IR 05000302/1987034

Insp Rept 50-302/87-34 on 871010-1112.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Including Defueling Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts & Facility Mods

ML20236V816
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/30/1987
From:	Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236V794	List: IR 05000302/1987034 IR 07100010/2011012 ML20236V792
References
50-302-87-34, NUDOCS 8712070115
Download: ML20236V816 (16)

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UNITED SVATES j

. [p Riog% MUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION j p" ,

, REGION 11 g ',, j 101 MARIETTA STREET, j

• . 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 1

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Report No.: 50-302/87-34 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No.: 50-302 License No : DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection Conducted: October 10 - November 12, 1987 Inspectors: O .) /A.- NM 3= , D T. F. Stetka, Senior Resident' Inspector Date Signed fh h JJ E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector f Y h ), NW J o, 72 Date Signed Approved by: h B. A. Wilson, Section Chief

~b b NW <3 o . 3 2 Date Si'gned Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY Scope: This routine irispection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations including defueling operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, f acility modifications, review of special reports, offsite review committee activities, and licensee action on previous inspection item Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

I Results: Two violations were identified (Failure to have proper equipment in operation during fuel movement operations, paragraph 5.a; Failure to adhere to facility procedures, paragraphs 5.b(9)a and 11.b.)

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9712070115 871201 2 PDR ADOCK 0500 G

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• P.. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor

• J. Brandely, Nuclear Security & Special Project Superintendent

• J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services

• M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

• J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support i M. Culver, Senior Nuclear Reactor Specialist H. Gelston, Superintendent, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

• B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• S. Johnson, Manager, Site Nuclear Services G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent

• M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

• R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent W. Neuman, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection (ISI)

• S. Robinson, Nuclear Chemistry & Radiation Protection Superintendent

• R. Thompson, Superintendent, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

• E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services

• K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing

• R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on November 12, 198 During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the in'spection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the Violations, Unresolved Item (UNR), and Inspector Followup Items (IFI).

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) IFI 302/87-12-03: The licensee has revised procedure SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log (revision 93 dated September 15, 1987),

to provide clear acceptance criteria for performing channel checks on the power range neutron flux channels. All channels must agree within a 5%

band from highest to lowest neutron flux indication to demonstrate satisfactory channel operatio ___-__- _ _-_ ~

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The licensee performs channel checks on reactor protection system channels by comparing the analog channels with each other and by observing the bistable status lights on the digital channels. The inspector considers this method acceptable and satisfactor (Closed) IFI 302/87-12-02: The licensee has revised procedure SP-321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and Power Availability Verification (revision 29 dated October 6, 1987), to include the requirement to periodically check the position of the cross-tie breakers to the non-safety Unit busses (breakers 3207 and 3208).

(Closed) Violation 302/87-19-02: Failure to establish required reactor protection system (RPS) instrumentation trip setpoints. The licensee has revised the RPS instrumentation calibration procedure SP-112 (revision 39 dated October 2, 1987) and the RPS functional test procedure SP-110 (revision 71 dated August 3, 1987) to incorporate main turbine control oil and main feedvater control oil pressure anticipatory reactor trip setpoints of 50 psig and 60 psig respectively. The inspector reviewed these procedures and verified implementation of the licensee's actio (0 pen) Unresolved Item 302/87-28-03: Determine the effect that increased Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) loading has on diesel generator operatio The licensee has reviewed this matter with the diesel manufacturer who has recommended that a more detailed inspection be performed on the diesel's upper piston wrist pin bushings which may have been damaged due to this operation. This inspection has been completed on EDG-1A and did not identify any abnormal wear. The inspection of EDG-1B is continuing and will be completed before the end of the current refueling outage. The licensee is planning to submit appropriate changes to Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 and is also considering major modifications to upgrade diesel load capabilities. The licensee has issued a Licensee Event Report (LER 87-19) reporting this matter. This item will remain open pending completion of the licensee's action (Closed) IFI 302/87-30-03: The licensee's contract engineers have completed their calculations regarding the possible pipe overstressing due to lead blanket installation. These calculations confirmed that the pipe and pipe hangers were not overstressed by the lead blanket (0 pen) UNR 302/87-04-03: As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-17, the licensee will issue a Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI) following completion of their engineering review.

l The TSI will clarify how the current procedure revisions to procedures SP-130 and SP-358 ( A,B,C) will meet the TS requi rement s . The TSI is expected to be completed and implemented by the end of February 198 (Closed) UNR 302/85-29-01: The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities to verify that the actions and commitments discussed in NRC Inspection Report 302/87-04, paragraph 3, were completed. This review indicated that all activities were completed by the commitment dates and that the Safety Listing is being updated on a periodic basi _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ .

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.(0 pen) UNR 302/87-30-01: This item addressed problems associated with procedure revision requests (PRRs) and their implementation as delineated in procedure AI-401. To correct these problems the licensee plans to rewrite procedure AI-401. Paragraph 6.b(1) of this report identifies additional problems with procedure AI-401 as they relate to Immediate Temporary Changes (ITC's) to procedures. This item will track activities on both PRR's and ITC's as they relate to procedure AI-40 . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or-deviations. An Unresolved Item is identified in paragraph 6.b(1) of this repor . Review of. Plant Operations The plant began this inspection period in the refueling mode (Mode 6). On October 24, 1987, the reactor vessel was defueled. The plant remained in this condition for the duration of this inspection report, Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the TS and the licensee's administrative procedure The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Outage Shift Manager's Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily. Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Log In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagout While reviewing the reactor operator's log on November 9, the inspector noted that during the period of 9:55 PM to 10:04 PM on November 7, 1987, the two operating Auxiliary Building (AB)

exhaust fans were secured due to a problem with the ventilation balance in the AB. Also during this time period the inspector noted that the other pair of exhaust f ans were secured because one of the fans (AHF-1C) kept tripping off after starting due to an apparent problem in the electrical circuitr During subsequent discussions with both operations and reactor engineering personnel that were involved with fuel handling operations in the spent fuel storage pool, the inspector determined that fuel movement operations we,'e in progress during this time period.

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1 TS 3.9.12 requires at least one pair of AB exhaust fans to be_in operation whenever one pair of exhaust fans are inoperable and fuel is being moved within the storage poo Failure to maintain at least one pair of fans in operation while the other pair of fans were inoperable and during fuel movement in the storage pool is contrary to the requirements of TS 3.9.12 and is considered to be a Violatio Violation (302/87-34-01): Failure to maintain at least one pair of AB exhaust fans in operation during fuel movement operations in the storage pool as required by TS 3.9.1 b. Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progres Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshift Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activitie The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator room; auxiliary building; reactor building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear room During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode: 1 Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxilia ry equipment operating parameter No violations or deviations were identifie (2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Core Flood (CF) system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect

"as-built" plant condition No violations or deviations were identifie (3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control

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room operations were being conducted in an orderly and i

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L professional manne In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the ~ continuity of plant status,. operational

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problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnover No violations or deviations were. identifie (4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions

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Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas

- throughout the , facility were ' observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existe No violations or deviations were identifie (5) Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that'these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirement These observations included:

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Selected licensee conducted surveys;-

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Entry and exit from. contaminated areas including step-cff pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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Work activity within radiation, high . radiation, and contaminated areas;

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' Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and,

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Proper wearing of fpersonnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipmen Area postings were independently. verified for accuracy by the inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation Work' Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the' controls were adequat The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel involvement in the objectives and goals of the progra No violations or deviations were identifie (6) Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The composition of the security organization was checked to insure that the mininum number of guards were available and that securi ty activit.ies were conducted with proper supervision. The performance of various shif ts of the security force were observed in the conduct of daily activities to include; protected and vital area access controls, searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory

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I 6 post In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie (7) Fire - Protection -

Fi re protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operabl No violations or deviations were identifie (8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followe The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-137, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Time Delay Relay Calibration (data review only);

- SP-178, Containment Leakage Test-Type "A" Including Liner Plate;

- SP-210, ASME Class 2 and Class 3 Pressure Testing;

- SP-220, Source Range Functional Tests During Refueling Operations;

- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;

- SP-323, Evacuation and Fire Alarm Demonstration (data review only);

- SP-397, Steam Generator Hydrostatic Test Surveillance (data review only);

- SP-406, Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements (data review only); and,

- SP-524, Battery Performance Discharge Tes No violations or deviations were identifie __________-____ -

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(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, TS requirements were being followe Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:

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Inspection and maintenance on the A and B Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) in accordance with surveillance procedure SP-605, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine Inspection / Maintenance;

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Clutch tripper adjustments to a motor operated steam admission valve ( ASV-204) to the emergency feedwater pump, in accordance with procedure MP-402, Maintenance of

"Limitorque" Valve Controls;

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Removal of pressurizer relief valve RCV-8 in accordance with procedure MP-102, RCV-8 and RCV-9 Pressurizer Relief Valve Maintenance;

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Troubleshooting and replacement of station battery bank "A" cell number 53 in accordance with procedures MP-531, Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, MP-401, DC System Maintenance, and associated testing in accordance with procedure SP-520, Weekly Battery Check;

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Replacement of Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling (SW)

System pump discharge check valve SWV-10 in accordance with MAR 83-02-10-01 and procedure MP-133, System Pneumatic Pressure Testing;

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Repair of motor leads on DC powered Limitorque motor operated valves in accordance with engineering instructions and procedure PM-105, Insulation Resistance Control Circuits High Potential Testing Inspection, Cleaning, and Drying Windings of Electric Motors; and,

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Replacement of main steam code safety valves in accordance with procedure MP-109, OTSG Relief Valve Maintenanc As the result of these reviews, the following items were  ;

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(a) On November 2, 1987, while reviewing the work packages associated with the removal, rebuilding, and replacement of the main steam code safety valves, the

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inspector noted that the "as found" ring settings of 14 of the 16 valves were not found to be in accordance with the setting requirements of procedure . MP-10 Procedure MP-109, which has been used by the licensee since at least 1980 to rebuild these valves, . requires the upper ring (UR) setting of these valles to be set at +165 notches (except for valves MSV-40 and MSV-48 which are required to be set at +170 notches) and the lower ring (LR) settings of these valves to be set at-6 notche The "as found" settings of these 14 valves were as follows:

Valve LR Setting UR Setting MSV-34 -6 +161 MSV-35 -6 +159 MSV-36 -3 '160 MSV-37 -12 +170-MSV-39 -6 +157 MSV-40 -7 +168 MSV-41 -7 +161 MSV-42 -5 +158 MSV-43 -3 +165 MSV-44 -12 +165 MSV-45 -3 +160 MSV-46 -5 +165 MSV-47 -5 +174 MSV-48 -5 +142 Following discussions with licensee personnel the inspector determined that these ring settings had the following affects:

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Upper Ring:

1) Increasing the number of notches gives a lower blowdown percent, i.e., a shorter blowdown time; 2) Increasing the number of notches increases the reseat pressure; and, 3) Increasing the number of notches tends to lower the set pressure slightl Lower Ring:

1) Increasing the number of notches (more negative) gives a lower blowdown percentage, i.e., a shorter blowdown t,me;

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2) Increasing the number of notches could cause the valve to simmer before it pops; and, 3) An increase of 20 notches or greater would prohibit the valve from attaining full lif As a result of these discussions the inspector con-cluded that previous valve operability had not been affected by these incorrect ring settings but also concluded that operability could hsve been affected if the incorrect settings were greate Since the valve rings are set during valve rebuilding and are pinned in place, the ring settings cannot change during valve operatio Therefore it appears that the valves were not set as required by procedure MP-109 during previous rebuildin The inspector expressed concern that the presently installed valves may not be set correctl The licensee representatives responded that during this outage, the valve vendor representative performed the ring settings and therefore they were confident that the ring settings were prope Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure MP-109 is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8. and is considered to be a violatio Violation (302/87-34-02): Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure MP-109 for setting of relief valve ring settings as required by TS 6.8. (b) As the result of maintenance on the "A" EDG in accordance with procedure SP-605, the licensee identified a minor coolant leak into the exhaust manifold and excessive wear on a camshaft lobe. These findings were judged to be minor and to not have an affect upon EDG operation. The coolant leak only occurred during a hydrostatic test which was conducted at twice the normal operating pressure. Since exten-sive additional EDG teardown would be necessary to correct these items and since the leadtime to obtain the necessary parts was excessive, the licensee decided to defer these repairs until the next refuel  ;

outag Subsequent post maintenance testing demon-strated full EDG operability.

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The licensee is developing two Preventative Maintenance (PM) procedures that' will be used. to -

monitor for further. degradation in these area IFI . ( 302/87-34-03): Review the . licensee's monitoring activities for the A EDG coolant leak and worn cam-shaft lobe, p

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(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that approved- procedures were ut'lized, that appropriate release approvals 'were obtained, and tha required surveys were taken.

