IR 05000280/1990005
| ML18153C172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1990 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Larry Nicholson, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C171 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-05, 50-280-90-5, 50-281-90-05, 50-281-90-5, NUDOCS 9004110010 | |
| Download: ML18153C172 (23) | |
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UNITED STATES
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No~.:. 50-280/90-05 and 50-281/90-05 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Bbulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Dtick~t Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:* DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection-Conducted:
February 4, through March 3, 1990 Inspectors:.
w~ Inspector J. L. Accompanying NRC Personnel:
B. Breslau R. Musser K. Poertner Approved by:
Scope:
n S. Shaeffer
(<-'[~
P.~E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY
..:i/e?(#.u Date, gned This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in th~ areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant. surveillance, licensee. event report-review, action oil previous inspection findings, evaluation of licensee self assessment capability, and licensee quality assurance program implementatio Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on February 4, 5, 8, 11, 19, 25, 26;.
and March 1, 2, and Results:
No cited violations or deviations were identified during this inspection perio Specific reviews were conducted in the* areas of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations~ SNSOC and IDER reviews, and operations rel~ted area The inspectors noted that the operations staff continued to i~prove with regards to*
performance of their day-to-day duties and personal accountability {paragraph 8.g).
During review of the 50.59 process, improvement was noted; however, the inspectors consider that further emphasis during training, in the area of licensing basis, would enhance individual capability for determination of what 900411 o;-, 1 0 PDR Ar*,,=,,-*t7-* 900:329 I]
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constitutes an imreviewed safety question {paragraph 8.b).
During the review
. of the SNSOC, the inspectors noted that formal trending of recurring problems was not being accomplishe However, a new trial systeni was being evaluated to ad:omplish this activit Several minor problems which resulted in NCVs were
. identified; however, corrective action for each problem was aggressively pursued by the licensee after identificatio The following NCVs were identified:
An"-NGV was identified for a failure to* follow *instructions for review/update of the plant status logs (paragrap~ 3. b).
An NCV was ide~tified for failure to follow procedure or instructions for control of system status lparagraph 4).
An NCV was identified for.failure to provide adequ~te proc~dures and/or instructions for maintenance activities which could affect the safety of
. the. station (paragraph 5.b).
- An NCV was identified for failure to provide and/or follow procedures for maintenance activities on a CCW heat ~xchanger (paragraph 5.c).
An NCV was* identified for failure to provide adequate procedure for*
periodic testing of radiation monitors (paragraph 7) *
An inspector followup item was identified with rega~ds to modificatiori of the control room envelope ventilation temperature control system (paragraph 8.b).
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- Persons Contacted Licensee Employe,es REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer *
D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- A. Fletcher, Assistant Superintendent of Engineering
- A. Friedman, Superintendent of Nuclear Training
- J. Grau, Sentor Instructor, Training
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- B. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance (effective March 1~ 1990)
- M. Kansler, Station Manager T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
- H. McCallum, Operations Coordinator, Training
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance {up to March 1, 1990j T. Sowers, Superintendent of.En~ineeri~g
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager NRC Personnel
- K. Poertner, Reactor Inspector, RII
- Attended exit intervie Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift'
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne During the week of February 26 through March 2, the NRR Project Manager for Surry, Mr. B. Buckley was on site to monitor plant activities and to conduct a review of the 1 i censee' s program with regards to 10 C FR 50. 5 The results of this review are discussed in paragraph 8 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status
Unit 1 and Unit 2 began the reporting period at power.. Both units operated at power for the duration of the inspection period.
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i 2 Operational Safety Verification (71707 & 42700) Daily Inspections The inspectors conducted ~aily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access,* and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels*
containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system*
elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance wi~h approved procedure The insp~ctors als6 routinely accompany station management on pl ant tau.rs and observed the effectiveness 6f their influence on ~ctivitie~ being performed by p1ant personne *
Weekly Inspections*
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component, and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours were conducted which included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely noted the temperature of the AFW pump discharge piping to ensure increases in temperature were being properly monitored and evaluated by the license Outing this inspection period, the inspectois conducted a detailed review of the Plant Status Log The logs are used to maintain a current status of systems or equipmen The program is controlled and accomplished in accordance ~ith administrative procedure SUADM-0-9, "Operations Department - Logs and Records
, dated October 27, 198 An inspection on February 6, 1990, of the Plant Status*
Logs for both units and the Common Plant Status Lbg revealed that the required weekly review/update for verifying accuracy is not being annotated as delineated in the instructions for maintaining the log Each system's review/update is clearly delineated as to the date verifications are to be accomplish~ The following list indicates a few of the systems which have not been annotated as having been *
verified, this is not an all-inclusive list:
Unit 1 System Date last partial verification CN/SD 1/21/90 CS/RS 1/27 /90 SS/DIST 12/17/89 RHR
- 1/1/90
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- * Uriit 2 Common System BR Ann. panel AS FC Switchyard BC BD/RT CN/SD
Date last partial verification 1/14/90 1/29/90
- 1/17 /90 12/17/89 1/26/90 1/30/90 1/31/90 Step.3.a. *of the Plant Status Log-instruction specifies, in part, that each plant system page will be reviewed/updated for accuracy on a. weekly basis and the. reviewed/updated block will be initialed and date Additionally, the inspector discussed the details of the Plant Status Log instructions with plant operators, noting that there is not a clear *understanding.as to who is responsible for initialing and dating the reviewed/updated bloc Additional discussions were held with operations supervision and it was concluded that clear direction regarding what was expected in this area had not be.en communicated to all concerne In addition, the* operations superintendent stated that he wanted to revisit this. program and revise some re~uirements based -0n experience gained since implementation last yea This review action was initiated by operations during this inspection period with active participation from each shif Changes were instituted for the purpose of *
providing a more reliable status of systems and components for reference during plant operations.
