IR 05000280/1990026
| ML18153C389 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1990 |
| From: | Holland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C388 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-26, 50-281-90-26, NUDOCS 9010120056 | |
| Download: ML18153C389 (15) | |
Text
. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/90-26 and 50-281/90-2 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boule~ard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.~ 50-280 and 50~281 License Nos.:. DPR-32 and-DPR-37
- Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 *
Inspection Conducted:
July 29 through September 1, 1990 Ins pee tors :,.....w-. _E.,,.?~.*;j....,,:~-~~..,,,..n....,d-, -s""f'~n'""'f=f-o-r---=R-e-s -:-i d..,..e-n"""'t--:-I-n-s-pe_c_,t,....o_r _____ _
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J. W. ~sident Inspector c::;u_ v
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Accompanying 9~ k __ Rufj,
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Approved by: \\? L~L-/1."- 2J;{-----
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief S. G. ~#~Resident Inspector Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
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. This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report clos.eout, and action on previous inspection finding During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted reviews of the licensee's backshift or weekend operation~ on July 29, August 5~ 19, 23, and 2 Results:
In the area of radiological controls, a strength was identified regarding the licensee's investigation into unplanned gaseous activity releases and the resulting event report (paragraph 3.d).
In the area of plant operations, a weakness was noted with regards to operator performance in situations which allow for.more than one course of actio Several operational problems ( system valve alignments and actions associated with a clear understanding of proper system alignments) occurred due to a lack of clear communications between shift-personnel (paragraph 3.d). Also, in the area of plant operations,
a strength was noted in. the performance of operations duririg the August 27 Unit 2 reactor trip transient and restart of the uni This is a continuing strength for the operations department based on irispector observations. of performance during other recent reactor trips a~d startups (paragraph 3.f).
In the area of*maintenarice, a weakness was identified in the licensee 1 s PM program regarding making changes to PM procedures without conducting a review of the implications of the changes (paragraph 4.a).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to perform a Technical Specification s*urveillances procedure within the required timeframe ( paragraph 6).
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R~ Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physici W. Gross, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
- D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- Attended exit interview.
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors, and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are liited in the last paragrap.
Pl ant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period at powe The unit ~ontinued to operate in a coastdown mode at power during the period and was operating at approximately 78% power when the inspection period ende Unit 2 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power until August 27, when the reactor was manually tripped from 100% power due to a failure of the A main feedwater regulating control valv This event is further discussed in paragraph 3.f. The unit returned to power on August 28, and operated at power for the remainder of the inspection perio.
Operational Safety Verification* (71707 & 42700) Daily Inspections The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels *
con ta i ni ng instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are Operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviatio reports, ta gout logs, temporary modification logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspectors also routinely accompanied station management on plant tours and observed the effectiveness of their influente on activities being performed by plant personne * Weekly Inspections
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The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following area;:
operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component, and operability of instrumentation and support i terns essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours were conducted which.included observation of general plant/equipment conditions,. fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely noted the temperature of the AFW pump discharge piping to ensure increases in temperature were being properly monitored and evaluated by the license Biweekly Inspections The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect; r.eview of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Other Inspection Activities Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit area RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required. -The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program ( RCSLK9).
On a* regular basis, RWPs were reviewed, and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked; and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie *
The inspectors reviewed the licensee 1s evaluation of_ five suspect gaseous activity releases. that occurred on July 26, 27, 28, and August 2 A special team was established that conducted an investigation and provided a written teport to licensee management and NRC inspector The report concluded that two of.the releases were unplanned and did not exceed TS limit The three remaining releases were attributed to erroneous radiation monitor indications and were not unplanned gaseous activity release The condition that caused the erroneous readings have been correcte The unplanned gaseous activity releases occurred on July 27 and 2~. **
The cause of the July 27 release was. determined to be a leaking swagelock fitting on ft pressure sensor indicating line in the Unit 1 CV~ The release rate was calculated to be 46 percent of TS limits for two minute The cause of the July 28 release was d~termined to b*e a packing leak on valve 1-SS-132 and a leaking fitting on flexible hose used to vent the PRT to the overhead gaseous* waste syste The rel ease rate was calculated to be 18 percent of TS limits for less than two minute Corrective action involved repair of the leaking components associated with both release During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the qua 1 ity assurance performance group 1s special evaluation of recent operations department problem The evaluation, which had been requested by station manage~ent, was focused in part on operational events such as, manual isolation of the Unit 1 A deborating demineralizer which resulted in the oncoming shift not being aware of the system alignment, improper control of system alignment of the SI hydrostatic test pump resulting in pump operation with the discharge valve closed, and improper alignment of the standby water chiller to Unit 2 which resulted in the tripping of the Unit 1 chille These events/errors occurred near the end of the last ins~ection period and were evaluated by the QA performance grou Their evaluation included interviews with personnel involved in the events and concluded that operational p.ersonnel were not always attentive to the job task In addition, interpretation of-administrative controls and station policies Was inconsistent and inter-and intra-department communica-tions were not always effectiv The results of this evaluation was presented to the station manager in early Augus The inspectors were briefed by the QA performance group on the special assessment report and held several discussions with station supervision and management on* the conclusions of the assessmen Based on the occurrence of these events, the inspectors consider that a weakness was identified regarding operator performance in situations which allow for more than one course of actio Several operational problems (i.e. system valve alignments and actions associated with correct understanding of proper system alignments)
occurred due to a lack of clear communications between shift personne Station management was receptive to the findings and stated that additional corrective actions focusing on attention to
detail and improvement of the communication* process would be implemente The inspectors consider that licensee management is sensitized to recognition of adverse trends in performante and properly focused resources to identify and correct these trend Physical Security Program Inspections In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the 1 i censee I s phys i ca 1 security progra The performance of various shifts of the ~ecurity force was observed in the.coriduct,o daily activities to include: protected.and vital areas access.
controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post No discrepancies were note f.. Li~ensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports On August 27, the licensee made a report in accordance*with 10 CFR 50.72 concerning a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from 100% powe On August 27, A steam generator feedwater regulating valve failed shu As a result, level in the A steam generator could. not be maintained and Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped prior to the receipt of any automatic reactor trip signal After the Unit 2 trip, operators took the required actions to place the unit in a hot shutdown conditio All safety systems performed as designe *
Following the trip, one of the feedwater heater safety valves lifted in the turbine building causing a fire sprinkler to actuate and spray water on the A main feedwater pum All rods inserted on the trip, however, the rod bottom 1 ight for Rod M-10 was* not immediately received but came in approximately 2 seconds after the manual tri Following the initial trip transient, !RPI for Rod M-10 indicated approximately 25 step In the post-trip review held on August 27, licensee management reviewed the Unit 2 manual trip and the corrective actions required to be complet~d prior to Unit 2 restar Corrective acttons involved determining the cause of the A steam generator main feedwater regulating valve to fail close, repairing A main feedwater pump water damage, and adjusting IRPI for Rod M-1 The inspectors monitored the licensee 1 s investigation into the cause of the Unit 2 A steam generator main feedwater regulating valve to clos The investigation concluded that the failure was caused by ERF computer input calibration and testing of MUX per procedure 2..:PT-2.49, Validyne Remote Multiplexer, dated June 23, 1988. * Performance of 2-PT-2.49 resulted in the removal the MUX circuit card that processes the output signal of Unit 2 A main feedwater regulating valve controller and installation of an extender test card assembly in place of the circuit car The extender test card contained a toggl switch that when placed in the 11short 11 position would short the output of Unit 2 A main feedwater regulating valve controller causing
a shut signal to be transmitted to A main feedwater regulating valv During the investigation, the licensee duplicated the event and concluded that the extender test card toggle switch Was placed in the wrong position or inadvertently bumped during installation causing the A main feedwater valve to shut. Subsequent investigation by the inspectors re~ealed that the extender test card toggle s~itch was installed by I&C personnel to allow the use bf the extender test card on other MUX circuit The inspectors discussed the extender test card modification with the l&C supervisor who stated that normally
. test tards are not modified and the MUX test card modification was an isolated cas On August 31~ the inspectors met with station management to diicuss the MUX cabinet testing that resulted.in the Unit 2 manual reactor tri In that meeting, the licensee stated that a temporary mqdification previously made to the cabinet was inadequately designed because it did not provide the proper isolation to test the cabinet during power operation. Also personnel performing MUX cabinet testing were unaware that-this interim modification did not provide adequate isolatio EWR 86-487, Autb Control of Feedwater (0-100% Power)-Dat Aquisition, installed the Unit 2 MUX cabinet interi~ modification in
, November of 1986, to monitor steam generator main feedwater regulating valve position and other plant parameters at remote*
station The design of this interim modification did not prevent feedback from the MUX cabinet to the feedwater regulating valve control circuitry. The same modification was installed in Unit 1, by EWR 86-541 in January 1987; however, it was designed differently than the Unit 2 modification in that it provided adequate isolation to prevent feedback. The inspectors concurred with the 1 i censee I s conclusion, and were informed that design controls currently in pl~ce would prevent a similar occurrence. The licensee stopped the Unit 2 MUX cabinet calibration until the feedback issue is resolved and in the future will modify the existing Unit 2 MUX cabinet design to prevent feedback to the steam generator regulating valve control circuitry. The inspectors consider licensee actions to be adequat On August 28, all Unit 2 restart corrective actions were completed and the unit was restarte The inspectors noted a strength in the performance of operations during the Unit 2 reactor trip transient and restart of the uni This is a continuing strength for the operations department based on inspector observations of performance during other recent reactor trips and startup.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the reporting period; the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities td assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspection areas included the followihg:
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. MOV Preventive Mai~tenance On August 20, the licensee performed PM on MOV l-SW-.MOV-102 Work order 3800098717 and procedure ZZ-MOV~M/Cl, Limitorque Motor Operated Va 1 ves Inspection and Lubrication, dated October 30, 1989, were utilized to accomplish this maintenanc.