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No violations or deviations were identifie (11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems

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were observed to insure that fluid-levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring points were not bindin .No. violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends,-and to determine.whether corrective actions appeared appropriat Events, which were reported.immediately, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfie LLERs 86-15, 87-03, 87-14, 87-19 and 87-23 were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC : Enforcement policy. LERs 86-15, 87-14, and 87-19 are closed'for.the following reasons:

(Closed) LER 86-15: This LER reported the failure to adequately test the 480 volt engineered safeguards bus load shedding capability. The-licensee has revised procedure SP-417, Refueling Interval Integrated Plant response to Engineered Safeguards Actuation (revision 23 dated June 30, 1987), to verify the correct load shedding of the control complex chillers and decay heat closed cycle cooling pump (Closed) LER 87-14: This LER reported that personnel error caused i surveillance procedure SP-312, Heat Balance Calculations, to not be performed within the allowable time interval. The licensee has completed counseling of the individual involved. In addition, this '

LER has been reviewed by all of the nuclear shift supervisor _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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11 (Closed) LER 87-19: This LER reported exceeding the emergency diesel generator design load rating during surveillance testin This matter was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-28 and identified as Unresolved Item 302/87-28-03. Further action on this item will be tracked by the unresolved ite .LER 87-23 will remain open:

(0 pen) LER 87-23: This LER reported the failure to have audible neutron flux indication during refueling operations. The licensee has determined that the cause for this event was due to inadequate procedure The licensee is presently revising procedures SP-406, Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements, and SP-441, Unit Shutdown Surveillance Plan, to correct these inadequacie b. -The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by TS, All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Polic As the result of these reviews the foll.owing items were identified:

(1) NCOR's87-140, 87-177,87-193, and 87-200 reported the improper use of the Immediate Temporary Change (ITC). An ITC is the licensee's mechanism to allow temporary changes to procedures as permitted under TS 6.8.3. To prevent recurrence of these occurrences the licensee has taken and will take the following actions:

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Procedures AI-400 and AI-401, the procedures that control procedure changes, will be rewritten to clarify how to write an ITC;

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The personnel involved with the issuance of the improper ITCs have been counseled in the proper use of the ITC;

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A letter and an enclosure containing examples of the incorrect ITC usage has been sent to all the Nuclear Shift Supervisors and Assistant Nuclear Shift Supervisors for them to review and requires them to initial for completion of this review; and,

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A letter will be sent to all managers and supervisors advising them of proper ITC use, j

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Similar procedure change problems involving procedure revisions were identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-30 and are being tracked by UNR (302/87-30-01). This finding will be considered part'of UNR (302/87-30-01) and tracked by this UNR (see paragraph 3 of this report).

V (21 NCOR 87-204 reported the finding that the fuel handling bridges

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and fuel transfer equipment were being operated outside of their design basis. This equipment was designed to be operated in water with a pH range of 5.5. to 6.5, but instead has been operating in water with a pH of 4.6 This operation has been going on since plant licensing in 197 ,

Engineering has reviewed this use and has determined through the review of surveillance test records and maintenance records that there is no present safety concern with continuing refueling operations with the present refueling water pH. To assure that continued usage of this equipment in the long term is not compromised, engineering has initiated an engineering evaluation on this issu IFI (302/87-34-04): Review the licensee's engineering evaluation to determine if continued use of fuel handling equipment with a low water pH is degrading the equipmen (3) NCOR 87-202 reported that during a . field verification of Clark Type PM Relays used in the engineered safeguards system, three relays were found to have undersized pickup coils and several other relays had contact arrangements which could result in unbalanced relay operation resulting in excessive wear and shortened service lif The licensee contacted the relay manufacturer for assistance in determining an appropriate course of action and decided to replace the undersized coils during the current refueling outage (modification MAR 87-10-06-01). Since the failure history of these relays showed no malfunctions since their initial installation during plant construction, the licensee plans to make changes to the relays so that the relay contacts are balanced during the next refuel outag In the interim, the licensee will perform monthly tests on the affected relays to verify operabilit IFI (302/87-34-05): Review the licensee's efforts to replace undersized relay coils and balance relay contacts for the engineered safeguards syste (4) NCOR 87-203 reported that during the performance of maintenance on valve MSV-56, the valve's disk seat guide was noted to be missing. This valve is one of two valves which supply steam to

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the steam driven emergency feedwater pump (EFP-2). The licensee is presently investigating this matter to determine if any damage to other equipment has resulted from this missing par Inspection of the redundant steam supply valve (MSV-55) did not discover the part nor did the part appear to have caused any damage to this valve. The licensee plans to inspect strainers in the steam piping to EFP-2 to verify that the missing part  !

will not obstruct steam flo IFI (302/87-34-06): Review the licensee's investigation into the missing part from valve MSV-56 and possible damage to other equipmen . Design, Design Changes and Modifications Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progres The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or associated testing observed:

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MAR 87-01-13-01, Setpoint Change on Control Rod Drive Brecker Undervoltage Sensors; and,

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MAR 83-02-10-01, Replacement of Valve SWV-1 No violations or deviations were identifie i 8. Review of Special Reports Tne licensee submitted a special report, dated November 5,1987, which reported that during the performance of procedure SP-155, Channel Check of the Triaxial-Peak Accelographs, monitor SI-005-MEI which is located on top of the "A" steam generator, was found to be inoperable. The licensee has obtained and calibrated a replacement monitor but has not yet installed the monitor due to extensive outage work being performed in the area. The i monitor is presently scheduled to be installed after completion of I refueling operations and prior to ascension into the hot shutdown condition (Mode 4). The past failure history of this instrumentation indicates that on several occasions this instrumentation has been found to be out of tolerance or inoperable. To prevent recurrence the licensee is j performing an evaluation to determine if a different design may be I I

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IFI (302/87-34-07): Review the installation of the replacement seismic monitor and evaluation of a different desig . Refueling Activities The inspectors witnessed several shift s of fuel handling operations and verified that the defueling was being performed in accordance with TS requirements and approved procedures. Areas inspected included the periodic testing of refueling related equipment and instrumentation, containment integrity, housekeeping in the refueling area, shift staffing during defueling, and periodic monitoring of plant status during defueling operation In addition, the following procedures were reviewed:

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FP-203, Defueling and Refueling Operations; and,

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FP-601, Fuel Handling Equipment Operation No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Offsite Review Committee Activities The inspector attended a meeting and reviewed the activities of the licensee's offsite review committee, the Nuclear General Review Committee (NGRC). This review included a determination that TS requirements were being met with regard to the following: "

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Committee quorum;

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Committee composition with respect to disciplines and expertise;

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Qualification of committee members; and,

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Review activities of the committe No violations or deviations were identifie . Nonroutine Event Followup On October 17, 1987, at approximately 9:17 PM the plant entered the Alert status when a loss of offsite power occurred. The power loss was caused when two contract maintenance personnel inadvertently caused a short to ground of a 230 Kilovolt (KV) line suppling the plant's startup transforme The short caused the circuit breakers suppling power to the transformer to open thus resulting in a loss of the offsite powe The resident inspector responded to this event and proceeded to the plant to review plant conditions and verify that proper actions had been and were being taken. ____-____A

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Plant systems responded properly with emergency power supplied via the standby "B" side emergency diesel generator (EDG B). At 10:10 PM, following restoration of the plant's "A" side vital busses (which were powered from the "B" side due to the plant's outage status), the Alert was downgraded to an Unusual Event (UE). The plant remained in an UE until 2:49 AM on October 18 when the power to the startup transformer was restore The two individuals involved were badly burned which resulted in the death of one of the individual Details of the industrial safety aspect of this event are being investigated onsite by a representative of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration-(OSHA). Additional NRC Region II response included sending a regional inspector to the site to investigate the implementation of the Site Emergency Pla Details of this NRC investigation and the findings are discussed in NRC Report 50-302/87-3 With the exception of the Violations identified in NRC Report 50-302/87-36, no additional Violations or Deviations were identifie b. NRC Region II received an allegation regarding a fire in the Reactor Building (R3) and that no fire watch had been poste The inspector's investigation of this event determined that the fire occurred at about 1:15 PM on October 25 in the RB when welding slag from welding on the personnel access hatch fell from the 119'

elevation to the 95' elevation and into an open can of paint. The paint caught fire but was quickly extinguished by the painter The inspector verified that a fire watch was posted, however, it appears that this fire watch was not adequate. Procedure CP-118, Fire Prevention Work Permit Procedure, paragraphs 4.4.2.c, d, and e require the fire watch to verify that combustibles are at an adequate distance, that floor and wall openings are protected, and that a fire watch has been established to monitor for sparks both above and below the floors that the work is being performed. These requirements were not met thus resulting in the fir Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure CP-118 is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be a Violation. This Violation is considered to be another example of the Violation identified in paragraph 5.b(9)a of this repor >

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