IR 05000302/1987019

Insp Rept 50-302/87-19 on 870710-0807.Violations & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Facility Mods & IE Info Notices

ML20238A387
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/28/1987
From:	Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238A233	List: IR 05000302/1987019 ML20238A231 ML20238A297 ML20238A326
References
50-302-87-19, IEIN-85-064, IEIN-85-068, IEIN-85-64, IEIN-85-68, NUDOCS 8709090269
Download: ML20238A387 (18)

Text

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@ CEOy o UNITED STATES 8' t

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ : E REGION 11 o 'E 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 f ATLANTA, GEORGsA 30303

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Report No: 50-302/87-19 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No: 50-302 Licensee No.: DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection Dates: July 10 - August 7, 1987 Inspectors: O/ m/p T. F. St Kka Senior Residen M nspector f[I B/W Oate signed m

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J. E. Tedrow esident Inspector s

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j j Approved by: ct _ /v w% F/2(/f7 Oate Signed Bf . Wilson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, non-routine operating events, review of 10 CFR Part 21 reports, review of IE information notices, review of special reports, review of Nuclear General Review Committee (NGRC) activities and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshift Results: One Violation and one Deviation were identified: Failure to ,

establish required instrumentation trip setpoints, paragraph 6.b.(1); Failure to meet a commitment as stated in a response letter to a Violation, paragraph :

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REPORT DETAILS l Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Bandhauer, Assistant Nuclear Plant Operations Manager

• Be-ker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

• J. Brt.ndely, Nuclear Security & Special Projects Superintendent

• C. Brown, Manager, Outages

• Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

• Ellsberry, Supervisor, Nuclear Technical Training

• A. Friend, Nuclear Staff Engineer

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• R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer

• H. Gelston, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services J. Gibson, Nuclear Technical Specification Coordinator

• E. Good, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer

• F. Harman, Nuclear Security Project Manager

• D. Harper, Licensing Assistant B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• H. Howard, Fire Protection Technical Assistant

• S. Johnson, Manager, Site Nuclear Services

• M. Kirk, Nuclear Operations Engineer J. Lander, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance & Outages

• Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

• L. Moffatt, Nuclear Safety Supervisor

• T. Neaman, Nuclear Security Officer W. Nielson, Senior Nuclear Electrical /I&C Supervisor G. Oberndorfer, Manager, Procurement & Material Contro!

• Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager

• Russell, Senior Nuclear Fire Protection Specialist

• Ryan, Nuclear Security Training Coordinator

• E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager

• K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing  ;

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R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusi6n of the inspection on August 7, 193 During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the Violations, Deviation, Unresolved Item and Inspector Followup Items (IFI).

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, 2 The licensee. representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and di not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. A licensee representative also notified the inspector that due ~ to the fact that the violation discussed in paragraph 6.b.(1) of this report was identified by the licersee, that-they reserve the right to' deny the violatio . -Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Violation 302/86-31-01: This violation was previously closed in NRC-Inspection Report 50/302-87-0 As part of their corrective action-associated with item (a) of this violation, the licensee stated in their response letter to the NRC dated January 22, 1987, that the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would be updated by July 1, 1987, to include descriptions for the normal operation of cooling water systems which supply cooling water for the makeup pumps (MVP). The cooling water alignment to these pumps is normally maintained such that cooling water from the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling (SW) system is supplied to MVP-1A and MVP-1B while cooling water from the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling (DC) system is supplied to MVP-1C. As a followup to the licensee's actions, the inspector reviewed the FSAR annual update for 1986 which was submitted on July 1 and noticed that the descriptions provided'