. The inspectors.also verified various system configurations by sampling information from the control room boards and correlating the information with each unit's respective Plant Status Lo During this review, the inspector noted that the status block for the #1 EOG
{Op/Inop) indicated that the #1 EOG was operable {the 110p
designation was circled) when in fact the #1 EOG was tagged out for maintenanc This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Unit 1 SR It should be noted that an *entry noting the inoperable status of the #1 EOG was made -0n _the same stat~s page~
The inspectors noted that, after identification of the above problems, licensee corrective actions were comprehensive and timely; Also, the inspectors did not identify any conditions which could have an adverse impact on safety with regards to system status contro Failure to follow instructions for review/update of the plant status
. logs is identified. as a violation (NCV 280, 281/90-05-01). However, bec~use the violation meets the criterion of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendi C,Section V.A; it will not be cite *
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4 Biweekly Inspections The inspectors.conducted biweekly inspe~tio~s in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect; review*of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control *room shift turnover; review of implemeritation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10.CFR 1 During this 1nspection period, a review was conducted of the licensee's safety-related tagout progra The program is controlled and accomplished -in accordance with administrative procedure SUADM-0-13, Operations Departmerit - Operations, Maintenance and
- Taggin The inspectors reviewed the requirements of SUADM-0-13 and compared the specified requirements with the practices actually performed by the license Specifically, the inspectors walked down Tagging Record 62700, which was placed into effect on 2/7/90 for the p~rpose of performing maintenance on the #1 EO The inspectors verified proper tagging placements, equipment status indications, and ensured that the tags were properly tompleted. _ Additionally, during various tours of the facility, the inspectors randomly verified that observed danger tags were properly placed and correctly indicated the status of the respective equipmen Based on. these reviews, the licensee I s tagging program appears to be. adequate and meets the specified requirements of SUADM-0-1 Other Inspection Activities Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, c*ontrol room, auxiliary building, _cabl penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facil,ty, low level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit area RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely and independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular
-* basis RWPs were reviewed, and specific work activities wer_e monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWPs~
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie Physical.Security Program Inspections
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In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee I s. physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed* in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected* and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge
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issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports (1) On February 12, 1990 the 1 i censee made a* report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 concerning a spill of approxi~ately 4. gallons of ammonia to the environment (ground spill which. went into storm drains).
The * report was made to the NRC because the 1 i censee was reporting the spill to the state water control* board as an environmental,issue requiring a repor The spill had no operational impact on the statio (2) On February 24, 1990, the licensee made a repo.rt in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72 concerning a* 1 oss * of emergency assessment capability in the local emergency operations facility due to a loss of power to the facilit This 1 oss of capability occurred at the same time the corporate emergency operations facility was out of service due to a scheduled maintenance evolutio Immediate actions included returning the corporate facility to service in less that two hours from the time that the LEOF capability was 1 os The 1 i censee investigated the power loss to the LEOF and determined that the loss of the local transmission line from Smithfield caused the even The LEOF was.returned to opera ti ona 1 status at 2215. hours on the same de.
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Within the ateas inspected, one non-cited violation was identifie.
ESF System Walkdown
{71710) Units 1 and 2 The inspe.ctors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF system Valve and breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment inateri a 1 conditions were satisfactor During this reporting period, accessible portions of the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Systems were walked down in detai This effort involved confirmation that system lineup requirements in procedures 1-0P-31.2A, Auxiliary Feedwater, and OC-1, Operational Check -
Control Room Switches/Controls, for Unit 1 and procedures 2-0P-31.2A, Auxiliary Feedwater, and OC-2, Operational Check -
Control Room Switches/Controls, for Unit 2 were consistent with the as-built configuration and the applicable plant drawings (Unit 1 -
11448-FM- -068A,.Unit 2 - 11548-FM -068A).
