April 8,1981 through April 17, 1981.
This leak rate was equivalent to an average 0.32 weight percent per day at 50 psig, more than double the allowable rate.
Logs and records maintained by the licensee indicate the existance and relative magnitude of this leak as early as April 13, 1981, but it remained un-identified by licensee management untti April 17, 1981. This is an l
item of noncompliance.
(309/81-12-01)
Technical Specification 5.8.1.a requires that written procedures be
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established, implemented, and maintained, covering the applicable
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procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November,
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l 1972.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, paragraph J requires that procedures be written to prescribe radiochemical sampling and analysis.
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Contrary to this requirement the licensee installed a temporary sampling device in the containment APD piping and took samples of containment air without a procedure prescribing the evolution.
This is an iten of noncompliance (309/81-12-02)
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b.
Management Meeting (1) An enforcement conference was convened by NRC Region I management to discuss NRC concerns regarding plant operation with containment leak rate in excess of Technical Specification limits during the period April 8-17, 1981.
Attendees included:
USNRC B. H. Grier, Director, Region I E. J. Brunner, Acting Director, Division of Resident and Project Inspection R. T. Carlson, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Staff R. R. Keimig, Chief, Projects Branch #2 R. M. Gallo, Chief, Projects Section 1A W. J. Lazarus, Acting Senior Resident Inspector,fiaine Yankee Maine Yankee Atomic Power Comoany J. H. Randazza, Vice President, tianager of Operations C. D. Frizzle, Manager, Nuclear Support J. Brinkler, Assistant Plant Manager
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(2) NRC Region I Management opened the meeting by stating their concerns regarding plant operation with' containment leak rate in excess of Technical Specification Limits and the installation and operation of a temporary sampling device without procedures.
The licensee provided the results of their review of this event and discussed the performance of their Containment Weight of Air Monitoring System.
The licensee stated that the importance of bringing anomalies in the weight of air plot to the attention of engineering personnel had been addressed in a memo to operators dated April 28, 1981.
The licensee also stated that further training of plant personnel regarding the Containment Weight of Air Monitoring System was under review. Regarding plant alterations, the licensee stated that revisions were under review to their plant alteration procedures to include a requirement that any modification of any system that could result in a radioactive release be addressed by a formal plant alteration or an ap,oro-priately approved procedure, j
Region I Management acknowledged and commented on the licensee's statements.
8.
Exit Intarl,eg i
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. The inspectors discussed the noncompliances identified in para-graph 7 with the Assistant Plant Manager on April 21, 1981 and with the l
Plant Manager on April 23, 1981.
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