for the SW and DC systems had not been changed but still reflected a configuration in.which MVP-1A is normally cooled from the DC syste Failure to complete the corrective actions as stated in the January 22, 1987 response letter to the NRC is considered to be a deviation from a commitment to the NR Deviation (302/87-19-01): Failure to meet a commitment as stated in the response. letter to Violation 86-31-01 dated January 22, 198 (0 pen) Violation 302/87-12-01: Failure to adhere to the requirements of and have an adequate surveillance procedure. The inspector reviewed the licensee's revised response dated June 26, 1987, and verified that the corrective actions delineated in the response had been implemented. The licensee is still reviewing and evaluating procedure SP-335C, Radiation Monitoring - Instrumentation Functional Test, to determine if a. more appropriate placement of Limits and Precautions within the body of the procedure will prevent future occurrences. This item remains open pending completion of this evaluation and the issuance of appropriate procedure change (Closed) Violation 302/87-10-02: Failure to perform the channel checks and calibrations on post accident monitoring instrumentation recorder The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated June 26, 1987, and verified that the corrective actions delineated in the response had been implemented.

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(0 pen) IFI 302/87-10-06: .The licensee has written, issued, and performed procedure PM-167, EFIC Time Delay Relay Testing, which tests the time delay relays prior to performing procedure SP-332, Monthly Feedwater Isolation Functional Tests. Procedure SP-332 was revised as Revision 27 to require opening of the valve power supply breaker if the valve continues to stroke after reaching the 80*. open position. The licensee is

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still evaluating the change to the feedwater isolation matrix and expects the evaluation to be completed by December,1987. This item remains open pending completion of this evaluatio (Closed) IFI 302/87-10-10: The licensee established a task force that was charged with the responsibility to plan and implement a boron corrosion inspection program. After several meetings this task force developed a preventative maintenance (PM) procedure, PM-168, Visual Observation Check for Boron Corrosion on Threaded and Flanged Connections on the High Pressure Primary Side. It is planned to perform this procedure during the upcoming refueling outage (scheduled for September 1987).

(0 pen) UNR 302/87-04-01: The licensee has initiated a program to review and revise their PM program called the PM-100 series procedures. There are 55 PM-100 series procedures that will be reviewed and revised as necessary. These procedures are expected to be completed on the followinj schedule: 1096 complete by 8/31/87; 50?s complete by 10/30/87; 65?s complete by 12/31/87; 90?s complete by 2/29/88; and 100?s complete by 3/31/8 At the conclusion of this inspection period, four procedures had been reviewed and revised and were ready for implementation. This item remains open pending completion of this progra The following item was closed by in office regional revie (Closed) UNR 302/85-01-14 delineated a concern in that the licensee was utilizing a non-degreed individual to fill the position of Shift Technical Advisor (STA). This situation contradicted commitments made in a letter dated October 15, 1982 f rom P . Y . Baynarti, Assistant to Vice President, Nuclear Power Operation, Florida Power Corporation to Darrel G. Eisenhut, Division of Licensing, USNR The letter stated that the licensee intended to employ individuals for the STA positions who possess Bachelor of Science degrees. The individual in question was selected based on an equivalency determination made by the license Following the identification of the unresolved item the licensee requested the NRC to perform an equivalency determinatio Therefore, based on the individual's; 1) Previous nuclear plant experience 2) Educational background 3) Statement contained in Florida Power Corporation letter dated May 14, 1986 to John F. Stolz that this individual represents the sole use of equivalency for STA selection by Flcrida Power Corporatio This item is close ..

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. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which mure information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 12 of this repor . Review of Plant Operations The plant teegan this inspection period in power operation -(Mode 1). On July 10 -1937, an anticipatory reactor trip occurred due to the failure of a . reactor coolant pump power monitor (see paragraph 8 of this . report for details of the reactor trip). Following repairs to the pump power monitor, a reactor startup was performeo on July 11 and the aactor achieved criticality at approximately 3:15 AM followed by the resumption of power operation at 4:00 AM. On August 1, at appro:<imately 11:20 AM a control rod stator failed which caused control rod #4 in rod group #2 to drop into the reactor core. Attempts to recover the control rod were unsuccessful and the plant was shutdown.to the hot /stanooy condition (Mode 3). On August 7 the plant was cooled down to the hot shutdown condition (Mode 4) curing replacement of the controi rod stator. Following stator replacement, plant hettup and reactor startup were commenced. The reactor achieved criticality at 5:48 AM on August 7 followed by the resumption of power operation at 7:30 AM. The plant remained in Mode 1 for the remainder of this inspection perio Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed varicus entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedure The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-Of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Log In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagout '

No violatiuns or deviations were icentified, Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee 4 meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activitie _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .

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The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generatnr room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear room '

During these tours, the following observations were'made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation .

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and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode: )

Equipment operating status;- area atmospheric ar.d liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameter j

.No violations or deviations were identifie (2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Emergency Feedwater (EF) system to verify that tne lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant condition No violations or deviations were identifie (3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant -l status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnover No violations or deviations were identifie (4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions -

Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existe No violations or deviations were identifie (5) Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance' with the facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included:

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Selected licensee conducted surveys;

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Entry and exit from contaminated areas including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and contaminated areas;

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Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and,

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipmen Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequat The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably Achievable ( ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel involvement in the objectives and goals of the progra During a review of Raciation Safety Incident Reports (RSIRs) the following items were icentified:

(a) RSIRs87-143 and 87-144 reported two instances, one on 7/9/87 and the other on 7/13/87 where individuals entered the RCA withoat proper personal dosimetr The licensee conducted a thorough investigation of these events and verified that no overexposure had occurred. In addition the licensee has instituted a new badge control program that will prevent personnel with expired or missing personal dosimetry from entering the RC This badge control program consists of chemistry-radiation personnel notifying security personnel of the discrepant personal dosimetry and security changing the person's access code thereby preventing access into the RC I (b) RSIRs87-134 and 87-145 reported two instances of contaminated materials being found outside of the RC In RSIR 87-134 parts of a normally uncontaminated main steam drain trap (MSDT) that is located in the turbine building were found to be contaminated on 6/28/8 Apparently personnel performing maintenance on the MSDT failed to notify chemistry-radiation personnel to survey the area prior to beginning work as required by procedure RSP-101, Basic Radiological Safety Information and Instructions for " Radiation Workers".

In RSIR 87-145 a slightly contaminated tool (200 cpm fixed)

was found in e tool issue trailer located outside of the protected area (and RCA). This tool was found during a survey being conducted as the result of a special survey

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a program the licensee had developed to detect such accidental releases of contaminated material I

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To prevent recurrence of these events the licensee took the following actions:

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Special training was conducted with plant mechanics to assure they are aware of RSP-101, Basic Radiological, requirements; -

An Interoffice Correspondence (IOC) was sent to the

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site training group requesting that a discussion of the SSP-101 requirements be covered in the annual ,

requalification training classes;

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An IOC was written by the maintenance superintendent i to all maintenance personnel and planners to remind them to assure proper planning and preparation for each job; and, j

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The licensee is considering adding a discussion of the i RSP-101 requirements to the mechanical shop's technical training classe The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation and corrective actions for each of these events. As a result of this review the licensee's activities are considered to be 'in i accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C, Item V, with respect to Licensee Identified Violations (LIV's)

and therefore these issues are not being cite (6) Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The composition of the security organization was checked to insure that the minimum number of guards were available and that security activities were conducted with proper supervision. The performance of varicas shifts of the security force were observed in the conduct of daily activities to include; protected and vital area access controls, searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory post In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital ]

area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identifie ;

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Fire protection activities, staffing and j equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was i appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, u________________

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'I actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency >

equipment, and fire barriers were operabl No violations or deviations were identified, j\

(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that '

approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were '1 conducting the tests, tests were adequate to verify equipment 1 operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followe ,