The detailed walkdown also involved confirmation that valves were properly positioned and that*
material conditions were satisfactor During the walkdown the inspectors noted that valve 1-FW-166, auxiliary feed pump 1-FW-P-3A suction gage isolation valve, was in the closed position instead of the required open positio This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Unit 1 SRO, who upon investigation of the
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matter, placed the valve into.the open position. * The fact that the pressure gage was isolated from the system did not affect the operabilfty of this componen This deficiency is identified as a violation (NCV 280/90-05~02) for failure to follow procedure or instructions for control of system statu Howeve~, because the violation ~eets the criterion of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V.A; it will not be cite Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the reporti~g period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance
- activities to assure compliance with the ~ppropriate procedure Inspection areas included the following: Main Control Room Chiller-l-VS-E-48 On February 14, 1990, the inspectors observed preventive maintenance being performed on control room chi 11 er 1-VS-E-4 Procedure VS-YS-M/2W, Cleaning of Control/Relay Room Chiller Condensate Pump Inlet Y-Type Strainer Safety-Related, dated 10/18/89, and procedure 1-VS-E-48, Control Room Chill er Condenser Tube Cleaning, dated 10/18/89, were'being used to provide instructions for performing the wor The work was being perform~d in accordance with work orders 3800092057 arid 380008932 The inspectors reviewed parts of the procedure~, observed the work in progiess, and had discussions with the maintenance worker No discrepancies were note Installation of 0-ring Seals in the Equipment Door Escape Lock Hatche During this inspection period, the inspectors moni tared 1 i censee actions regarding inspection of the 0-ring hatch seals that were installed on the inner and outer escape lock hatches of the equipment door for Units 1 and 2 *. The Unit 1 escape lock hatches were inspected on February 24, 199 *During this inspection it was
. determined that the 0-ri ng sea 1 s had been ins ta 11 ed backward New seals were installed in accordance with the appropriate procedure and the required testing was performed to verify the maintenance of containment integrit On February 25, 1990 the Unit 2 escape lock hatches were inspecte This inspection determined that the outer hatch. seal was installed backward The inner hatch seal was installed in the correct orientatio A new seal was installed and the required containment integrity testing was performe Both conditions were documented on deviation reports by the license A review by the inspectors of the post-maintenance testing results for the work that was done prior to each unit I s restart indicated containment integrity had been maintained even though the seals had been installed backward The inspectors also reviewed the work packages for seal installation for February 24 and 25 and concluded
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that adequate instruction was provided for proper installation of the
_ seals during this perio The inspectors then reviewed available
. documeritation for the installation and/or inspection of the escape lock hatch seals during the most recent* outages and conclud~d that a procedure had not been used fo~ past installations.* Discussions with licensee management confirmed that this maintenance activity had been accomplished using a "skill of the craft" approac Although the inspector did conclude that the safety significance.of these in~orrect seal installatioris was minimal d~e to adequate post main-tenance testing, he also believes that procedure~ and/or instructions to perform this activity during past outage installations was inadequat * This issue is identified as a violation (NCV 280,281/90-05-03) for failure to provfde adequate procedures and/or instructions for maintenance activities which could affect the safety of the statio However, because the violation meets the criterion of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V.A; it will not be cite c; CCW Keat Eichanger Tube Leakage (1-CC-E-lA).
During this inspection period, the licensee conducted corrective maintenance on the A CCW heat exchanger due to identification of leakage from the CCW system to the service water side of the heat exchanger The inspectors observed some of the work in progress, reviewed the maintenance work order package, and discussed the lea detection and plugging processes with the systems engineer; Work order 3800091421 was used to perform this wor 'A review of this work package and discussions with maintenance personnel revealed the following discrepancies:
- At the time of review, the category 1 inventory tags (indicates safety-related material) for the tube plugs were not attached. to the work order as required by paragraph 5.4.3. of procedufe VPAP-0702~ Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components, dated December 18, 198.
During the plugging of two tubes, the crew failed to read and follow engineering instructions regarding the reaming of a tube before pluggin The turnover of *the job from one crew to another may have* contributed to the failure to review the engineering requirement A discussion with the licensee maintenance management revealed that the engineering instructions that are attached to a maintenance package are normally deviated into the procedur The procedure did not have a detailed step which required the plug to be reamed before pluggin The plugs for the two tubes had to be removed and*
replace The inspectors discussed *the. above deficiencies with maintenance management and concluded that although each occurrence was related to a failure to provide adequate procedure and/or to follow procedure, they also noted that the.licensee took corrective actions to resolve
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- each deficiency before completing the wor In addition, the post maintenance testing of the heat exchanger demonstrated that the leakage problem *had been correcte This issue is itlentified as a violati.on. (NCV 280; 281/90-05-04} for failure to provide and/or follow procedurei for maintenance ~ctivities on a CCW heat exchange However, becaLlse the violation meets the critetion of 10 CFR, Part 2, *
Appendix C,Section V.A., it will not be cite *
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The inspector also noted that during the inspection of both of the*
tube sheets frir matching plugged tubes, the licensee found one tube that had a plug in only one en This tube had been plugged in a previous maintenance outage and it could not be determined if a tube plug had been inserted or * if the plug had vibrated out of the openin This discrepancy was als_o corrected before the heat exchanger was returned to servic The inspector reviewed the post-maintenance leak check for the CCW heat exchanger repai No discrepancies were noted..