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The inspectors monitored the licensee's activities assoiiated with the PM performed on MOV 1-SW-MOV-1028. One concern identified during
.. the perform~nce of this activity wai that procedure ZZ-MOV-M/Cl had..
. been changed to delete specific maintenance items if an MOV could not be cycled because of plant condition Cleaning and lubricatitiri of*
the stem and checking for proper operator operation are examples of PM items that could be deleted. Procedure ZZ-MOV-M/C1 is a generic procedure that provides instructions to perform PM on all Units 1 and 2 ~afety related MOV *
The inspectors reviewed completed work packages involving PM previously accomplished in accordance with procedure ZZ-MOV-M/Cl on MOVs other than 1-SW-MOV~l02B and concluded that in some instances not all the procedural maintenance items were performed because the MOV being worked could not be cycle Although not all of the items of this maintenance procedure had been performed, the licensee's PM program was annotated such that the maintenance had been complete The licensee's PM program did not contaiD provisions to complete the maintenance when plant conditions would allow the MOV to be cycled. A second concern identified was that the ZZ-MOV-M/Cl procedural changes to delete the maintenance items previously discussed were made by maintenance department personnel and not reviewed by technical personnel that were cognizant of the MOV progra These concerns, involving deletion of MOV preventive maintenance items by procedural changes without an MDV-specific review of the implication of the changes and PM program personnel, were identified as weaknesses. in the area of maintenance. Maintenance department management agreed with the inspectors' concerns and initiated corrective actio Repair of Discharge Tunnel Radiation Monitor On August 19, 1990, discharge tunnel radiation monitor, RM-SW-120, experienced spurious spiking into the alert/alarm rang Emergency work order 3800099495 was issued for the repair of this monitor..
Initially the instrument shop replaced the 1 og. rate card and performed a calibration, but this did not solve the spiking proble Then electrical maintenance, in conjunction with the system engineer, walked down the system and found the radiation monitor's signal cables in close proximity to 480 volt power cables used to supply power to four yard light The spiking appeared to occur when the lights came on at night.
The inspectors observed the attachment of test equipment for -
troubleshooting the spiking condition. A spike was.observed on the test oscilloscope and the radiation monitor spiked into the alert/
alarm range when the yard lights were energized~
The spiking was thought to occur because of degraded ballasts in the lights (mdistu~e in the ballasts caused arcing).
These four lights were deenergized, and no further spiking was observed on the monito Electrical maintenance has ordered new ballasts for the four lights, and they will be replaced when the new parts are receive For long term planning, the systemi engineer ~ill reque~t an EWR t6 reroute the electrical control cable The inspectors consider that the licensees' initial evaluation of this problem was adequat No
~iscrepancies were identifie Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function. -
Adequate coordination existed among ~ersonnel involved in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following: Testing of No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator On August 15, * 1990, the i nsp_ectors witnessed the performance of perfodic test 1-PT-22.3I, Diesel Generator No. 1 Monthly Exercise Test, dated December 12, 198 The purpose of the test was to verify that EOG No. 1 and associated fuel transfer pumps and system operated as required by TSs 4.6 and 4.6A-1C and to verify that the air start system check valves were operable as required by inservice test requirement The inspectors witnessed part of the testing from the EOG roo No discrepancies were note Testing of Turbine Driven AFW Pump 1-FW-P-2 On August 15, 1990, Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was tested in accordance with periodic test l-PT-15.lC, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (l-FW-P-2), dated May 10, 199 The
inspectors observed the starting of the pump,. positioning of certai valves~ recording of temperatures, recording of pressures, and th~
- performance of vibrational testin The licensee also performed -
1-PT-15.2, (l-FW-T-2) Steam Supply Line Check Valves, dated December 28, 198 This test involves the quarterly ex~rcise for check valves 1-MS-176, 178, and 182 to satisfy the requirements in ASME Section..
