IR 05000302/1987016

Insp Rept 50-302/87-16 on 870512-0611.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts

ML20234C374
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/25/1987
From:	Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234C334	List: IR 05000302/1987016 ML20234C331
References
50-302-87-16, NUDOCS 8707060441
Download: ML20234C374 (16)

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UNITED STATES f g@ Mooq'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No: 50-302/87-16 Licensee: -Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No: 50-302 Licensee No,. DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection Dates: May 12 - June 11, 1987 Inspectors: %

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~ T. Stetka, Senior Resident Inspectorf

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Date Signed

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'J. E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector 7L[ ~

Date Signed Approved by[/ O h k / t_)m 2I h)

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,4f. A. hiil son, SecRon Chief g;f Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, review of low temperature overpressure protection, review of plant procedures, licensee action on previous inspection items and the annual emergency drill . Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshift Results: Df the areas ' inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie !

0707060441 870625 PDR ADOCK 05000302 O PDR

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REPORT DETAILS

' ' Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. Brandely, Nuclear Security & Special Projects Superintendent

• P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor

• Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

• J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support

• R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Enginee A. Friend, Nuclear Staff Engineer H. Gelston, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services D. Green, Nuclear Licensing Specialist

• V. Hernandez, Senior Nuclear Quality Assurance Specialist 8. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• R. Jones, Nuclear Modification Specialist

• J. Krafker, Nuclear Management Support Superintendent

• M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Special'.t

• W. Marshall, Nuclear Shif t Supervisor P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

=*R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent H. Reeder, Nuclear Operations Technical Advisor S. Robinson, Nuclear Waste Manager

• E. Simpson, Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering & Projects

• F. Sullivan. Superintendent, Site Nuclear Engineering Services R. Widell, Manager, Nuclear Operations Engineering K. Wilsor, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

• W. Worley, Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on June 11, 198 During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the Unresolved Item (UNR) and Inspector Followup Items (IFI). The inspector also discussed some minor procedure problems identified during the plant procedure inspection discussed in paragraph 9 of this report. These problems, involving some procedure reference errors and an apparent signature error while making a procedure change, were identified so that the licensee would take appropriate corrective action . > .

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed ;

by the. inspectors during this inspectio !

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item 302/83-11-07: The licensee has completed the engineering review for instrument drift problems associated with the Reactor' Protection System (RPS), Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) and Engineered Safeguards (ES) system Licensee Event Report (LER)

83-039/03X-1 was issued on January 27, 1984, to report this matter to the NR The licensee is presently reviewing more recent instrument drift problems as discussed in IFI 302/86-09-06. The licensee intends to establish a e computer based information tracking system for instrumentation which are subject to drift. This data base will be updated with current instrument status and problem resolution when identified. In discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that the instruments identified with this item (302/83-11-07) would be incorporated into the action already being taken for IFI 302/86-09-0 For record purposes, item 302/83-11-07 is considered closed with further action tracked by IFI 302/86-09-0 (Closed) IFI 302/87-10-04: The licensee has implemented the recommendations of the Colt Information Letter dated July 14, 1986. This letter recommended that the time during which the emergency diesels are run under no load or light load conditions be minimized to prevent damage to the scavenging air blower. The licensee has revised the emergency diesel generator surveillance test procedures SP-354A (revision 17 dated March 9, 1987) and SP-354B (revision 15 dated March 9, 1987) to limit this time to less than three minutes which is in agreement with the information lette (Closed) IFI 302/86-35-03: The licensee has determined that governor sightg ;ses with upper and lower oil level markings are no longer availab.e for the emergency diesel generators. To accommodate the lack of markings, the licensee has revised the emergency diesel generator surveillance procedures (SP-354A revision 17 and SP-3548 revision 15) to specify the correct governor oil level required in the two different types of sightglasses presently installe (Closed) IFI 302/87-04-04: Modification (MAR) 87-02-03-01, Return MUV-16 to Original Configuration, was completed. This MAR replaced the valve internals with the correct internals, documented use of valve packing that is consistent with plant procedures, and provides the necessary documentation to insure that the same valve internals are used in the

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futur An analysis performed on the debris found in the valve body concluded that the debris was not caused by the valve packing and was due to normal system operation and maintenance. The licensee further