Within the areas inspected, two NCVs were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700}
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as follo~s:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended functio Adequate coordinatibn existed among personnel involved in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following: Consequence Limiting Safeguards Logic - Unit 2 On February' 19, 1990. the inspectors witnessed the performance of periodic test 2-PT~8.5, Consequence Limiting Safeguards Logic High-High. Train, dated* September 7,. 198 This monthly test. is performed in order to satisfy the requirements in TS Table 4.1-The inspectors witnessed the partial testing of two channels in the train A pa~t of the syste These observations.were made in both the control room and in the emergency switchgear roo No discrepancies were identifie *
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- Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Unit 1 On February 25, 1990, the inspectors witnessed the performance of periodic :test 1-PT-15.lA, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-3A, dated October 31, 1989.. This monthly test is performed in order to satisfy the requirements in TS 4.8~ The inspectors witriessed the positioning of valves, reading of pressure gauges, and the taking. of.vibration measurement No discrepancies were identifie * Operational T~sting of CCW Heat Exchanger (1-CC-E-lA)
On February 25; 1990, the inspectors observed the performance of special test procedure STP-41A, 1-CC-E-A Operability Check, dated September 26,* 1989, which was used for returning this heat exchanger to servic No discrepancies were note Within the areas i~spected, no violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER 1s listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requireme~ts were being met and to evaluate initial adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspector 1s review also included followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required correttive actions were cbmplet LERs that" identify violations of regulations and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V.G.1 are identified as an NCV in the following closeout paragraphs~
These items are identified to allow for*
proper evaluations of corrective actions in the. event that similar events occur in the futur (Clbsed) LER 280/89-43, Low Pressure SI May Not Actuate During a Harsh Environment in Containment Due to Instrument Loop Inaccuracie The issue involved identification of an instrument loop uncertainty associated with the low pressurizer pressure safety injection setpoint under an adverse environment conditio This uncertainty exceeded the margin between th setpoint assumed in the accident analysis and the actual setpoint valu The licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation of the condition and concluded that the increased loop inaccuracy should* not result in consequences beyond those of the current analysi This issue was discussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-38 in paragraph 3.f(l).
More formal and detailed analysis was performed that substantiated the conclusions of the preliminary evaluatio The inspector reviewed the preliminary analysis with the licensee and also was provided with the results of the final analysi These results will be used to update the Surry UFSAR at the next revision interva The inspector considers that
. licensee actions to.address this issue were adequate. This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-44, Manual Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Initiated Following Loss of Power to Semi-Vital Bus Caused by a Fault on 11A 11 RSS **
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indications of control rods inserting into the reacto The event was reviewed at the time of occurrence by the inspectors and fully discussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-3 Corrective actions for the cause of the transformer fault were reviewed and considered adequat This LER is close *
(Closed) LER 281/89-13, Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoints Outside of Tech_nical Specification Allowable Limits Due to Establishing Setpoints Without Loop Sea The issue involved identification of a potential problem with regards to the method used to test and set the pressurizer safety valve Unit 2 had recently shutdown due to a leaking pressurizer safety valv Thfs issue was closely followed by the inspectors and was documented in Inspection Reports 280,281/89-31 and 89-3 This LER is close *(closed) LER 281/89-14, Leakage Through Containment Purge MOV Exceeds Maximum Allowabl The issue involved identifitation of suspected leak~ge past containment isolation valves greater that that allowed by T The leakage was discovered while the unit was in cold shutdown. Repairs were accomplished on the MOV and it was satisfactorily tested prior to the unit startup~
However, the unit had heated up past 200 degrees for three days with this potential condition in existenc The inspector reviewed the licensee's testing schedu1e and concluded that all required testing had been accomplished prior to identification of this proble The inspector also reviewed the test results after repairs were mad This LER is close *
(Closed) L_ER 281/89-15, RCS Boron Dilution Without Containment Integrit The issue involved dilution of the Unit 2 RCS without establishment of containment integrity as required by T This event was discussed* in Inspection Report 280,281/89~31 and resulted in issuance of a violation for failure to follow procedur The licensee's corrective acti.on for this event will be reviewed during the closeout *of the violation..This LER is close (Closed) LER 281/89-16, Unplanned ESF Component Actuation,.FW Bypass Closure and MFP Trip Due to Personnel Error and Procedure Deficienc The issue involved an automatic* trip of a main feedwater pump breaker and isolation of the feedwater bypass flowpath to the C steam generator during filling evolutions to place the generator in wet layup-.
The unit was in cold shutdown at the time and the automatic functions occurred as designed when the generator 1 eve 1 exceeded 75%.
The cause of the event was a failure of the operator to block the automatic signal to prevent the *
actuation of the component Also noted was a lack of a procedural step to alert the operator to block the signal when level approached the*
setpoin This event had minimal - safety significan_ce on the uni Corrective actions included modification of the procedure to caution the operators of the need to use the feed water control reset pushbuttons to.
prevent unnecessary component actuations. The inspector verified that the procedure shanges were mad This LER is close **
(Closed) LER 281/89-17, 11 C
Pressurizer Safety Valve Lifted.Below Technical Specification Limi The issue involved a lifting of the C pressurizer safety valve during performance of an RCS pressure test in preparation for unit restar Licensee immediate actions were to-reduce pressure to reseat the valve and then return the unit to cold shutdown for corrective acti~n This issue was related to the issue discussed in LER 281/89~1 These i~sues were closely followed by the inspectors and were documented in Inspection Reports 280,281/89-31 and 89-3 This LER is close *
(Closed) LER 281/89-18, Unplanned ESF Actuation, Closure of Cbntainment Isolation Valves Due to Activation of Radiation Monitor Alarm Due to Operator Erro The issue involved inadvertent actuation of an alarm on the. containment manipulator crane radiation monitor during performance of a periodic test by an operator traine The alarm caused the ESF actuation to occur as designed*.