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-SP-300 Operating Daily Surveillance Log; l -SP-312 Heat Balance Calculations; j-SP-317 RC System Water Inventory Balance;  ;;1-SP-335C Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Functional J1 Test Tech. Spec. RMA's;

-SP-367 Fire Service Valve Alignment and Operability  ;

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-SP-401 Control Rod Programming Verification; ,

-SP-421 Reactivity Balance Cciculations;

-SP-422 RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance;

-SP-425 Control Rod Drive Patch Panel Access Control; -

-SP-701, Radiation Monitoring System Surveillance Program; '

-SP-702 Reactor Coolant and Decay Heat Daily Surveillance -

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Program; and,

-SP-709 Reactor Coolant and Decay Heat Non-scheduled Surveillance Progra While reviewing the completed data for procedures SP-300 performed on July 16,1987 and SP-312 performed cr July 22, 1987, the inspector noted the following examples of failure to adhere to facility procedures:

(a) Procedure SP-312 is performed to provide a comparison of calculated heat balance power with that indicated by the nuclear instrumentation system. Step 9.1.3 of procedure ~ ,

SP-312 requires that the calculated heat balance power be obtained from the Reference Core Power (QCORE) provided in .

the plant computer group # 59 display. The group # 59

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printout, which was obtained at the time of the comparison, indicated that QCORE was 64.37% of full powe The ,*

operator, however, used a value for heat balance power of .' f1 64.06% of full power which did not agree with the group #59 display printout. The inspector also noted that this error ..

was not detected by subsequent supervisory review <

Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure SP-312 is considered to be a violation of TS 6. . .

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I (b) Procedure SP-300 is performed each shift to determine the operating status of equipment throughout the plant. The procedure was revised on July 16 to add an Enclosure (4) .

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that provided channel checks for the post-accident monitoring instrumentatio During a review of this Enclosure (4) on July 22 the inspector noted that the Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) "A" level data for instruments S284 and SP-18-LII were not within the normal range limit If the instrumentation is outside of the normal range limits (out-of-spec), step 4.1.2 of SP-300 requires that the out-of-spec data be circled and that the appropriate TS action statement be entered. Due to the failure of the licensee to detect the out-of-spec data during observation or during subsequent supervisory review, the thirty day action statement of TS 3.3.3.6 was not entere Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure SP-300 is considered to be a violation of TS 6. The licensee was issued a similar violation against TS 6.8.1 in j NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-17. Since this report covered inspection activities for the month of June 1987, there has been insufficient time for the licensee to respond. Therefore, the violations discussed in this paragraph will not be cited but instead will be considered to be further examples of Violation 50-302/87-17-0 These examples were discussed in the exit meeting conducted on August 7, 1987. The licensee will address their corrective ,

actions to these examples concurrently with their response to (

Violation 50-302/87-17-0 ( 9) Maintenance Activities -

The inspector observed maintenance ,

i activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followe i Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the ;

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Troubleshooting, repair and testing of the "B" Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitor (RCPPM-1B) in accordance with ,

procedures MP-531, Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, PT-304, j Time Response of Agastat, and SP-110, RPS Functional )

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Testing of main steam safety valves MSV-38 and MSV-47 in accordance with procedure SP-650, Main Steam Code Safety Valves Test;

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Inspection, insulation resistance testing, and high potential testing on the breakers which supply power to the

"A" Reactor Building Spray Puup (BSP-1A) and the "A" Decay Heat Seawater Pump (RWP-3A);

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Troubleshooting, associated with the failure of the "B" AC reactor trip breaker to close, in accordance with procedures MP-531 and PM-118, AC and DC Breakers - Control-Rod Drive System;

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Resetting of the nuclear overpower high flux reactor. trip setpoint in accordance with-procedure SP-113, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration; and,

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Calibration of the turbine control oil and main feedwater pump control oil . anticipatory reactor trip pressure switches in accordance with procedure SP-112, Calibration of the Reactor Protection Syste No violations or deviations were identifie (10) Radioactive Waste Controls -