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concluded that the valve packing that was in use and will continut to be in use was acceptable for this operatio (Closed) IFI 302/86-35-07: The licensee installed a high frequency filter on the Integrated Control Sy. stem (ICS) input signal in accordance with MAR 86-11-11-04,. FW Signal Current Isolators. As a result of this and other modifications made to the main feedwater pump control system, it appears that the pump overspeed problem has been correcte (Closed) Unresolved Item 302/85-44-05: The inspector reviewed the status l of the Quality Control (QC) inspector training and certification program :

for the three inspectors .in questio Two inspectors completed the program satisfactorily and one did not. The inspector that failed to pass the program was subsequently released from the site and any inspections he had performed were reviewed by the licensee's QC department to verify adequacy of these inspection The inspector also verified that contracted QC inspectors presently onsite have completed and passed the training and certification program. The QC supervisor has not yet completed the full QC inspector qualification program. The licensee has assigned this supervisor in an administrative ;

capacity and has restricted the supervisor's ANSI N45.2.6 Level II certification due to the lack of on-the-job inspection experienc It is tho licensee's intent to have this supervisor become a fully qualified Level Il QC inspector. The inspector verified that the supervisor's present qualifications are in accordance with the licensee's policies and l have been certified as such by the license t (Closed) IFI 302/86-38-08: The licensee is developing a program to

> in prove post maintenance testing, it is expected that this program will be implemented by October 1987. Subsequent to this inspection, Violation 302/86-39-01 was issued due to the faGure of the licensee to perform a post maintenance tes For record purposes this item is closed and further activity will be tracked under Violation 302/86-39-0 . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation An unresolved item is identified in paragraph 5.b(1) of this repor Review of Plant Operations The plant continued in power . operation for the duration of this inspection period, Shift Logs and Facility Records

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The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical-Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedure The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-Of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Log In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagout No violations or deviations were identifie b. Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to '

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshift Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and- i management activitie The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; contral room; emergency diesel generator i room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear room During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and' liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameter During this inspection period the inspectors were notified via an internal memorandum from NRC Region II governing the use of instrumentation that is pegged either high or low during normal plant operatio The memorandum stated that such in,trumentation must be placed "on scale" when a channel check is required to assure that the instrument has not failed high or low, p

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Following receipt of this memorandum, the inspectors identified the following pegged instrumentation:

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Reactor ' Coolant System (RCS) low range pressure, 0-600 psig,(RC-131-PI);

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Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) system

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Once-Through Steam Generator (OTSG) A/P low range level (SP-25/26/29/30-LI);

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GTSG start-up range level (SP-1B-LI2); and,

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Start-up feedwater flow (SP-7A/B-FI).

These instruments are pegged high during normal operation and require a' routine channel chec In addition, another instrument, High RCS Pressure Shut Down Bypass, is required to be channel checked while the plant is in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) at which time the RCS pressure indicator .

is_ pegged lo l The licensee was informed of the Regional position and the inspectors' findings. The inspectors stated that while they had identified some specific instrumentation that were affected by the- pegged instrument ruling, that there may be additional instrumentation involved that has not yet been identifie The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments and observations and immediately began actions to identify applicable instrumentation and develop methods for performing adequate channel check Unresolved Item (302/87-16-01): Identify pegged instrumentation that require a channel check and develop appropriate channel check method (2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Decay Heat Removal (DH) system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect l

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"as-built" plant condition No violations or deviations were identifie (3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manne In addition, the inspector observed shift i turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant i

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status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnover No violations or deviations were identifie (4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components and clearliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existe No violations or deviations were identifie (5) Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included:

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' Selected licensee conducted surveys;

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Entry and exit from contaminated areas including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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Work activity within radiation.. high radiation, and contaminated areas;

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Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and,

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipmen Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the inspector The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequat The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably Achievable ( ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel involvement in the objectives and goals of the progra During a review of two Radiation Safety Incident Reports (RSIRs),87-123 and 87-124, the inspector noted that these incidents related to the possible contamination of " clean" fluid systems. The two systems involved, demineralized water (DW) and domestic water (D0), have evidence of contamination on some components in each system. Subsequent analyses of these systems did not identify any system contamination. The licensee has not yet determined the cause of the component contaminatio r

