IR 05000286/2012009

IR 05000286-12-009, on 06/27/12 - 09/25/12; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3; Operation of Inter-Unit Fuel Transfer Canister and Cask System

ML12339A250
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	11/28/2012
From:	Marc Ferdas Decommissioning Branch I
To:	Ventosa J Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
IR-12-009
Download: ML12339A250 (13)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

21OO RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1OO

SUBJECT:

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 3 _ INTER-UNIT SPENT FUEL TRANSFER INSPECTION REPORT NO. O5OOO28612012009

Dear Mr. Ventosa:

On September 25,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection of the inter-unit spent fuel transfer from Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 to Unit 2. The enclosed inspection report documerlts the inspection results which were discussed on October 25,2012, with Don Mayer, senior nnanagement representative for this project, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conductbd under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules anp regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedurps and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.390 of thb NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will bS available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the P(rblicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, Marc S. Ferdas, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Docket No.: 50-286 License No.: DPR-64 Enclosure: I nspection Report 05000286/20 1 2009 w/Attachment: Supplementary lnformation cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500028612012009;0612712012 - 0912512012; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3;

Operation of Inter-Unit Fuel Transfer Canister and Cask System.

This report covers the inter-unit fuel transfer operational dry run and initial fuel transfer inspection conducted by a team of six NRC inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4. orHER ACTTVTTES (OA)

4045 Other Activities Background On July 13,2012, the NRC issued Amendment No. 268 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 (lP2) and Amendment No. 246to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for lP3. The amendments revised the licenses and Technical Specifications (TS) by authorizing the transfer of spent fuel from the lP3 spent fuel pool (SFP) to the lP2 SFP using a newly-designed shielded transfer canister (STC) for further transfer to the onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (rsFSr).

.1 Pre-operational Test Prooram

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated Entergy's performance during NRC observed pre-operational dry run activities that were performed in order to fulfill requirements in Appendix C Inter-Unit Fuel Transfer TS 2.3. The inspectors observed dry run activities on June 27-29 (Phase l), August 8 (Phase lll), 13-15 (Phase lV), and September 13-14 (Phase ll),2012. The pre-operational dry run activities were conducted in four phases.

The inspectors observed STC closure operations and preparation for transferring the STC between units (Phase l). The inspectors verified the following activities were performed in accordance with the TS and Entergy's procedures: verification of loading operation conditions, dose rate monitoring, leak test of the steam generator system, free flow water test of the STC lid connections, installation and torquing of the STC lid, leak rate test of the lid seals, establishment of steam vapor space, pressure rise test, leak rate test of the port cover plates, and installation of the HI-TRAC top lid.

The inspectors observed load handling and fuel loading operations at lP3 (Phase ll).

The inspectors verified the following activities were performed in accordance with the TS and Entergy's procedures: installation of the centering assembly in the HI-TRAC, use of the FSB overhead crane to lift the STC out of the HI-TMC and into the SFP, removing the STC lid, installing and removing the cell blocker, installing and removing a dummy spent fuel assembly, installing the STC lid remotely, removing the STC from the SFP, dose rate monitoring of the STC lid, removal of water out of the STC, performing emergency manual crane operations, and placing the STC into the HI-TRAC.

The inspectors observed inter-unit transfer between lP3 and lP2 (Phase lll). The inspectors verified the following activities were performed in accordance with the TS and Entergy's procedures: placement of the HI-TRAC with STC on the air pallet system outside lP3 fuel storage building (FSB) truck bay, moving the HI-TRAC/STC into and out of the lP3 FSB using the air pallet system, use of the vertical cask transporter (VCT) to transport the HI-TRAC/STC from lP3 and lP2, lowering the HI-TRAC/STC onto the lP2 low profile transporter (LPT), moving the HI-TRAC/STC into lP2 using the LPT and the tugger vehicle, and using the rail system to move the HI-TRAC/STC to the staging position in the lP2 truck bay.

The inspectors observed load handling and fuel unloading operations at Unit 2 (Phase lV). The inspectors verified the following activities were performed in accordance with the TS and Entergy's procedures: verification of the SFP boron concentration, venting the pressure from the HI-TRAC cavity, removing the HI-TRAC lid, venting the pressure from the STC cavity, preparing the STC lid for SFP operations, use of the gantry crane to transfer the STC into the SFP, removing the STC lid under water, removing a dummy fuel assembly in the STC, removing the STC from the SFP, and performing emergency manualgantry crane operations with the STC.

The inspectors reviewed Entergy's inter-unit fuel loading, unloading, and processing procedures to ensure that they contained commitments and requirements specified in the operating license amendment, the safety evaluation report (SER), TS, and the Holtec Licensing Report. The inspectors also reviewed the procedures and information related to selection of spent fuel and non-fuel hardware for transfer in the STC. The inspectors verified that the spent fuel and non-fuel hardware for the first transfer met the TS for loading in the STC. The inspectors also reviewed the move sheet that indicated the locations where the assemblies and hardware were to be placed in the lP2 spent fuel pool and compared the move sheet against the requirements described in lP2 TS.