Solid waste compacting and selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were take No violations or deviations were ide ntifie (11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were-observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, ano that anchoring points were not bindin No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic d impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriat Events, which were reported immediately, were reviewed as they occurred ta determine if the TS were satisfie LERs 86-20, 87-09, and 87-10 were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement policy. LERs 87-09 and 87-10 are close (0 pen) LER 86-20: This LER reported the failure to meet the required time interval for three consecutive 18 month surveillance tests. The licensee has revised procedure SP-443 (revision 77 dated July 14, 1987) to ensure that scheduling is not dependent upon the test's prior performance date. The inspector reviewed this procedure and noted that although the scheduling is no longer dependent on prior

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performance, the scheduled date for accomplishment for five procedures would still place them outside the 3.25 time interval allowed for performance of the three ' consecutive tests. -The inspector discussed this observation with licensee representatives who agreed to review this matter to. ensure compliance with the 3.25 time - interval . for three consecutive tests. This LER remains open pendirg ' completion of - the licensee's review and subsequent NRC revie '

b. ' The inspector reviewed ' Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following: compliance with the.TS, corrective actions as identified in the reports or- during subsequent reviews' have been accomplished or are being ' pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by T All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Polic (1) NCOR 87-123 reported the failure to set the-Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation anticipatory trip setpoints as required by TS 2.2.1 (Table 2.2.1). Table 2.2.1 requires the anticipatory reactor trips for the main turbine and both main feedwater pumps to be set at trip setpoints of greater than 45 psig control oil pressure and greater thsn 55 psig control oil pressure- respectivel During a review of surveillance procedures the licensee identified that the tolerances allowed in the RPS monthly functional test and calibration procedures was not consistent with the TS and allowed setpoints for the anticipatory reactor trips which were lower than those required by table 2. From the licensee's investigation of this matter, it appears that the tolerances allowed by the procedures were incorrect since the time the anticipatory trips were added to the TS (TS amendment #95, issued January 21, 1987). Review of past ,

performances of the monthly functional test results indicated that the actual setpoints for the main turbine and main feedwater pump trips were less than 45 psig and 55 psig respectively from approximately January 1987 to June 198 Failure to establish the RPS instrumentation trip setpoints as required by Table 2.2.1 is contrary to TS 2.2.1 .and i s considered to be a violation.

l l Violation (302/87-19-02): Failure to establish the RPS i

instrumentation trip setpoints as required by TS 2. (2) NCOR 87-118 reported that the plant heat balance calculation had not been performed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by TS 4.3.1.1.1 table 4.3-1(2). This matter was identified by the i

licensee during a shift turnover of control room operators on L

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July 2 During thi s shift turnover the relieving shift supervisor determined that the previous heat balance calculation was performed on July 21 at 6:10 AM and that performance of the surveillance was overdue. The plant heat balance calculation was then performed at approximately 12:25 PM. Approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> and 15 minutes had elapsed between the performances of the surveillanc The licensee attributes the cause for this event 5 to be personnel error on the part of the previous shift supervisor and has counseled this individual accordingly. The licensee also plans to report this matter via a LE This matter is considered to be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence. This item will be reviewed further when the LER is issue (3) NCOR 87-119 reported the loss of power to several radiation monitors. This event occurred on July 24 during the performance of maintenance on radiation monitor RMG-10. A power surge was apparently caused by this maintenance which resulted in a blown fuse to the group of radiation monitors which are supplied from the "B" vital bus (VBDP-4) thereby causing a power failure to the entire group of monitors. This also resulted in a slight decrease of the voltage supplied to the vital bus and initiated an automatic transfer to the bus's citernate power suppl During this transfer the "B" AC reactor trip breaker opened upon sensing a loss of voltage condition on the vital bus. This event did not result in a reactor trip since AC power was still available to the control rod drive mechanisms through the redundant "A" reactor trip breake Another similar event occurred on August 5 during maintenance on radiation monitor RMG-4. The sequence of events was similar to the July 24 event and again resulted in the opening of the "B" AC reactor trip breaker. This event occurred with the plant in the hot / standby conditio The inspectors discussed this matter with licensee representatives who stated that the following corrective actions were being performed to prevent recurrence of this event:

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The I&C shop will determine the root cause for the power surge and subsequent loss of power to the monitors during maintenance evolutions conducted inside the radiation monitor cabinets;

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A supervisor will be present during future work performed inside the radiation monitoring cabinets until such time as the root cause for this problem is identified;

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The licensee will evaluate other methods of performing required maintenance to these monitors; and,

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A field problem report will be written to obtain engineering assistance to evaluate the disposition of signal and power supply wire bundles located in the back of the radiation monitor pane Inspector Followup Item (302/87-19-03): Review the licensee's corrective action associated with the loss of multiple radiation monitors and opening of the "B" reactor trip breake . Design, Design Changes and Modifications Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the i changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that l the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and

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approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met

acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, l and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessar This review included selected observations of modifications -

and/or testing in progres Modification MAR 86-11-03-01, Check Valve Verification Modification on EFP-1 and EFP-2, was reviewed. This MAR installed instrument gages on the recirculation lines for the emergency feedwater pumps to enable the licensee to verify correct operation of check valves in these line No violations or deviations were identifie . Nonroutine Event Followup On July 10 the plant was operating at approximately 64% power on three Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP). The "C" RCP had been previously secured due to an overheating problem associated with this pump's motor thrust bearing. At approximately 5:37 AM a relay associated with the power monitor for the "B" RCP failed. The pump power monitors are used to measure the power being drawn by the RCPs and are utilized in the reactor protection system to provide an anticipatory reactor trip in the event that two or more RCPs fail or are otherwise secured. This anticipatory reactor trip ensures that the reactor is not operating unless adequate cooling flow is available from the RCPs to remove heat from the reacto g The failure of the relay in the "B" RCP power monitor did not alter the normal operation of the RCP but did cause this monitor to send a signal to the RPS that the "B" RCP had failed or stoppe The false signal generated from the "B" RCP power monitor and the signal associated with the power monitor for the already secured "C" RCP initiated the reactor tri The inspectors reviewed the licensee's post trip review and restart justification and maintenance activities which were conducted following the reactor tri No violations or deviations were identifie '

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l Review of the licensee's actions on 10 CFR Part 21 Reports i

The inspector reviewed the licensee's action associated with the following 1 reports:

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A 10 CFR Part 21 report dated September 13, 1985, concerning {

undervoltage trip devices supplied on General Electric type AK and )

AKR circuit breakers. Ther,e breakers are utilized by the lit.ensee as reactor trip breakers end are also discussed in NRC Information Notice (IEN) 85-58. The licensee's action in regards to this IEN is ,

discussed in NRC Inspemtion Report 50-302/85-41. Action on this 1

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matter is considered complete and this item is considered to be close A 10 CFR Part 21 report dated June 5,1985, concerning inner polar connectors between the poles of diesel generators manufactured by Fairbanks Morse. These diesels are used by the licensee for onsite ,

emergency power in the event of loss of offsite power. This item is !

also the subject of IEN 85-6 The licensee's actions associated j with this IEN are discussed in paragraph 10 of this repor e

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A 10 CFR Part 21 report dated May 13, 1985, concerning short time delay band levers for Brown Boveri K-Line circuit breakers. This item is also the subject of IEN 85-64. For record purposes this j report will be considered closed and further followup will be l performed as discussed in paragraph 10 of this ',epor l l

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A 10 CFR Part 21 report dated August 29, 1985, concerning placing all )

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high presrure injection valve cables in the same cable support tra j

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Actico on ,this matter is considered complete und this item is 1

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co'niliderec' to be closed ]

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tb violations or deviations were identifie . Review of IE Information Notices (IEN)

'1 The fospector reviewed the licensee's action with respect to the following

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IEN 85-64, BBC Brown Bovent Low-Voltap K-Line Circuit Breakers, With 3 Deficient Dvercuennt TrN Devices Modeb OD-4 and 00-5. This IEN discusses a p obl.m withs these breaurs manufactured from October

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?983 to Msrth 1965 tcscejated with short time delay band levers. The

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licensee hat re/64rchto their records and discovered that only two

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, breakers manufactured during this time period are presently in use l 4 rd 'these he in vt-safety eelated applicaticw. However, due to l

% t% gsdcc<c' wpl.fcations of this problem, the licensee has initiated I a wot t request OlR f9571) P.o inspect all Brown Boveri OD-4 and OD-5 .

thakers inttalVed. ' This inspereion will include all the safety and

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z non-safety applications 3f this type 4f breaker

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- presently performing 'this inspection as part of their ongoing routine breaker preventive maintenance schedul Inspector Followup Item (302/87-19-04): Review the licensee's inspections of short time delay band . levers associated with Biown Boveci K-Liae circuit breaker IEN 85-68, Diesel Generator Failure at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear. Station Unit 1. This IEN discusses a problem with the diesel generator inner

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polar connector becoming loose and damaging generator component The licensee contacted the manufacturer for information regarding this problem and determined that the emergency diesel generators in use by the licensee do not have this inner polar connector installed and therefore this is not a concern. Action on this item is complete and this matter is considered close . Review of Special Reports The licensee submitted a special report, dated August 3,1987, regarding dose equivalent I-131 exceeding the 1.0 microcuries/ gram limit following the reactor trip of July 2,1987.. The inspectors reviewed this report to determine the licensee's compliance with the T No violations-or deviations were identifie . Review of Nuclear General Review Committee (NGRC) Activities The inspector reviewed the activities of the licensee's offsite review ccmmittee, the NGRC, to determine if the functions of the NGRC are being i performed in accordance with regulatory requirement To accomplish this inspection the inspector reviewed the NGRC Charter, l Revision 4, dated March 30, 1987 and the following procedures:

- 1.1 NGRC Organization, Revision 0;

- 1.2 NGRC Meetings, Revision 0;

- 1.3 NGRC Interfaces, Revision 0;

- 1.4 Action Items and Follow-up Items, Revision 0;

- 2.1 Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0;

- 2.2 Safety Evaluation Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0;

- 2.3 Significant Events and LER Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0;

- 2.4 Techn1 cal Specifications Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0;

- 2.5 Environmental tionitoring Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0;

- 2.6 Audit Program Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0;

- 2.7 Corporate Review Subcommittee Operations, Revision 0; and,

- 2.8 Violations Subcommittee Operations, Revision The inspector also reviewed the qualifications of the NGRC members and their alternates and meeting minutes numbers 159 through 167 covering the period of August 20, 1986 through June 9, 1987. These minutes were ,

reviewed to verify that a proper quorum was present, that an appropriate '

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agenda was developed and conducted, and that the various subcommittees met and reported to the full NGRC as require During a review of the member qualifications, the inspector noted that some members may not meet the qualifications specified in TS 6.5. .This finding was based upon a review of member qualification summaries that were provided to the inspector, some of which appear to be outdate i When notified of this finding, licensee representatives proceeded to conduct a records search so that the present member qualifications could be verifie The inspector has requested the licensee to provide a listing of all present and past NGRC members and alternates, their date of l assignment to the NGRC, . and an updated qualification summary for each of these members. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's request and will i

provide the information.

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This issue is unresolved pending receipt and review of the NGRC member i l' qualification Unresolved Item (302/87-19-05): Provide the qualifications and assignments of NGRC members and alternates for NRC review.

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