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In 1977 the NRC issued Circular 77-14, Separation of Contaminated Water Systems from Non-Contaminated Plant Systems, which discussed an apparently similar occurrence at another nur. lear facility. The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to this Circular and could not determine what actions had been taken to address this issu The inspector discussed his observations and findings with licensee personnel and requested information when the cause of the component contamination has been determined. In addition the inspector requested that the licensee review their activities with respect tc Circular 77-14 to insure that the incident discussed in the Circular does not occur at Crystal Rive Inspector Followup Item (302/87-16-02): Review the licensee's activities to determine the cause of component contamination discussed in RSIR's87-123 and 87-124 and the review of IEC 77-1 (6) Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The composition of the security organization was checked to insure that the minimum number of guards were available and that security activities were conducted with proper supervision. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include; protected and vital area access controls, searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory post In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed the operational status of CCTV monitors and the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and the security organization interface with operations and maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie (7) Fi re Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operabl No violations or deviations were identifie (8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment

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operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followe The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

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SP-118, Electromatic Relief Valve Functional Testing;

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SP-181, Containment Air Lock Test (Semi-Annual);

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SP-216, Sample Line Leak Rate Test;

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SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;

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SP-333, Cont-o1 Rod Exercises;

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SP-349B, Emergency Feedwater (EFP-2) Monthly Operability Demon stra tion ;

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SP-354B, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Quality & Diesel Generator Monthly Test;

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SP-425, Control Rod Drive Patch Panel Access Control;

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SP-702, Reactor Coolant & Decay Heat Daily Surveillance Program; and,

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SP-711, . Core Flood Tank "A" Monthly Surveillance Progra No violations or deviations were identifie (9) Maintenance Activities -

The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; I and, TS requirements were being followe Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:

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Troubleshooting and repair of a failed level transmitter (BS-3-LT) for the sodium hydroxide addition tank (BST-1) in accordance with procedure MP-531;

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Troubleshooting and repair of an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel A steam generator h:gh range level transmitter (SP-17-LT) in accordance with procedure MP-531; L

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Troubleshooting and repair of an operating range steam generator level transmitter (SP-1A-LT2) in accordance with procedure _MP-531;

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Troubleshooting an inoperable pressurizer spray valve RCV-14; and,

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Resetting of EFIC control valve' EFV-55 in accordance with procedure SP-14 No violations or deviations were identifie (10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected liquid releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were take No violations or deviations were identifie . (11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety related systems were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring points were not bindin No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfie LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement polic LERs 87-03, 87-04 and 77-104 are close (Closed) LER 87-03: This LER reported that a TS surveillance requirement to manually isolate the containment purge and exhaust system was not conducted. The licensee has revised the applicable surveillance test procedure (SP-346, revision 9 dated May 4, 1987) to include the manual isolation tes (Closed) LER 87-04: Procedure OP-412 has been revised as two procedures; OP-412A, Waste Gas Disposal System, and OP-4128, WGDT Release to Ventilation. The new procedures enhance the channel check requirements on the flow rate recorder and provide a procedure to estimate the discharge flow rate if the flow rate recorder is inoperabl (Closed) LER 77-104: The licensee submitted a letter dated May 29, which concerned LER 77-104, Re This LER was generated as a

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result of instrument drift of the originally installed Bailey By Transmitter These transmitters were replaced in 1985 -(MAR 81-05-41) with Rosemont 11530 transmitters. With this modification

and other surveillances, there is no longer any need to meet the monthly commitment for calibration of the RC Flow Transmitters. For record purposes, LER 77-104 is considered close LERs 87-06 and 87-07 remain open for the following reasons:

(0 pen) LER 87-06: This LER reported that the "B" channel of the Toxic Gas Monitoring system had been inadvertently left in the " test" position. The licensee attributed the cause of this event to a lack l of control over the keys that are used to place this instrumentation into the test configuration. To prevent recurrence the licensee is revising procedu.e CP-123, Key Control, and the . instrumentation test procedures SP-326A, Toxic Gas Detection System (Weekly), and SP-326B, Toxic Gas Detection System (Semi-Annual), to provide formal control over these key This LER remains open pending completion of procedure revision (0 pen) LER 87-07: 'This LER reported an apparent design discrepancy in. the Engineered Safeguards (ES) 480 volt degraded voltage protection relayin The licensee has analyzed this event and determined that the present configuration does not result in

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unanalyzed plant operatio The licensee is having an. independent engineering firm perform an analysis of the load distributions on the ES buses. Upon completion of this analysis (which will be completed by July 30,1987), a design modification will be installed to correct the discrepancy. This LER remains open pending completion of the analysis and the design modificatio .b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been ,

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are ;