The inspectors also verified that:

(1) preoperational procedures for inter-unit fuel transfer activities were prepared, reviewed, and initially approved in accordance with Entergy's administrative procedures;

(2) Entergy personnel conducting the preoperational test activities had a clear understanding of their duties and responsibilities;

(3) equipment used during preoperational test activities had been tested and evaluated for its impact on plant structures, systems, and components before performance of preoperational tests;

(4) equipment used during preoperationaltest activities met maintenance criteria required by the manufacturer and Entergy;

(5) Entergy implemented the site radiological protection program for activities such as contamination controls, temporary shielding, distance, and surveys (including neutron surveys as required by the TS); and

(6) Entergy performed management and quality assurance reviews on preoperational test activities.

The inspectors also reviewed corrective action reports on issues that could affect preoperational inter-unit transfer activities to ensure that issues were entered into the corrective action program, prioritized, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2 Initial Inter-Unit Fuel Transfer

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Entergy's initial inter-unit fuel transfer of 12 spent fuel assemblies from lP3 to lP2 on September 16-20, and 23-25,2012. The inspectors verified compliance with Entergy's operating license amendment, SER, Holtec Licensing Report, TS, NRC regulations, and Entergy procedures.

The inspectors attended pre-job briefs and verified that the briefs emphasized the critical steps and reviewed the conditions in the work areas. The inspectors interviewed personnel and ensured they were trained and knowledgeable regarding the tasks to be performed. In addition, training records were reviewed to ensure personnel were qualified to perform their assigned tasks.

The inspectors observed the loading of spent fuel assemblies from the lP3 SFP into the STC, placing of the lid on the STC, and heavy load movement of the STC from the lP3 SFP into the HI-TRAC in the lP3 FSB truck bay. The inspectors observed STC processing operations including: STC closure operations and preparation of the STC for transfer between lP3 and lP2 (including verifying the loading operations conditions, dose rate readings on the side of the HI-TRAC, leak testing of the steam generator system, free flow water test of the STC lid connections, installation and torquing of the lid studs and nuts, leak rate test of the lid seals, establishment of the steam vapor space, pressure rise test, leak rate test of the port cover plates, and installation of the HI-TRAC top lid). In addition the inspectors observed the movement of the STC from lP3 to lP2; and placing the STC and unloading spent fuel assemblies into the lP2 SFP. During performance of these activities, the inspectors verified that procedure use, communication. and coordination of inter-unit fuel transfer activities met established standards and requirements.

The inspectors reviewed maintenance records and verified that equipment used during operational activities met maintenance criteria required by the manufacturer and Entergy. In addition, the inspectors verified Entergy performed management and quality assurance reviews during initial transfer operations.

The inspectors reviewed radiation protection procedures, radiation work permits (RWPs), and the established radiological controls associated with the inter-unit fuel transfer. The inspectors assessed whether workers were aware of the radiological conditions in their work area and the RWP controls/limits. The inspectors reviewed radiological records from the first fuel transfer to confirm that radiation survey levels measuied were within limits established in the TS and consistent with values specified in the Holtec Licensing Report.

The inspectors reviewed corrective action reports and the associated follow-up actions that were generated since the pre-operational dry run activities to ensure that issues were entered into the corrective action program, prioritized, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

40A6 Meetinqs, includinq Exit On October 25,2012, the team presented the results via telephone to Don Mayer, the senior management representative for the inter-unit fuel transfer project; Joe Defrancesco, prgect manager; and other Entergy personnel. Bridget Frymire, Power Systems Operations Specialist for the New York State Department of Public Service, also participated in the exit meeting. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

Supplementary Information

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Indian Point

J. Defrancesco Project Management

L. Gary Quality Assurance

R. Jones Dry Cask Storage

M. Laham Project Management

T. Linke Dry Cask Storage

D. Mayer Senior Management Representative

R. Miller Project Management

F. Mitchell Radiation Protection

W. Osmin Reactor Engineering

T. Pasko Dry Cask Storage Supervisor

C. Patterson Dry Cask Storage Supervisor

W. Riggs Project Management

T. Salentino Dry Cask Storage Superintendent

S. Stevens Radiation Protection Supervisor

J. Stewart Radiation Protection

C. Tippin Reactor Engineering

S. Traditi Dry Cask Storage

R. Waters Licensing

C. Weber Dry Cask Storage

NRC

J. Boska NRR, Project Manager

D. Pickett NRR, Project Manager

ITEMS OPEN. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED

Opened/Closed/Discussed

None