Immediate corrective action was to reset the alarm and reopen the containment isolation valves for the instrument
- air compressor No operational problem resulted as a result of the isolation valve's realignmen Additional corrective actions included reinstruction of the operator traine In addition, a caution was added to the periodic test for each unit to warn the operators of the consequences when turning area radiation monitors o The inspector verified that the periodic tests {1-and 2-PT-26.1) were revised to include* the. cautio This item is identified as a violation (NCV 281/90-05-05) for failure to provide adequate procedure for periodic testing of radiation monitor This LER is close (Closed) LER i81/89-19, Service Water MOVs to the RSHXs Inop~rabl~ Due to Personnel Error in Removing Flood Protectio The issue involved inadvertent removal of flood protection dikes which provided protection of the subject valve This condition made the subject valves technically inoperabl This item was reviewed by the inspectors and discussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-3 * In that report a viol at ion was identified relating to the above even Long term corrective actions will be reviewed as part of the closeout of the violatio This LER is close.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702) (CLOSED) Violation 280,281/87-10-01, Failure to conduct an. annual physical inventory for all special nuclear Materia This violation was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/88-41 in October of 198 At that time, the licensee's quality assurance organization identified the failure to perform the requirements identified in the licensee's corrective actions for the violatio This failure to take appropriate * corrective act.ion * for an NRC violation was identified as an additional example to violation 280,281/88-41-0 The inspector reviewed the licensee's supplemental response to the ori gi na 1 violation dated January 25, 1989, and determined that administrative procedure VPAP 1406, Control of Nuclear Material, d~ted December 26, 1989, was e~tablished to provide guidelines and responsible personnel for performing physical
- inventory of a 11 i ncore and ex core detector The inspector verified that a physical inventory process was established on a semi-annual basis and also reviewed the most recent completion of periodic test 28.10, Physical Inventory of SNM Detectors and other SNM Sources, and found no discrepancie The procedure has been modified to require accountability for the material identified in a baseline determiation plus SNM which may be received in the future. The inspector concluded that the corrective actions stated in the violation response and
- -_supplemental response have been implemente This item is closed.
. (Closed) Violation 280,281/88-41-01, Failure to take corrective actions for identification of deficiencies. In response to a Notice of Violations issued by the NRC on May 18, 1989, the licensee provided an initial reply on June 14, 1989, and a detailed response
- in their submittal of July 14, 198 The specific issues dealt with a failure to evaluate, in a timely manner, a potential problem associated with gas binding of high head safety injection pumps and the fa.ilure to conduct adequate safety evaluations of control room chiller capacity as a result of plant modification Corrective actions for the gas binding issue included the installation of high point vents in the recirculation lines prior to each unit 1s restar The inspectors verified that these vents were installed as part o closeout actions associated with unit restart effort In addition, the deviation report process for identification and evaluation of
- defici~ncies has been tevised to allow for a more thorough review of conditions adverse to qualit The July 14, 1989 submittal also addressed the violation relating to the failure to properly assess the MCR and ESGR ventilation systems operating conditions with respect to the System design requirem~~ts, and the failure to properly conduct reviews as required by 10 CFR 50.5 One of the corrective actions to avoid-future violations,*
cited in the July 14 submittal was the enhancement of the licensee 1s 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation process and the training provided to those personnel who perform the 10 CFR 50.59 reviews at the Surry facilit *
Part of the licensee 1s short term corrective actions for the control room chiller capacity issues were addressed prior to Unit 1.restart in July, 198 Extensive inspection of these corrective actions were conducted by the inspectors~
.A summary of these inspections was discussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-1 This summary concluded that adequate interim corrective actions had been accomplished prior to restar One of the corrective actions implemented by the licensee included expanding the scope of review of the safety evaluations associated with the 10 CFR 50.59 review process as documented in the corporate standard (NODS-LR-10)
and Surry Power Station administrative procedure SUADM-LR-1 Attachment 1 to SUADM-LR-:-12 consists of 13 pages of criteria that must be considered in the safety evaluation
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proces In addition, the training program has been upgraded to address the expanded scope of the safety evaluation and to require
.* training in the area of general plant systems.* Personnel who prepare, review, or approve 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations must satisfy specific training requirements. _These requirements were discussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-39 and considered adequat Al 1 qualified personnel including station managers and superintendents are required to be requalified on an annual basi A list of all personnel is published on a monthly basis with annual expiration date Ninety five percent or greater of the qualified personnel have been requa 1 i fi ed in the use of the 1 a test revision of SUADM-LR-12. * The inspector conducted interviews with five individ-uals who are qualified to prepare 10 CFR 50.59 review These interviews indicated that technical knowledge was good, but a need was noted for strengthening the training in the understanding of whether or not a particular is.sue is an unreviewed safety question, with regards to the plant 1s licensing basis as delineated in the FSAR, UFSAR, SERs and other licensing