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by T All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Polic (1) NCOR 87-85 reported the possible failure to recognize entry into a TS action statement. TS 3.8.1.1 requires two physically independent offsite power sources to be operable. Work activities at the Unit 1 and/or Unit 2 fossil plants and at the 230 KV switchyard (source of offsite power to the nuclear unit)

have not been adequately controlled by the licensee in the past thus resulting in the nuclear unit (Unit 3) personnel not being cognizant of the effect these activities could have on their plan In this case these work activities have apparently compromised the independence of the offsite power supply and no i

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T5 action statement was entere The licensee is presently performing an engineering analysis to clarify the electrical system design reliability considerations to the 230 KV switchyard and to identify what constitutes independent power sources. This matter is already being tracked by the corrective action associated with LER 86-25. The adequacy of the J

licensee's control of work performed at the fossil units and the 230 KV switchyard is already addressed by IFI 302/87-12-0 Additional followup will be tracked by these item (2) NCOR 87-86 reported the excessive failure rate for toxic gas detection instrumentation. To maintain the toxic gas detection system in an operable condition, the licensee has had to devote a large amount of maintenance personnel and time. Due to the cost of this maintenance and the increased downtime of the equipment to effect repairs, the licensee is considering replacement of this instrumentation with a more reliable one which would require less maintenanc The licensee is considering replacing this instrumentation, depending on parts >

availability, during the next refueling outag IFI (302/87-16-03): Review the licensee's progress to replace the toxic gas instrumentation with more reliable instrumentatio . Review of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's system for preventing overpressurization of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) during operation of the plant at low RCS temperature To accomplish this review the following items were examined:

- Selected correspondence between the licensee and the NRC;

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A 10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation associated with modification (MAR)

76-12-22 to modify the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) setpoint;

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The PORV surveillance testing procedure (SP-118);

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Heatup and cooldown operating procedures (OP-202, OP-209);

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The history of maintenance and modifications performed on the PORV; and,

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Operator training in the use of the PORV low pressure setpoin The licensee's LTOP system consists of the plant's pressurizer with a steam or gas space surge volume in conjunction with the PORV set at a low pressure setpoint of 550 psig. In addition the licensee has implemented administrative controls to provide further protection against the effects of an inadvertent actuation of the high pressure injection system during low temperature conditions. This system and the administrative controls

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i were initially reviewed and approved by the NRC in an amendment to the facility opcrating license (license amendment number 21,- July 3,1979).

On February 10, 1986, the licensee reported via LER 84-23-01 that the original commitments made in 1979 could not be met due to conflicts with other license conditions and due to an oversight by the licensee to install LTOP condition alarms. To resolve these discrepancies, the

. licensee revised the administrative controls to remove the conflicts and in correspondence dated October 15, 1986 has stated that the alarms will be installed by the end of the next refuel outage that is scheduled to begin in September 1987. LER 84-23-01 will remain open pending installation of the LTOP alarm The inspector verified implementation of the licensee's revised commitments as stated in LER 84-23-01, and reviewed the most recently completed heatup and cooldown operating procedures to verify compliance with these commitments. In addition, surveillance procedure SP-118 was reviewed to determine the method used by the licensee to periodically test the PORV low pressure setpoin This procedure is performed on a refueling interval basi Plant operators receive training concerning RCS LTOP during licensed operator training and requalification training. During- this training the precautions and actions required by procedures OP-202 and OP-209 are reviewed with the operators. The operators are further required to read these two operating procedures on an annual basis as part of the required reading progra No violations or deviations were identifie , Nonroutine Event Followup On June 2, 1987, at approximately 5:15 AM, a plant pressure transient occurred. Af ter initiating routine pressurizer spray flow to equalize the concentration of chemicals in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), plant operators were unable to shut the pressurizer spray valve (RCV-14). An attempt to shut the pressurizer spray isolation valve (RCV-13) was made, however this valve was also inoperable. Pressurizer spray flow exceeded the pressurizer heater capacity which resulted in a decrease in RCS pressur A work request was issued to electrically troubleshoot the

motor control center for valve RCV-14 and the valve was finally shut at approximately 5

40 The lowest RCS pressure reached was approximately 1985 psi The licensee attributes the cause for the inoperable valves to the buildup of boric acid crystals around the valve stem. These crystals form as a result of minor valve packing weepag Neither valve RCV-13 nor RCV-14

, can be repaired with the plant in operatio Valve RCV-14 has subsequently been operated (the closing operation apparently dislodging the boron crystal buildup) and has been set in a throttled position such that plant pressure can be controlled with the pressurizer heaters. The

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licensee intends to leave RCV-14 in the throttled position for the

