IR 05000302/1987020

Insp Rept 50-302/87-20 on 870720-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Ie Bulletins 80-11 & 85-01 & Snubber Surveillance Program

ML20237L442
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/18/1987
From:	Jape F, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237L417	List: IR 05000302/1987020 ML20237L415
References
50-302-87-20, IEB-80-11, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, NUDOCS 8708280103
Download: ML20237L442 (9)

Text

1. spH Ric o UNITEo STATES

1. 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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.l Report No.: 50-302/87-20 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street,. South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.: 50-302 License No. : DPR-72 j Facility Name: Crystal River 3 i Inspection Conducted: uly 20-24, 1987 Inspector: b _

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Date Signed g.J.Len // /

Approved by: //(&Ft F. Jape, Chief V /

Q /[/h Date Signed Test Programs Section ,

Division of Reactor Safety j SUMMARY Scope: This special, announced inspection was in the areas of follow-up on licensee action on previous inspection findings, IEB 80-11, IEB 85-01, the l snubber surveillance program, and previously identified inspector follow-up items (IFI).

Results: No violations were identifie l

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l REPORT DETAILS q j Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees i

• A. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services )

• Cooper, Superintendent Technical Support

• Gibson, Nuclear Technical Specifications Coordinator ,

• A. Hernandet, Senior Nuclear QA Specialist I

• Q. Partain, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

• J. Rainwater, ISI Specialist

• L. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager

• C. Simpson, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support

• Whittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent j NRC Resident Inspector l j

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• T. F. Stetka

• Attended exit interview I Exit Interview j The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 24, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the l areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio l Licensee Action on Previcus Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 302/85-20-01, Snubber Surveillance /

Maintenance Procedure The inspector examined procedures which control surveillance and maintenance of safety-related snubbers. The procedures have been revised to clarify the term low fluid level and to stipulate that fluid is not to be added to snubbers prior to functional testing so that snubber operability may be determine The licensee has prepared maintenance instructions to address i maintenance and rebuilding of Grinnell snubbers and has added those !

l snubbers to the listing of safety-related snubbers. UNR 302/85-20-01. '

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is closed.

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2 (Closed) Violation Item 320/85-20-02, Inadequate QA Records Documenting Visual Inspection of Safety-Related Snubbers. The licensee's corrective actions for this violation are stated in their May 31 1985 response to NRC Region II for Inspector Report N /85-20. To correct this problem, the licensee counseled the individuals who failed to properly complete the records and advised them of the requirements pertaining to review of the completed procedure and the need to properly complete quality records. The inspector examined the results of snubber visual inspectior, completed in January-February 1986 and verified the records had been properly completed and reviewed by the ISI Specialist per procedure requirements. Violations 302/85-20-01 is close (Closed) Violation Item 302/85-27-01, Failure to Maintain the Control Room Count Rate Signal Audible. The licensee corrective actions for this violation are stated in their August 20, 1985 response to NRC Region II for Inspection Report No. 50-302/85-27. The apparent cause of this violation was inadvertent adjustment of the volume control knob for the audible source range monitor. To correct this viola-tion, the licensee revised surveillance procedure SP-220. . Source )

Range Functional Tests During Refueling Operation, to relocate the PA amplifies for the audible source range monitor to prevent inadvertent control knob adjustment during refueling operations. The licensee l also revised surveillance procedure SP 406, Refueling Operation Daily i Data Requirements to require documentation of checks of the audible  ;

count rate every eight hours during refueling operation The .

inspector examined procedure SP-220 and SP 406 and verified that the '

procedures had been revised per the licensee commitments. Violation 302/85-27-01 is close ] (Closed) UNR 302/85-27-02, Retention of Records Regarding TS 4.9.2(c)

Surveillance of Audible Source Range Count Rate in Control Roo This UNR is related to violation item 302/85-27-01 discussed in Paragraph 3.C, above. As part of the corrective action for the ,

violation, the licensee revised procedure SP 406 to require docu- I mentation of the audible source range monitor checks during refueling operation Since the licensee was cited for failure to have the ,

audible source range monitor operable in violation 302/85-27-02, l another violation is to warranted for lack of records verifying operability of the audible source range monitor. UNR 302/85-27-02 is close . Unresolved Items ,

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio i h

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l I Snubber Surveillance Program (70370) ]

i The inspector examined procedures and quality records related to the j snubber surveillance program and inspected selected snubbers on safety- l related piping systems. There are no safety related mechanical snubbers j at this site, all snubbers are hydraulic. Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are specified in Technical Specification 3/4.7.9.1, Review of Snubber Surveillance / Maintenance Procedure j The inspector examined the following procedures which control snubber surveillance / maintenance activitie (1) Surveillance Procedure Number SP-200, Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testin (2) Surveillance Procedure Number SP-201, Accessible / Inaccessible Hydraulic Snubbers Visual Inspectio (3) Maintenance Procedure Number MP-174, Pipe Snubber Rebuild and Test Procedur (4) Maintenance Procedure Number MP-175, Pipe Snubber Removal and Installatio (5) Maintenance Procedure Number MP-177, Power Piping Snubbers In-Situ " Maintenanc (6) Maintenance Procedure Number Mp-195, ITT Grinnell Pipe Snubber Rebuild Procedur (7) Maintenance Procedure MP-197, ITT Grinnell Snubbers In-Site Maintenanc (8) Maintenance Procedure MP-197, ITT Grinnell Snubbers In-Site Maintenanc (9) Performance Testing Procedure PT-130, Hydraulic Pipe Snubber Test Procedur (10) Material Technology Speical Process Specification VA-008, Visual Examination Acceptance Standard for Supports, Pipe Hangers and Restraint (11) Material Technology Special Process Specification VT-010, Visual Examination of Supports, Pipe Hangers and Restraints (12) Surveillance Procedure SP-458, Tabulation of Technical Specification Applicability to Hydraulic Snubber t

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4 Inspection of Snubbers The inspector performed a visual inspection of the safety-related snubbers listed below and verified that the snubbers were not damaged, that attachment to the supporting structure was secure, that fluid level in the snubbers was visible in the reservoir sight glass as defined in procedures SP-210, and that the fluid was not leaking from the snubbe Snubbers examined were as follows:

(1) Snubber number EFH-141 on the emergency feedwater syste (2) Snubber numbers FWH-150, 153, 154 and 171 on the feedwater syste (3) Snubber numbers MSH 317, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 210, 212, 213 227, and 232 on the main steam syste Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed the quality records documenting the results of visual inspection performed on accessible and inaccessible (

safety-related snubbers during January-February, 1986. During their surveillance, operability of two snubbers RCH-48 and MSH-119, was questioned. These snubbers were functionally tested per procedure and Technical Specification requirements to determine operabilit The inspector reviewed the functional test data. The results of the functional tests showed the snubbers were operable. As a result, all snubbers met visual inspection criteria. Based on TS Table 4.7-4, the required inspection interval was 18 months. After testing was completed, the snubbers were rebuilt on Work Request 70076 (MSH-119)

and Work Request 76306 (RCH-48) and functionally tested for post-maintenance per procedural requirement The inspector also reviewed results of visual inspection performed an safety-related snubbers in March 1985 and a summary of the results of snubber functional testing performed in April 1985 and January-February 198 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design (25537)

The licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-11 in letters in NRC, dated July 7, 1980 and November 17, 1980. In a letter, dated March 23, 1982, the licensee stated that the emergency feedwater system was not considered as a safety-related system when the original IEB 80-11 analysis was completed. The March 23, 1982, letter stated that the EFW system was reclassified as safety-related and as a result additional masonry walls were identified which required analysi In letters dated February 29, 1984, and November 25, 1985, to the NRC office of Nuclear Reactor

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Regulations, (NRR), the licensee responded to request for additional information concerning masonry wall desig In a letter dated April 30, 1984, to NRR, the licensee committed to label all non-seismically qualified masonry walls and to modify walls 1,2, and 3 in the control complex to remove the masonry block or grout from approximately one inch around three safety-related conduits located at the top of these wall The inspector examined walls 1, 2, and 3 in the control complex and verified that the walls labeled per the licensee's commitment and that the masonry block and/or grout had been removed from being in contact with conduit numbers ACC-29, AHC-656, and AHC 583 per the licensee's commitmen The inspector also examined the licensee's actions to complete IEB 80-11 requirements during inspections documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-302/80-36, 81-09, and 82-12. Final acceptance of the licensee's criteria used for design analysis of masonry wall is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated May 2,1986 titled Crystal River Unit 3, Masonry Wall Design, IE Bulletin 80-11. This SER !

l was provided to the licensee in a letter, dated May 2, 1986 from B. Mozafari, NRR Project Manager to W. S. Wilgus, FPC. IE Bulletin 80-11 is close . (Closed) IE Buletin 85-01, Steam Binding of Aux 11ary Feedwater Pumps (92703)

The licensee responded to this bulletin in a letter to NRC Region II, I dated February 25, 1986, subject IE Bulletin 85-01. In order to address potential problem of steam binding of the emergency (auxiliary) feedwater pumps, the licensee revised surveillance procedures SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log, and Operating Procedure OP-605, Feedwater Syste The revision to SP-300 requires that each emergency feedwater pump !

discharge piping be monitored once each shift to verify the piping is not hot to the touch. The revision of OP-605 added steps to the procedure addressing value line up and steps to be taken in the event the emergency feedwater pumps become steam boun The ' inspector examined procedures SP-300 and OP-605 and verified that revisions had been incorporated per licensee commitments. The inspector examined surveillance completed under SP-300 for the dates of July 16 - July 21, 1987 and verified that each emergency feedwater pump discharged was monitored once per shift per procedural requirement The licensee's action in response to this bulletin was examined extensively by the resident inspectors. The results of the resident inspectors' inspections are documented in Inspection Report No /85-21, 86-09, and 86-1 IE Bulletin 85-01 is close . IE Information Notice (IEN) 85-45, Potential Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable Incore Flux Mapping System Used in Westinghouse Design Plant !

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l IEN 85-45 provided information to. license's regarding possible interaction -'

l between the nonsafety-related portions of he flux mapping system and the seal' table in Westinghouse designed plants during as seismic event. The potential. interactions existed because portions of the flux mapping system that had not been seismically designed were located directly 'above the i incore instrumentation tubing / seal table. The inspector reviewed. the i licensee's evaluation of IEW 85-45, discussed the evaluation ~with. licensee engineer, and review 8 & W design drawing for the incore. monitoring-l' syste The review disclosed that he B & W incore monitoring system ]'

design for Crystal River 3. is. not similar to the Westinghouse design.

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Each incore instrument is enclosed in a separate closure assembly within i l the incore instrumentation pi Drawings reviewed by_the inspector were as follows: j

- B & W Drawing Number 136499E, Incore Monitoring System Piping Assembly

- B& W Drawing Number 136502, Incore Monitoring System Piping Closure Assembly

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B & W Drawing Number 136501, Incore Monitoring System Piping-Details - Sheet 2 The inspector concurs with the licensee's evaluation that IEN 85-45 is not applicable to the Crystal River 3 desig . Previously Identified Inspector Followup Items (Closed) IFI 320/85-32-01, Review Surveillance and Test Procedures; Produced Using the Writer's Guide

! Review of procedures and observations of data collection during pre and post-critically tests disclosed test procedures contained insufficient data and log. sheets to record raw test data and document 4 necessary calculations to demonstrate that acceptance criteria ha been satisfied. During discussion with the inspector during inspec- ,

tion. number 85-32; the licensee indicated that a writer's guide to' i assist in writing adequate procedures was being prepared and would be in use by January 1986. During the current inspection, the inspector -

discussed the procedure enhancement program with' license personne These discussions disclosed that separate Writer's Guides .had been prepared for preparation of Performance Testing procedures and <

preparation of Surveillance Procedures. In addition,. the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) has identified a generic concern regarding preparation of Operating Procedures. The licensee has.an ongoing procedure upgrading program which will be a long ' term project to improve operating, surveillance and performance testing procedure The inspector examined the writer's guides for

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f l surveillance procedure The inspector also examined the procedures ]

listed below and verified, that data sheets, test logs and sign off I had been incorporated into them to support data collection and to J demonstrate test results met acceptance criteria procedures examined I were as follows:

(1) SP-102, Control Rod Drop Time Tests (2) SP-444, High Pressure Injection Flow Verification Test (3) SP-417,. Refueling Interval Integrated Plant Response to )

Engineered Safeguards Actuation i (4) SP-220, Source Range Functional Tests During Refueling Operation !

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(5) PT-100, Controlling Procedure for Precritical Testing (6) PT-110, Controlling Procedure for Zero Power Phy' sics Testing .

Based on review of the above procedures, the inspector concluded that the licensee had followed the writer's guides in preparation of the procedures and that the licensee's procedure - l enhancement program is contributing to increased procedure j qualit IFI 302/85-32-01 is close b. (0 pen) IFI 302/85-32-02, Establish Technical or Statistical' Base for

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Rejection of Data l

The inspector reviewed performance Testing Procedures PT-100,.

Controlling Procedure for Precritial Testing. Review of Attachment 1

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, sample standard deviation in the method to use to reject data which is outside the expected distribution curve. Further review of the

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implementation of this method and it adequacy will be made by NRC during precitical testing conducted after the fall 1987 refueling one

! outage. IFI 302/85-32-02 will remain open.

c. (0 pen) IFI 302/85-32-03, Application and Implementation of the Chi-Squared Test for Source. Range Neutron. Monitors The inspector reviewed performance testing' procedure PT-110, Controlling Procedure for Zero Power Physics Testin Review of Enclosure 2 to their procedure' disclosed that the licensee has incorporated the Chi-Squared method 'into the procedure to calculate source range instrument count rate stabilit Implementation of.this revised procedure will be examined by NRC during zero power physic ;

testing conducted . after the fall 1987 refueling outag IFI 302/85-32-03 will remain ope ;

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Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Temporary Instruction (TI) Closecut I a. (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2525/69 - Inspection of Response to IEB 85-01. This TI was issued to define the inspection, reporting and evaluation responsibilities of NRC inspectors for IE Bulletin 85-01. The inspector completed the inspector requirements detailed -

in the TI during this inspection (See paragraph 7). (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/16 - Inspector to Determine if a Potential Seismic Interaction Exists Between Movable Incore Flux I Mapping System and Seal Table at Westinghouse Designed Facilities of i Facility of Similar Desig This TI defined the NRC inspector i requirements for IE Information Notice 85-4 The inspectors l completed the requirements detailed in the TI during this inspection !

(See paragraph 8).

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