documentatio While an example of an unreviewed question is contained in the training program, it appears that further classroom discussion of various potenti a 1 unrevi ewed safety question scenarios could minimize the potential for misinterpreting 10 CFR 50.5 As a result of the inspection, an improvement was noted in the 10 CFR 50.59 review process. However, further emphasis during training, in the area of licensing basis, would enhance individual capability for determi-nation of what constitutes an unreviewed safety questio The inspectors have concluded that licensee corrective actions to resolve the gas binding and control room chiller capacity issues have been adequately resolved in order to close this ite However, additional followup is required with regards to the licensee 1 s implementation of long term corrective action which will result in plant modification of the control room envelope ventilation tempera-ture control syste This item is identified as an inspector follow-up item, (280,281/90-05-06), Followup on licensee actions with regards to modification of the control room envelope ventilation temperature control syste (Closed)
Violation 280,281/89-06-02, Failure to take prompt corrective action on potential wetting of safety-related component This issue involved the repeated wetting of the AFW motors during periods of heavy rainfall. The licensee had failed to challenge this condition adverse to quality and perform corrective actions in a timely manne The inspectors reviewed the interim fix to prevent the roof plug leakage, as well as a permanent design change that will redesign the plugs to provide a positive seal. * The schedule for completion of the modification is mid-199 The licensee appears to have adequately addressed the concer In addition, the inspectors have noted an increased sensitivity toward identifying discrepant conditions for resolution as displayed in the increased number of
- *
station deviations that are routinely generated since the issue was identified. This item is close (Closed).Violation 280,281/89-06-03, Failure* to take adequate corrective action on purging of unqualified parts from the site supply syste This issue involved inadequate licensee action to remove unacceptable safety-related parts from warehouse inventor The licensee had failed to take prompt corrective ~ction to ensure that safety-related components were repaired using only qualified replacement parts.. The inspectors previously reviewed an engineering evaluation of the replica parts issue and the replacement of these parts in Unit 1 low.head SI pump 1-SI-P-lA (Reference Inspection Report Nos. 280,281/88-51, 89-06, 89.. 08, 89-13, and 89-20).
The licensee identified the potential for having replica parts in fuel pool cooling pump l-FC-P-18 and component cooling water pump 1-CC-P-18. These pumps have been evaluated and demonstrated op~rable and the pumps will be inspected and refurbished during the next pump overhau The inspector considers that the licensee's corrective actions for this condition are adequat This item is close (Closed) I FI 280,281/89-06-05, Foll owup on licensee commitment to refurbish all safety-related 4160 volt breaker The issue involve litensee identification of a failure of a 4160 volt breaker to close causing a loss of power to two vital busse Corrective action for this condition included refurbishment of all safety-related 4160 volt breakers prior to each unit's restar These actions were verified by the inspectors* and closed out in Inspection Report 280,281/89-20 for Unit For Unit 2, the actions were closed out as part of the*
CAL letter closeou This issue was di~cussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-28. This item is close *
(Closed) Violation 281/89-08-01, Failure to pro~ide and/or follow procedure involving startup, operation, and shutdown of systems and
- components involving nuclear. safety. of the station. The issue involved an incorrect alignment of a safety-related system which was in operation and providing decay heat removal cooling to the Unit 2 reacto The licensee responded to this violation. in a letter dated June 8, 198 In that letter, the licensee stated that the oper~tors involved in the event were discipline Also, i~cre~sed management attention was noted with regards to reenforcing required usage of procedures when manipulating.any plant co~ponent/syste In addition, a Plant Status Log was developed and implemented in order
- to help maintain_ system configuration contro *
The inspectrirs have closely monitored licensee corrective actions.in this area during and after the even The inspectors have noticed a con ti nui ng improvement in operator personal* accountabilit However, the review of the Plant Status Log as documented in paragraph indicated some l~pse in operator attention to detai Although the log reviews were n6t being documented as required, the i~spection did n_ot identify any actual plant configuration problem...
..
In summary, the inspectors consider that the. operations* staff is continuing *to improve with regards to accountability and attention to
. detail ~nd that the licensee's corrective actions continue to be effective. This item is close * (Closed) VIO 280,281/89-08-02, Failure to provide and/or follow procedure This violation involved two examples where work was hot
- adequately prescribed in a pro~edure. The first example involved the control and ownership of instrumentation valve The inspector reviewed administrative procedure SUADM..:.0-29 that was issued* to control this process and instrument department procedure 1-IMP-P-MISC-066 that was revised to.include the subject valve A second example of inadequate procedure was identified regarding the inspection and reconnection of motor termination A review of subsequent training and procedures indicated that these issues were correcte *
An additional problem identified in this violation was the failure to follow procedures that resulted in systems being returned to servic~
through the engineering work requests program without the proper technical revie The inspector reviewed the revised station
.
admi ni strati ve procedure gover_ni ng engineering work requests and concluded that the issue had been properly addresse This program will eventually be phased out and folded into a single design change program for all plant modification The inspector concluded that corrective actions as a result of this violation were adequat This item.is close.