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On August 28, the inspectors witnessed.the perfor~ance of peri6dic test 2-PT-14.2, Main Steam Trip and Main Steam Non-Return Valves, dated December 12, 198 The purpose of this test is to verify that
. the main steam trip and non-return valves close as required by TS The inspectors observed the test from the-control room and.the Unit 2 safeguards buildin No discrepancies were identifie Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Review (92700)
The inspector reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to evaluate initial adequacy of the corrective action The inspector's r~view also included followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective actions were complet (Closed) LER 280/90.:.06, Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip Following Loss of Instrument Air Due to Air Dryer Failur The issue involved a manual reactor trip of Unit 1 from approximately 95% reactor power due to indication of closure of at least one main steam trip valve because of low instrument air pressur This event was discussed in Inspection Report 280, 281/90-2 In that report, the trip and licensee corrective actions prior to unit restart were reviewed and discussed. * The inspectors consider that licensee corrective action was adequat (Closed) LER 280/90-07, Fire Protection Dampers Surveillance Procedure Not Performed Within Technical Specification Required Interval. Due to Administrative Oversigh The issue involved a failure to perform a required surveillance procedure within its required TS periodicity due to oversight of the group responsible for performing the surveillanc Immediate corrective action included establishment of fire watches until the surveillance could be performe Additional corrective actions included enhancement of the methods used to inform and remind personnel responsible for PTs of the scheduled due date The inspectors reviewed the licensee 1s corrective action including administrative procedure upgrade This item is identified as an NCV (280/90-26-01) for failure to perform TS required surveillance procedure within the required timefram This licensee identified* violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.l of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfie **
.9 (Closed) LER 281/90-03, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Failure of A Main..
Feedwater Regulating Valv The issue involved a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from approximately 100% reactor power due to closute of the A main feedwater regulating valv This event was discussed in Inspection Report 280, 281/90-2 In that.report, the trip and licensee corrective actions prior to unit restart were reviewed* and discusse The inspectors consider that licensee corrective actions were adequat Within the areas inspetted, one non-cited violation was identifie..
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. * 7.. Action on Previous Inspection findings (92701, 92702) (Closed) !FI 280/89-20-02, Followup on licensee evaluation of mainte~ance activities associated with the repair of 1-SI-P-l The item was discussed in Inspection Report 280, 281/89-2 In* that report it was pointed out that due to difficulties ~ncountered, the pump had. to be assembled and disassembled several time Difficulties were encountered in the following areas: Mechanical seal problems-Level indicator rod in seal head tank bent-Pump binding after reassembly-Seismic support modifications-Bolt torquing specification problems As a result of these difficulties 5 the licensee conducted a post maintenance evaluation to review lessons learned in this are The inspector discussed the maintenance evaluation of each of these area The licensee made several procedural modifications including incorporation of the technical representative's instructions, insertion of. correct bolt torquing values, and issuance of a procedure for adjusting seal head tank limit switche The licensee's actions appear to be adequate in this are (Closed) Violation 280/89-21-02, Failure to Place an Inoperable Canal Level Instrument in Trip Within One Hour as Required by TS The high level intake structure lev~l instrument was rendered inoperable by the installation of stop logs in the canal structur TS, Table 7.7-2, Item 5.a, requies that the instrument channel be placed in a tripped status for the inoperable instrument within one hou The station personnel fai.led to follow the TS requirement for this even The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated October 2, 198 In that letter, the licensee stated that corrective actions involved:
Removal of the stop logs and restoration of.the affected intake canal level instrument channe Requiring all temporary modifications be screened to determine if a 10 CFR 50.59 review/safety analysis is require Requiring shift technical advisors review temporary modifications for concurrenc *
Superintendent of Operations ~eeting with each shift to discuss this event and issuing a memorandum discussing systems/*
components from one unit which are required to be available for the opposite uni.
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Revising the temporary modification adminstrative procedure to ensure that potent i a 1 effects on the opposite unit are considere *
Placing the LER for this incident in operator required readin Implementing procedures for the installation of stop logs at the high level intake struct~r....