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remainder of the operating cycl IFI- (302/87-16-04): Review thc licensee's activities to control I pressurizer spray flow and repair valves RCV-13 and RCV-1 i 9. Review of Plant Procedures The inspector conducted a review of selected plant procedures to verify the following:

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Review and approval were in accordance with TS requirements;

- Procedures were revised consistent with TS or license revisions;

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Procedure changes and records of these changes' were in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59;

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Temporary procedure changes were in accordance with TS requirements

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and did not preclude proper operator actions;

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Procedures are properly formatted and are technically adequate to accomplish the_ intended tasks; and,

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Procedures include provisions for assuring that components exposed to a freezing environment remain operabl The following procedures were reviewed:

-- AI-500, Revision 56, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

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AI-800, Revision 17, CONDUCT OF PLANT SECURITY & SPECIAL PROJECTS

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OP-202, Revision 75, PLANT HEATUP

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OP-204, Revision 47, POWER OPERATION l

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OP-305, Revision 5, SOLID SYSTEM PRESSURE CONTROL

- OP-401, Revision 27, CORE FLOODING SYSTEM

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OP-406, Revision 33, SPENT FUEL COOLING SYSTEM

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OP-408, Revision 48, NUCLEAR SERVICES COOLING SYSTEM

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OP-505, Revision 8, RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM SET POINT CHANGES

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OP-704, Revision 9, COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM i

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SP-363, Revision 24, FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTS

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SP-365, Revision 27, FIRE PUMP OPERABILITY AND RECIRCULATION

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SP-366, Revision 19, FIRE SYSTEM ANNUAL VALVE SURVEILLANCE

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SP-367, Revision 1, FIRE SERVICE VALVE ALIGNMENT AND OPERABILITY CHECK

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EP-260, Revision 0, INADEQUATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL

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EP-290, Revision 5, INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

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AP-360, Revision 0, LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL i

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AP-880, Revision 4, FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION l

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MP-107, Revision 6, PRESSURIZER MAINTENANCE

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MP-145, Revision 7, DISASSEMBLY AND REASSEMBLY OF SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMPS SFP-1A AND 1B

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MP-159, Revision 3, CORE FLOODING TANK MANWAY COVER REMOVAL AND REINSTALLATION MP-203, Revision 1,

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REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF RADIATION MONITOR DETECTORS

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MP-531. Revision 1, TROUBLESHOOTING PLANT EQUIPMENT

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AR-301, Revision 4, ES A ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE, for the following annunciators:

"CF TANK 1A' PRESSURE"

"CF TANK A' LEVEL"

"NS SEAWATER PUMP A' TRIP"

"NS RW PUMP A' MOTOR OVERLOAD"

"NS RW PUMP 1A' OUT OF SERVICE" l

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AR-304, Revision 3 ES D ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE, for the following annunciators:

"CF TANK B' PRESSURE"

"CF TANK iB' LEVEL" i

"NS SEAWATER PUMP B' TRIP" l

"NS RW PUMP B' MOTOR OVERLOAD"

"NS RW PUMP B' OUT OF SERVICE"

"NS RW PUMP B' AUTO START"

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AR-402, Revision 5, PSA G ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE, for the following annunciators:

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" SPENT FUEL PUMPS TRIP"

"$ PENT FUEL P0OL LEVEL"

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AR-403, Revision 5, PSA H ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE, for the following annunciator:

" ATMOSPHERIC HIGH RAD"

" ATMOSPHERIC LO RAD / FAIL"

" ATMOSPHERIC AIR FLW HI/LO"

" LIQUID HIGH RAD"

" LIQUID LO/ RAD FAIL"

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AR-501, Revi sion 4, ICS I ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE, for the following annunciator:

"RC OUTLET TEMP HI";

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AR-801, Revision 2, FS A ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE, for the following annunciators:

" FIRE WATER TANK 3A LEVEL L'0W"

" FIRE WATER TANK 3B LEVEL LOW"

" FREON SYSTEM ACTIVATED"

" FIRE PUMP 3B RUNNING"

" FIRE PUMP 3A OVERSPEED"

" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM FIRE" :

No violations or deviations were identifie ,

10. Annual Emergency Drill On June 4, 1987, the annual emergency drill was conducted by the licensee to verify the effectiveness of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and implementing procedure In addition to the licensee, the participants in the drill included the State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties, and the NRC. The drill was observed by - a number of personnel, including the NRC. Details of the drill, including the results of the critiques held on June 5,1987, are discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-1