.
. (Closed) NCV 280,281/89-17-01, Failure to provide for continuous*
review of a 11 opera ti ans and safety aspects of the nuclear faci 1 i ty as specified in TS 6.1. This noncited violation addressed a failure to perform TS reviews by the independent review group and was addressed in detail and cited as a violation in North Anna Inspection Report 338,339/89-1 The item was left open when issued, pending review of this area for both station A subseq~ent review of this area was performed between February 20 and 23, 1990 (see paragraph 9). Based on this review, this item is closed~ Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
During this inspection period, a detailed review of the licensee's on-site self assessment capability was conducted with regards to monitoring of the station safety committee meetings.and review This review included observing SNSOC committee meetings, their prior committee meeting minutes for the last year and the actions which the committee initiated to correct identified violations; reportable events or areas noted as weaknesses.*
While attending a SNSOC meeting on February 8, 1990, the inspector noted that the committee members were.reviewing multiple procedures at the same tim This observation was discussed with station management and they stated that only. those items that were routine were reviewed in this
......
manne New items or tests were presented to SNSOC and/or were routed to the committee members ahead of the meetin The inspector al~o noted SNSOC ~cti~n items w~re not being trended to determine recurring problem In the past, trend evaluations would be requested if a SNSOC member remembered that similar problems were recurring. The licensee was aware that this area needed attention and has initiated~ computer based trtal program to provide tracking and trendin This program was discussed with the inspector and appears to be able to track open action items as an agenda item ~uring scheduled weekly SNSOC meetings. * This ne~ tracking system will be monitored by the inspectors during their continuing review of the SNSO During th.is inspection period, an inspector traveled to the corporate office and conducted a detailed review of the lic~nsee's self-assessment capabilitie The applicable requirements are addressed in TS 6.1.C.2, Independent/Operational Event Review Group (IOER) *
.The group that is assigned this review responsibility was formally identified as IOER but has recently changed their title to Corporate Nuclear Safety (CNS).
The IOER was divided into two separate groups with separate immediate supervisio The CNS group continues to perform all TS related independent reviews while the IOER Group (not to be confused with the TS required subject review) reviews industry events for applicability to both Surry and North Ann Both groups are under the direction of the Manager, Nuilear Licensing and Program *
Management has recently become more involved in the activities of the independent/operating review activities as indicated by the following acti ans:*
A study was completed by an outside consultant which identified needed improvement Additional qualified reviewers have been added* to the CNS review grou There are 11 personnel now assigned to this group where there were previously only three peopl Five of the reviewers are qualified per$onnel and the remai.nder are qualified contractors. A program has been established to assure the qualifications of each of the reviewers * *
.
.
.
.
A dedicated supervisor has been assigned to the grou The backlo~ of items requiring independent review has been assessed-and a determination has been made tti review the documents that had not been reviewed dating as far back as June, 198 Two qualified* *
r~vie~ers have been assigned f~ll time to this task. This review is scheduled to be completed by September, 199 A Quality Assurance audit was conducted between May 30 and June 3, 1989, and identified seven finding These findings paralleled the findings addressed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-17, conducted.in May, 198.,
' I
. '..
These audit findings have been corrected although the final feport from QA evaluating thecorrective actions has not been issue A CNS administrative manual has been written and implemented containing requirements on the. review process to insure consistency.* This manual also contains a matrix to cover all required TS subjects with a corresponding checkoff shee The inspector reviewed the ~ualifications of the reviewers, including the consultants, and the specified topics requiring independent review that are identified in T The reviews had all been conducted or were identified to be *reviewed with assigned dates for completio A computerized tracking system has been developed to maintain an up-to-date status and to provide status for management revie Currently there are approximately 200 items that have been identified as requiring review~
In _addition to their review responsibilities, the CNS group has. been given the task to conduct assessments of areas that management considers w*eak or areas where trends show a potential proble Management also authorizes the use of additional consultants to aid in the accomplishment of these assessment CNS had just completed an assessment of the Emergency Operating Procedures for Surry on February 23, 199 As part of this review, the inspector reviewed a proposed TS amendment that was submitted to the NRC in correspondence dated February 1, 199 This proposal when implemented, will establish.a Management Safety Review Committee (MSRC)
as presently described in Standard Technical Specification The CNS group wi 11 at that time become a subcommittee of the MSR The licensee has already formed this group in part and is making necessary preparations to implement their function In summary, the inspectors determined from these reviews, coupled with discussions with the licensee, that the requirements of TS 6.1.C.1 and 6.1.C.2 are being met and an adequate self-assessment program is being implemente *
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)
Continuing evaluations have been conducted during this and past inspection periods since July, 1989, of the licensee's Quality *Assurance Program implementation. * These evaluations include review of recent inspection *
reports, SALP reports, open i terns, 1 i censee corrective acti ans for NRC inspection findings, and Licensee Event Report The evaluation focused
- on the findings fro_m the previous assessment perio Each functional area problem or weakness was comprehensively reviewed and integrated with the root cause determinations and corrective actions taken by the licensee during the current assessmen The results of the evaluation were discussed with NRC management and inspections were focused on the areas
,.
(
' *
- '
{
.. **
identified as weaknesse Due to the shortening of the assess~ent period to nine months, on-site NRC inspections have increased in freq~ency in most funttional areas in order to better eval~ate the licensee's progress
- since the end of.the last ~ssessment period. Weaknesses have cdntinued to be identified in the maintenance/surveillance functional area and will be
"
reviewed i.n detail by a team inspectio The licensee has been providing updated information with regards to corrective actions for past problems to the NRC staff for integration into the current NRC inspection plan for the-Surry unit This cooperation allows for timely integration of inspections needed for quality determinations of the licensee's perform-ance and progress in each SALP functional area and the overall implementa-tion of their quality assurance progra Within the areas inspected, no viblations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on on March 6, 1990 with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exi No cited violations or deviations were identified during this inspectio*n perio Specific reviews were conducted in the areas of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, SNSOC and IDER reviews, and operations related area The inspectors noted that the operations staff continued to improve regarding performance of their day-to-day *duties and personal accountability (paragraph 8.f).
During review of the 50.59 process, improvement was noted; however, the inspectors consider that further emphasis during training in the area of licensing basis would enhance individual capabil-ity for determination of what constitutes an unreviewed safety question
{paragraph 8.b).
During tbe review of the SNSOC, the inspectors noted that formal trending of recurring problems was not being accomplishe However, a new trial system was being evaluated to accomplish this activit Several minor problems which resulted in NCVs were identified; however, corrective action for each problem was aggressively pursued by the licensee in each case. The following NCVs were identified: *
An NCV was-identified for a failure to follow instructions for review/update of. the plant status logs
{paragraph 3.b).
(280,281/90-05-0l).
An NCV was identified for failure to follow procedure or instructions for control of system status (paragraph 4).
(280,281/90-05-02).
.
.
.
.
. An NCV was identified tor f~ilure to provide ad~quate procedures and/or instructions for maintenance activities which could affect the safety of the station (paragraph 5.b).
(280,281/90-05~03).
..
i
.
~
An NCV was identified for failure to provide and/or follow procedures for maintenance activities on the CCW heat exchanger (paragraph 5.c).
{280,281/90-05-04).
.
An NCV was identified for failure to provide adequate procedure for periodic testing of radiation monitors (paragraph 7).
(281/90-05-05).
An inspector followup item was identified with regards to modification of the control room envelope ventilation temperature control* system (paragraph 8.b}.
(280,281/90-05-06).
.
_
The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions with no dissenting comment The 1 icensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
INDEX OF ACRONYMS AND INJTIALISMS AFW ANSI AP AS BD BR CAD CAL cc ccw CFR CLS CN CNS cs cw
. DPI.
- FSAR FW GDC GPM AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE AUXILIARY STEAM SLOWDOWN BORON RECOVERY COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER COMPONENT COOLING COMPONENT COOLING WATER CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARD CONDENSATE
-
CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY CONTAINMENT SPRAY CIRCULATING WATER DELTA PRESSURE INDICATORS DEVIATION REPORT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC CONTROL ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES FIRE CONTROL FITNESS FOR DUTY FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FEEDWATER GENERAL-DESIGN CRITERIA GALLONS PER MINUTE
HP.
. IOER
!RPI ISI LEOF LER LCO LHSI LOCA LOOP MCR MER3 MER4 MFP MMP MOV MSRC NCf NRC NRR OP ORS PCV
- -
HEALTH PHYSICS HEAT EXCHANGER
- 20 HIGH.PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION
.INSTRUMENT AIR.
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM
- INDEPEND~NT OFFSITt EVALUATION/REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATION INSERVICE INSPECTION LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY LICENSEE.EVENT REPORT LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION LOSS 0~ COOLANT ACCIDENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER MAIN CONTROL ROOM MECHA~ICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM 3 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM 4 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP MECHANIC~L MAINTENANCE PROCEDU~ES MOTOR OPERATED VALVE MANAGEMENT SAFETY REVIEW COMMITTEE NON-CITED VIOLATION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. NUCLEAR REACTORS REGULATION OPERATING PROCEDURE
.
.
OUTSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY PNEUMATIC CONTROL VALVE PRESSURE INDICATOR PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE PERIODIC TEST.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
.. QUALITY CONTROL
- RESIDENT ACTION ITE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REGULATORY GUIDES REACTOR OPERATOR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTE * RECIRCULATION SPRA RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER RESERVE SERVICE STATION TRANSFORMER SG RECIRCULATION AND TRANSFER RADIATION WORK PERMIT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE STEAM DRAIN SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SAFETY INJECTION SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
"
SNSOC sov SPDS SRO ss SW TAVG TI TS TSC UFSAR URI UV vs
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM
.SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR STATION SERVICE SERVICE WATER AVERAGE TEMPERATURE OF RCS TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UNRESOLVED ITEM
. UNDER VOLTAGE VENTILATION SYSTEM