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Revising the startup checklist to evaluate*the installation of a stop 1 og to determine if it could affect the operabi 1 ity of any syste *
The inspectors reviewed the revised adminstrative procedures SUADM-0-11, Function Bypass and Temporary Modification Control, and
. SUADM-LR-12, Safety Analysis/10CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 Safety Evaluations and Justifications for Continued Operations, stop log installation procedures, Superintendent of Operations memorandum dated July 29, 1989, and the startup check *lis The inspectors verified that stated corrective actions were implemente * (Closed) Violation 280/89-21-04, Failure to Maintain Greater Than 60,000 Gallons of Water in the Unit 2 Emergency Condensate Storage Tank as required by TS* 3.6.B.2. * This issue involved operators allowing the Unit 2 emergency condensate tank level to fall below the minimum TS required level required to support Unit 1. The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated October 2, 198 In that lett~r, the licensee stated that ~orrective actions involved~
Discipline of personnel involved Enhancement of procedures to more clearly identify emergency condensate storage tank volume requirements.*
Revision of procedures to simplify the evolution of transferring water form the* emergency condensate tank to the underground storage tan Implementat1on of prejo~ briefings for proceduralized evolutions on safety-related system Annunciator enhancement Senior management meeting with SROs to discuss attention to detai Superintendent of Operations issuance of a memorandum to operations personnel reminding them of systems/components -from one unit which are required to be available for the opposite unit operation,
Revision of TS to a 11 ow the opposites unit's emergency condensate storage tank to be inoperable during the same time period as the opposite unit's auxiliary feedwater system.
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The inspectors reviewed 1/2-0P-31.2.5, Filling the Emergency Condensate Makeup Tank, dated October 12, 1989, 2-PT-36, Instrument *
. Sufveillance, dated May 31, 1990, the memorandum from Superintendent of Operations to operations department personnel dated July 29, 1990, TS amendment numbers 143 and 140, and EWR 89-67 The inspectors verified that stated corrective actions were implemente (Closed) IFI 280, 281/89-24-07, Follbwup on Licensee Review of El ectri ca 1 Contractor Breaker Overhaul Practice This i tern was discussed in Inspection Report 280,281/89-2 In t.hat report,* a *.
concern was identified when a 480 volt AC breaker, 1.:..Rs-PM0-2A, *
failed to close immediately in response to the positioning of the control switc The problem was discovered when a periodic test was performed _ to p 1 ace the breaker in service after its overhau 1.
An investigation initiated by Station Deviation Report Sl-89-.1834 revealed that the breaker's trip rod setting was not in accordance with the vendor's manual instruction Overhaul of the breaker had recently been accomplished by PDT, a Virginia Power Co. contractor, a*nd as a result of this problem, 12 similar breikers, overhauled by PDT, were checked and all were found to have the proper trip rod settin The 1 i censee discussed the event with PDT and reviewed PDT's documentation for the overhauled breaker (1-RS-PM0-2A).
This documentation showed that the breaker was properly overhauled, that adjustments are witnessed by QA and that the recorded, as left, trip rod setting was within specification It is considered and that the breaker failing to close immediately by switch positioning was an isolated case and was caused by the disturbance of a marginal setting during shipping and handling of the breake The licensee considers that PDT does quality.work based on testing, the contractor's work record, and on licensee surveillances of PDT's work practice.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 5, 1990 with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1~
The following summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exi In the aiia of radiological controls, a strength was identified regarding the licensee's investigation into the unplanned gaseous activity releases and resulting event repor In the area of plant operations, a weakness was noted regarding operator performance in situations which allow for more. than one course of action.,
Several operational problems (i.e. system valve alignments and actions associated with a clear understanding of proper system alignments)
occurred due to a lack of clear communications between shift personne **
In the area of plant operations, a strength was noted in the performance of operations during the Unit 2 reactor trip transient and restart* of the uni This is a continuing strength for the operations department based on inspector observations of performance during other recent reactor trips and startup *
In the area of maintenance, a weakness was identified in the licensee's preventative maintenance program with regards to making changes to mainten~nce pfocedures without conducting a review of the impli~ations of
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. A non-cited violation ~as identified for 'failure to perfor~ Technica Specification surveillances procedure within the required timeframe (280/90-26-01).
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Licensee management was informed of the items closed in paragraphs 6 and The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions with no dissenting comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
. Index of Acronyms amd Initialisms AFW AC ASME CFR eves EOG ERF ESF EWR I&C IFI
.IRPI LCO LER MOV MUX NCV NRC PDT PM PRT
. PT QA RCS RWP SI SRO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ALTERNATING CURRENT AMERICAM SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL.ENGINEERS CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATO EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM INDIVIDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATOR LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT MOTOR OPERATED VALVE MULTIPLEXER NON-CITED VIOLATION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POWER DISTRIBUTION TECHNOLOGY PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK PERIODIC TEST QUALITY ASSURANCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RADIATION WORK PERMIT SAFETY INJECTION SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
SUADM SW TS
. SURRY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SERVICE WATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS